DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 125 584 IR 003 668

AUTHOR McKay, Bruce
TITLE The CBC and the Public: Management Decision Making in the English Television Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1970-1974.
INSTITUTION Stanford Univ., Calif. Inst. for Communication Research.
PUB DATE May 76
NOTE 372p.; PhD dissertation, Stanford University

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 HC-$19.41 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Broadcast Industry; *Broadcast Television; *Case Studies; Community Attitudes; Decision Making; Doctoral Theses; Management; Mass Media; Media Research; Models; National Organizations; Policy Formation; *Public Opinion; Public Policy; *Public Television; Research Utilization; Television
IDENTIFIERS *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; CBC; Communications Research; English Television Service

ABSTRACT

A discussion of mass media studies, public broadcasting, and the relationship between public broadcasting and society provides the background for this study. Models for communication research study are examined to establish the methodology for the study of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). General background on Canadian public broadcasting is followed by a discussion of the role of the participant observer, the management decision making process, and CBC license renewal. A chapter on public issues reviews public consideration of the role and operation of the CBC and English Television during the study period. Following the examination of public issues is an analysis of public television in Canada, management decision making in CBC English Television, and communication research utilization. The report concludes with a summary of the main features of the study and an examination of the possible outcomes of some of the alternatives which have been suggested. (CH)

****
* Documents acquired by ERIC include many informal unpublished *
* materials not available from other sources. ERIC makes every effort *
* to obtain the best copy available. Nevertheless, items of marginal *
* reproducibility are often encountered and this affects the quality *
* of the microfiche and hardcopy reproductions ERIC makes available *
* via the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). EDRS is not *
* responsible for the quality of the original document. Reproductions *
* supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original. *
****

ED125584

The CBC and The Public

Management Decision Making in the English Television Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1970-1974

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

A doctoral dissertation case study
prepared in the
Institute for Communication Research
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Principal Advisor: Professor Edwin B. Parker

May 1976

Bruce McKay

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Bruce McKay
TO ERIC AND ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING UNDER AGREEMENTS WITH THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION. FURTHER REPRODUCTION OUTSIDE THE ERIC SYSTEM REQUIRES PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNER."

IR 003 668

Excerpts from "The People and Their Heritage: History"
by Ramsay Cook
in the Statistics Canada publication, CANADA 1974,
reproduced by permission of the Crown Copyright holder,
Information Canada, Ottawa.

Excerpts from THE MAKING OF A TELEVISION SERIES
used by permission of the author and copyright holder,
Philip Elliott.

Excerpts from NEWS FROM NOWHERE
by Edward Jay Epstein
used by permission of Random House, Inc.

Excerpts from A HISTORY OF JOURNALISM IN CANADA
by W.H. Kesterton
used by permission of the copyright holder,
McClelland and Stewart Limited, Toronto.

Excerpts from "The Origins of Public Broadcasting in Canada"
by Margaret Prang
in THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW (March 1965),
used by permission of the author and
University of Toronto Press.

Excerpts from COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
by Everett M. Rogers and Rekha Agarwala-Rogers
used by permission of the authors.

Excerpts from THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE
by Anthony Smith
used by permission of the author and
The University of Illinois Press.

© 1976 by Robert Bruce McKay

Printed and bound in USA.

Inquiries: Bruce McKay, Box 18, Embro, Ontario N0J 1J0, Canada.

Preface

In many ways this study of management decision making in a public television system is, for me at least, a very happy accident. I have been fortunate that a number of public broadcasting organizations and supporting organizations have allowed me to participate in projects which have brought me into contact with their management decision making processes.

Because it is important for others to understand the perspective of the participant observer in a case study such as this, the histories of the various projects and activities are reviewed in sections of the text. As they are reviewed, the sources of my sense of indebtedness will become obvious.

At the outset, however, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of those who have made this particular study possible.

Among those associated with Stanford University who have been especially helpful are the members of my dissertation committee, Edwin Parker (principal dissertation advisor), Nathan Maccoby (program advisor), Lyle Nelson, and Don Roberts. Wilbur Schramm provided valuable guidance during 1970-1972.

Central among those associated with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation whose cooperation made this work possible are Robert Allen, Thom Benson, Gordon Cullingham, Ron Devion, Norn Garriock, Peter Herrndorf, Jean Jemison, Arthur Laird, Len Lauk, Barry MacDonald, Knowlton Nash, Hugh Palmer, Ken Purdye, Don Richardson, Don Summerfeldt, Vincent Tovell, and Stan Westlake. Pierre Charbonneau provided valuable assistance in reviewing early drafts of this study. Working with Hugh Gauntlett was a privilege.

A number of people associated with public television in the United States helped in various ways. Among them are Douglass Cater, David Davis, James Fellows, Nat Katzman, Jack Lyle, Richard Moore, Michael Nyhan, Jon Rice, and Willard Rowland.

I would also like to acknowledge the encouragement and assistance from across the Atlantic of Philip Elliott, James Halloran, Hilde Himmelweit, and Anthony Smith.

Special thanks to Helen and Jim McKay, Chris Paton, and Ron Bruce.

To others who have contributed directly or indirectly to this study, my thanks for your cooperation, assistance, and tolerance.

The financial assistance of the Canada Council has been crucial. Fellowship support for three of my years at Stanford allowed me the independence to carry this work to its completion.

The cooperation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation has been of particular importance, and for that I am especially grateful. But the views expressed here are mine, and I take sole responsibility for them.

"THE CBC AND THE PUBLIC:
MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING IN THE
ENGLISH TELEVISION SERVICE OF THE
CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION,
1970-1974"

Skeleton Outline

1. Introduction

COMMUNICATION RESEARCH BACKGROUND

2. Mass Media Research
3. Public Broadcasting and the Public

METHODOLOGY BACKGROUND

4. The Participant Observer Tradition
5. Models and Alternate Modes of Analysis

CANADIAN PUBLIC BROADCASTING BACKGROUND

6. The Canadian Perspective
7. The Canadian Broadcasting System, 1970-1974

CASE STUDY BACKGROUND

8. The Participant Observer
9. The Management Decision Making Setting
10. The 1974 CBC Licence Renewal Process

THE CBC AND THE PUBLIC

11. Public Issues

ANALYSIS

12. Public Television in Canada
13. Management Decision Making
14. Communication Research Utilization

15. Remarks

Appendix
References
Index

Contents

Page

Preface iii
Skeleton Outline iv
Contents v
Figures x
Terms and Abbreviations xii

1. INTRODUCTION
  - a) About Scrutinizing the CBC 1
  - b) How This Study Came About 3
  - c) The Study of Broadcasting Institutions 3
  - d) Possible Areas of Inquiry 4
  - e) Potential Problems 5
  - f) This Study's Guidelines 6
  - g) Reader's Guide 7
  - h) Preview of the Analysis Chapters 11

Communication Research Background

2. MASS MEDIA RESEARCH
  - a) Case Studies and Theory 13
  - b) Research Within the Broadcast Media 13
  - c) Research About the Broadcast Media 15
    - Audience and Content Studies 16
    - Institutional Research 17
      - Media Structure and Ownership Studies 18
      - Media Output Studies 18
      - Media Operation Studies 19
      - Personal Narrative Studies 22
      - Problems in Institutional Research 24
    - Societal Studies 26
  - d) Research Utilization 27

3. PUBLIC BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC
  - a) Public Media Role Considerations 28
  - b) The Public Broadcasting Tradition 28
  - c) The General Nature of Mandates 30
  - d) The Mass Media and Mass Society 31
  - e) The Mirror Analogy and Responsibility 33
  - f) The Special Role of Public Broadcasting 35
    - Balance, Fairness, and Political Independence 35
    - Balance, Range, and Optimization 36
    - Leadership and Public Service 39

Methodology Background

4. THE PARTICIPANT OBSERVER TRADITION
  - a) Applicability 40
  - b) Limitations and Precautions 42

5. MODELS AND ALTERNATE MODES OF ANALYSIS
  - a) Related Research Areas 44
  - b) Models and Approach to Analysis 45

Canadian Public Broadcasting Background

6. THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

- a) Communication and Canadian Nationhood 50
- b) The Canadian Setting 51
  - Geography 51
  - Population Density and Geographical Distribution 55
  - Population Distribution by Language 56
- c) Historical Overview 57
- d) Broadcasting History 59
  - Developments to 1932 60
  - The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission 64
  - The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 65
  - The 1968 Broadcasting Act and CBC Reorganization 67

7. THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM, 1970-1974

- a) The Overall System
  - Stations and Networks 69
  - Cable and Audience Fragmentation 71
  - Technological Trends 74
- b) The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
  - Services, Distribution, and Coverage 76
  - English Television Program Services 77
  - Resources and Expenditures 79
- c) The Regulatory Agency 84
  - Ownership, Control, and Canadian Content 85
  - Cable and Activist Regulation 86
  - FM Radio Policy and Program Content Concerns 89
  - Shaping the CBC 90

Case Study Background

8. THE PARTICIPANT OBSERVER

- a) Case Studies and Personal Values 93
- b) General Orientation 93
- c) Stanford and CBC Experience, 1969-1972 95
- d) CBC Experience, 1972-1974 96

9. THE MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING SETTING

- a) The Corporate Setting 104
- b) The Corporate Structure 107
- c) The Divisional Structure 107
- d) The English Television Structure 108
- e) Program Development 112
- f) The Planning System 114

10. THE 1974 LICENCE RENEWAL PROCESS

- a) Levels of Dialogue 118
- b) The CRTC Position 118
- c) Public Participation and Interventions 120
- d) CBC Preparations and Developments 123
- e) The Public Hearing
  - Atmosphere 125
  - Presentations and Questioning 129
  - Public Assessment 129
- f) The Licence Renewal Decision 131

The CBC and The Public

11. PUBLIC ISSUES 135

a) Nationalism Issues 135
- National Unity Contributions 137
  - Shared Program Experiences 138
- Canadian Content 140
  - CBC Efficiency 142
  - Production Efficiency Observations 144
- US Programming 147
  - Licence Conditions and Independence 153
- The Canadian Film Industry 155
- Comments 159

b) Regionalism Issues 161
- Regional Flow and Exchange 163
  - Decentralization of Production 163
  - Regional Program Exchange 166
  - Network Program Content 167
  - Management Decision Making 169
- Coverage and Facilities
  - Coverage 173
  - Production Facilities 174
  - Toronto Consolidation 177
  - The North 183
- Comments 183

c) Recognition and Portrayal Issues
- English Television and French Canada 185
- Multiculturalism 186
- Women 187
- Comments 188

d) Audience Orientation 190
- Mass and Specialized Audience Balance 190
- Content Balance 193
- Audience Balance 195
  - Audience Interests and Tastes 196
  - Balancing Overload 197
- Comments 199

e) Costs and Financing
- Level of Resources 201
  - Efficiency 204
  - Case Study Observations 205
  - Resource Allocation Strategy 206
  - Program Development 211
- Commercial Activities 214
- Long Range Planning
  - Annual Funding 217
  - Planning Approach 218
- Comments 219

Analysis

12. PUBLIC TELEVISION IN CANADA

- a) Introduction 224
    - The Canadian Situation 225
- b) Environmental Demand Characteristics 228
    - Requirements 228
    - Expectations 229
- c) Environmental Support Characteristics
    - Support Traditions 231
        - Governmental Support of Cultural Activity 231
        - The Canadian Public Broadcasting Tradition 232
        - Governmental Participation in Commercial Activity 232
    - Public Support 233
    - Political Support 235
    - Governmental Support 240
    - Regulatory Support 241
- d) Structural Characteristics
    - Relationship with the Public 242
    - Relationship with Parliament 243
    - Relationship with the Government 244
    - Relationship with the Regulatory Agency 245
- e) Analysis 247
    - The CBC Options 247
        - The Commercial Broadcasting Service Option 248
        - The Educational Broadcasting Service Option 249
        - The Public Broadcasting Service Options 250
    - Institutional Characteristics 252
        - Defensiveness 253
        - Conservatism 256
    - Policy Development Process Characteristics 259
        - Participation 259
        - Jurisdiction and Coordination 260
    - Structural Implications 262
- f) Overview 263
- g) Comments 267

13. MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING IN CBC ENGLISH TELEVISION

- a) The Case Study Perspective 274
- b) Environmental Characteristics 275
    - The Political Environment 275
    - The Service Environment 276
    - The Creative Environment 277
- c) Structural Characteristics
    - Structural Setting 280
    - Structural Form 283
- d) Analysis
    - Communciation Overload 283
    - Operational Focus for Decision Making 285
    - The Management of Constraints 286
        - Resource Orientation 287
        - Systems Solutions 287
        - Responsiveness 289
    - The Management of Public Service
        - Service Orientation 290
        - Audience Orientation 290
    - The Management of Creativity 291

e) Overview 292
f) Comments
Structural Implications 293
Public Orientation 294
Internal Orientation
Internal Communication 297
Personnel Development 298

14. COMMUNICATION RESEARCH UTILIZATION 301
a) Communication Research in Canada
Environmental Characteristics
Needs, Requirements, and Expectations 301
Support 302
Structural and Utilization Process Characteristics 303
Analysis 304
b) Communication Research in CBC English Television
The Case Study Situation 305
Research Activity 307
Environmental Characteristics
Needs, Requirements, and Expectations 308
Support 310
Structural and Utilization Process Characteristics 311
Analysis 312
c) Comments 316
A Role for Research About Public Broadcasting 316
A Role for Research Within Public Broadcasting 317

15. REMARKS 320
a) About This Study 320
b) About Public Broadcasting Institutions 321
c) About the CBC 324
d) About Public Broadcasting in Canada 326

Post Script, 23 June 1976 333

Appendix. Excerpts from the Broadcasting Act 335

References 339

Index 354

Figures

Figure		Page
1-1	Chapter Organization Scheme	8
1-2	Content Organization Scheme	10
5-1	Simple Structural Model: An Organization in its Environment	45
5-2	Simple Structural Model: The CBC in its Environment	46
5-3	Model of an Organization as an Open System	47
5-4	Model of the CBC as an Open System	47
5-5	Open System Model of the CBC: Interface and Internal Characteristics	48
6-1	Map: Canada - Provinces, Territories, and Capitals	52
6-2	Map: Canada - Population Density Distribution	53
6-3	Population Statistics: Provinces, Territories, and Selected Urban Centres	54
6-4	National Land Area and Population Comparisons	55
6-5	Population by Mother Tongue by Province	56
7-1	Canadian Broadcasting System Stations by Affiliation	69
7-2	Cable Television Coverage and Penetration by Province	70
7-3	Cable Television Penetration in Selected Urban Areas	71
7-4	Audience Fragmentation: Toronto, Vancouver, and Halifax	73
7-5	CBC and Affiliated Stations and Rebroadcasters	77
7-6	CBC Coverage by Medium and Language	77
7-7	Map: CBC English Television Coverage	78
7-8	CBC English Television Network Program Schedule, Winter 1973/74	80
7-9	Program Period Classifications, Winter 1973/74	81
7-10	Distributions of Total CBC Operating Expense, 1973/74	79
7-11	Average Hourly Television Program Costs, 1969/70 and 1973/74	82
7-12	English Television Program Budget Purchasing Power, 1969/70 - 1973/74	82
8-1	Participant Observer Activities, October 1972 - September 1974	98
9-1	Primary Working Relationships between the CBC and the Federal Government	105
9-2	CBC Corporate Organizational Structure, 1974	106
9-3	English Services Division Organizational Structure, 1974	108
9-4	Interlocking Media and Regional Organizational Structures	109
9-5	English Television Organizational Structure, 1974	110

9-6 The "Fourth Floor" Organizational Structure, 1974 111
9-7 The Organizational Position of Producers 112
9-8 Planning System Timetable, 1974/75 Program Year 116
10-1 Order of Appearance, 1974 CRTC Hearing on CBC Network Licence Renewals 128
11-1 Public Broadcasting System Efficiency Comparisons, 1970 146
11-2 Content Analysis of THE NATIONAL, December 1973 and January 1974 169
11-3 Content Analysis of Representative Winter Week Network Programming, 1970 - 1974 194
12-1 CBC Television's First "Life Cycle" 246
13-1 CBC Symbol, 1974 296
14-1 CBC Audience Panel Analysis Report Format 306
14-2 Audience Age Profiles, Toronto, March 1974 314

Terms and Abbreviations

ABC	American Broadcasting Company [US]
ACP	Accelerated Coverage Plan
Act	1968 Broadcasting Act
ACTRA	Association of Canadian Television and Radio Artists
AFM	American Federation of Musicians
AM	Amplitude Modulation [radio]
ATV	Associated Television [UK]
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BBG	Board of Broadcast Governors [1958-1968]
BBM	BBM Bureau of Measurement
CAB	Canadian Association of Broadcasters
Canadian broadcasting system	- combined public and private broadcasting services, including stations, networks, and cable systems
CATV	Community Antenna Television ("cable")
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation ("the Corporation")
CBL	Canadian Broadcasting League
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System [US]
CFDC	Canadian Film Development Corporation
Commission	Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC)
Corporation	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)
COT	Committee on Television [intervention group]
CP	Canadian Press [news service]
CPB	Corporation for Public Broadcasting [US]
CRBC	Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission [1932-1936]
CRTC	Canadian Radio-Television Commission ("the Commission")
CTV	CTV [Canadian Television] Television Network [private]
CUPE	Canadian Union of Public Employees
Decision	CRTC Decision on CBC Network Licence Renewal Applications (CRTC 1974b)
DNS	CBC "Daily News Summary" [press excerpts]
ESD	CBC English Services Division
FCC	Federal Communications Commission [US]
FM	Frequency Modulation [radio]
FSD	CBC French Services Division
MDTV	Managing Director of Television
MP	Member of Parliament [federal]

NABET	National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians
National broadcasting service	public broadcasting service provided by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)
NBC	National Broadcasting Company [US]
NBP	Northern Broadcast Plan
NFB	National Film Board of Canada
NHK	Nippon Hoso Kyokai [Japanese public broadcasting corporation]
NPR	National Public Radio [US]
OECA	Ontario Educational Communications Authority
ORTO	Olympics Radio and Television Organization
PBS	Public Broadcasting Service [US]
Rating	Audience size measurement: percentage of potential viewers or households (including those not watching television) viewing a particular program
Share	Audience size measurement: percentage of viewers or households actually watching television viewing a particular program
Submission	CBC English Television licence renewal submission to the CRTC (CBC 1973b)
TV	Television
UHF	Ultra High Frequency [television channels 2-13]
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
VHF	Very High Frequency [television channels 14-83]

REFERENCE NOTATION

p	page
pnt	point
prt	part
s	section
page	reference to this document

EXCERPT NOTATION

...	elipse within one senetnce
....	elipse greater than one sentence

Chapter 1

Introduction

a) ABOUT SCRUTINIZING THE CBC

> *Every consideration of Canadian broadcasting, every analysis of the mass media in this country, must contain a reference to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, because it is so great a factor in Canadian communications. And every time the CBC is scrutinized, faults will be noted, because it is a very large and complex organization and it is not in the nature of such organizations to achieve perfection.*
>
> *Unfortunately, sniping at the CBC has become a national pastime that ranks with watching National Hockey League games and thinking deeply about reform of the Senate.*
>
> *The CBC is a national communications medium in a country that has no national newspaper. It is the only truly national broadcasting enterprise in Canada, offering service to all but a tiny minority of Canadians in both official languages. It has striven to develop Canadian talent, to reveal Canadians to one another, to strengthen the fabric of Canadian society -- and for all these things we can be grateful to the CBC as an entity quite unlike any other in the world. But there are faults, and they have in some cases been noted before, and they have not all been remedied. (Davey 1970a, p 195)*

With the above paragraphs the report of the Special Senate Committee on the Mass Media began its consideration of the Canadian public broadcasting system. The report then proceeded to criticize: the CBC's commercial policy, its program distribution arrangements, its record in collective bargaining, the effectiveness of its commercial sales department, its dollar efficiency in producing programs, its "preoccupation" with the major production centres in Toronto and Montreal, and the extent to which it used video tape editing. It ended on a somewhat more positive note: "We are faced with the fact that if the CBC did not exist, we would have to invent it" (Davey, 1970a, p 203).

Such public scrutiny of the CBC was not new when the Senate Committee ("The Davey Committee") issued its report in December 1970. The Corporation had appeared frequently before parliamentary committees. It had been examined by many special committees and commissions -- including Royal Commissions on the Arts, Letters and Sciences, on Broadcasting, on Government Organization, and on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Between 1932 and 1970, at least 25 such committees and commissions looked at Canadian broadcasting or some aspect of it (CBC 1970a, p 31).

All of this public scrutiny is understandable. Although the Broadcasting Act does not label the CBC as the "public" broadcasting service (the exact terminology is "the national broadcasting service"), the CBC is a public broadcasting service, if only by virtue of the fact that about 80% of its funding is provided by the public through federal government appropriations approved by Parliament.

In April 1970 the CBC went before the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC) to seek, for the first time, the formal licensing of its networks. The appearance was apparently considered within the CBC to be a relatively routine exercise. It wasn't.

Newspaper accounts of the proceedings appeared under such headings as "CBC Bloodies Itself in Public," "CBC Bosses in Dismal Showing," "CBC Has Commissioners Furious," and "[CRTC Chairman] Juneau Tells CBC It's Not Doing Job of Fostering National Unity" (CBC 1970c). The 1970 hearing was frustrating for both the CBC and the CRTC. It wasn't exactly a public relations victory for the CBC, and the CRTC felt it never did get satisfactory answers to many of its questions. At one point during the hearing, CRTC Chairman Pierre Juneau attempted to focus the discussions, as follows:

> The main question, is seems to me, is "What should be the precise objectives and purposes of the CBC in relation to the rest of Canadian broadcasting which is -- let's say 'tends to be' -- more commercial?"
>
> Now it seems to me that if we do not, during this hearing, and as a result of this hearing, achieve a little bit of progress in clarifying that point, whatever else we achieve will not be that important. (CRTC 1970a, p 271)

The hearing then proceeded to consider the CBC's level of spending on artistic talent, possible uses for the domestic satellite system, language training, the number of women in senior or middle management positions, the loss of talent to the United States, violence in television programs, commercial acceptance policies, and so on.

Almost four years later, in Februay 1974, the CBC appeared before the CRTC to seek renewals of the network licences granted subsequent to the 1970 hearing -- and to once again be examined in public. In the interval there had been many changes at the CBC. It had a new President, Laurent Picard, who had not only taught at Harvard and established a reputation as a management consultant, but who had also become familiar with the CBC -- as Executive Vice President of the Corporation for four years. It had completed a major reorganization which created two principal domestic service divisions: a French Services Division with headquarters in Montreal, and an English Services Division with headquarters in Toronto. It had increased the Canadian content of its schedules and had extended the coverage of its services. And it had conducted internal reviews of its policies, positions, and performance so as to be properly prepared to answer questions at the CRTC hearing.

The 1974 licence renewal hearing began shortly after nine o'clock on Monday, 18 February. Outside it was a bitterly cold Ottawa winter morning. Inside the hearing room, a ballroom in the basement of the Talisman Motor Inn, were assembled the participants and the observers: the CRTC Commissioners, CRTC staff personnel, the senior officers of the CBC, CBC staff personnel, representatives of a wide range of groups which had requested an opportunity to intervene in the proceedings, individual intervenors, reporters, media columnists, translators, interested broadcasting and other communication professionals, journalism students, interested citizens, and CBC French and English radio and television crews.

The Chairman of the Commission, on its behalf, opened the hearing with the following remarks:

> A strong CBC is vital to the health of Canadian broadcasting which has been characterized as the central nervous system of Canadian nationhood. The present Minister of Communications, when he was Secretary of State, underlined this importance when he called the CBC "the cornerstone of the Canadian broadcasting system." It is clear that any weakening of the national service, as it is called, would pose a threat to the entire Canadian broadcasting system. Conversely, efforts to revitalize the Canadian broadcasting system as required by the Broadcasting Act, cannot succeed without ... an innovative CBC, sensitive to changing needs, while still constant to original principles of service.... This hearing is not an investigation of the CBC. Let us hope that Canadians have had enough of this peculiar sport. It will be, I hope, a careful and serene discussion of Canadian national broadcasting service, of its mandate, its philosophy, its accomplishments, its future orientations. (CRTC 1974b, p 2)

b) HOW THIS STUDY CAME ABOUT

A communication researcher could learn a great deal about the nature of public broadcasting organizations simply by studying the written record of the 1974 hearing. I had a special advantage: I was there, not as an observer but as a background participant. For several months Don Richardson and I had been working under Hugh Gauntlett's supervision in Toronto on the preparatory "homework" for English Television's appearance at the hearing. We had helped prepare the English Television written submission to the CRTC, had clipped and studied a flood of comment on the CBC in magazines and newspapers, had reviewed the interventions filed with the CRTC, had checked out the various criticisms and suggestions, and had prepared a briefing book for senior executives. We were sure we knew more about "what was wrong with the CBC" than anyone else possibly ever could. And we hoped that our work would contribute in some small way to better public understanding of CBC English Television and its operating environment and -- especially -- to the clarification of the CBC's role within the overall Canadian broadcasting system.

It was not until two months later that the plan for this study was formulated. In October 1972 I had begun work with CBC English Television in Toronto on a project to study and improve the network's Program Evaluation System. That experience was to have formed the basis for my Stanford dissertation, but for a number of reasons it was not possible to gather suitable dissertation material. For personal financial reasons, I remained with the English Television "Planning Group," carrying out project assignments, reporting to the Director of TV Network Scheduling. Helping prepare for the CRTC hearing was the largest of these assignments.

In April 1974 I notified my advisors that I would be in a position to return to Stanford that fall to search for a new dissertation topic. In the discussions which followed it emerged that while I had been in Toronto the Institute for Communication Research at Stanford had developed an increased interest in policy research, and was prepared to accept case study type dissertations. The obvious question, suddenly, was whether it would be possible to base a case study dissertation on my CBC experiences. (In addition to the time spent at English Television headquarters, I had also worked for the CBC in Ottawa -- for five months in 1970 as a trainee producer in public affairs, and in Vancouver -- for six months in 1971 as an associate producer in television current affairs.)

c) THE STUDY OF BROADCASTING INSTITUTIONS

Communication research studies of broadcasting institutions have overwhelmingly been forced to concentrate on detailed operational processes at fairly low organizational levels. Studies such as Jay Epstein's NEWS FROM NOWHERE, an investigation of the NBC NIGHTLY NEWS unit, and Philip Elliott's THE MAKING OF A TELEVISION SERIES, a study of the production of a documentary series at Associated Television in Britain, have revealed a great deal about the processes by which producers and units make program content decisions. Some insights into the management processes within US commercial television networks have been provided in personal narrative form by observers such as Les Brown (in TELEVI$ION) and Fred Friendly (in DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL).

There have, however, been very few opportunities to systematically study decision making at the management level. The problem is access. Commercial broadcasting organizations are reluctant to give researchers access to their executives and to their boardrooms for fear of disclosure of competitive strategies and "trade secrets." Even public broadcasting organizations have been reluctant to expose themselves to this type of scrutiny. Professor James D. Halloran, Director of the Centre for Mass Communication Research at the University of Leicester, has observed:

> Research which provides information about the size, composition and reactions of audiences, about the effectiveness of the message, and about the attractiveness or influence of certain forms of presentation -- in short, research which serves the interests of the media -- is the research, sometimes the only research, favoured by the broadcaster. There are many reasons, some obvious, some not so obvious, why most broadcasters tend to prefer this sort of research to studies which set out to examine the production process, decision-making, or the control, support and organization of broadcasting institutions. (Halloran 1972, p 3)

> It is necessary to study the production side -- the media industries -- for from everything that could possibly be created or presented, only certain things are produced and offered to the public, and what is offered is not a matter of chance. This means that we must study the history and development of media institutions (and their relationship to other institutions, including government). We must ask questions about organization and structure, about ownership, control, resources and technology -- as well as about the import of media material from other countries. (Halloran 1974, p 5)

In this case the research "fieldwork" was completed before anyone involved recognized that it would be possible to use it as the basis for a study such as this. But as the situation was reviewed in the spring of 1974, it became clear that it should be possible, subject to CBC cooperation, to capitalize on this somewhat unique situation and to use my experiences as the basis for a structured case study.

d) POSSIBLE AREAS OF INQUIRY

Apart from the fact that we had already been permitted the necessary access to decision makers and had available an extensive body of documentation, there were three main reasons for our interest in a detailed study of CBC English Television. Two of the possible areas of inquiry had to do with communication research in a general sense; the third related to the state of public broadcasting in Canada.

1. Institutional Characteristics of Public Broadcasting Organizations

   As indicated above, the communication research tradition was noticeably short of studies of broadcast institutions, especially at the management level. In this case there was an opportunity to look closely at the operation of one public television system and make some contribution to the communication research understanding of the nature of media institutions -- of their environments, of their structures, and of their processes.

2. Communication Research Utilization in Mass Media Organizations

   It had become clear that even the existing body of communication research findings and techniques was having very little influence on the planning and operation (or on the regulation) of at least this one major mass media institution. It seemed important to examine the reasons for these research utilization problems and to make others aware of them.

3. Contemporary Issues in Public Television in Canada

   Although it is not likely a unanimous view, in the eyes of many the 1974 licence renewal exercise generated more heat than light -- more controversy than understanding. It seemed that, for a variety of reasons, an important opportunity to improve public understanding of the nature of Canada's public broadcasting system (and of its oportunities and problems) had at least to some extent been lost in the midst of what must have appeared from the outside to have been an inter-agency public relations battle. I had been privy to the insights of many, both inside and outside the CBC, and it seemed that it might well be useful to some Canadians to have these observations pulled together into an independent assessment of the environment, structures, and processes within CBC English Television.

We concluded that these possible areas of inquiry were complementary and that a single study could address itself to all three. In order to be able to arrive at generalizations about the media institution (about the program decision making environment, structures, and processes) and about the utilization of research, it would be necessary to examine a number of specific conditions, issues, and events. These detailed examinations of aspects of public television in Canada seemed to have potential value in and of themselves.

e) POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

There were a number of potential problems -- some peculiar to this situation, some common to all case studies of this type. The major "special" problem was that the subject matter of this study was also the subject of intense and emotional public debate. The CRTC's announcement and decision on the CBC network licence renewal applications, RADIO FREQUENCIES ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY, brought the CBC and the CRTC into very direct and very public conflict when it was issued at the end of March 1974. Our intention at the Institute for Communication Research was to contribute to public understanding, and not to fan unproductive controversy. It still is.

A common problem in case studies of this type is the treatment of confidential or privileged information. This problem was somewhat more severe in this case because I had moved freely throughout the organization, not as a social science observer, but as a contract employee. I had worked in CBC studios, served on task force investigations, participated in meetings up to the level of the President, and had accumulated a massive set of files of internal documents. I had unintentionally been given privileged observer status.

We were fortunate that there already existed an extensive body of "public domain" material, much of it linked to the 1970 and 1974 public hearings. The 1974 hearing alone yielded a wealth of documentation on the CBC: 320 pages of Corporate submissions, 3,000 pages of interventions, 1,495 pages of transcript, thousands of column inches of newspaper and magazine coverage, and a 245 page licence renewal decision. We decided to base our examination of the English Television service primarily on this material. It seemed that every comment that could possibly be made about the CBC appeared somewhere in the stacks of published reports, transcripts, and clippings. My own personal experiences and observations would be useful in the selection and organization of the supporting documentation, but the use of previously published material held the promise of solving many of the problems which might arise from my privileged access to the organization.

Even so, it was clear that the selective use of certain of the confidential or privileged information to which I had been exposed would significantly strengthen this study. It was therefore necessary to seek extensive further cooperation from the CBC. In order to establish a basis with the CBC for the clearance of internal information, and to in some small way limit the scope of this quite general survey, a set of guidelines was developed at the outset of this study. They were agreed to by the Institute for Communication Research and by the CBC, and they have guided this work throughout. It seems important, to promote the greatest possible understanding of what follows, to reproduce those guidelines here.

f) THIS STUDY'S GUIDELINES

1. The first primary objective of this study will be to map the management decision making environment, structures, and processes in this one public television organization.

2. The second primary objective will be to examine the extent to which mass communications research findings, theories, and techniques influence such decision making.

3. A third objective will be to examine in detail current issues and conditions in public broadcasting in Canada from a communication research perspective.

4. Specific current issues and conditions in Canadian broadcasting will be examined principally with a view to establishing a basis for the analysis of institutional characteristics and of research utilization problems -- rather than as studies in their own right.

5. This study will focus on the English Television service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Other aspects of the overall CBC operation will be considered to the extent that they influence or contrast with English Television.

6. This study will concentrate primarily on CBC English Television during the period from early 1970 through mid 1974.

7. To make this study as useful as possible to a wide range of readers, basic background sections will be included to cover the historical development of public broadcasting in Canada, the general state of Canadian broadcasting in the 1970-1974 period, and contemporary Canadian social and political issues.

8. It is beyond the scope of this work to attempt to generalize the findings of this study to other Canadian or foreign public or commercial broadcasting organizations. Experience elsewhere will, however, be cited where appropriate.

9. The intent throughout will be to contribute to understanding -- of the characteristics of broadcast institutions, of communications research utilization problems, and, incidentally, of problems in public broadcasting in Canada -- as opposed to passing judgements.

10. The focus will be on general conditions, influences, trends, and characteristics -- as opposed to the decisions, actions, or personalities of individuals.

11. The experience and perspective of the participant observer will be explicitly detailed, and personal views, where included, will be clearly identified as such.

12. This study will touch on some areas in which the author claims no special expertise. Some consideration of the nature of nationalism, of the various theories of how public broadcasting can best serve the public, and of the sociology of organizations and organizational decision making is inevitable. Rather than avoid these areas, this study will incorporate the amateur views of the author.

13. To as great an extent as possible, public domain documentation (drawn from previously published materials and sources generally available to the public) will be used in this study.

14. Confidential materials gathered during the course of the fieldwork will be used only subject to the approval of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

15. In line with the policy guidelines of the Senate of the Academic Council of Stanford University concerning secrecy in research, the final study report must be freely publishable.

g) READER'S GUIDE

This is an extremely long document.

Its length has resulted, in part, from the attempt to address three somewhat different potential audiences: those interested in the nature of media institutions, those interested in improving the utilization of communication research findings and techniques, and those concerned with public television in Canada. One consequence of addressing three problems in combination is that a great deal of background material must be provided for the benefit of those familiar with one or two of the problems areas, but not with all three. Attempting to map English Television decision making in sufficient detail to provide useful source material for further analysis in three distinct areas has also contributed to this document's length.

Although it would have been possible to include many of the background chapters and certain of the analysis sections as appendices, that approach has not been taken. You may not need to read all of the background sections, and you may not have an interest in all of the analysis sections. But this document has been sequenced to encourage readers to at least scan any chapters or sections which they feel they might omit reading in detail.

Because different readers with different backgrounds may choose to use this document for different purposes, it seems useful to outline here its structure -- to provide a "reader's guide" for using what follows. Figure 1-1 is intended to show, in a general way, the connection between the background and analysis chapters, although no attempt has been made to portray in detail the interlocking relationships between sections. Chapters 1 and 15 are common start and finish points; Chapter 11 provides a common base for the three analysis chapters. The following summaries are intended to guide you through the four "streams" of background which lead to Chapter 11.

Chapter 2. Mass Media Research

This is an overview of completed mass media studies and outstanding research problems intended to serve as an introduction to mass media research for those not already familiar with the full range of communication research activity and interest. There is a widespread impression that mass media research consists primarily of measuring the sizes of audiences. In fact, in addition to audience and content studies, there are important findings and remaining problems in "institutional" research, and there are important "societal" questions about the relationship between the mass media and society, and about the role of the media as social institutions. Those readers not especially familiar with these research fields may be surprised that so many common mass media characteristics have already been isolated and that communication research interest extends so far beyond audience measurement. Researchers will be reminded that much remains unknown, and that most "societal" questions are matters of public policy.

Chapter 3. Public Broadcasting and The Public

Public broadcasting institutions are a distinctly special class of mass media organizations. In addition to the basic responsibilities shared by all broadcasters, they have special obligations which arise from the fact that they have been deliberately created by the public to serve one or more common societal purposes. This chapter briefly traces the origins of the public broadcasting "tradition," and explores some of the complexities of even the ideal or theoretical relationship between public broadcasting organizations and the "mass societies" they now serve. The questions raised should be of interest to most readers; the discussion of "The Special Role of Public Broadcasting" is referenced throughout the analysis sections.

Figure 1-1. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION SCHEME


1. Introduction
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH BACKGROUND
2. Mass Media Research
3. Public Broadcasting & The Public
METHODOLOGY BACKGROUND
4. Participant Observer Tradition
5. Models & Alternate Modes of Analysis
CANADIAN PUBLIC BROADCASTING BACKGROUND
6. Canadian Perspective
7. Canadian Broadcasting System, 70-4
CASE STUDY BACKGROUND
8. The Participant Observer
9. Management Decision Making Environment
10. The 1974 Licence Renewal Process
THE CBC AND THE PUBLIC
11. Public Issues
ANALYSIS
12. Public Television in Canada
13. Management Decision Making
14. Communication Research Utilization
15. Remarks

Chapter 4. The Participant Observer Tradition

This is a communication "research" study, but it does not report the results of tightly controlled experiments; it is a record of what I saw and what I sensed while looking around inside an organization. This chapter explores some of the advantages and disadvantages of this approach to research; the attention of those concerned with the rigour of this study is directed to the discussion of "Limitations and Precautions."

Chapter 5. Models and Alternate Modes of Analysis

Although this is a "communication" research study, the approach to analysis in Chapters 12-14 borrows from the application of general systems theory to the "organizational" research traditions in economics, sociology, political science, business administration, and psychology. This chapter establishes the basis for the "environment/structure/process" approach to analysis and the basis of the linkage between "environmental" and "institutional" characteristics.

Chapter 6. The Canadian Perspective

One of the central arguments in this study is that broadcasting systems are encoded versions of the political issues which confront societies. For those not especially familiar with the density and distribution of the Canadian population, and with its geographical distribution by language, section 6(b) provides an indication of the physical challenge to broadcasting in Canada. For those not familiar with Canadian history, section 6(c) traces the origins of and nature of Canadian nationalism and of the country's regional and linguistic tensions. For those not especially familiar with the circumstances of the creation of the CBC, section 6(d) traces the origins of public broadcasting in Canada, and provides the first indications of the relationship between the public's approach to the organization and regulation of broadcasting and the nature of the political and social dilemmas facing that public.

Chapter 7. The Canadian Broadcasting System, 1970-1974

Chapter 6 provides background on broad issues facing the Canadian public; this chapter focuses on specific conditions, trends, and issues in broadcasting in Canada during the study period. For those not familiar with the extent of "fragmentation" of the Canadian viewing audience resulting from the rapid spread of cable television services, section 7(a) establishes some of the basis for the argument that, at the end of the study period, changes in the overall Canadian broadcasting environment indicated a need for a CBC English Television service more clearly "differentiated" from commercial television services. For most readers, section 7(b) provides basic background, statistical, and financial information about the CBC and about English Television in 1970-1974, useful as background to Chapters 11-13. For those not familiar with the "activist" nature of broadcasting regulation in Canada during the study period, section 7(c) outlines the problems and approaches of the CRTC, and establishes part of the basis for Chapter 12's analysis of the relationship between the CBC and the regulatory agency.

Chapter 8. The Participant Observer

"Participant observation" research studies can never be totally objective; they are "shaped" by the nature of specific experiences and also by personal values. The best protection against undetectable bias is to outline the background of the observer; this chapter provides such information for the benefit of those especially concerned with the adequacy of the basis for personal comment in later chapters.

Figure 1-2. CONTENT ORGANIZATION SCHEME

	(12)	(13)	(14)
BACKGROUND CHAPTERS			
2. Mass Media Research	•	•	●
3. Public Broadcasting and The Public	●	●	●
4. The Participant Observer Tradition		•	
5. Models and Alternate Modes of Analysis	•	•	
6. The Canadian Perspective	●	●	•
7. The Canadian Broadcasting System, 1970-1974	●	●	●
8. The Participant Observer		•	•
9. The Management Decision Making Setting	•	●	•
10. The 1974 CBC Licence Renewal Process	●	●	•
ISSUE SECTIONS			
11(a) Nationalism Issues	●	●	•
11(b) Regionalism Issues	●	●	•
11(c) Recognition and Portrayal Issues	•	●	•
11(d) Audience Orientation	●	●	●
11(e) Costs and Financing	●	●	•

ANALYSIS CHAPTERS

12. Public Television in Canada
13. Management Decision Making in CBC English Television
14. Communication Research Utilization

Legend: ● Major contribution to analysis • Minor contribution

Chapter 9. The Management Decision Making Setting

This chapter provides important information about the structural arrangements for and in the CBC, and about the structure, functions, and approaches of the decision making group most closely observed.

Chapter 10. The 1974 CBC Licence Renewal Process

This chapter's chronological review of the CRTC's renewal of CBC network licences outlines the conditions under which consideration of the issues examined in Chapter 11 took place. It also provides the first evidence of certain problems in the operation of the regulatory system which are examined in Chapter 12.

Chapter 11 ("Public Issues") reviews public consideration of the role and operation of the CBC and of English Television during the study period. In the process, it provides detailed observations which are pieced together into larger patterns in Chapters 12-14. Figure 1-2 depicts the structure of the relationship between the background and issue material and the analysis chapters. Some "issues" are of more importance to some analysis sections than to others; the larger intersection markers indicate those background chapters and issue sections which are of particular importance to the analysis chapters.

It is unlikely that all readers will have an equal interest in all of Chapters 12, 13, and 14; in particular, Chapter 14 is addressed primarily to communication researchers. An outline of the findings in the analysis chapters is provided below. Chapter 15 ("Remarks") is where we all get back together again.

h) PREVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS CHAPTERS

Chapter 12. Public Television in Canada

The general nature of the relationship between the public broadcasting organization and the public at the national level has turned out to have been a much more significant factor in shaping organizational decision making in CBC English Television than was anticipated when analysis began. This study finds that, in 1974, the changed and still changing Canadian broadcasting environment implied a need to more clearly differentiate English Television service from the private commercial services. Such a move would, however, have required changes in public policy on public broadcasting in Canada; in fact, the policy development and interpretation processes of the CBC, the CRTC, and of government were deadlocked. Analysis of the relationship between general issues facing the country as a whole and specific broadcasting policy issues supports Anthony Smith's contention that "many of the unresolved neuroses from which nations suffer can be found reflected in the ways they choose to organise radio and television."

This chapter argues that many of the "problem" issues facing English Television had their origins in the national environment and in that environment's influence on the structural arrangements for public broadcasting in Canada. It also argues that, by 1974, there existed a need for a comprehensive and coordinated review of public broadcasting policy, and a further need to establish an ongoing public policy development and interpretation process, adaptable both to general changes in the cultural, policical, social, and economic environments and to specific changes in the broadcasting environment.

Chapter 13. Management Decision Making in CBC English Television

How broadcasting services are managed seems to have long puzzled both Canadians contemplating the CBC and researchers concerned with mass media institutions in general. This study finds the management decision making processes within English Television to have been an understandable (if not predictable) function of environmental, structural, and institutional characteristics. It finds a distinctly operational focus for decision making, but suggests that the service balancing processes required were inherently so complex as to make such an operational approach to decision making virtually inevitable. And it points to a basic balancing dilemma which Smith has argued faces all broadcasting: "When it finds a level of taste at which it can successfully aggregate its audience, it becomes culturally valueless; when it occupies a higher ground in a spirit of dedicated intellectual exclusiveness, it fails its purpose of serving the entire society."

This chapter argues that, both in order for the broadcasting organization to be adequately "in touch" with societal conditions (and thus "balance" appropriately), and in order for it to survive as an institution, in 1974 the CBC needed to become much more "open" in communicating with the Canadian people about its problems and aspirations -- about the problems and aspirations of the Canadian people's public broadcasting service. It also argues that many of the internal problems of English Television, though originating in part from an understandable communication overload on operational management, indicated needs throughout the CBC for more open internal communication and for greater attention to the special needs of individuals within a creative organization.

Chapter 14. Communication Research Utilization

This chapter, intended primarily for researchers, adds very little except additional detail to the general patterns of communication research utilization in broadcasting policy and development, and in media operation, observed elsewhere. The main finding is that communication research had a very limited impact in both areas.

The chapter argues that, if this common pattern is ever to change, it will have to be on the basis of researcher initiative.

Chapter 15 considers the findings of the analysis chapters in combination, and comments on the probable outcomes of pursuing various public broadcasting policy options in Canada.

Chapter 2

Mass Media Research

a) CASE STUDIES AND THEORY

An individual case study, such as this one, seldom gives rise to a major theoretical development on its own. But there are important roles for case studies within research disciplines. They provide opportunities to compare theories with closely observed actual conditions, and these observations, when considered together with other findings, can contribute to theory building. Case studies do not relate to a single, clearly defined, or narrowly focused body of theoretical literature. Instead, they provide accounts of the conditions found in a particular situation, and these serve to form parts of the bases for the re-examination of a wide range of existing theories. This chapter presents an overview (rather than an exhaustive examination) of some of the wide range of mass media research areas which relate, in one way or another, to this study.

b) RESEARCH WITHIN THE BROADCAST MEDIA

Although it may seem artificial to make a distinction between the mass media research conducted within mass media organizations and about them, in practice there are significant differences in the nature of the work undertaken.

Outside of academic communities, and especially in the mass media industries, mass media research is frequently equated with audience research. Audience research -- properly conceived, carefully conducted, and (especially) intelligently used -- has a very important role to play in the responsible operation of mass media institutions. (It may, however, be more appropriate to think of audience research as a tool rather than a research end in itself. It has a role to play, but so do other types of mass media research.)

The audience research which is done within the broadcast media can be broken down according to source: research done by research service organizations, by commercial broadcasting organizations, and by (or for) public broadcasting institutions.

Much of the work done by research service organizations consists of gathering and distributing program "rating" information. Most of these organizations, such as the A.C. Nielsen Company, are business enterprises which sell the results of their ratings surveys -- on a contract basis -- to networks, stations, advertising agencies, and advertisers. In Canada, one of the principal sources of program rating information is the BBM Bureau of Measurement, a non-profit organization formed and controlled by advertisers, advertising agencies, and broadcasters to conduct impartial measurements of radio and television audiences.

Most of the research service companies also undertake other specialized studies for individual clients; the results of such investigations are provided on a confidential basis only to the client contracting for these specific investigations.

A specialized type of commercial research study currently being conducted in North American broadcasting is the class of study performed for a local television station to determine how best to increase the size of audiences for local television news programs. Typically these studies involve the interviewing of approximately 300 television viewers in the coverage area of the station contracting for the study, assistance to station management in interpretation of the results, and consulting advice, based on professional experience, on what changes in on-camera personnel, presentation format, and/or story selection would be most likely to increase audience size and/or produce a desired change in the demographic composition of the audience. The effects on news programming of these "research" studies and the trends they have generated have been the subject of critical comment, not only in the study of journalism (eg- Barrett, 1973) but in at least one public affairs program on television itself (CBS: SIXTY MINUTES, "The Rating War," 10 March 1974).

Another type of audience "research" conducted for the commercial broadcasting industry is the measurement of response to pilots of program series screened in specially equipped theatres, principally in Los Angeles. Although the validity of the results from such screening tests has been questioned (eg- Bercovici, pp 23-6), this type of testing continues in the US. Although the CBC contracted with Canadian Facts Limited, representatives of the Schwerin Corporation in Canada, for similar testing during the 1950's, the practice has been discontinued (Morrison, pp 167-8).

Very little is known about the research activities of the commercial broadcasting industry itself. Although some commercial network papers and studies suggesting that violence in television programs has not been proven to be harmful to audiences have been made public (eg- CBS Inc., 1964; Milgram, 1974), the nature and results of most of their investigations are not made public. It is generally assumed that the bulk of their work is concerned with audience viewing patterns and with techniques for optimizing the size and composition of audiences for programs. Commercial television broadcasting is a competitive business: the results of research studies are treated with the same confidentiality accorded "business secrets" in any business enterprise.

Research conducted by and for public broadcasting organizations, like its commercial counterpart, has at least until recently been concerned primarily with audience measurement. In Canada, what became CBC Research was originally set up as the CBC's "Audience Research" department (Morrison, p 162).

It is important to note a difference in the pattern of research activity within the Canadian and US pubic broadcasting systems, a difference related to the fact that the US system is highly decentralized in comparison with the Canadian public broadcasting system. As of the end of June 1973, the licences for the 236 stations in the US public television system were held by 150 separate licensees: 52 non-profit community station corporations, 26 state and municipal government authorities, 19 local pubic school systems, and 53 universities and colleges. At the national level, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) administers the distribution of financial support to the stations, but is forbidden under its charter in the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 from directly engaging in the production of programs. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), a cooperative organization of the individual stations, operates a station program cooperative that selects programs to be produced and supplied to its member stations and also operates the interconnection service that feeds these programs to the stations.

Research activity is distributed throughout this decentralized system. CPB tends to concentrate its efforts on original studies which have implications for the US public broadcasting system as a whole. PBS was instrumental in arranging to obtain basic audience size and composition data from the commercial research services. Throughout the system, and especially at the station level, research is undertaken not only by the broadcasting organizations themselves, but also by university departments with interests in broadcasting. In addition, some special studies are funded by the institutional supporters of public broadcasting (such as the Ford Foundation) and in connection with program development (as in the case of the Children's Television Workshop's SESAME STREET).

The scope of research at the station level in the US is being expanded to include "community needs ascertainment" as well as audience studies. Formal ascertainment studies are required by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of all commercial applicants for the granting or renewal of broadcasting licences; public broadcasters had been conducting similar studies voluntarily, but in early 1976 the FCC moved to make these studies of community issues and needs mandatory. In general terms, research within US public broadcasting is characterized by the large number of its sources, by great diversity in approach and technique, and by a concentration on audience and community needs ascertainment studies.

In Canada, research within public broadcasting has almost entirely been carried out by the broadcasting institutions themselves, primarily by the CBC and provincial authorities.

In surveying research within the broadcast media around the world, Halloran has observed that those who work within media institutions "are usually obliged to take the problem as given, and have little opportunity (and in many cases little inclination) to probe at depth or question the values of the institutions." He continued:

> Still, it could be misleading to lump all audience research departments together. Some are less restricted than others, and in the case of Finland we may see the emergence of a different approach to research altogether [in which] attempts are being made to further a type of critical goal research which ideally would be linked to forward planning within the institution. At first sight this seems to give a more central and vital role to research than is customary in most broadcasting instititions....
>
> Finland, however, would appear to be an exceptional case. Generally, the distinction between the typical work of an audience research department and the sort of work that would stem from our approach [at the Centre for Mass Communication Research] is worth making, if only to draw attention to the limitations and restrictions inherent in service or administrative research. (Halloran 1971, pp 12-3)

Research activity within the CBC during the study period, reviewed in Chapter 14, consisted primarily of audience research investigations; in that respect, the pattern was far from exceptional, though certain CBC Research studies focused on critical questions of a more basic nature than those commonly addressed by research departments within broadcasting institutions.

c) RESEARCH ABOUT THE BROADCAST MEDIA

Research about the broadcast media can be divided, along lines suggested by Michael Gurevitch, into three categories: "audience and content studies" about exposure to the possible influence of media content on the audience; "institutional studies" on the structure and organization of media institutions, on the behaviour of individuals within these institutions, and on the nature of the output which is disseminated by them; and "societal studies," concerning the relationship between mass media and society, and the role of the media as social institutions. Gurevitch noted:

> Clearly, these three categories are strongly interrelated. Indeed, if studies classified in the first two categories are to have any sociological significance, they ought to be set, and looked at, in a wider social context. In other words, they could then be also classified as "societal studies." (Gurevitch, p 161)

Audience and Content Studies

Studies of audience exposure to, use of, and attitudes towards various types of mass media content are not now uncommon. A major study of this type in the Canadian setting was "The Media and the People," a report by Martin Goldfarb Consultants commissioned by the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media (Davey, 1970c, pp 3-184). The audience research conducted by the mass media institutions themselves can be included in this grouping: one study that addressed "the need to identify certain broader patterns of audience response that cut across and are, in a sense, independent of the particular programs that make up the pattern," was "Patterns of Television Viewing in Canada," a study conducted for the CBC President's "Study of Television in the Seventies" (CBC 1973a).

A much less straightforward type of investigation concerns itself with mass media "effects." Studies on the effects of the media have attracted some public attention, especially those dealing with the effects of violence in programs and the influence of television on young people. It should be noted that this is not the easiest type of research to undertake. The US National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence remarked in 1969:

> It is difficult to design studies linking human behavior or personality formation to media content, in view of the vast array of variables in the social environment that converge to shape a person's conduct and values. Television is but one powerful element in a complex nexus of social forces impinging on people's lives. (US 1969, p 1)

Despite the difficulties, considerable effort has been expended in the search for a better understanding of the linkage between televised violence and violent behaviour in society, particularly in children. (For an overview of this work, see Roberts, 1973.) A major undertaking in this area was the US Surgeon General's $1.8 million inquiry, summarized in the Scientific Advisory Committee's report, TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE (US 1971). Douglass Cater and Stephen Strickland have argued that, given the political and economic environment in which the research summary was written, and the conflict between the commercial television industry representatives and the social scientists on the Scientific Advisory Committee, it is not surprising that the conclusions reported were labelled "preliminary" and "tentative" (Cater & Strickland, pp 2,70). In their overview of the problems of social effects in broadcasting, Wilbur Schramm and Janet Alexander observed:

> Despite disagreement among members of the commission, the general conclusion was that there is a proved connection between the watching of large amounts of violence on television and greater probability of violent behavior in real life ....
>
> In one sense, this concern is exactly the same kind as that voiced against advertisements for cigarettes and potentially harmful drugs: television may be encouraging the use of poisons. In two other senses, however, it is very different. For one thing, the effect of television programs on children is much more subtle and harder to measure than the incidence of lung cancer in smoking and non-smoking groups, or the incidence of death or damage from proprietary drugs. In the second place, whereas in the case of cigarettes and drugs the objection is merely to the advertising of a presumably dangerous product, in the case of violence the objection is to television's own product and is, therefore, both more awkward to regulate and more directly an attack on the stewardship of broadcasters. (Schramm & Alexander, p 609)

Of all the areas within mass media research, it is perhaps in the "effects" studies where the need for "basic" research can be most easily seen. In the case of the research into the relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, the causal effect link was proven statistically, but the mechanism (how it occurs) is still not understood. Research into media effects faces the same problem: since the effects manifest themselves for some people under some conditions, and since the mechanisms through which the effects occur are not clearly established, the answers to specific questions are forced to take the form of statements of statistical probability.

The volume of research on the effects of sex and violence in the mass media and on television's influence on young people is significant when compared with truly "basic" research. George L. Hall, Director of the Virginia Public Telecommunications Council, has observed:

> Our more corporate-minded institutions are not given, or driven, to the generation of basic research efforts, probably because the findings which might eventuate are not perceived as being germane or relevant to the "brush fire" sorts of decision making with which their managements are eminently concerned. And even if findings were to be clearly relevant, they might also be sharply adverse to established policy directions for which political commitments are all but irreversible. (Hall, p 3)

Hall summarized the arguments of those who perceive a clear need for basic mass media research as follows:

> Without basic research ... our whole institution may be building upon the sands of illusion, to be swept into the seas of history at the first real flood. We know practically nothing about such fundamental human behaviors as diversion and far too little about the social role(s) of the electronic mass media. And yet our field generates virtually no basic research efforts of the kinds needed. Instead ... we count noses in our insignificant applied research efforts which are usually contrived to put out annoying brush fires and confirm our momentary inconsequential judgements. (Hall, p 2)

In presenting the case for a particular approach to research dealing with policy questions, Harold Mendelsohn argued:

> Before social research can serve to undergird overall mass communication policy a considerably more functionally oriented research effort is required. For example, we need much more data than are now available on two major variables. On the micro level, we need a far better understanding of what roles the media play in the full process of socialization. On the macro level, we need far more insight into the integrative-disintegrative functions of the media in relation to groups and communities. (Mendelsohn, p 389)

The problems facing the conduct of "effects" research, such as on the linkage between televised violence and violent behaviour, are difficult and not widely understood. Consideration of work completed has been complicated by broadcasting industry arguments that viewing does not affect behaviour (except buying behaviour). The resulting debates have at least underlined the need for a more basic understanding of the role of the media in society and in individual lives.

Institutional Research

Audience research, effects research, and basic research can all, in a sense, be considered "policy" research: each can provide valuable guidance in policy development. But, in order to be able to provide policy advice on questions about mass media planning and operation, it is not only profitable but necessary to study the structure and operation of the existing mass media industries and institutions. The formation of mass media policy, like policy formation in any area, is an evolutionary process. Consequently, it is inevitable that policy ideas and questions will normally be expressed in terms relating directly to the existing industries and institutions. Studies of the formal and (especially) the financial structures of the media are not uncommon, but there have been relatively few investigations of the internal operation of media institutions, especially at the policy setting level.

Speaking of trends in mass media research in Britain, Halloran has observed:

> We have broadened our terms of reference since those early days and today our research, although not ignoring questions about the effects of the media, goes much wider and deeper. For example, we are interested in the factors that govern or influence what the media make available, as well as the factors that govern or influence what use is made of what is made available. It is necessary to study the production side .... the history and development of media institutions (and their relationship to other institutions, including government) .... organization and structure ... ownership, control, resources and technology .... the professional values and the day-to-day operations.... (Halloran 1974, p 5)

Media Structure and Ownership Studies

Studies of the formal structure of the media have been conducted periodically in Canada, as elsewhere, as an aid to the formation of policies on the concentration of media ownership and on foreign ownership, often in response to governmental needs for information in connection with the economic regulation of the newspaper, magazine, and broadcasting industries. The largest of the three volumes of the report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media was Volume II -- WORDS, MUSIC, AND DOLLARS: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLISHING AND BROADCASTING IN CANADA. The 572 page report dealt with the actual concentration of ownership, with the economics of the operation of the mass media, and with a wide range of factors affecting concentration and economics in the media (Davey 1970b). John Porter's chapter on "The Ideological System: The Mass Media," in THE VERTICAL MOSAIC, contained major sections on "Structure and Control of the Mass Media" and on "The Major Mass Media Complexes" (Porter, pp 457-90).

Media Output Studies

Many of the studies conducted of the day to day operations of the media have followed an established tradition in print journalism research, the tradition of the "gatekeeper" study. In its classic form, a gatekeeper study examines the selection processes by which editors select from all available wire service copy those stories to be carried in their newspapers. In "The Gatekeeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News," D.M. White commented that when studying reasons for rejecting wire copy one could see how highly subjective -- how reliant on value judgements based on the "gatekeeper's" own set of experiences, attitudes, and expectations -- the communication of "news" really is (White, p 171). In "Social Control in the Television Newsroom," Daniel Garvey summarized the research on news selection processes completed up to 1971, with particular attention to television news (Garvey, pp 23-52). His own study found that, although management policy influenced the selection of news items in the three television stations studied to some extent, the socialization process of becoming part of the news staff was a complex one, and a great many factors aside from management policy affected content decisions.

A related type of study, which has the advantage of not requiring access to the media organization itself, is the content analysis of media output. Studies of this type have been conducted by various organizations and individuals to support specific arguments about the portrayal of women and racial minorities, and about the alleged political bias of news organizations. Others have used content analysis as a tool for gaining a better understanding of the overall selection patterns evident in the output of the media. Benjamin D. Singer's study, "Violence, Protest, and War in Television News," was a comparative content analysis of the network newscasts of the CBC and CBS TV. Singer commented:

> In societies where the media are not controlled and news presentations are free to vary, periodic monitoring of such media as television in a comparative perspective is important, particularly where scarcity of time intensifies the selection process. One of the assumptions underlying traditional press freedoms is that, within limits, all news will be published. This is hardly the case with our dominant medium, television; in fact, the reverse is true: very little of the news is used. Hence, such a medium has enormous power to affect the perceived environment of viewers through repeated emphasis of certain categories of events. This process, by distorting the social reality perceived by individuals in a society, alters their standards of judgment and hence frame of reference toward what is normal and expected in such a society. (Singer, pp 240-1)

Media Operation Studies

One of the relatively few detailed studies of the "inside" operation of the television medium is Edward Jay Epstein's NEWS FROM NOWHERE: TELEVISION AND THE NEWS. During 1968 and 1969 Epstein observed the program units which produced the NBC EVENING NEWS, the CBS EVENING NEWS, and the ABC EVENING NEWS. Although access at CBS and ABC was more limited, NBC permitted Epstein more or less free reign of the news organization. The research yielded an extremely valuable picture of the operation of the "evening news" units. In reviewing the study, Ithiel de Sola Pool commented:

> Epstein is not an ideological crusader either for or against the networks. He is not writing an expose of evil men.... He recognizes that, as a result of a series of organizational constraints on what is permissible, economic, easy, graphic, and appealing to put on the air, what actually appears on television news is a very different thing from a mirror image of society. (Pool, p 311)

In summarizing the results of his study, Epstein observed:

> The main finding of this study is that the pictures of society which are shown on television as national news are largely -- though not entirely -- performed and shaped by organizational considerations. To maintain themselves in a competitive world, the networks impose a set of prior restraints, rules and conditions on the operations of their news divisions. Budgets are set for the production of news, time is scheduled for its presentation, and general policies are laid down concerning its content. To satisfy these requirements -- and keep their jobs -- news executives and producers formulate procedures, systems and policies intended to reduce the uncertainties of news to manageable proportions.... The basic contours of network news can thus be at least partly explained in terms of the demands which the news organizations must meet in order to continue operating without crises or intervention from network executives. (pp 258-9)

It is impossible here to cover fully Epstein's detailed observations, but they have made a significant contribution to our understanding of the impact of organizational, technical, and financial factors (or "operational" factors) on media content selection and shaping processes. Some of these factors are relatively obvious; a surprising proportion are not. Epstein noted, for instance:

> The imperatives of network scheduling tend to impose certain common forms on essentially disparate events.... Thus, almost all news events appear to take place in a roughly similar time frame and are explained in approximately corresponding length -- usually a few minutes per story. (Epstein, p 240)
>
> The paramount need of the networks to maintain a maximum audience flow compels producers to reorganize the news into certain story formats that are presumed most capable of holding the attention of viewers, regardless of their subject or content.... The solution found by the networks is to cast each event, which in itself might not be immediately relevant to the lives of most of those watching, into conflict stories that presumably have universal appeal. (pp 240-1)
>
> The economic logic of network news also provides a strong incentive for covering timeless stories instead of current ones in California. A timely story about the day's events would first have to be transmitted to New York on a specially rented cable ... which in 1969 cost about $3,000 per hour (nearly half of the program's daily budget for relaying stories from all over the world). On the other hand, timeless features can be transported at practically no cost by air freight -- or when cables were rented by the hour for other purposes.... California feature stories can also be conveniently used to satisfy the networks' policy of ending the program with humorous or light stories.... The search for quirks and aberrations in California life is thus rooted partly in the logistical difficulties of covering current events, and partly in the program's need for feature stories. (pp 245-6)
>
> Producers also prefer action pieces that require no lengthy exposition, since they can easily be truncated to fill the available time in a segment and thus help pace the program. (p 247)
>
> Since there is no economic reason regularly to employ more film crews than is necessary to produce the daily quota, coverage is generally limited to a dozen or so selected events. This, in turn, requires that the events which are selected for coverage are highly predictable and almost certain to produce a usable news story. (p 260)
>
> The tendency to depict symbolic protests rather than substantive problems is closely related to the problem of audience maintenance. Protests can be universally comprehended, it is presumed, if they are presented in purely symbolic terms: one group, standing for one cause, challenging another group and cause. (p 270)
>
> In his classic study of the functions of executives, Chester I. Barnard found that they most effectively control large organizations not by participating in day-to-day decisions, but by inducing the necessary organizational values in their subordinates. This is also true in the case of television news executives, which includes the network news president, vice-presidents, and news managers of the various operations. While they may decide on program budgets, long-term assignments and the coverage of such major scheduled events as elections, conventions and moratoriums, they have little opportunity to intervene in most of the routine decisions involved in covering and reconstructing the day's news stories. In most cases, the speed and diversity of news events make any sort of close executive supervision virtually impossible. To run a news organization effectively, then, executives depend on producers making the same sort of judgments that they would make in similar circumstances. In turn, this requires that they recruit or inculcate producers with the "right" outlook and values for their particular job. (p 229)

Another valuable investigation of the "inside" operation of a program unit is a British study, Philip Elliott's THE MAKING OF A TELEVISION SERIES: A CASE STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE. Elliott's study examined the production of a seven program documentary series, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE, made in the autumn of 1967 for Associated Television (ATV) and transmitted over most of the Independent Television Network in the spring of 1968. Whereas Epstein studied the operations of commercial network daily news units which operate in an extremely competitive environment -- where audience size, program costs, and immediacy were major considerations, Elliott looked at the production -- over a four month period -- of seven documentaries which had originally been conceived as an adult education series. What emerged from the Elliott study was a picture of the production process in a less constrained environment than that of daily news -- an environment conditioned more by the interests, acquaintances, and habits of the production personnel than in the case of the Epstein investigation.

Although THE MAKING OF A TELEVISION SERIES was a study of only one production unit, the basic patterns which it revealed seem familiar to anyone who has worked in the production not only of documentaries but of any type of information program, including news. Elliott identified three main "chains" through which ideas and material for the series emerged:

- "the subject chain," based on the producer's ideas and past experience,
- "the presentation chain," based on program time slot, program budget, and customary and ideal methods of presentation, and
- "the contact chain," based on what was visible and available to the production team. Included in the contact chain, the most significant of the three, were three main "contact" mechanisms: institutional sources -- organizations and formal channels, the media themselves -- especially the press and television, and personal contacts and acquaintances.

Elliott also found organizational and operational factors, as well as personal ones, to have influenced content selection and shaping:

> The producer's views about prejudice were initially the most important source for ideas about subject areas to be covered in the programmes. The executive producer discussed his ideas for the series with the producer when he commissioned him to make the programmes.... In this case the producer did not receive any detailed instructions, simply a general outline of the plan for the series, and he was not required to prepare any synopses. (Elliott, p 26)
>
> The producer was not only important in choosing the subject area but also in providing a range of knowledge and contacts to develop each area with subject ideas. The discussion within the production team was carried on in terms of personal feelings, without reference to any other evidence. Very little material on the subject of social prejudice was collected in the course of later researching and even less of this material was used in the programmes, because the production team was not clear what ideas to collect under this heading. (p 40)
>
> To be selected, material must usually meet the producer's expectations. The Black Power material did not meet the producer's expectations but these had been at least partly formed by the previous accounts of the Black Power movement given in the media.... These examples raise again a problem ... of the way in which events are selected and reported through the media to fit a limited number of self-supporting themes and images. The result is to limit the number of 'views of the world' available in society....
>
> There is an important tendency for television to be a reflective medium, sampling the range of conventional wisdom available in society on any topic and then relaying it back to society in programme form. (pp 58-61)

> On the one hand there was an unwillingness to commit the programmes to any particular view; on the other hand, views were allowed to emerge as a consequence of decisions influenced by presentation or audience attention. In the course of this study a distinction needs to be drawn between "communication," attempts to transmit particular meanings to an audience, and "attention," judging the level of audience satisfaction, keeping the viewer interested, and above all, making sure they do not switch off. Various factors in television production seem to support an implicit philosophy that so long as the audience attends, communication can be left to take care of itself. (p 84)
>
> Because of the organic style of work organization found in the production team, the course of the production process depended on the coincidence of personal goals and the development of personal relationships. The producer and the others in the production team were left to interpret their brief within the organization, with few directives on the shape and content of the final programmes. (p 143)
>
> The main conclusion to be drawn from the present study is that television production tends to ensure cultural repetition and continuity. On many subjects which might be treated by television, and on most which are continually regarded as news, there seem to be standard perspectives available within the media culture which are likely to be reinforced and repeated in the process of gathering material for a new programme. (p 147)
>
> It is inevitable that if the main focus in programme production is on audience attention and satisfaction, the main dimension of possible audience reaction will be emotional response to familiar symbols.... The argument suggested by this book is that a shift towards emotionalism and symbolism is not just a consequence of the different inherent qualities of the different media. It is the result of the gradual progression towards media showing more and more mass characteristics in content and organization....
>
> A second issue is that although the professional communicator has gradually emerged as a new-style intellectual in society, the tendency is for him to be preoccupied with the form rather than the content of communication. On the other hand those who are preoccupied with content are not likely to achieve access to the form...
>
> One of the common sense arguments which appears to contradict the view of the media as system-maintaining is that in most sections of television at least the predominant ethos continues to be liberal-progressive. But such an ethos, and even occasional programmes which seem to be a direct reflection of it, cannot by themselves refute the argument of this book that the more mass the media the more inhibitions are placed on a direct communication process. (p 166)

Both the Epstein and Elliott studies identified sets of operational and personal factors as significant in determining media content. The descriptions of content selection and shaping processes at production unit levels which they provided are, in general terms, consistent with the observations of units in this study. And the questions raised about mass media control and operation provide a first glimpse of dilemmas considered in more detail in Chapter 13.

Personal Narrative Studies

Much of what has been written about the management program decision making processes in media institutions takes the form of first or second hand narratives of events. Although these personal histories do not for the most part advance detailed or specific hypotheses about the nature of the decision making process observed, they do serve as case study reports of patterns of incidents.

Fred W. Friendly's account of his experiences over a sixteen-year period at CBS News, DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL, deals at length with his frustrations in attempting to secure air time for the coverage of news events which he considered sufficiently significant to warrant the pre-emption of regularly scheduled commercial programming (eg- Friendly, p 213).

Les Brown's annecdotal account of management program decision making at ABC, CBS, and NBC headquarters in New York at the beginning of the 1970's, TELEVI$ION: THE BUSINESS BEHIND THE BOX, reinforces Friendly's observations about the overriding importance of profit making as a criterion for program decision making in the US commercial networks.

Both Friendly and Brown deal with the uses made of ratings. Ratings have been the subject of quite extensive comment for many years: their accuracy, reliability, and validity have frequently been challenged; their influence on program selection has been denounced as leading to least common denominator fare; and the tendency for ratings to foster thinking of potential television audiences as a "mass" has been seen as leading to the debasement of art and the substitution of a mass culture fabricated by technicians and profit-seeking administrators (Skornia, pp 120-42). Because questions about ratings will be taken up in later chapters, it is useful to note here the personal observations of Friendly and Brown about the role of ratings in the management of the US commercial networks:

> The choice of programs is delegated to a staff of buyers and taste followers with a unique ability to select those shows which are going to capture the attention of a jury of some twelve hundred families; the viewing habits of this small group are accepted as the projection of what nearly fifty-five million other homes are watching.... I never knew anyone at CBS who thought much of the [A.C.] Nielsen [rating] sample. There were constant attempts to have it improved, but the standard answer to any protest about it was: "Don't knock it; the advertisers take it as their bible and the advertising rates are established by it." (Friendly, p 268)

> Network presidents make ratings their first order of business. They will arrive at the office and, before considering other matters, ask, How did we do last night?....
>
> The [1969-70] rating war embarrassed the network presidents. It was a little like street fighting, and they wanted to represent themselves as being above that. They denounced it and yet persisted in taking part. It was like a war being called a peace action. (Brown, p 95)
>
> Advertisers do not so much buy the present or future network as the past one. When they make their purchases for the coming fall, they base them on the network's rating performance the previous year.... Some advertisers relish the prestige of being associated with the leading network, others bank on the security of it. If an advertising agency should disappoint its client, it can argue that it did the least reckless thing, buying the network that had the greatest popularity and circulation. (p 97)

Serious industry interest in basic demographic characteristics of audiences (principally age and sex) began during the period covered by Brown, partly on the basis of initiatives by Paul Klein, then director of the NBC audience research department. Brown reported:

> [Klein] believed that television could be better than it was under the system, that the audience could force a modification of the old programming formulas, and this gave him a mission.
>
> In his own mind, CBS was representative of the old television and NBC of the new. The old saw the TV audience as a single mass, the means to which was programming for the lowest-common denominator. The new recognized the viewership as several different audiences, and it set out to capture the most desirable, from a commercial standpoint, for itself. Klein's mission (Brown, self-assigned) was to prove that CBS was out of date. (Brown, pp 79-80)
>
> Klein was planning a press conference, coincident with the last rating report of the season, to make a declaration that he hoped would end the old rating game forever and introduce a new one.
>
> He would say: Well, we have won the season. Here are the books to prove it, and I am here to tell you that it does not mean a thing. It does not matter how many homes are tuned to a program, and it will never matter again. What matters is which people are watching, whether they are old people or young people. Old people want to watch the staples, Lawrence Welk and situation comedies. Young people will watch dramas, movies, and new program forms we have not gotten around to discovering yet. When we start thinking in terms of People Ratings instead of Homes Ratings, television is going to improve vastly. (p 82)

Demographic breakouts have come to have an established place throughout the commercial industry, primarily because of advertiser interest in reaching those segments of the potential audience most likely to spend on their particular products or services. The new importance attached to the demographic characteristics of audiences had an obvious effect on the US network schedules during the early 1970's, especially at CBS. Programs such as THE BEVERLY HILLBILLIES, GREEN ACRES, HOGAN'S HEROES, and PETTICOAT JUNCTION disappeared from the CBS lineup as the network began to seek the younger audiences more attractive to advertisers.

Problems in Institutional Research

Despite contributions such as those cited above, the institutional research tradition within mass communication studies is still not strong. Halloran has commented:

> Generally, in mass communication research, theory has failed to keep pace with techniques, doing has prevailed over thinking, and the tendency to do research (almost like American tourists 'do' Paris or London) has led to the collection of data before the problems have been adequately formulated. This tendency is not unconnected with the fact that a great deal of mass communication research has been motivated by administrative, service, or commercial requirements....
>
> [This] has led to an under-estimation of the potential of research. Consequently, those responsible for media output, already pre-disposed by their position to be suspicious about independent enquiries into the nature of their operations, have had their position reinforced. Their inadequate expectations about the nature and possibilities of research have been maintained, and this -- in turn -- has influenced their policy towards funding research and towards the granting of research facilities.
>
> Mass communication has not been thought of as a process; the production side, the media industries, have not been adequately studied and -- even when research

> has been carried out in this area -- it has usually been at a relatively low level of the operation.... There have been few attempts to study the mass communicator as a professional who reflects the values of his profession, occupies a sensitive central position in a social network, rejects and selects information in response to a variety of pressures -- all within a given social system. In brief, the communicator has not been systematically studied at the several levels of his operation, and we have still to develop a theory which allows for the systematic analysis of communicator decision. (Halloran 1974, pp 9-11)

Research about broadcast institutions typically has taken place in an environment characterized largely by tension between the researcher and the broadcaster. This is not overly surprising, since the broadcaster is the subject of the inquiry, but in some cases this "tension" actually seems to have manifest itself more as fear, suspicion, and/or hostility.

In searching for stations to cooperate in his study on social control in the television newsroom, Garvey was turned down by 20 stations; only 3 stations cooperated in the study. Discussing the negotiations which preceeded refusal by one large San Francisco station, he reported:

> The questions which the station executives insisted on deleting from the questionnaire include every question that has any bearing upon management interference in the operation of the newsroom. (Garvey, p 12)

Garvey observed that his problem was not a new one:

> Perhaps the most widely cited study of news selection, David Manning White's "The Gatekeeper," could only be published after White agreed to delete material which the editor he studied did not wish to be made public. (p 15)

In fact, Garvey's experience was far from an isolated incident. The "tension" between the broadcast industry and social science researchers in the case of the US Surgeon General's inquiry into the effects of televised violence on young people was noted earlier. By 1970 the problem was sufficiently common to warrant an International Seminar on Broadcaster/Researcher Cooperation in Mass Communication Research. At the seminar, held at the University of Leicester, Sir Charles Curran stated the position of the BBC:

> If there has been a single discernible thread running through what I have said I hope it will have been this: the BBC is in the programme-making business and its overriding concern must always be with those who make programmes and with those who watch and listen to them. We reject the idea that we should contribute financially to research because it is not part of our proper function to re-distribute public money in this particular way. We have no right to pick the pocket of the viewer to find out what is in his head. But we accept that there should be further studies and we also accept that the relationship between the BBC and the researchers should be positive and constructive. We accept, too, that we have a commitment to help, provided co-operation does not hinder our programme services in doing their primary task. Research must always be subservient to programmes. As professionals in research, listening to a professional in programmes, you would not expect me to say anything else .... (Curran, p 58)

Later chapters of this study will take up the nature of the relationship between researchers and broadcasters in Canada. The situation was somewhat different from that in Britain: the CBC did not seem to be the object of much research interest for Canadian universities and independent research institutions. And the Corporation's cooperation with this study was in marked contrast with Garvey's experiences with US commercial stations.

Societal Studies

Over and above the problems addressed by "audience and content" and "institutional" studies, there are the "societal" questions about the relationship between the mass media and society and about the role of the media as social institutions. Many of the questions in this area remain to be addressed, much less solved. Halloran reported in 1973 that the following questions had been developed at a workshop on mapping out areas of possible research:

- Many decisions in media policy are made in the name of 'the public good' and 'the national interest'. But what do these terms really mean, and who decides what is good?

- How should one decide between
  (a) private interests and public control?
  (b) public accountability and freedom of speech?

- Granted existing structures of newsgathering, selection, and presentation, is it not inevitable that the 'free flow of information' will work to the advantage of those who possess the information and the means to disseminate it?

- Is it not time that the media were demystified, and that we began to question the restrictions and the possible tyranny of professionalism? Must we always have the few talking about the many to the many?

- Will the multiplicity of channels made possible by the new technology lead to cultural diversity and better opportunities for minority interests? In any case, who will control the software, the input, or the programmes?

- Is public monopoly the only real guanantee of diversity?

- Granted existing systems of ownership and control and the prevalence of western news values, are the media ever likely to provide the amount and quality of information necessary for people to act intelligently in a particpatory democracy?

- Is there not a grave risk that we shall become paralysed by an overload of information? How much can we tolerate? How much can we understand?

- In what way, to what extent, and over what time-period will the new developments in media technology render existing communication technology obsolete?

- Does the 'communications revolution' represent an entirely new factor in the socialization process and, if so, how?

- Does the new technology demand an entirely new institutional and organizational structure, or can existing structures be suitably adapted? (Halloran 1974, pp 8-9)

This is not a "societal" study in the sense that it sets out to deal directly with questions of the sort listed above. This is an institutional study but, as Gurevitch observed, there are strong interrelationships and institutional studies should be set in a "societal" context. A few of the questions posed above are explored in the next chapter.

d) RESEARCH UTILIZATION

In COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS, Everett Rogers and Floyd Shoemaker make a point which, though obvious enough, is of critical importance to researchers: "It is clear that research alone is not enough to solve most problems; the results of the research must be diffused and utilized before their advantages can be realized." And they point to the creation of "research utilization branches" in a wide variety of US governmental agencies as one indication of the recognition of the importance of research diffusion and utilization (Rogers & Shoemaker, p 16).

Despite the fact that research on the "communication of innovations" intersects the boundaries of communication research, and despite the fact that Rogers and Shoemaker review the results of over 1500 studies in their book, very little study has been made of the diffusion and utilization of the findings of communication research itself. This is particularly the case with mass media research.

There are many factors which help to account for the lack of formal study of the utilization of mass media research, but one of the basic reasons is that the level of utilization is known to be extremely low. Although this would seem to give added importance to studying utilization patterns, it introduces a basic problem: it is hard to find utilization patterns to investigate.

In a conversation reviewing the outline of this work, Hilde Himmelweit, Professor of Social Psychology at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a member of the Annan Committee on the Future of Broadcasting in Great Britain, commented that a dissertation focused solely on the actual utilization of mass media research findings by broadcast institutions would be a very short study. Speaking of the situation in US public broadcasting, George Hall commented:

> In practice, serious policy decisions based on valid research findings are almost as scarce in public telecommunications as in the noisy halls of Congress. Research is all too often talismanic: an ultimate protection against darkness perhaps but decoration withal. We engage in it more to witness our modern faith in science than to apply the strictures of its truths to our intuited undertakings. (Hall, p 2)
>
> Those of us on the management side do indeed tend to regard research findings ... as the Mafiosi do their madonnas: decorations to be shut away in the parlor, safe from the dangerous hustle-bustle of making a living. (p 44)

The utilization of research findings in public broadcasting policy development and interpretation in Canada and in CBC English Television is considered later in this study, principally in Chapter 14. In both settings, the level of utilization was low, and in many respects similar to the patterns noted in the US and UK.

Chapter 3

Public Broadcasting and The Public

a) PUBLIC MEDIA ROLE CONSIDERATIONS

The study of the commercial mass media tends to get caught up in regulatory questions: such investigations tend to focus on what the media should not be doing. Broadcasting policies frequently deal in negatives: limits on concentration of ownership, limits on the proportion of time devoted to commercial messages, requirements for minimum levels of specified types of programming, guidelines about what should not appear in programming for young people, and so on.

Although this attention to things the media should not be doing is somewhat understandable in the commercial broadcasting case, the argument can be made that thought about public media should at least consider what the media are capable of doing if not what they should be doing. This brings us to some of the "societal" questions reported by Halloran and cited earlier:

- Given that many decisions in media policy are made in the name of "the public good" and "the national interest," what do these terms really mean? Who decides?

- How should one decide between private interets and public good? Between public accountability and freedom of speech?

A case study such as this is not an appropriate forum for an exhaustive consideration of the overall role of the media in society, or of the ideal role of public media. But, since this is a study of a public broadcasting institution, it must to some extent take into account the possible roles for the institution.

Consideration of the range of possible roles for a public broadcasting organization, however, involves a series of even larger societal questions -- dealing with the nature of mass society and with the concept of nationalism. In this chapter these questions are taken up primarily against the background of the development of the public broadcasting "tradition."

b) THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING TRADITION

The western tradition in public broadcasting is generally considered to have originated in Britain with the British Broadcasting Company, which operated from 1922 (when broadcasting began) until the end of 1926. The General Manager was J.C.W. Reith (the late Lord Reith). The BBC has reported:

> The [Company's] policy during those years was based on Reith's conviction, not universally shared, that broadcasting, then in its infancy, held great potentialities. He saw it as being in the future a source, not only of entertainment, but also of information and enlightenment available to all. Its motive should be that of public service, and he stressed the need for high standards and a strong sense of responsibility. (BBC, p 281)

It was on the basis of approval of what had been done, and of a recognition of the further possibilities, that the government-appointed Crawford Committee recommended in 1925 that the broadcasting service should be conducted in the future by a public corporation "acting as a trustee for the national interest." In accordance with the committee's recommendations, the entire property and undertaking of the British Broadcasting Company "as a going concern," together with its existing contract and staff, were taken over by the British Broadcasting Corporation on 1 January 1927 (BBC, pp 281-2).

Speaking of the beginnings of broadcasting in Britain in THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE, Anthony Smith has observed:

> When broadcasting began it had to share the role of cultural 'brokerage' with the record industry, the cinema, the popular performing arts and to some extent the newspaper. It inherited their problems too, the problems of how to address the audience, what image it should contain within itself of the single and simultaneous manifestation of the mass audience. (Smith 1973, p 43)

In Reith's words:

> So the responsibility at the outset conceived, and despite all discouragements pursued, was to carry into the greatest number of homes everything that was best in every department of human knowledge, endeavour and achievement; and to avoid whatever was or might be hurtful. In the earliest years accused of setting out to give the public not what it wanted but what the BBC thought it should have, the answer was that few knew what they wanted, fewer what they needed. In any event it was better to over-estimate than to under-estimate. If another policy had been adopted -- that of the lowest common denominator -- what then? Probably nobody would have protested; it would have been quite natural. (Reith, p 101)

Smith analyzed Reith's approach as follows:

> The BBC was not overly tempted to become a mere tool of government in its efforts to grant itself security of tenure over the airways. The political ingenuity behind broadcasting in Britain lay in the way the organisation was anchored to Parliament as a whole, by Royal Charter, under the technical supervision of the Post Office rather than the more thorough supervision it might have received if it had been attached, say, to the Board of Trade. It was Reith who chose this device and exploited it. The BBC had to be responsive to the political community as a whole, not to any section of it. Any leaning to one side or the other was a result of tactics rather than strategy. Its purpose was to 'dig itself in' to the overall socio-political structure of the country.... [Reith] argued too that it was 'the combination of public service motive, sense of moral obligation, assured finance, and the brute force of monopoly which enabled the BBC to make of broadcasting what no other country in the world has made of it -- these four fundamentals.' (Smith 1973, pp 70-1)

Although the BBC started with a monopoly in broadcasting in Britain and has had commercial competition only since the early 1950's, in the US the public broadcasting system was not developed until long after the national commercial television networks had established themselves. Conseqently, the role of the public broadcasting system in the US has largely been considered in relation to the existing commercial system. The blueprint for "public" television in the US was set down by the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television in 1967:

> If we were to sum up our proposal with all the brevity at our command, we would say that what we recommend if freedom. We seek freedom from the constraints, however necessary in their context, of commercial television. We seek for educational television freedom from the pressures of inadequate funds. We seek for the artist, the technician, the journalist, the scholar, and the public servant freedom to create, freedom to innovate, freedom to be heard in this most far-reaching medium. We seek for the citizen freedom to view, to see programs that the present system, by its incompleteness, denies him. (Carnegie, pp 98-9

The record of the development of public broadcasting in Canada runs a middle course between the British and American approaches. And it is largely a political history. The two major histories of broadcasting in Canada (Weir; Peers) report the development of public broadcasting in terms of reactions to political and economic circumstances. The principal arguments for the establishment of public broadcasting in Canada were political arguments rooted more in cultural nationalism than in a critical analysis of the role of communication in Canadian society. The relationship between political nationalism and the establishment of public broadcasting in Canada is taken up in section 6(d).

c) THE GENERAL NATURE OF MANDATES

Throughout the development of the public broadcasting systems in Britain, Canada, and the United States run the same role descriptions: to inform, to enlighten, and to entertain. But there has been little elaboration on these goals. The BBC's Charter describes the nature of the role of the Corporation only in very general terms: it cites "the widespread interest ... in the broadcasting services and ... the great value of such services as a means of disseminating information, education, and entertainment" (BBC, p 290). Speaking from his experience as the first President of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting in the US, John W. Macy, Jr. noted: "The overpowering concern about structure, relationships, and technical means has preempted the basic purpose of the system: to provide programs to the citizen viewer, programs which will educate, enlighten, and entertain" (Macy, p 40).

It has been observed that all major broadcasting institutions in the world face a similar type of problem. Legislators attempt to relate the power of broadcasting to the public interest and draw up very broad mandates with national goals; they either try to define or imply objectives for programming and service which are global in scope.

The 1966 Canadian government White Paper on Broadcasting foreshadowed the 1968 Broadcasting Act's attention to the setting of somewhat more specific objectives. The White Paper observed:

> Under the present Broadcasting Act, responsibility is assigned to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation for the operation of a national broadcasting service. The interpretation of this phrase has been largely left to the Corporation itself, and it has fulfiled its primary responsibility to provide broadcasting services to the Canadian people as a whole in a manner that is altogether praiseworthy.
>
> The new legislation will confirm the objectives developed by the Corporation, which are to provide a complete and balanced service of information, enlightenment, and entertainment for people of different ages, interests and tastes, including a high content of regional, national, and international news, factual and interpretative reports, and programs devoted to all aspects of the arts, light entertainment, and sport. It should seek to use and develop Canadian artistic and cultural resources and talent, wherever situated, to the maximum extent consistent with high standards of program quality. It should serve the two official-language groups and the special needs of geographic regions, and it should actively contribute to the flow and exchange of information, entertainment and understanding between cultures and between regions. (Stanbury, p 12)

Excerpts from the 1968 Act appear as the Appendix. Even though the new legislation did inorporate some of the objectives suggested in the White Paper [illegible]the mandate is still extremely general and largely confirmatory of "the objectiv[illegible] developed by the Corporation." Interpretation is still left largely to the Corporation. The situation is not unusual; it may be inevitable.

Because there are changes in the subjects of public concern -- in the content of the debate about how best to serve "the public good" or "the national interest" -- legislative mandates or regulatory requirements cannot deal specifically with media content. If ongoing mass media institutions are to have the freedom to address new problems in a changing society, they must have the freedom to continuously re-examine and re-interpret their roles within that society. With that freedom, however, comes responsibility -- the responsibility to continuously review what may be "in the public interest."

d) THE MASS MEDIA AND MASS SOCIETY

It is interesting to note that Canadian theoretical work in the communication area has not played a more significant role in the consideration of the nature of nationalism in Canada or in the formation of national communication policy. Recently James Carey, an American, has attempted to attract attention to the work of the Canadian historian and economic and political theorist, Harold Innis: "Innis' work represents the distinctively Canadian effort to erect a theory of communications that is true to the realities of Canadian experience yet possesses, as well, applicability to the history of communications in other countries and on other continents" (Carey, p 27).

Although it is impossible here to do justice to the work of either Innis or Carey, it is useful to extract from their work one concept that provides the starting point for this brief exploration of the relationship between the mass media and society and of the role of the media as social institutions. Carey has written:

> When Innis spoke of monopolies of knowledge, his examples were often directed at problems that were physical and structural: speed of movement and access to stored information. But he also used the term in a stronger sense. He believed that the fundamental form of social power is the power to define what reality is. Monopolies of knowledge then in the cultural sense refer to the efforts of groups to determine the entire world view of a people: to produce, through the control of speech and ritual and art, an entire system of thought, an official view of reality. (Carey, pp 44-5)

The media are social institutions, developed or "invented" by society. It can be argued that in the twentieth century the mass media have acquired a great deal of social power -- of the power to define reality. Mass media systems can be viewed as innovations which have gained widespread acceptance by society because they have certain advantages in helping to serve societal needs or wants: they inform -- help watch the horizon, they teach -- help to transmit the culture, they persuade -- help to reach consensus, they entertain, and (in most cases in western society) help to sell merchandise and services (Rivers & Schramm, p 15). Carey completed his argument as follows:

> The impact of forms of communication, then, resides in the forms of social order and organization they call forth and facilitate, the forms of consciousness they support and the points at which they locate forms of authority. If this is what the phrase means then, in fact, the medium is the message. (Carey, p 51)

Although our understanding of the mechanisms through which the media participate in socialization processes is relative primitive, the existence of socialization effects is rarely disputed. On the contrary, we frequently hear of "the awesome power of the media." Current thinking about the "power" of the media is that the influences are much less immediate, direct, and predictable than was once thought. We have learned that people come to the mass media (as to other forms of communication) seeking what they want, that they have their defences up, and that they place great reliance on their own social groups and their own advisors -- on interpersonal communication. The power of the media is now visualized not as a tidal wave, but as a meandering river gradually depositing layers of information and opinion. Compared to the occasional and dramatic changes once attributed to the mass media, this never-ending effect is immensely more powerful and pervasive (Rivers & Schramm, pp 27-8).

Smith reports one view of the role of the broadcast media in Britain:

> Thirty years ago R.S. Lambert summed up his experiences in the first decade of broadcasting in Britain with a picture of the broadcasting institution as the centre of a web of social contacts. Every group contending for the attention of the new mass audience had to find a path to its door. 'Today, the BBC holds -- in the field of art, intellect and politics -- the power once exercised by the Court. It has become the main indirect organ of government, all the more potent because its influence is indirect.... No doubt the tendency is inevitable -- and we are doomed, in this twentieth century to see individualism in art, music, drama, literature and journalism disappear and in its place a kind of corporate system, within which the formerly independent thinker, writer, performer will have to seek absorption.' (Smith 1973, p 15)

Smith himself views the role of broadcasting in terms even more critical than those of Lambert:

> Broadcasting, in the process of rapid growth over half a century, has acquired a role of such magnitude that it (and its controllers) can steer the course of entire cultures; just as an economy can be manipulated today by a few who control the major offices in a few large corporations, so can a culture be oriented in certain directions by a tiny group of broadcasting impressarios whose main motive is the preservation of their own institutions intact rather than the actual 'good' of the culture concerned. (Smith 1973, p 17)

Given the widespread belief in the power of the media as socialization mechanisms, it is not surprising that they are criticized whenever individuals or groups determine that the media output does not adequately represent their opinions and perceptions to others -- whenever they become dissatisfied with the media definition of reality.

Some of this criticism arises from new and existing groupings of individuals who are dissatisfied with the portrayal of their role in society -- groupings such as blacks, women, native peoples, ethnic communities, gay people, and so on.

Criticism also arises because of dissatisfaction with the extent and/or style of treatment in media output of the values and ideas and beliefs held with respect to such diverse matters as law and order, sexual mores, drug abuse, religious convictions, reform of the free enterprise system, political ideology, and so on.

The inevitability of such criticism was expressed quite colourfully in the report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media:

> In a land of bubblegum forests and lollipop trees, every man would have his own newspaper or broadcasting station, devoted exclusively to programming that man's opinions and perceptions. (Davey 1970a, p 4)

Tensions between societies and their media institutions are neither new nor surprising. These tensions have for the most part, at least until recently, arisen from questions about the content of the media output, rather than from debate about the existence, function, and structure of the media. Smith argues that the tensions result from characteristics of mass society rather than from factors peculiar to broadcasting:

> I think that the actual technical development of broadcasting took directions which were dictated by a new configuartion of market forces and social beliefs about the nature of mass society; broadcasting thus arrived in the 1920s in a form which seemed to offer solutions to the fears existing at that moment about the volatile nature of mass society. Broadcasting had to find a way to inform and entertain without overstimulating the audience. (Smith 1973, p 17)

> Certain social, cultural, educational and political dilemmas had been apparent in mass society for a generation. Those dilemmas, to this day unresolved, have dominated all the decisions which have shaped the development of Marconi's wireless discoveries. The story of broadcasting can therefore be read as the story of the interaction of a series of inventions with a series of beliefs about the nature of twentieth-century mass societies. The organisation of broadcasting, the institutions which govern it, the divisions of labour within it, the methods of financing it, the development of the very types of programme used in radio and television, all the conscious and unconscious assumptions of which the business of broadcasting is compounded, can be made to reveal, like geological strata, the successive encrustations of the argument about the culture and government of a society of masses. (p 22)

e) THE MIRROR ANALOGY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Complete satisfaction with the performance of the media has to be relegated to "a land of bubblegum forests and lollipop trees" because selection decisions, or selection processes, intervene. The limitations implicit in the concept of "mass" media are such that the media can't be all things to all people all of the time. The responsibility for the determination of what services the media do provide falls to the operators of the mass media institutions.

Broadcasters typically do not talk about the nature or scope of their responsibility for determining media content. On the contrary, they prefer to portray the media in a fashion that distracts attention from media influences on society and from the fact that selection processes are at work. The most common device for this type of portrayal is the "mirror" analogy. US commercial network presidents are particularly attracted to it; Epstein reported:

> Leonard H. Goldenson, president of the ABC television network, thus testified before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence that complaints of news distortion were due entirely to the fact that "Americans are reluctant to accept the images reflected by the mirror we have held up to our society." Robert D. Kasmire, a vice president of NBC, also told the commission, "There is no doubt that television is, to a large degree, a mirror of society. It is also a mirror of public attitudes and preferences." Reuven Frank [president of the NBC news division] further advanced this notion in an article entitled "The Ugly Mirror," asserting that "individuals working in television organizations do not make the decisive difference; the fact that television is there makes the difference." The "mirror," Frank concluded, is being blamed for the ugly events it reflects: "Television has become the object of what psychoanalysts call transference." The president of NBC, Julian Goodman, putting it in more fashionable terms, told the commission, "In short, the medium is being blamed for the message." The president of CBS, Frank Stanton, testifying before a House committee, explained, "What the media do is hold a mirror up to society and try to report it as faithfuly as possible".... (Epstein, pp 13-4)

The mirror analogy, though poetically attractive, has a definite tendency to distract attention from the responsibility of media operators for content selection. As it is frequently used, the analogy suggests a "perfect" mirror: instantaneous in its reflection, totally free from distortion, infinite in its dimensions, and pointed in all directions simultaneously. There is, I think, a place for the term "reflection" in discussion of broadcasting, but its use must be distinguished from use of the mirror analogy to argue that selection of media content does not take place. The CBC English Television submission to the CRTC, for instance, used the analogy but recognized responsibility:

> The national broadcasting service must be a clear mirror in which the Canadian people can see themselves in all their diversity -- and thus confront the subtle and elusive substance of their unity. Those who would deny that unity are themselves part of the diversity, and to exclude them would be to falsify the reflection of the Canadian people to themselves in the national network service. (CBC 1973b, p 32)

In THE UNCERTAIN MIRROR, the Special Senate Committee commented on the role of institutions in exerising the power of selection:

> We hestitate to wade too deeply into the swamps of sociology and McLuhanism, but it does seem clear that all the conflict, the hassle, the demonstrations, the social anguish which currently surround us have at least one common characteristic: they're all concerned with people versus institutions. From China's cultural revolution to Czechoslovakia's counterrevolution, from the high school sit-in to the Red Power movement, this theme is a constant.
>
> The media, precisely because they are institutions, are involved in this conflict -- and they are involved as participants. One of the truly depressing aspects of our enquiry was the ingenuous view of so many media owners that they are mere spectators. They're not spectators. They control the presentation of news, and therefore have a vast and perhaps disproportionate say in how our society defines itself.... Of course the people won't always vote the way the editorial writers tell them on next week's sewer bylaw; but who decides when they'll start thinking and talking about sewers -- or whether they'll ever worry about pollution at all? (Davey 1970a, pp 7-8)

Schramm and Alexander have observed: "All discussions of broadcasting ultimately come back to programming and, consequently, to the public interest." Speaking specifically about US commercial broadcasting, they commented:

> The obvious answer of the broadcasting industry to its critics is that you want the people to be given what you think they ought to have; we give them what they want....
>
> This question of responsibility will be continually with a broadcasting system that is expected to pay in responsibility for its freedom. There is no easy answer or simple rule to define programming responsibiity, but it may be instructive to quote what the Pilkington Committee in Britain said about the same problem as it impinged on British broadcasting: "The choice is not between either giving the public what it wants, or giving the public 'what someone thinks is good for it,' and nothing else. There is an area of possibility between the two; and it is within this area that the choice lies. The broadcasting authorities have certainly a duty to keep sensitively aware of the public's tastes and attitudes as they now are and in all their variety; and to care about them. But if they do more than that, this is not to give the public 'what someone thinks is good for it.' It is to respect the public's right to choose from the widest possible range of subject matter and so to enlarge worthwhile experience. Because, in principle, the possible range of subject matter is inexhaustible, all of it can never be presented, nor can the public know what the range is. So, the broadcaster must explore it, and choose from it first. This might be called 'giving a lead': but it is not the lead of the autocratic or arrogant. It is the proper exercise of responsibility by public authorities duly constituted as trustees of the public interest." (Schramm & Alexander, pp 613-4)

f) THE SPECIAL ROLE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING

Public broadcasters do not frequently hide behind superficial applications of the mirror analogy: those who have seriously considered the role of their institutions recognize their responsibility for the content of the public media. In addition, they frequently find themselves reminded of their responsibilities by governments, regulatory agencies, the press, other groups, and individual citizens. It does not necessarily follow, however, that mere recognition of this responsibility makes its discharge any easier. In fact, it is possible that a heightened sense of responsibility makes selection decision making more difficult.

Balance, Fairness, and Political Independence

Perhaps the most obvious responsibilities in public broadcasting are those related to the handling of controversial political matters. The public broadcasting tradition is that these media institutions must not be manipulated by political or ideological cliques and that they must be free from political interference by governments.

In some western countries these concerns have led to the deliberate "insulation" of public broadcasting institutions from their funding governments. One of the principal arguments offered in support of long range funding schemes has always been that such arrangements would serve to further protect public broadcasting from year to year attempts at political interference.

Frequently concerns about bias, interference, and the handling of controversial matters are the subject of specific mandate provisions. In Canada, the Broadcasting Act declares that "the programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system should be varied and comprehensive and should provide reasonable opportunity for the expression of differing views on matters of public concern" (Act, s 3.d). The US Public Broadcasting Act charges CPB to maintain "strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature" (Macy, p 166). In Britain, the matter of balance, fairness, and independence, though not dealt with at length in the BBC's Charter or Licence, is the subject of a "Prescribing Memorandum" from the Secretary of State and of declared BBC policy:

> Balance within the single programme is not sought after religiously on every occasion but only where circumstances, and the nature of the issue being discussed, are deemed to call for it. The identification of those circumstances is a matter for careful editorial judgment.
>
> Secondly, it has never been the policy of the BBC to try to 'balance' news bulletins internally. The content of bulletins is manifestly dependent on the uncontrolled succession of events which make the news, from hour to hour and from day to day. To attempt to balance it artificially would be to distort it. And, in any case, over a period of time the news tends to be self-balancing....
>
> The statement about the BBC's impartiality needs one footnote: impartiality does not imply an Olympian neutrality or detachment from those basic moral and constitutional beliefs on which the nation's life is founded. The BBC does not feel obliged for example to appear neutral as between truth and untruth, justice and injustice, freedom and slavery, compassion and cruelty, tolerance and intolerance (including racial intolerance). This is an important reservation, but not one which detracts from the BBC's overall determination to be impartial in its presentation of controversial issues. (BBC, pp 284-5)

The BBC approach tends to have been adopted as the model for the public broadcasting systems in Canada and the US and, although charges of bias are frequently leveled against public broadcasting (as they are against all media), the basic principles of balance and fairness are fairly widely understood and accepted. One aspect of the "impartiality" stance of the BBC that is frequently overlooked in the discussion of public broadcasting elsewhere is the relationship between that impartiality and institutional independence. The BBC has noted:

> It should be stressed that the policy of impartiality is closely bound up with the independent status of the BBC. Without genuine independence, it is difficult, if not impossible, for broadcasters to maintain the highest standard of truthfulness and impartiality. Conversely, without having established a reputation for just those qualities it is difficult for any broadcasting organisation to be recognised as truly independent and worthy of trust. (BBC, p 285)

Smith has observed that "broadcasting arrived encrusted in the assumption that it was an instrument by which a few voices addressed a multitude, without response." Consequently, he argues:

> It was necessary to contain and control the minds and energies of these few, and the new technology thus came to be housed in institutions on which was imposed an 'ideology' of a kind which would keep them out of trouble -- that ideology is variously described as 'objectivity' or 'impartiality', and it is instructive to observe the ever-changing meanings which these words are given as each broadcasting organisation struggles for survival in the sceptial political environment. (Smith 1973, p 17)

Balance, Range, and Optimization

In the commercial broadcasting environment, success is measured in a relatively simple and direct fashion. The shareholders in the enterprise are concerned that the business be financially successful. Within limits imposed by public service requirements and other licensing conditions, the management of a commercial broadcasting operation has a responsibility to shareholders to maximize profits. One element in this profit maximization process is the control of expenditures; the other, of course, is the generation of as much gross revenue as possible. The search is for the optimum operating point -- the point at which the rate of spending and the rate of income are balanced in such a way that the maximum possible return on investment results. Given the operating logic of the advertising industry which supports commercial television broadcasting, the search for the optimum operating point translates very directly into a search for the largest possible audiences. The consequences of this fact of commercial life have been the subject of volumes and volumes of comment. While one may be alarmed at the long range cultural consequences, it is clear that the provision of "least common denominator" program services provides the maximum return to shareholders in the existing advertising and commercial broadcasting context. The balance between different types of programming is determined by popularity considerations. Entertainment programming predominates, those programs capable of attracting the largest audience shares are scheduled at times when the greatest numbers of people are watching television, and so on. The commercial broadcaster seeks to make the best possible use of the medium for his purposes, and those purposes are primarily financial. In short, the commercial broadcaster seeks to serve "the market."

In public broadcasting, the determination of what is "the best possible use of the medium" is infinitely more complicated. There is no single criterion, such as profit maximization, to guide all decisions. But, for a public broadcasting organization using public funds to provide services on the public airwaves, there is a responsibility to optimize the level of service to the public. This particular responsibility is perhaps the most difficult for public broadcasters to discharge.

Its discharge is further complicated by the fact that a public broadcaster's "public" and his "audience" are not identical. It is clear that members of what may be termed the "active" public -- politicians, members of organized groups, and individuals especially concerned with the welfare of the public at large -- have great potential political influence on the support and control of public broadcasting; they are frequently its least attentive listeners or viewers. The views of those who spend the most time with the media are frequently the least actively expressed. Alan Thomas noted that commissions and committees investigating broadcasting hear primarily from the active public, and from those concerned with the market:

> The Audience is an entity in its own right and must be understood as such. A great deal of broadcasting policy in Canada has been formulated on the basis that the audience is simply either the public or the consumer in disguise, and only the most temporary of phenomenon.... In all countries that have admitted electronic media, both the public and the market have assumed that these media were a simple means of directly extending their influence. Instead they have, almost inadvertently, created a new and puzzling phenomen, the audience. What used to be referred to as "the listening public" has taken on a mysterious and perplexing character of its own. (Thomas, p 27)

The approach in this study, admittedly an oversimplification, is to consider the population as a whole to constitute "the public," and to consider that public, as distinct from the "active" public (organizations, agencies, groups, and so on), as the appropriate potential audience for public broadcasting.

If a public broadcasting organization attempts to maximize the size of its audience at all times, "least common denominator" fare will prevail, and its programming will be similar to that provided by commercial broadcasters whose purpose it is to serve "the market." While an appreciable segment of the public may be satisfied with such a service, individual interests and tastes differ and other significant segments of the public may find nothing at all of interest in the program service provided.

Both the concept of "public" broadcasting and the use of public funding, generated by a taxation system not connected with the viewing of television, carry the implication that service should be provided to all segments of the public, to all individuals in the nation. Because it is impossible to provide programming that will be of interest to all people (at any given time, much less continuously), it is therefore necessary that a range of services be provided so that, at one time or another, the public broadcasting system provides service appropriate for all members of the public. Range of programming is not, however, a one dimensional matter. It is perhaps easiest to consider two clusters of range dimensions, loosely grouped in audience and in content terms.

The potential audience for public television, the public as a whole, is not an undifferentiated mass of identical individuals. Peple differ from each other in ways, or along dimensions, such as age, sex, ethnic origin, level of education, occupation, level of income, place of dwelling, family obligations, physical mobility, hours of work, and so on. Each of these factors has implications for the planning of appropriate public programming services.

Interests differ to at least as great an extent. Some people profess no interest in light, diversionary entertainment; others frequently seek relaxation. Some are especially interested in the fine arts, some in sports, some in international relations, some in steam railroading, some in music, and so on and on. Even within interest groupings, tastes differ. Some people participate actively in sports and outdoor activities; others prefer to be spectators. No one need be told that tastes in music differ.

Despite the wide variations in the individual characteristics of members of the potential audience, and in the interests and tastes of those individuals, public broadcasting has a special responsibility to serve the whole of the public. In Canada, this responsibility is expressed in the Broadcasting Act as follows:

> The national broadcasting service should be a balanced service of information, enlightenment and entertainment for prople of different ages, interests and tastes covering the whole range of programming in fair proportion. (Act, s 3.g.i)

This provision of the Broadcasting Act raises another aspect of the special responsibilities of public broadcasting: the provision of a balanced service. A balance must be struck between entertainment and information programming, between programming for high school students and corporate executives, between programming for amateur hockey players and opera lovers. The English Television licence renewal submission commented:

> The interpretation of the concept of "balance" in television programming is not a simple matter. It raises a multitude of questions, both theoretical and practical. The CBC's mandate in the Broadcasting Act charges the Corporation with the provision of a service which is "balanced", and the Act stipulates certain primary "dimensions" (age, interests, and tastes) to be considered in establishing such balance. Not surprisingly, as these provisions in the Corporation's mandate are translated into actual broadcast plans it often emerges that the achievement of balance in one dimension is in conflict with the maintenance of balance in another.
>
> From a practical standpoint, the way in which balance and range considerations, other provisions in the mandate, and resource constraints are harmonized hy the English Television Network can be seen in the network's weekly program schedule....
>
> The basis for the division of program time among the various types of programs arises from the profiles of the actual and potential audiences for network television. By its nature television is a mass medium, and a national television network directed to meet all tastes must program adequately in mass terms in order to use the medium effectively. This does not mean that any significant subject or area of taste and interest can be neglected, but it does mean that the programming mix must be designed with the total profile of the potential audience clearly in mind. That profile contains Canadians of diverse social and ethnic backgrounds, and of widely differing economic and social circumstances. The characteristic viewer is the ordinary Canadian, and although there is no such thing as the average man, common tastes and widespread interests must be well reflected in the program balance. There must also, of course, be programs which can broaden those tastes and interests.
>
> The broadcasting of the English Television Network service does not take place in a vacuum. It takes place in the North American broadcast environment against direct domestic competition, in long-standing competition along the border against foreign broadcasters who are extremely powerful and skilled in the popular entertainment arts, and increasingly in the face of their encroachment even further into the Canadian market via cable. (CBC 1973b, p 1)

This excerpt raises one of the central issues in current debates about the role of public broadcasting: the extent to which programming for a "mass" audience is appropriate. Inevitably, the answer is that there should be programming both for large and for specialized audiences. Both types of programming are already provided by all broadcasters, both public and private. The argument is about balance.

As noted in the CBC submission, program planning in public television is complicated by the extent to which popular entertainment programming is made available by commercial broadcasters. One possible approach is to leave the provision of light entertainment programming to the private operators, and to use public television for those services not provided by the public sector. This provision of "alternative" programming is the role taken on by public broadcasting in the United States. But, to many, this approach seems to have disturbing implications for the level of public support for public broadcasting, and so the matter of institutional survival enters the already complex service balancing process. In the Canadian situation, there is additionally the question of whether the exclusive or predominant provision of "alternative" service is consistent with the national broadcasting service's national unity and Canadian identity mandate obligations.

Leadership and Public Service

Running through many of the debates about mass media journalism are musings about the rights of editors to select what will and will not be reported. They are musings, not serious questions, because there are obvious and inescapable requirements for decision making that can only be satisfied if the number of people immediately involved is limited. There is thus a requirement for responsibility. The discharge of this responsibility requires leadership, the development of editorial policies, and the implementation of those policies.

The same is true in the overall management of public broadcasting. The responsibilities of broadcasters for program service content were considered in the section on the "mirror" analogy. The broadcaster must explore the possible range of programming and choose from it first.

As trustees of the public interest, the managers of public broadcasting institutions have a special responsibility for the definition of reality that they provide. The view of reality must be complete: no segments of the public should be systematically excluded, intentionally or unintentionally. And the view must be contemporary: programming must be sensitive and responsive to current ideas, conditions, and trends in society -- it must be "in touch." And the actual "good" of the culture concerned must come before even matters of institutional survival.

As the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 was signed into law, the President of the United States, Lyndon Johnson, delivered a charge to public broadcasters which has universal applicability:

> Television is still a young invention. But we have learned already that it has immense -- even revolutionary -- power to change, to change our lives. I hope that those who lead the corporation will direct that power toward the great and not the trivial purposes. At its best, public television would help make our nation a replica of the old Greek marketplace, where public affairs took place in view of all citizens. But in weak or irresponsible hands, it could generate controversy without understanding; it could mislead as well as teach; it could appeal to passions rather than to reason. If public television is to fulfill our hopes, then the corporation must be long on enlightened leadership. (Macy, p 29)

Methodology Background

Chapter 4

The Participant Observer Tradition

a) APPLICABILITY

The technique of participant observation is a research method developed primarily in the field of social anthropology. Recently, however, it has come to be adopted more frequently in the study of media institutions. A recent case study of the planning and implementation of community communication systems in the Canadian North (Hudson) was based on participant observation. The investigations of the operation of television program units reviewed in Chapter 2 (Elliott; Epstein) were observer studies. Elliott noted:

> Participant observation, more than most methods in social research, seems to attract extreme reactions from critics and enthusiasts. Its advantages lie in the possibility of tackling social process and relationships within the social situation. It is not simply a way of studying individuals but of individuals within society, covering not only beliefs and behaviour but also the characteristic features of the setting as observed and as experienced by the actors. A commonly held middle position in evaluating the method is that it is a legitimate first step in exploratory research which can then be backed up by other techniques.... But different research techniques should be seen as complimentary, differently suited to a variety of research problems, rather than ranged in a hierarchy in which participant observation is relegated to preliminary status. (Elliott, p 170)

The intention here is not to debate the merits of the method in general or to examine its operational details, but simply to review those aspects of the participant observer approach which are of particular relevance to this study. For standard treatments of the method, see Selltiz (1959), Whyte (1955), Bruyn (1966), and McCall and Simmons (1969).

Participant observation has the advantage of providing access to the research situation under conditions as close to "normal" as possible. In discussing the use of the participant observer approach in THE MAKING OF A TELEVISION SERIES, Elliott commented:

> This method matches the personal, particularistic features of media organizations and their occupational milieu. General, formal approaches may be met with suspicious resistance, similar to that shown by members of other organizations and occupational groups, but compounded by such factors as the publicity associated with work for the media and, internally, by the nature of career routes and employment opportunities....
>
> One drawback to participant observation as a method of research is that the situation observed and the account recorded may have been arranged for the benefit of the researcher. A good answer to this criticism is that deliberate distortion is much less likely to occur if an observer is present over a period of time, than

> it is, for example, in responses to a questionnaire or interview. Moreover, other goals, such as getting the work done or the programmes produced, inevitably take precedence over any aim to mislead the researcher. Participant observation is not so much a single method as a battery of methods, including most of the other research techniques in embryo. For this reason it was particularly suited to the present project, enabling a wide range of research questions and interests to be handled continuously. A specific technique would have required an initial decision on the precise focus of the research. This is not to say that the research had no focus at the start, but rather from the outset that there was a continual interaction between theoretical assumptions and interests, general and specific hypotheses and the data of the particular case. This case study approach, like the 'extended case' method in social anthropology, on which it is to some extent modelled, incorporates the dynamics of behaviour and process while allowing beliefs and organization to be explored in more static, structural terms. (Elliott, pp 6-8)

The advantages of participant observation are more easily understood by reference to studies which have used such as approach than by the examination of theoretical considerations. An excellent demonstration of the importance of close observation was provided by Jane Jacobs in THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES. Jacobs provided no extended discussion of her research method: none was required. The book was an attack on the principles and aims that have shaped modern, orthodox city planning and rebuilding. Jacobs argued that the urban planning tradition had failed because its practitioners had not learned how real cities work in real life:

> Cities are an immense laboratory of trial and error, failure and success, in city building and city design. This is the laboratory in which city planning should have been learning and forming and testing its theories. Instead the practitioners and teachers of this discipline (if such it can be called) have ignored the study of success and failure in real life, have been incurious about the reasons for unexpected success, and are guided instead by principles derived from the behavior of towns, suburbs, tuberculosis sanatoria, and imaginary dream cities -- from anything but cities themselves. (Jacobs, p 6)

Jacobs' perspective, and the importance she attached to involved observation, were revealed in an account of a telephone conversation with a Boston planning official. She was calling from the heart of an area which, although considered a "slum," appeared to her to be a comfortable, safe, and happy neighbourhood. After learning from the planner that the area had the lowest delinquency, disease, and infant mortality rates in the city and the lowest ratio of rent to income in the city, she was told that the area was a terrible slum that had to be changed. "You should have more slums like this," Jacobs said. "Don't tell me there are plans to wipe this out. You ought to be down here learning as much as you can from it" (Jacobs, p 10).

THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES based its arguments for revised thinking about city planning on the results of Jacobs' observation of the social functions of neighbourhoods -- her own and others which were observed over extended periods of time. Over and over Jacobs made the case for observation and familiarization:

> If only well-meaning officials in departments of the city government or in freewheeling authorities knew intimately, or cared about, the streets or districts which their schemes so vitally affect -- or if they knew in the least what the citizens of that place consider of value in their lives, and why. So many of the conflicts would never occur if planners and other supposed experts understood in the least how cities work and respected those workings. (Jacobs, p 406)

The dangers in conducting investigations from the "outside" are also best understood through a look at completed studies. The conclusions of this study differ markedly from those of William Preshing's 1965 study of the CBC's commercial activities and their inter-relationship to the Corporation's objectives and development. Preshing concluded that, "to the extent that the CBC has been successful in attaining its objectives, its commercial activities have assisted in this attainment" (Preshing, p 113).

The investigation was external: "To test the hypotheses, the relevant literature was surveyed. This consisted of the CBC's Annual Reports, the Reports of the various Royal Commissions, Parliamentary Committee Reports, material from the learned and professional journals and magazines, and from popular works" (p 3).

Ten years later the impact of the CBC's commercial activities on the achievement of its objectives was the subject of intense public debate. The matter is taken up at length in later chapters: my conclusion was that the dysfunctional impact was significant. The differences in the findings of the two studies arise primarily because of the methodological differences. Preshing based his analysis on "the relevant literature" -- the most detailed of which was a CBC survey of public opinion. On the other hand, my observations of the daily operations of the network management group suggest that the most significant consequences of the CBC's commercial involvement were internal, and that only the less important effects could be seen by "outsiders" -- whether those outsiders were private citizens, media columnists, academic researchers, or broadcasting regulators. Assessment of the merits of the different conclusions about commercial activity is left with the reader, but it seems important to note here the differences in the methodological approaches.

b) LIMITATIONS AND PRECAUTIONS

Although the method has its advantages in terms of access and flexibility, there are tendencies which present problems in maintaining "objectivity" and in avoiding becoming so accustomed to the setting under study that the original perspective becomes lost. Selltiz noted:

> The participant observer faces especially severe difficulties in maintaining objectivity. He is likely to develop friendly relations with some of the people he is studying.... A full record of interviews and observations is as important in maintaining the objectivity of the researcher as it is in providing research data.
>
> Becoming involved in a situation may lessen the sharpness of observation not only because the investigator identifies with his informants but also because he becomes accustomed to certain kinds of behavior. To get access to intimate data, the observer allows himself to become absorbed in the local culture, but then this very absorption process makes him take for granted behavior that he should be trying to explain.... It is ... helpful to describe and explain his observations regularly to someone outside of the situation. The outsider does not take as much for granted, and his questions are a safeguard against growing blind spots. (Selltiz, pp 214-5)
>
> At first sight, it might seem that a high degree of participation could be justified only as an inevitable compromise with the practical demands of the situation. For a high degree of participation not only demands more effort on the part of the investigator, but introduces a new person into the community -- the participant observer, whose presence may change it to an unknown extent. However, participation in community life can actually enhance the "naturalness" of the observer's position. There are many situations in which the observer might well be experienced as an inhibiting stranger unless he undertook a function meaningful to the members of the community.... Through intensive participation in community

> life, the observer exposes himself to experiences that give him a firsthand knowledge of the more subtle pressures and counterpressures to which the members of the community are exposed. His introspection about his own experiences as a participant represents one of the most fruitful means of understanding the community's characteristics. (p 220)

About "objectivity" in social science research, Gunnar Myrdal commented:

> A "disinterested" social science has never existed and never will exist. For logical reasons, it is impossible. A view presupposes a viewpoint. Research, like every other rationally pursued activity, must have a direction. The viewpoint and the direction are determined by our interest in the matter. Valuations enter into the choice of approach, the selection of problems, the definition of concepts, and the gathering of data, and are by no means confined to the practical or political inferences drawn from theoretical findings. (Mrydal, p 32)

Heather Hudson commented further:

> Social science research is never purely objective. The researcher always carries his own set of personal biases, assumptions and expectations. His discipline introduces biases in terms of which variables he can measure and how he choses criteria to determine success or failure. The selection process of what to evaluate itself limits the scope and channels the research. These are necessary considerations in doing research, but it should be remembered that the outcome cannot then possibly be complete objectivity. Rather than attempting the impossible, the researcher should be called upon to make his position and assumptions explicit. (Hudson, p 11)

Chapter 8 provides a detailed review of this participant observer's background, intended to indicate the directions of the personal biases, assumptions, and expectations at work in this study.

Chapter 5

Models and Alternate Modes of Analysis

a) RELATED RESEARCH AREAS

A case study of decision making in a public television institution falls comfortably under the heading of "communication research." But it is clearly also a study of organizational behaviour of a sort more frequently considered to be the sociology of institutions. This study had its origins in the communication research tradition, and its focus is directed more towards the general study of a particular mass media system than towards the intensive investigation of organizational behaviour. However, there is here an intersection of the two traditions which is not only inevitable but also profitable.

The formal study of organizational decision making draws ideas from a variety of academic disciplines -- most conspicuously from economics, sociology, political science, business administration, and pschology. The types of organizations studied include business firms, schools, public bureaucracies, universities, hospitals, churches, navies, and so on. Although some attention has been paid to noting differences among different types of institutions, much of the effort has been directed towards identifying characteristics of decision making that have significance across institutions.

Decision making in any organization is heavily influenced by the "inputs" to the organization, by the environment in which it operates. There is no obvious reason why this should not be the case within the CBC. Consequently, considerable attention is devoted to the examination of CBC English Television's management decision making environment -- including the historical, geographical, political, economic, and industrial settings.

But decision making in an institution is also influenced, sometimes quite significantly, by "internal" characteristics of the organization itself. Some of these internal characteristics are a predictable function of the structural form of the institution; others are commonly found in all organizations, regardless of their structure; some of these internal characteristics are peculiar to specific organizations. Again, there is no obvious reason why these three types of internal characteristics should not have been expected to be present in CBC English Television. In the case of internal characteristics which are a function of structure or which are common to many organizations, their observed presence in the CBC is most easily explained in this study through reference to the observations of those who have specialized in the study of organizational decision making across a wide variety of types of institutions. Rather than attempt an integrated review of the organizational decision making literature here, the relevant findings are cited in the analysis sections.

As well as borrowing from the main stream of general organizational research, this study also takes advantage of studies already completed in a more specialized area, that of organizational communication. Organizational communication research had its roots as a new discipline in several fields -- including anthropology, industrial sociology, industrial psychology, management theory, and communication theory. This approach to the study of organizations, through analysis of communication behaviour, has an obvious attraction for a communication researcher: the basis for analysis is a body of research findings already familiar to students of communication. In addition, however, the organizational communication approach can contribute significantly to the understanding of decentralized institutions, such as the CBC, which are large, complex, and heavily dependent on internal communication channels and networks. The principal references used are Gerald M. Goldhaber's ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION (1974), which deals primarily with the kinds of communication behaviour currently practiced in most complex organizations, and COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS (1976) by Everett M. Rogers and Rekha Agarwala-Rogers, a new volume which provides a synthesis of organizational communication research to date.

b) MODELS AND APPROACH TO ANALYSIS

Starting with the next chapter, this study begins to focus more and more on the CBC. But it is a gradual focusing process: because so much background has been presented, and because so much more follows before analysis begins in Chapter 11, it may be useful at this point to establish the boundaries of this study and to explain the linkage between the "background" and "analysis" sections.

Implicit in the organization of this study, and in its attention to "background," is the assumption that the program decision making "environment" is an important factor in shaping the decision making processes under study. The distinction between "the environment" and "the organization" is now common in studies of organizations. Goldhaber advanced as one of the three basic propositions underlying the study of organizational communication the following: "Organizational communication occurs within a complex open system which is influenced by and influences its environment" (Goldhaber, p 11).

The application of general models to actual situations requires very careful specification of the boundaries of the elements of the model. Figure 5-1 presents a basic structural model of the relationship between an organization and its environment. Figure 5-2 applies this simple model to the CBC, and serves to demonstrate the difficulties in establishing boundary specifications. The identification of concentrations of interest and influence in Figure 5-2 is arbitrary and intended only to illustrate the complexity of the environment.

Figure 5-1. SIMPLE STRUCTURAL MODEL: AN ORGANIZATION AND ITS ENVIRONMENT



- An organization is an open system because of its constant interaction with its environment.
- Organizations receive input from their environment and send outputs into their environment.

Based on Goldhaber, pp 10, 41.

In this case the basic relationship between the organization and its environment derives from the Broadcasting Act -- which declares a "Broadcasting Policy for Canada," establishes the CBC for the purpose of providing "the national broadcasting service," and specifies the objectives for that service. In short, the organization is the institution created by Parliament to provide the national broadcasting service: the CBC; the environment is the nation: Canada.

Figure 5-2. SIMPLE STRUCTURAL MODEL: THE CBC AND ITS ENVIRONMENT


Individual Citizens
Media Columnists
The Regulatory Agency
The Cabinet
Interest Groups
ORGANIZATION: The National Broadcasting Service (CBC)
Treasury Board
Focus: ESD TV
The Fine Arts
Parliamentary Committees
The Popular Arts
Affiliated Stations
Commercial Broadcast Industry
And so on ...
ENVIRONMENT: The Nation (Canada)

The outer limits of the environment are easier to define than those between the institution and the environment, though as Figure 5-2 suggests, they can scarcely be considered "limits" at all. As noted in Chapter 3, public broadcasting mandates typically define or imply objectives for programming and service which are global in scope. Even if this were a study of the CBC in its entirety, there would be severe problems in defining the boundaries between the organization and its environment. Within the ranks of those who specialize in the study of organizations there are those who argue that such boundaries are dysfunctionally artificial and, more importantly, that an organization does not simply adapt to a ready-made environment but actually has a role in reshaping its environment. Karl Weick has argued:

> To say that the organization adapts to itself and to that which is not itself, doesn't say much. We need to know specifically what is being adapted to by what means. Until adaptation is localized and boundaries between inside and outside are removed or made more explicit, it will be difficult to know very much about what an organization is, what it does, or why it does it. (Weick, p 28)

In this case any attempt to clearly fix boundaries would be further complicated by the fact that this is a study of one part of an institution. The focus is on the CBC English Television Service: the French, Northern, and International Services are considered only incidentally, as is English Radio. Are these services "inside"? Is the CBC's Head Office part of the organization for this study, or is it part of the setting in which English Television operates? The distinctions would seem to be far less important than an awareness of the continuous and, in the case of the CBC, extensive interaction between the organization and its environment.

Systems theory models do not play an integral part in the analysis sections of this study, but they have provided useful pointers to types of institutional characteristics to be considered, and they have suggested schemes for the categorization of observations and generalizations. A model derived from general systems theory which portrays an

Figure 5-3. MODEL OF AN ORGANIZATION AS AN OPEN SYSTEM


Input
Transformation
Output
Feedback
Environment

- An organization is an OPEN SYSTEM because of its constant interaction with its environment.
- INPUT is that which is imported into the organization from the environment.
- TRANSFORMATION is the process by which the inputs are changed into outputs.
- OUTPUT is the product or service which the system exports into its environment.
- FEEDBACK accounts for the cyclic nature of systems. Some of the system's outputs are sent back into the system as new inputs.
- The nuts and bolts of systems theory is INTERDEPENDENCE -- the interlocking relationships between the parts of a system and the whole system.

Based on Goldhaber, pp 40-3.

Figure 5-4. MODEL OF THE CBC AS AN OPEN SYSTEM


INPUT
Segments of the Public
TRANSFORMATION
The Public Broadcasting Organization
(CBC English Services Division- Television)
OUTPUT
Public Broadcasting Service Programming
(CBC English Television Service)
Feedback
ENVIRONMENT: The Nation (Canada)

organization as on open system is presented in Figure 5-3. Figure 5-4 applies that general model to the program decision making process in public broadcasting. It also changes the basis for system analysis from conventional "inputs" and "outputs" to the flow of information. Weick noted:

> One of the more promising ways of treating the environment is in terms of information. Rather than regarding the crucial environment of organizations as consisting of raw materials and consumers of transformed raw materials, it seems

> possible to gain a more complete view of what happens if we take information and meaning as the critical commodities on which organizations operate, to which their processes are directed, and in terms of which their relations are established. (Weick, p 28)

Figure 5-5. OPEN SYSTEM MODEL OF THE CBC: INTERFACE AND INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS



The representation of the program decision making system presented in Figure 5-5 is obviously oversimplified and is not intended to be comprehensively representative. But it does give rise to certain observations about the relationship between a public broadcasting organization and its public and about the institutional characteristics of such organizations. The first such observation is that the relationship between the public broadcasting institution and its public is extremely complex. This fact affects this study to the extent that only certain aspects of the relationship have been selected for comment. The second observation arising from Figure 5-5 is that it is possible to think of two sets of institutional characteristics. These have been termed "interface" and "internal" characteristics. Interface characteristics refer to the ways in which the organization interacts with its sources of input where the institution comes into contact with its environment. These characteristics are sometimes relatively visible from "outside." Internal characteristics, on the other hand, are difficult to perceive accurately from outside; they refer to the inside workings of the organization; to the way in which elements of the institution respond to other internal elements.

The disctinction between interface and internal characteristics is somewhat artificial; in particular, the two sets of characteristics are highly interrelated. Nevertheless, the concept of two types of characteristics is a useful one. Public evaluation of the organization was based primarily on assessment of programming output and on observation of the institution at its interface with the public. Internal characteristics entered into such public evaluations principally through reports made by "outsiders" -- by media columnists and by Parliamentary commissions and committees. Consideration of a distinction between interface and internal characteristics makes possible the isolation of those internal characteristics which are common to many types of organizations.

To a great extent the organizational behaviour tradition findings describe the characteristics of the behaviour of individuals within organizations. Such findings principally explain the internal consequences of an organization's environment, structure, and processes.

The analysis of decision making processes is not entirely straightforward. Despite attempts to take all observable and reported factors into account, other factors may be highly significant. One of the reviewers of the plan for this study commented as follows:

> The decision-making process of a public organization is a most difficult thing to analyze. Besides the outside factors that you list correctly, there exist hidden and subjective motivations impossible to pinpoint but which, in the end, might outweigh the former. The decision taken may be right -- and could be and often is justified afterwards on rational ground -- but it might be based on reasons known only to the one who took the decision in the first place.
>
> On the other hand, and this may seem to contradict what I have just said, it could be argued that rarely is any one person in possession of every single element involved in any given decision. This will appear particularly true at middle management levels. I will let you decide whether this is a strength or a weakness.

The influence of hidden factors on the matters treated in this study is considered to be a possibility more than a strength or weakness. Both the general nature of the observations made and the use of multiple instances as bases for those observations are considered to reduce the risk of serious analysis errors. But such a risk exists and it is recognized.

Canadian Public Broadcasting Background

Chapter 6

The Canadian Perspective

a) COMMUNICATION AND CANADIAN NATIONHOOD

> *The existence of Canada, as a political and social entity, has always been heavily dependent upon effective east/west communications. This is the historical reason for the successive development of the routes of the voyageurs, coast-to-coast railways, telegraph and telephone systems, broadcasting services, airlines, the Trans-Canada Highway and, most recently, a domestic satellite communications system. These systems, counter-balancing the strong north/south pull of continentalism, have been essential for industrial and resource development, for the transmission and dissemination of information, and for the expression and sharing of social and cultural values.*
>
> *- Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada: A Position Paper of the Government of Canada, March 1973 (Green Paper, p 3)*

Effective communication systems may well be a more significant factor in the existence of Canada, as a political and social entity, than for any other nation on earth. In any event, there are few who would argue with the government position paper's statement quoted above that the existence of the country has always been "heavily dependent" on effective communication systems.

Although it will be argued in later chapters that "the CBC isn't as unique as it sometimes likes to think it is," the fact remains that it is, in many significant ways, quite unique. There are similarities between certain of the world's commercial broadcasting organizations, but there is probably no such thing as the "typical" public broadcasting institution. And if there is, the CBC is not that typical institution.

Many of the problems with which CBC English Television found itself confronted in early 1970s had their origins at least 50 years earlier. And many of its major problems arose from characteristics of Canada "as a political and social entity" that pre-date Confederation. Section 6(b) sketches the geographic and population distribution characteristics of the country. Sections 6(c) and 6(d) provide brief outlines of Canadian history in general and of Canadian broadcasting history. This background material is intended primarily for those not already familiar with the Canadian situation. I am not an historian. Because of that, and because the background provided here should be as objective as possible, sections 6(c) and 6(d) draw heavily on the works of those who truly are students of Canadian history. Rather than paraphrase their observations, I have quoted extensively.

b) THE CANADIAN SETTING

Both the public and private elements which together constitute "the Canadian broadcasting system" operate in an environment which is not only historically but also geographically and culturally unique. Certain aspects of the country's geography, of its population distribution, and of the distribution of the population by language are of particular consequence to broadcasting.

Geography

Kenneth McNaught's HISTORY OF CANADA begins with the following paragraph:

> From the time of the earliest records Canada has been part of a frontier, just as in her own growth she has fostered frontiers. The struggle of men and of metropolitan centres to extend and control those frontiers, as well as to improve life behind them, lies at the heart of Canadian history -- and geography determined many of the conditions of that struggle. (McNaught, p 7)

Figure 6-1 provides a basic outline map of the provinces and territories to serve as a framework for these observations by McNaught:

> Reaching from Atlantic to Pacific and flanked by huge islands on either coast, the half-continent exhibits sharply etched regions and substantial variations in climate. The most striking regional boundaries run along north-south lines, thus conveying the impression that the principal inhabited regions of the country are northward thrusts of similar regions in the United States. On the east coast the Atlantic provinces of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick are part of the rocky uplands of Appalachia whose southern reaches encompass the New England states. The St. Lawrence lowlands, which include the most southerly portion of the province of Quebec and the southern part of Ontario which thrusts like a peninsula into what is now the industrial heart of America, are similar in structure to northern New York state, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan. Beyond Lake Superior, and separated from southern Ontario by a thousand miles of rock highlands, stretch the Canadian prairies. Part of the immense interior plain of the continent, reaching from the Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic Ocean at the mouth of the Mackenzie River, the prairies are so integral a section of a north-south region that it is still possible along hundreds of miles of the Canadian-American border to be unsure of one's national location. Again, in the western Cordillera [principally in British Columbia and the Yukon], fruit and timber valleys, mountain ranges and mineral veins run unbroken across the man-made frontier of the forty-ninth parallel.
>
> So evident is this pattern that for years Canadian historians, economists and geographers endorsed the thesis that the 'natural' forces of the continent pointed towards political-economic integration of its parts. The popular, and even academic conclusion was that the Canadian nation had been built in the teeth of incredible geographic obstacles. (McNaught, pp 7-8)

Although assessments of the importance of "the natural north-south pull of the continent" differ, the absolute size of the land is an inescapable reality. Canada, at over 3.8 million square miles, is the second largest country by land area in the world.

Figure 6-1. MAP: CANADA - PROVINCES, TERRITORIES, AND CAPITALS


YUKON
Whitehorse
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
Yellowknife
BRITISH COLUMBIA
ALBERTA
Edmonton
Calgary
SASKATCHEWAN
Regina
MANITOBA
Winnipeg
ONTARIO
QUEBEC
NEWFOUNDLAND
St. John's
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
Charlottetown
NEW BRUNSWICK
Fredericton
NOVA SCOTIA
Halifax
Quebec
Montreal
OTTAWA
Toronto
Buffalo
Detroit
Boston
New York
Vancouver
Victoria
Seattle
West to East: 3,223 miles
South to North: 2,875 miles
LEGEND
PROVINCES
FEDERAL CAPITAL
Provincial Capitals
Other Cities


POPULATION DENSITY
5
10
20
50
Persons
Per
Square
Mile

Based on Britannica 1974a, p 723.

Figure 6-2. MAP: CANADA - POPULATION DENSITY DISTRIBUTION

Figure 6-3. POPULATION STATISTICS:
PROVINCES, TERRITORIES, CAPITALS, AND SELECTED URBAN CENTRES

PROVINCE / Centre[2]	Provincial Population	CMA[3] Population	Proportion of Total	Population Density (Persons per square mile)
BRITISH COLUMBIA	2,185,000		10.1 %	6.0
Vancouver		1,082,000		
* Victoria		196,000		
ALBERTA	1,628,000		7.5 %	6.4
* Edmonton		496,000		
Calgary		403,000		
SASKATCHEWAN	926,000		4.3 %	3.7
* Regina		141,000		
Saskatoon		126,000		
MANITOBA	988,000		4.6 %	3.9
* Winnipeg		540,000		
ONTARIO	7,703,000		35.7 %	18.7
* Toronto		2,628,000		
Hamilton		499,000		
St Catharines-Niagara		303,000		
London		286,000		
Windsor		259,000		
[Ottawa-Hull]		603,000		
QUEBEC	6,028,000		27.9 %	10.1
Montreal		2,743,000		
* Quebec		481,000		
NEW BRUNSWICK	635,000		2.9 %	22.4
Saint John		107,000		
* Fredericton		24,000		
NOVA SCOTIA	789,000		3.7 %	36.8
* Halifax		223,000		
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND	112,000		0.5 %	51.1
* Charlottetown		19,000		
NEWFOUNDLAND	522,000		2.4 %	3.3
* St John's		132,000		
YUKON	18,000		0.1 %	0.09
* Whitehorse		11,000		
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES	35,000		0.2 %	0.03
* Yellowknife		6,000		
TOTAL - CANADA	21,568,000		100 %	5.6

Notes:
1. All figures are from the 1971 Census of Canada.
2. * denotes provincial and territorial capitals.
3. Urban centre population figures are for "Census Metropolital Areas."
4. All population figures have been rounded to the nearest 1,000.

Sources: SC 1973b and SC 1973c.

Population Density and Geographical Distribution

In mid 1970 the population of the world was estimated to be 3,632 million, of which 321 million lived in North America. Only a little over 21 million were in Canada. Although the country has 6.8% of the world's land area, it has only 0.6% of the world's population.

The population is concentrated [illegible] southern part of the counrty: about 75% of the population lives in urban areas [illegible] concentrated within 100 miles of the United States border, 90% within 200 miles (on 12% of the land).

The east-west belt of population along the international boundary is not continuous: the population centres are separated from each other and strung together like beads on a string. The concentration of population into urbam centres is increasing: between 1966 and 1971 the urban population grew by 11.4%, and the cities over 100,000 expanded even more rapidly.

Each of the population clusters is nearer to a large centre in the United States than it is to a cluster within Canada: Boston for the Atlantic provinces; New York for

Figure 6-4. NATIONAL LAND AREA AND POPULATION COMPARISONS, MID 1972



Country	Land Area (Square Miles)	Population	Population Density (Persons per Square Mile)
Canada	3,851,809	21,848,000	5.7
United States	3,615,122	208,842,000	57.8
United Kingdom	94,217	55,798,000	592.2
Japan	145,711	106,958,000	734.0

Sources: Britannica 1974b, p 558 and CBC 1974c, p 38.

the Ottawa-St. Lawrence lowlands; Buffalo, Detroit, and Chicago for the Great Lakes lowlands; Minneapolis- St. Paul for the Prairies; and Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco for the west coast (Britannica 1974a, p 723).

The population density distribution by area is shown in Figure 6-2. Virtually all land in the northern halves of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and Newfoundland has a density of less than two persons per square mile. Figure 6-3 provides population statistics for the provinces and selected urban centres. The land masses and populations of Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan are compared in Figure 6-4.

Population Distribution by Language

Just as the overall pattern of population distribution has implications for the coverage requirements of the Canadian broadcasting system, so too does the distribution of the English and French components of the population.

The 1971 Census reported the "mother tongue" language of 60% of the population as English, of 27% as French, and of 13% as other languages. The geographical distribution of the two official language groups is not uniform: 84% of the French mother tongue languge group lives in Quebec. The Census figures by province appear in Figure 6-5.

The main elements of the "other" mother tongue component of the population are: German - 561,000 (2.6% of the total Canadian population), Italian - 538,000 (2.5%), Ukranian - 310,000 (1.4%), Indian and Eskimo - 180,000 (0.8%), Dutch - 145,000 (0.7%), Polish - 135,000 (0.6%), and Greek - 104,000 (0.5%). (SC 1973a)

Figure 6-5. POPULATION BY MOTHER TONGUE BY PROVINCE

	Population within Province by Mother Tongue			As a Proportion of the Total Canadian Language Group Population	
Province / Territory	% English	% French	% Other	% of Total English	% of Total French
British Columbia	83	2	16	14	1
Alberta	78	3	20	10	1
Saskatchewan	74	3	23	5	1
Manitoba	67	6	27	5	1
Ontario	78	6	16	46	8
Quebec	13	81	6	6	84
New Brunswick	65	34	1	3	4
Nova Scotia	93	5	2	6	1
Prince Edward Island	92	7	1	1	0.1
Newfoundland	99	1	1	4	0.1
Yukon	83	2	14	0.1	0.01
Northwest Territories	47	3	50	0.1	0.02
TOTAL - CANADA	60	27	13	100	100

Examples:
- English is the mother tongue of 78 % of the population of Ontario.
- Ontario accounts for 46 % of the English mother tongue population of Canada.

Source: 1971 Census of Canada (SC 1973a).

c) HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

This summary, by the noted Canadian historian, Ramsay Cook, is from CANADA 1974, published by Statistics Canada.

> Canada is an independent nation in North America composed of two predominant linguistic and cultural groups: French and English. To these major groups, and to the small native population of Indians and Inuit, have been added over the last hundred years many thousands of immigrants representing the major European cultures. For the most part these immigrant groups have associated themselves with the English-speaking community, though maintaining many aspects of their mother cultures. The country has thus never been a homogeneous melting pot, but has rather had the aspect of a cultural mosaic in which the major pattern is traced in the colours of the French and English cultures.
>
> Much of the country's history can be viewed as a continuing search for accommodation and co-operation between the two major cultural communities, and the integration of newcomers into the basic pattern. At the same time, as this internal accommodation has been working itself out, the country has passed through a dual process of self-definition in relation to the outside world. The first of these processes has been the evolution of the country from the status of a colony within the British Empire to the stature of independent nationhood within the Commonwealth. The second more subtle and often more difficult process has been in defining and defending its independence in relation to the power and prestige of its enormous neighbour, the United States. These two themes of internal bicultural accommodation and external self-definition underlie and affect nearly every other development in the Canadian past: patterns of settlement, institutional growth, economic development, foreign policy, cultural evolution....
>
> From the earliest beginning the French and English established competitive settlements and trading centres.... It was this competition, and the rivalry of France and Britain in Europe, which ultimately brought war and the downfall of the French empire in North America. But before that event took place New France had sunk deep roots along the banks of the St. Lawrence and in Acadia....
>
> By the 1740's French-English rivalry in Europe, North America, and elsewhere in the world brought the beginnings of a war that was to spell the end of New France. The final phase of that war began in 1754 and was concluded by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 when France's major North American possessions were ceded to the British.
>
> The British Conquest of Canada, a major event in the country's history, temporarily united North America under the British flag. Within two decades that unity was permanently destroyed by the success of the American War of Independence. Yet in the intervening period the French-speaking inhabitants of Canada, numbering about 70,000 at the time of the Conquest, had continued to exhibit their capacity to survive. Faced with growing unrest in the thirteen colonies, the British authorities in Canada gave up an early attempt to assimilate their new subjects and granted recognition, in the Quebec Act of 1774, to the major institutions of the French-speaking community: its civil laws, its seigneurial system, its Roman Catholic religious organization. The efforts of the revolting colonies to add Canada and Nova Scotia to their cause failed. But during and after the war thousands of Loyalists fled northward, settling in Nova Scotia, what was later to become New Brunswick, and to Canada both in the Eastern Townships and the western region of the colony north of Lake Ontario. It was in this fashion that the first substantial group of English-speaking settlers established themselves in the predominantly French-speaking British colony. Here was the beginning of the pattern of Canada's future development....

By the middle of the nineteenth century the British colonies in North America -- *Canada, Nova Scotia,* New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland -- were ready to move haltingly toward a new stage in their constitutional development. Each colony separately faced an increasing burden of public expenditure in tha age of canal and railway building. Each, too, was faced with limited markets, since the coming of free trade in Britain had ended their preferential treatment within the Empire. In the Canadas there was the additional problem of growing political deadlock and threatening cultural conflict in a union based upon equality of representation for each of the two sections [which eventually became Quebec and Ontario]. And, finally, in the 1860's, there was the threat of an increasingly hostile United States just emerging from its bloody civil war. These events, plus the encouragement of Britain anxious to reduce its commitments in North America, resulted in a decision in 1865 to move toward a federation of all British North America.

That federation was partly achieved on July 1, 1867, when the Canadas, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick joined together in Confederation under the British North America Act.... The constitution was a highly centralized federal scheme which made the central government clearly dominant, but left to the provinces those matters which they considered to be of purely local concern. The French and English languages were established as official in the federal Parliament, its records, and its courts, and the Province of Quebec was also recognized as an officially bilingual province....

Once the basic structure was established, the federal Conservative government, led by Sir John A. Macdonald, proceeded to develop policies to fill out the skeleton. The railway, binding together the various far-flung sections, was the first developmental policy. But along with it were immigration programs to populate the open spaces with agricultural settlers and a policy of tariff protection, announced in 1879, to develop a Canadian industrial system. It was the Macdonald government's determination to build a national economy on an east-west axis independent of the United States....

The Laurier years [1896-1911], for all their prosperity, witnessed the beginnings of serious cultural, sectional, and class conflicts. Relations between English- and French-speaking Canadians had been worsened by the hanging of Louis Riel, with whom the French Canadian identified [in Manitoba in 1885]. Then came attacks upon the French language and Catholic separate schools in Manitoba and the Northwest in the 1890's. Laurier successfully smoothed over this latter crisis, but cultural relations were also strained by Canadian involvement in the Boer War and the long pre-war debate over the country's place in Imperial affairs. French Canadians, on the whole, were reluctant to be involved in Imperial affairs, while many English Canadians identified Canadian interests with those of the Empire -- especially since the Empire provided a protective umbrella against the United States. This development reached its culmination in 1917 when the country, which had entered the war united, was split culturally over the issue of conscription for overseas service.

Sectional discontents were present especially in the Prairie West. This region, almost exclusively agricultural, felt that the national economic policies were designed primarily for the industrial areas of central Canada. The defeat of a proposed reciprocity arrangement with the United States in the election of 1911 left the West in a mood of discontent which manifested itself only after the war in the form of the farmer's Progressive Party. Class tensions were apparent in the growth of labour organization under the leadership of the Trades and Labour Council of Canada. The end of the war also saw labour conflict flare in a general strike in Winnipeg in the spring of 1919.

Canada emerged from the war, in which she had played a substantial part, with a new sense of national pride. That pride was transformed, in the postwar years, into a quest for a status of equality within the new British Commonwealth.... The Statute of Westminster in 1931 provided the legal definition of Canadian autonomy.

The Great Depression brought serious dislocation of the Canadian economy, heavy unemployment, and new movements of social protest. In Quebec this discontent expressed itself in a new party called the "Union nationale" while elsewhere in Canada, especially in the West, the Social Credit and Co-operative Commonwealth Federation parties made a marked impact....

The war and postwar years were a period of great prosperity and economic growth for Canadians. Again Canada played an important part in the war and its unity was only briefly threatened, again over the conscription issue. W.L.M. King's retirement in 1949 and his replacement by Louis St. Laurent marked an easy transition to postwar prosperity. Much of this new growth was financed by American direct investment so that prosperity was bought at the price of increasing American control of the Canadian economy. Since this came at a time when Canada was moving into closer European (NATO) and North American (NORAD) military alliances with the United States, some Canadians began to worry about the country's future. It was this concern, added to a growing dissatisfaction in several of the provinces over Ottawa's centralist policies, that brought the Conservative John Diefenbaker to power in 1957.

The Diefenbaker years were marked by a growing debate over Canada-U.S. relations and, more particularly, the revival of nationalism in Quebec under the guise of a "quiet revolution." This latter event included a whole series of measures meant to modernize Quebec society now transformed by accelerated industrialism. With increasing frequency and intensity many prominent French Canadians expressed dissatisfaction with their status within Confederation and began asking that Quebec be given more autonomy as a province and that French be given greater recognition throughout Canada. In 1963 Lester Pearson's minority Liberal government established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to examine this question. Four years later, after the centennial celebrations, Mr. Pearson proposed a series of federal-provincial discussions to examine and reform the constitution in general. This task is being continued under the direction of his successor, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, whose Liberal Party was given a majority in the general election of 1968.

The first four years of the Trudeau government saw continued, but ultimately unsuccessful, constitutional negotiations. In October 1970 the government responded to the kidnapping of a British diplomat, and the kidnapping and murder of a Quebec cabinet minister, by the "Front de la Liberation de Quebec" by proclaiming the War Measures Act. Some changes in foreign policy were designed to affirm Canadian sovereignty and reduce the country's military commitment in Europe. Increasingly, however, economic problems took precedence over all others with inflation and unemployment creating serious difficulties. When the government asked for a renewed mandate in October 1972 the electorate replied in an uncertain voice: 109 Liberals, 107 Conservatives, 31 N.D.P. [New Democratic Party], 15 Social Credit, 1 Independent and 1 without party affiliation. Once again instability and uncertainty characterized the political scene, reflecting economic problems, ethnic tensions, and regional conflicts. (Cook, pp 31-7; emphasis added)

A subsequent election, in July 1974, returned the Trudeau government to power with a clear majority. But at the same time new stresses -- having to do with federal taxation of the petroleum industry which is concentrated in Alberta, and with an official languages bill in Quebec -- were being applied to Confederation.

d) BROADCASTING HISTORY

Detailed histories of the development of broadcasting in Canada are provided in THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL BROADCASTING IN CANADA, by E. Austin Weir, and in THE POLITICS OF CANADIAN BROADCASTING, 1920-1951, by Frank W. Peers. This section quotes extensively from "The Origins of of Public Broadcasting in Canada," an article by Margaret Prang which appeared in the March 1965 issue of THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW.

Developments to 1932

The decisive role played by the federal government in the first fifty years of the Canadian endeavour to create a nation around a trans-continental system of transportation has been the subject of frequent comment. Although some historians have overemphasized the distinctiveness of the role of government intervention in Canadian economic life, it is still true that state initiative has played a larger part in the nation's economic growth than is the case in most countries in the Americas and western Europe. Two conditions have been primarily responsible for the extent of state intervention in Canada: the inability or reluctance of private enterprise to take the business risks imposed by the vast extent and small population of the country, and the willingness of influential groups of Canadians to use the power of the dominion government in the search for national security in the face of economic and political threats from the United States....

While the Canadian economic structure was being built and maintained precariously against the southward pull of the American giant there were always Canadians, from the time of the short-lived Canada First movement onwards, who declared that railways and tariffs were not an end in themslves, but rather the material basis for the growth of a uniquely Canadian culture. Yet by the end of World War I, when a degree of economic stability had been achieved, there was little evidence of that northern flowering for which a new generation of nationalists looked. Only in the painting of the Group of Seven was there an art that could be considered "Canadian"....

Despite the meagre cultural achievements of Canadians the postwar generation of nationalists, especially young intellectuals, were firm in the conviction that the political community, whose independent existence had been recognized by the rest of the world at the Peace Conference and in the League of Nations, was the bearer of a distinctively Canadian way of life which would soon find adequate artistic and intellectual expression.... Throughout the first postwar decade national organizations were born with a frequency unprecedented in Canadian history, while old ones took on fresh vitality....

Ironically, just when an increasing number of Canadians were involved in the activities of flourishing nation-wide enterprises a revolution in communications ... was threatening the clearer delineation of a Canadian identity. The advent of radio broadcasting, as a potential medium of communication with every home on the continent, added a new and alarming dimension to Canada's relations with the United States. Never before had the "undefended boundary" presented such an open door to cultural annexation.

By 1930 the whole settled area of Canada was within regular range of American radio stations, while only about 60 per cent of the total Canadian population was able to hear Canadian programmes on any regular basis.... One-half of the total power in Canada was concentrated in Toronto and Montreal and several of these stations devoted a high proportion of their time to relaying American programmes sponsored by American commercial interests doing business in Canada; the Maritime provinces had only 5 per cent and British Columbia 4 per cent of the broadcastinging power in Canada. Not only were Canadian stations weak in power, but ... they had access to only six clear channels, shared eleven others with American stations, and were frequently drowned out by their more powerful Although Canadians had produced some programmes of high quality there was general consent in Canada that the standard of Canadian programmes of all kinds was inferior; Canada could not compete either with Amos n' Andy or the Chicago Symphony, and even when they could get Canadian programmes most Canadians preferred American broadcasts. The net result was that at the end of the twenties at least 80 per cent of the programmes listened to by Canadians were of American origin.

Under these conditions the Liberal government of Mackenzie King was faced with mounting discontent from many quarters over the content and reception of radio programmes in Canada. Moreover, the government was frequently under attack for allegedly acting, through powers residing in the Department of Marine, as a religious and political censor in issuing licences for transmitters. During the parliamentary session of 1928 .... [it was] indicated that the government was favourably inclined toward the establishment of a Crown company, similar to the British Broadcasting Corporation, to place the control of broadcasting beyond political influence. Since the government did not possess the information needed to establish a new policy, it proposed to appoint a royal commission to advise parliament on the future control, organization, and financing of broadcasting. The Conservatives supported this decision, pleading that members of the commission be non-partisan and capable of studying seriously a question which, according to Sir George Perley, "affects everybody in this country." The only outright criticism came from J.S. Woodsworth, who argued that no commission was needed, since the plight of Canadian radio was well known and provided all the incentive needed to allow the government to proceed at once with the establishment of public ownership of broadcasting. Woodsworth conceded that there were certain dangers in government control, but declared he would "rather trust our own Canadian government than trust these highly organized private commercial companies in the United States"....

Eventually, on December 6, 1928, the government announced the personnel of the commission: Sir John Aird, president of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, as chairman; Charles Bowman, editor of a Liberal newspaper, the OTTAWA CITIZEN; and Dr. Auguste Frigon, Director of Technical Education for the province of Quebec. After studying broadcasting in the United States, Britain, and several European countries, the commission submitted its report to the government on September 11, 1929. Despite diversity of opinion among Canadians about broadcasting methods, the commissioners reported "unanimity on one fundamental question -- Canadian radio listeners want Canadian broadcasting." To satisfy this demand the commission recommended the formation of a broadcasting company "vested with all the powers of a private enterprise, its status and duties corresponding to those of a public utility." The company would derive its revenues from licence fees, indirect advertising, and government subsidy. Provincial interests were to be protected by the appointment of provincial directors who would have "full control" of programmes broadcast within their respective provinces. The public company would own and operate all radio stations and would build seven 50,000 watt stations spaced across the country to form the core of a national network capable of providing service to all Canadians. The system being recommended for Canada was obviously a modification of that provided in the British Broadcasting Corporation, the most important departures from the British practice being the recognition of Canada's federal structure and the provision for indirect advertising; sponsorship of programmes was to be permitted but no direct promotion of specific products would be allowed over the air.

Initally, public response to the Aird Report, especially in the press, both Liberal and Conservative, was generally favourable, but within weeks of the publication of the report came the great market crash of the autumn of 1929. Consideration of broadcasting policy was pushed aside in the face of more obviously urgent matters of public policy....

[In the 1930 federal general election, R.B. Bennett's Conservatives defeated the Liberal government] Although many individual Conservatives favoured public ownership of radio the hostility of the new millionaire to public ownership in general was well known.... In addition to the uncertainties arising from the Conservative victory supporters of public broadcasting faced the inevitable reluctance of the government to embark on new expenditures of public funds during a depression. Although the work of the Aird Commission had done much to convince Canadians that public radio was desirable the probability that the commission's recommendations would be shelved seemed high. In the autumn of 1930 a group of young Canadians determined that the change in government and the exigencies of the depression must not be allowed to impede the implementation of the Aird Report. As the instrument of their endeavour to rally the diverse organizations and individuals who feared that delay would enable "interested commercial groups with strong American affiliations to gain control of the Canadian air," they formed the Canadian Radio

League. The League was conceived by Graham Spry, National Secretary of the Association of Canadian Clubs, sometime during 1930 and began to take form early in October of that year at an informal meeting in the Ottawa home of Alan Plaunt. The spirit of this undertaking was well illustrated by the slogan Spry used at the top of a letter written at this time to Brooke Claxton, with whom he had already discussed the project: "Britannia rules the waves -- shall Columbia rule the wavelengths ?" ....

From the outset the organizers of the Radio League were fully aware of the crucial role that French Canada would play in the radio issue and they gave careful thought to the best means of securing the support of representative French Canadians.... Contrary to their original expectations, it proved more difficult for the promoters of the League to form an active local committee in Toronto than in Montreal.... The refusal of F.R. MacKelcan to join the executive committee was a blow which the officers of the League laboured for some weeks to reverse.... MacKelcan feared that a ban on advertising might deprive Canadian listeners of "the marvellous programs we are getting from such orchestras as the Philadelphia, Philharmonic and Boston" without providing acceptable alternatives. Although somewhat mollified by the declarations of Spry and Plaunt that American concerts need not be excluded from any Canadian network and in agreement with them that the B.B.C. had been of enormous service to music in Britain, MacKelcan remained unconvinced. He argued that the impressive results achieved in Britain were due to the highly centralized structure of the B.B.C. rather than to public ownership in itself; the decentralization of control and of production facilities proposed by the Aird Report and apparently endorsed by the Canadian Radio League would threaten the standard of musical performance and public taste in Canada. In contrast to Britain, Canada lacked "a generally recognized Metropolis in which all would agree that the major broadcasting activities should be concentrated." There was no doubt in MacKelcan's mind that any unbiased observer would recognize Toronto as the most important musical centre in the country but if the League's proposals were adopted "this natural concentration of broadcasting ... would disappear ... and the small sum available ... would largely be dissipated by spreading the expenditure over a large number of broadcasting centres. In short, we will probably find ourselves in the position of seven men trying to cover themselves on a cold night with one blanket."

MacKelcan's queries about the degree of centralized control to be practised were difficult questions which the proponents of public broadcasting would have preferred not to face publicly for the moment.... The [Aird] commissioners had all been aware that if their report was to be accepted at all they had to make some concessions to the strong provincial feeling of the time, no less evident in Ontario than in Quebec; nor could they ignore the fact that constitutionally, education, which public broadcasting would serve, was under provincial control....

The Radio League enjoyed the support of most of the Canadian press.... farm and labour organizations.... national organizations of a more general character.... the Canadian Legion and the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire... the Native Sons of Canada and the Women's Institutes.... educational bodies from the Royal Society to a host of local home and school clubs.... [and] Roman Catholic bishops and the leaders of the major protestant churches.... Whatever the special emphasis of this wide variety of interests one theme ran through all their arguments: a system of public broadcasting would inform Canadians from coast to coast of the aspirations and problems of various regions and groups in the community and provide a forum for the discussion of national issues and a medium for the development of a national consciousness that was at present entirely lacking....

By the end of January, 1931 ... the Bennett government had become convinced that radio, at least in Canada, was by nature a monopoly, although it had not yet decided whether that monopoly should be public or private. Just at this point complications inherent in the Canadian federal system arose to produce a delay in bringing the issue to a conclusion.

In claiming control of radio for the provinces Premier L.A. Tascherau of Quebec was endeavouring to further his more general war on Ottawa, a war in which the major battleground was the development of St. Lawrence water power. Shortly, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Manitoba announced their intention of joining Quebec in an appeal to the courts.... The Supreme Court of Canada decreed in favour of the Dominion and the radio case was then taken by the province of Quebec to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council [in London]....

Within a week of the Privy Council's decision of February 9, 1932, that exclusive control of radio lay with the federal government, Prime Minister Bennett told the House of Commons that the government would shortly appoint a special committee of the House to advise parliament on the establishment of a system "to ensure from Canadian sources as complete and satisfactory a service as the present development of radio science will permit"....

The precise date of Bennett's conversion to the principle of public broadcasting remains obscure, but he clearly was highly sympathetic by the time of the appointment of the special committee of the House.... Not long before the committee was due to begin its hearings Spry received a sudden phone call one evening from Prime Minister Bennett. Bennett reported that at a recent meeting of the cabinet some anxiety had been expressed that there had not been more evidence of public opinion on the radio issue from the Prairie provinces. Could Spry do something about it? Spry immediately made arrangements to go west....

Before the parliamentary debate on the [special committee's] report Bennett asked the members of the Conservative caucus to write to him expressing their views on radio policy. Apparently he received few replies, but all of these either opposed the recommendations of the committee or urged delay in their implementation. Most of the writers seem to have thought that a national, bilingual radio system was being proposed, for the reason most frequently given for hostility to the report was the alleged objection of English listeners to hearing French on the radio, or the danger that the French would demand more than their fair share of radio time. Clearly these members were not representative of the caucus, and came quickly into line once government policy was declared. The House adopted the report of the Special Committee with only one dissenting vote (a Liberal)....

The new broadcasting act seemed to be a substantial victory for the supporters of public ownership and control. In its provision for a network of high-powered stations, in the allocation to a commission of power to control and regulate all broadcasting in Canada, including programmes and advertising, to acquire any or all existing stations in Canada through purchase or appropriation, and to prohibit the establishment of privately operated chains, the act provided a potential framework for a genuine public system. Yet the act also contained features which fell short of the hopes of the Radio League. The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission was a full-time three-man commission appointed directly by the government and responsible both for the determination of policy and for the actual management of the national system. This body bore no resemblance to the much larger, voluntary Board of Governors advocated by the Aird Commission and the Radio League, which was intended to have only general oversight over policy, leaving the management of broadcasting to professional staff. Further, the act provided for a $2.00 licence fee rather than the $3.00 fee reguired by the Radio League scheme. In 1932 few Canadians realized what was to become painfully clear in the ensuing four years -- that the commission was too dependent on the government and that the financial provisions were so limited that the national network was only partially constituted. Local private stations were therefore allowed to proliferate to an extent unforeseen either by the Aird Commission or the Radio League. The politicans were for the present content. During the debate on the broadcasting bill, Ernest Lapointe, speaking for the Liberal opposition, and J.S. Woodsworth for the independent group, associated themselves warmly with Prime Minister Bennett's assertion that public ownership was the only means of assuring "complete Canadian control of broadcasting from Canadian sources ... so that ... national consciousness may be fostered and sustained and national unity ... strengthened." Privately, Bennett was still declaring his abhorrence of public ownership, except under the most unusual circumstances....

> Thus a traditional "Canadian" solution had been accepted in response to a new version of the classic Canadian dilemma. Regional and racial divisions had yielded to a national unity, long in the process of growth, but brought to a fresh consciousness by a new American threat.... As in earlier Canadian enterprises ther was no commitment to public ownership in principle, but once convinced that the choice was between "the State or the United States," most Canadians of the thirties had a ready answer. For some the choice was made easier by the realization that in the market conditions of the time the financial stakes were not worth a major battle, or that their material interest would be best served by government action to maintain the east-west communications axis. Strictly economic factors similar to those which involved the government in the building of the C.P.R. played a part. The decisive force was national feeling. Thus the radio policy of the 1930's was proof that Canadians had created a national identity and were prepared to use a new medium of communication to protect and nourish it. (Prang, pp 1-31; emphasis added)

The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission

The following excerpts are from CBC -- A BRIEF HISTORY AND BACKGROUND, published by the CBC in 1970.

> In four years, the CRBC accomplished a lot. It offered ambitious and largely Canadian programming in two languages. Its studios and transmitters were modernized and some new facilities were set up, including a shortwave receiving station to relay programs from Britain. Engineering and coverage surveys were conducted, and technical assistance was given to many private stations to improve broadcast quality and reception. Technical regulations were developed and enforced. Some of the frequency conflicts with the United States were resolved, to Canada's advantage....
>
> But right from the start, the Commission was severly handicapped by lack of money, lack of independence, and the inadequacy of the commission idea itself, which asked so much of just three men....
>
> In 1936, the national network still reached less than half the population. It operated only in the evenings and on Sunday afternoons, because wire connections, even for a few hours a day, took something like a quarter of the Commission's total expenditure. French and English listeners had to share this limited service, with the result that both felt deprived. Programming was affected too....
>
> The Commission couldn't attract some of the staff it needed, because its personnel were subject to the Civil Service Act, which restricted salary scales and called for Ministerial approval of appointments. Also, the Commissioners were expected to direct both policy and operations -- difficult in any field, but especially so in national network broadcasting.
>
> Several attempts were made to correct the situation. In 1933, legislation was passed to remove senior Commission staff from Civil Service wage restrictions. In 1934, a Parliamentary committee on broadcasting recommended among other things that a general manager -- a broadcasting expert -- be appointed to take charge of the operational side of the CRBC. This did not lead to legislation, however. In 1936, under another government, another Parliamentary broadcasting committee was appointed, to report on the CRBC, the overall system, and the Broadcasting Act....
>
> In its general recommendations, the 1936 committee supported some of the 1934 findings and went even further. It suggested:
>
> - that a public corporation modelled more closely on the lines of a private corporation be set up to replace the CRBC,
> - that the corporation have an experienced broadcasting executive as general manager,

> and as policy directors a non-partisan board of nine "men of broad outlook" representing all parts of Canada,
> - that the corporation have "substantially the powers now enjoyed by the British Broadcasting Corporation," plus exclusive control over all networks and the programs and advertising of all private stations,
> - that the corporation have full internal control of its staff and their conditions of employment,
> - that the corporation recommend to the government on all licensing and related matters, such as power increases and frequency assignments, but that routine technical regulations and their enforcement be directly handled by a government department, as the Aird Report had recommended, and
> - that the corporation be authorized to borrow from the government for capital funds to build new stations.
>
> In all these ways the corporation was to be different from the CRBC. What was hoped for was a new and more flexible agency, but one still based on the idea of public ownership and control. In fact, the committee specifically reaffirmed "the principle of complete nationalization of radio broadcasting in Canada. Pending ... this, ... the fullest co-operation should be maintained between the corporation and the private stations."
>
> A new Broadcasting Act, based on the committee's recommendations, took effect on November 2nd, 1936. It created the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (CBC 1970a, pp 7-9; emphasis added)

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

The following excerpts are from A HISTORY OF JOURNALISM IN CANADA, by W.H. Kesterton.

> The CBC received much greater independence and more clearly defined responsibility than did its unhappy predecessor. The Corporation's accomplishments have been many. It established a network of stations which made varied programmes available to nearly all Canadians in a country of vast area. The network consisted of basic CBC stations and private-station affiliates that served five time zones until 1949 and six time zones after Newfoundland joined Confederation. During the Second World War a French-language network was established, and the existing English-language network was made into two networks, the Trans-Canada and the Dominion, although the latter were united again in 1962, after television viewing had reduced radio listening....
>
> If the depression delayed the growth of national publicly-owned radio, it also limited the development of private broadcasting. But the postwar decade saw a proliferation of private radio stations. The period was also marked by financial difficulty for the CBC. Originally intended to be self-supporting, the Corporation found itself unable to meet the cost of expanding its facilities through the limited income from receiver licences; from 1951 onwards it became dependent on parliamentary subsidies. The licences were abolished in 1953. In particular, the advent of television brought voracious demands on the public budget.
>
> From one standpoint, the introduction of the new medium was a major accomplishment. Beginning in mid-1952 Canada adopted television more quickly than any other country in the world. By the end of 1955, she had become in many respects the world's second television country -- in terms of programmes, number of stations, network service, extent of coverage, and per capita ownership of sets. Montreal became the fourth and Toronto the fifth largest world TV production centre. The Corporation gave the world's largest French television service in terms of sets-in-use and production of programmes.

> Such achievements did not protect the system from criticism. Critics who seemed to think broadcasts should cater exclusively to what they considered to be the majority audience resented what they regarded as the CBC's highbrow programming. Private stations and their supporters felt it was unfair to force the taxpayer to subsidize the CBC. But, above all, the role of the Corporation as both regulator of and competitor with the private stations was greatly resented. Those who thought the CBC was too independent called for a more authoritarian control of the publicly-owned Corporation; those who believed the CBC was too vulnerable to political pressure urged that it be made freer of potential parliamentary influence by assuring it funds on a less piece-meal basis than that of the annual parliamentary grant.
>
> Such issues became so acute that in 1955 the government appointed the Fowler Commission to investigate broadcasting and recommend measures for its improvement. The action implemented a recommendation made by the Massey Commission [on the Arts, Letters and Sciences] in 1951. The Commission on Broadcasting reported in 1957.... Among its recommendations were proposals: that the CBC's regulatory function be given to a separate body, the Board of Broadcast Governors, with jurisdiction in certain matters over the CBC and private broadcasters alike; that annual parliamentary grants to the CBC be replaced by a system of long-term financing; that the Corporation should be more aggressive in its pursuit of the advertiser's dollar.
>
> The Conservative government put a new Broadcasting Act on the books in 1958. It accepted some but not all of the Fowler proposals. It created the Board of Broadcast Governors, which was charged with such matters as the granting of broadcasting licences and the determining of rules to govern advertising on radio and television. But the government rejected the financing recommendations. By granting funds according to a tacit philosophy of "making up the operating deficit," the government gave implicit support to the Fowler recommendation that the Corporation adopt more aggressive measures to earn much of its own revenue.
>
> Such regulations placed the CBC in an awkward position: on the one hand, it was given the mission of contributing to Canada's cultural identity; on the other hand, it was forced into a competition for advertising with private broadcasters that could not fail to dissipate some of the Corporation's creative energy.
>
> It was in the realm of television that the competition was most intense. This was because the private stations were able to form a network of their own, Canadian Television (CTV), when eight cities were linked up in 1961. Commercial rivalry between CBC and CTV was typified by the 1962 controversy over the Grey Cup telecasting rights....
>
> The Broadcasting Act of 1958 and the creation of the BBG ... solved neither the chronic nor the new problems of broadcasting. During 1960 charges of political favouritism arose out of some BBG rulings.... The CBC was accused, particularly during election time, of a pro-Liberal, pro-establishment bias. Criticism of programming seemed to grow increasingly vitriolic: it was claimed, sometimes with almost hysterical emphasis, that programmes were immoral, obscene, sacrilegious, dishonest, over-violent, esoteric, immature, low-brow, inflammatory, nationally divisive, seditious, and treasonable. (Kesterton, pp 213-16; emphasis added)

[In 1963 the government appointed an informal committee to discuss the Canadian broadcasting situation. After the committee reported it became evident that a more searching study was needed if a remedy was to be found for "the ills of Canadian radio and television." A Committee on Broadcasting, again headed by Robert Fowler, was appointed in 1964; it reported in September 1965.]

> In the tradition of the Aird Commission thirty-five years earlier, the Committee reiterated the need for the broadcasting system to help establish a Canadian cultural identity, particularly in the face of American encroachments. It was faithful to the philosophy that public ownership and/or control is right and proper over media in which the channels for information and entertaining are severely limited. But it also suggested some measures to prevent the government influence over broadcasting which is a danger in any system involving public ownership and control.

> As a means of eliminating confusion over BBG and CBC jurisdiction, the Committee recommended creation of one regulatory body ... to be responsible for the direction, supervision, and control of the whole broadcasting system....
>
> The Committee condemned the broadcasting situation they found eight years after the Fowler Commission Report. It said that the worst of U.S. programming was dominating Canadian broadcasting. It accused the CBC and private broadcasters of failing to interpret the two national cultures to each other....
>
> The Committee was no kinder to broadcasting administration than it was to broadcasting performance. The CBC administration, so it thought, was top-heavy; the Corporation lacked unity, cohesion and "esprit de corps"; internal communication was inefficient....
>
> The Fowler Committee made positive recommendations to remedy the defects criticized. It proposed that improved service basically Canadian in character, should be given highest priority....
>
> On July 4, 1966 the government tabled a White Paper which laid the groundwork for proposed legislation to amend the Broadcasting Act. Reiterating the forty-year-old promise of making the system a means of strengthening Canadian identity and Canadian unity, the document promised solutions to Canada's broadcasting troubles sharply different from the main proposals contained in the Fowler Committee Report. (Kesterton, pp 217-9; emphasis added)

The 1968 Broadcasting Act and CBC Reorganization

Eventually, on 1 October 1967, the government introduced a new Broadcasting Act into Parliament. It was based in part on the Fowler Committee recommendations, in part on the White Paper proposals, and in part on subsequent input. The Act passed into law on 7 March 1968. The new Act proclaimed a "single system" of Canadian broadcasting and created a new agency, the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC), to replace the BBG and control the whole broadcasting system. This development is reviewed in detail in section 7(c). So far as the CBC was concerned, the long term financing arrangements, recommended both in the Fowler Committee's report and in the White Paper, were again rejected.

The development and passage of the Broadcasting Act was to a large extent overshadowed by public crises involving the CBC. The most significant of these erupted in the spring of 1966 and centred on the controversial Sunday night public affairs program, THIS HOUR HAS SEVEN DAYS. The program was remarkably popular with the public: although public affairs programs typically attract smaller audiences than do entertainment programs, SEVEN DAYS claimed the largest audience of any CBC program except telecasts of National Hockey League games. The program unit is now generally considered to have occasionally engaged in some practices, notably in editing, not consistent with professional journalism standards for fairness. However, the approach of the CBC's senior management to dealing with the situation is widely held to have been ill-considered, insensitive to public interest in the program, and the cause of extensive damage to the internal morale of the CBC and to the individual careers of many who were drawn into the dispute on matters of principle.

Although tension between the production unit and the senior management of the Corporation had been building for some time, the public controversy was triggered by a senior management directive, sent through "channels" to the program's Executive Producer, that one of the program's on air hosts was not to be rehired. This senior management intervention seemed to deal with the selection of talent rather than with the producer's handling of program content. Although senior CBC management was apparently convinced that there would be no trouble about the directive, the move was widely interpreted as an attempt to disrupt much more than the on-camera presentation of the program. Some observers suspected that the program was simply too controversial for management comfort

The basic arguments actually revolved about the responsibility of the creators of the program, appropriate supervision procedures, and -- especially -- the lack of communication between programmers and those in management who were responsible to the CBC President.

The SEVEN DAYS controversy commanded front page headline coverage in newspapers across the country for weeks. The affair was investigated by an independent inquiry commissioned by the Prime Minister and was taken up by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Broadcasting, Films and Assistance to the Arts. The debate was fanned by a comment by the Secretary of State, the Honourable Judy LaMarsh, that this estrangement of the programmers from management was far from an isolated incident and that it represented "only the tip of the iceberg." And controversy was sparked anew during debate on the new Broadcasting Act when, in a televised interview, the Secretary of State (through whom the CBC reported to Parliament) characterized the Corporation as having "rotten" management (LaMarsh, pp 264, 277-82).

THIS HOUR HAS SEVEN DAYS ended its 1965/66 season a few weeks ahead of schedule and never returned to the air. CBC management decided to replace it with a program produced by a new and rapidly assembled production unit. The SEVEN DAYS personnel scattered: many left the CBC and some left broadcasting; the program's Executive Producer went to work in the United States. (For two personal accounts of the circumstances surrounding the public arguments, see LaMarsh, pp 227-90, and Watson, pp 35-61.)

One of the recommendations that emerged from the various SEVEN DAYS investigations concerned the fact that English Television programs were mainly made in Toronto, while those with the ultimate power to make decisions were all in Ottawa. It was suggested that there should be vice presidents for the English and for the French networks, and that these officers should be stationed in Toronto and in Montreal.

By the end of 1968 a series of changes had been made. With the new Broadcasting Act the BBG, which had been chaired by Dr. Andrew Stewart, was replaced by the CRTC under Pierre Juneau. The government had appointed a new CBC President, George Davidson, and a new Executive Vice President, Laurent Picard, had also been appointed. And a major reorganization of the CBC had begun with the appointment of the English and French network vice presidents, Eugene Hallman and Raymond David. Val Clery, expressing his own views in MACLEAN'S in 1974, characterized Davidson's presidency, with which I am not personally familiar, as follows:

> .... The coincidence of his appointment with a federal cutback in spending allowed him to conduct his presidency with much the same parsimony he had shown earlier as Secretary of the Treasury Board.
>
> Davidson was, probably, in the government's eyes, the best president the CBC ever had: at once victim and dedicated victimizer. His instinctive response to a three-year federal freeze of the CBC's budget was to freeze all program budgets and reduce staff by banning the refilling of any personnel vacancies. Since senior executives tend to work with an eye on their retirement dates, very few executive posts were vacated during the period. Program staff, on the other hand, many of them on short-term contract, were decimated, either by being laid off or quitting to search for jobs where there was more money to make programs. In the end the ban on hiring had to be relaxed, but not before more of the CBC's creative blood had been drained away. (Clery, p 54)

With the posting of Davidson to the United Nations in 1972, Picard took over as President and held the position through the end of the study period.

The next chapter looks in somewhat more detail at conditions in the Canadian broadcasting system during the 1970-1974 case study period, and at the general roles and problems of the CBC and the CRTC during that period.

Chapter 7

The Canadian Broadcasting System, 1970-1974

a) THE OVERALL SYSTEM

Stations and Networks

Under the 1968 Broadcasting Act the CRTC regulated all broadcasting undertakings in Canada as an integrated "single" system -- "the Canadian broadcasting system." The national broadcasting service provided by the CBC was the principal public component of the overall system; in addition, the system included educational stations, private commercial broadcasting operations, and cable television undertakings.

A table of radio and television stations by network appears as Figure 7-1. Except as otherwise noted, this section describes the overall system as of 31 March 1974. Of the three English language television networks, two (CBC and CTV) were national; one (Global) was a regional network (in Ontario). Of the two French language networks, one (CBC) was national and the other (TVA) was private and restricted to one province (Quebec).

Figure 7-1. CANADIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM STATIONS BY AFFILIATION, 31 March 1974

Station Affiliation	Broadcasting Transmitting Undertakings[1]					
	TV	AM	FM	LPRT[2]	SW	Total
CBC Owned & Operated	209	40	18	283	3	553
CBC Affiliates	226	111				337
CTV Affiliates	129					129
TVA Affiliates	5					5
Global	6					6
OECA[3]	5					5
Independent	8	214	83		6	311
TOTAL	588	365	101	283	9	1346

Notes:
1. Figures include stations and rebroadcasters, both English and French.
2. Low Power Relay Transmitters, mostly AM, some FM.
3. Ontario Educational Communications Authority stations licensed but not on the air as of 31 March 1974.

Source: CRTC 1974c, p 45.

The CTV Television Network was created in 1960-61 to link the first eight non-CBC "second channel" private commercial television stations. By March 1974 CTV service was provided by a total of 129 transmitters whose combined coverage extended to over 85% of the Canadian population. Under the terms of a 1972 reorganization of the network, there were three types of affiliates: supplementary affiliates, affiliates, and full affiliates who participated in revenue and share costs and obligations of the network on a proportional basis. The CTV network, which included stations in 10 provinces, operated from Toronto. Most of CTV's Canadian programming was produced by the full affiliate stations.

All six transmitters of the Global Television Network, which began service to southern Ontario in January 1974, carried identical signals at all times. Global operated two production centres: at its Toronto operations headquarters, and at its Ottawa news bureau. Global service was estimated to reach 29% of the Canadian population.

The 1974 figures include licences for five television transmitters issued to the Ontario Educational Communications Authority (OECA). These stations were not on the air as of 31 March 1974. OECA transmission to the Toronto area began in 1970 under an arrangement by which the CBC held the licence for UHF Channel 19. OECA service was also provided throughout Ontario by existing CBC and private stations which carried OECA programs early in their broadcast days.

The services of these stations and networks were provided to an estimated 6,716,000 Canadian households. As of January 1975, the CBC Statistics Department estimated that of these households:

- 97% had television sets,
- 57% had colour television sets,
- 34% had two or more television sets,
- 41% had cable television service, and
- 73% had FM radio sets.

Figure 7-2. CABLE TELEVISION COVERAGE AND PENETRATION BY PROVINCE

Province	Coverage (% of Households in CATV Licensed Areas)	Penetration (% of Households Subscribing)	
	1973[1]	1971[2]	1975[3]
British Columbia	84	54	66
Alberta	69	5	37
Saskatchewan	5	3	6
Manitoba	57	17	34
Ontario	74	33	51
Quebec	61	22	32
New Brunswick	12	11	14
Nova Scotia	35	-	21
Prince Edward Island	-	-	-
Newfoundland	-	-	-
TOTAL - CANADA	63	26	41

Sources: 1. CRTC 1974c, p 46. 2. BBM 1972, p 2. 3. CBC 1975a, p 23.

Cable and Audience Fragmentation

The proportion of households subscribing to cable television services is notable. Cable penetration increased rapidly throughout the case study period. Two factors were responsible for the relatively more rapid growth of CATV in Canada than elsewhere. Initially cable was realized to have significant advantages in a land with a low population density and with major sets of topographical obstacles to normal off-air reception of domestic television stations. But cable also made possible the distribution of signals from stations in the northern portions of the United States. Viewers could thus be provided with access not only to the stations of the Canadian broadcasting system but also to American stations, principally the affiliates of the three US commercial networks. Figure 7-2 details cable penetration by province and indicates the growth in the early 1970s. The provincial averages mask the high levels of cable penetration in urban areas. Penetration figures for selected urban areas at the mid point of the case study period are provided in Figure 7-3.

Figure 7-3. CABLE TELEVISION PENETRATION IN SELECTED URBAN AREAS, September 1972

Urban Area	Penetration	Urban Area	Penetration
London, Ontario	79 %	Sarnia, Ontario	51 %
Victoria, British Columbia	78 %	Chatham, Ontario	46 %
Guelph, Ontario	77 %	Fredericton, New Brunswick	46 %
Sherbrooke, Quebec	74 %	Kelowna, British Columbia	45 %
Cornwall, Ontario	72 %	Lethbridge, Alberta	44 %
Thunder Bay, Ontario	72 %	Toronto, Ontario	44 %
Trois Rivieres, Quebec	72 %	Sault Ste Marie, Ontario	42 %
Vancouver, British Columbia	71 %	Oshawa, Ontario	35 %
Kitchener, Ontario	70 %	Winnipeg, Manitoba	34 %
Belleville-Trenton, Ontario	69 %	Drummondville, Quebec	30 %
Peterborough, Ontario	68 %	Calgary, Alberta	29 %
Brantford, Ontario	66 %	North Bay, Ontario	26 %
Shawinigan, Quebec	64 %	St Catharines, Ontario	26 %
Ottawa-Hull, Ontario-Quebec	62 %	Montreal, Quebec	23 %
Nanaimo, British Columbia	58 %	Quebec, Quebec	19 %
Barrie, Ontario	56 %	Sorel, Quebec	16 %
Hamilton, Ontario	52 %	Edmonton, Alberta	11 %
Chilliwack, British Columbia	51 %	Halifax, Nova Scotia	7 %

Note: These "urban area" figures are for Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations established by Statistics Canada. Source: BBM 1973, p 6.

In a major statement on cable issued in July 1971 (following a series of position papers and guidelines and a public hearing), the CRTC set out its policy for the development of cable as part of the overall "single system" of Canadian broadcasting. One part of the complex announcement set out a priority sequence for the carriage of stations on available CATV channels, as follows:

1. All Canadian television stations whose official Grade A contour encloses any part of the licensed area of the cable television system.

2. All Canadian television stations whose official Grade B contour encloses any part of the licensed area of the cable television system unless it is a private affiliate forming part of the same Canadian network as a local station.

   If a station owned and operated by the CBC providing the full national service is not included in priority 1 or 2 and is available, it must be carried.

3. Any Canadian station whose official Grade B contour does not enclose any part of the cable television system licensed area which is not affiliated to the same Canadian network as a local or regional station and where reception is economically practical and technically feasible.

> Stations not included in the list [including US stations] are optional stations and may be carried if all basic services are provided for. (CRTC 1971b, pp 14-5)

Although the priority list has been revised in detail since first issued, the basic thrust remains the same. In December 1972 the CRTC began approving applications by cable system operators to provide optional converter services to enable subscribers to receive additional programs on non-standard channels not available on the basic (VHF channels) service. These converter services further increased the subscribers' choice of programs. An indication of the range of program services distributed by some CATV systems is provided below by the list of stations carried by Rogers Cable TV Limited in its Toronto operating area. Basic services (on VHF channels, available without optional converter service) are indicated with an asterisk.

* CBLT - CBC English Television (CBC owned), Toronto
* CBLFT - CBC French Television (CBC owned), Toronto
* CFTO - CTV Affiliate, Toronto
* CKGN - Global Television Network, Toronto
* CITY - Independent, Toronto
* CICA - Ontario Educational Communications Authority, Toronto
* CHCH - Independent, Hamilton
CKVR - CBC English Television (Affiliate), Barrie
CKCO - CTV Affiliate, Kitchener
CHEX - CBC English Television (Affiliate), Peterborough
* WGR - NBC Affiliate, Buffalo
* WBEN - CBS Affiliate, Buffalo
* WKBW - ABC Affiliate, Buffalo
WNED - PBS Member Station, Buffalo
WUTV - Independent, Buffalo.

In addition to distributing the signals of the above 15 stations, 7 channels of programming originated for cable were provided or under development, as follows:

- Local Community Programming and Information
- Multi-cultural Ethnic Television
- News, Weather, and FM radio
- Stock News and Business Analysis
- Comparative Prices for Consumers
- Airport Information
- A Partial Television Viewing Guide.

The impact of CATV on the patterns of television viewing in Canada was dramatic. Viewing by cable in Toronto climbed from less than 5% of all viewing in 1967 to well over 30% in November 1970. In British Columbia, viewing by cable had reached a proportion of 52% of all viewing by November 1970 (Stewart, p 45). Figure 7-4 provides 1970 and 1974 audience share figures for stations in three selected urban areas as an indication of the "audience fragmentation" effect of cable. Note that in Vancouver the five US stations accounted for over half (51%) of the total average audience share. In Toronto, the Buffalo stations accounted for at least 41% of the total average share, the 56% of the total going to major Canadian stations was spread over five separate operations, and on cable converter service "other" choices included five additional stations and special cable origination channels.

The availability of US television station signals to Canadian viewers had both an economic and cultural impact on the Canadian broadcasting system. In its February 1971 position paper on cable, the CRTC observed:

Figure 7-4. AUDIENCE FRAGMENTATION: TORONTO, VANCOUVER, AND HALIFAX

Station	Affiliation	Location	Central Area Average 1/4 Hour Share of Audience	
			January 1970	January 1974
TORONTO (1972 Cable Penetration: 44%)				
CBLT	CBC English	Toronto	21	18
CBLFT	CBC French	Toronto	*	-
CFTO	CTV	Toronto	24	21
CKGN	Global	Toronto	*	3
CITY	Independent	Toronto	*	3
CHCH	Independent	Hamilton	12	11
WGR	NBC	Buffalo	13	12
WBEN	CBS	Buffalo	13	12
WKBW	ABC	Buffalo	13	15
WUTV	Independent	Buffalo	*	2
Others			2	4
VANCOUVER (1972 Cable Penetration: 71%)				
CBUT	CBC English	Vancouver	21	24
CHAN	CTV	Vancouver	23	19
CHEK	CBC & CTV	Victoria	3	4
KING	NBC	Seattle	7	11
KIRO	CBS	Seattle	4	8
KOMO	ABC	Seattle	11	13
KTNT	Independent	Tacoma	1	1
KVOS	CBS	Bellingham	30	18
Others			-	2
HALIFAX (1972 Cable Penetration: 7%)				
CBHT	CBC English	Halifax	41	34
CBHFT	CBC French	Halifax	*	-
CJCH	CTV	Halifax	59	51
WEMT	ABC	Bangor	-	7
Others			-	8

Notes: 1. Audience figures are for all persons aged 2 and up, for average 1/4 hours, Monday through Sunday, 10:00 am through 1:00 am.
2. * denotes station not in operation in January 1970.
3. - denotes audience size below minimum reporting standards.

Sources: BBM 1970 and BBM 1974a.

Cable television has developed more rapidly in Canada than in the United States, where its spread in the major cities has been delayed by the FCC as a matter of policy.

The problem for Canada is more acute than for the United States.

Except for Detroit and Buffalo, no major U.S. city is within reach of Canadian television signals. Yet, most of Canada's largest cities are within reach of U.S. television signals. In some cases television stations licensed in the United States could not exist without their Canadian coverage as a source of revenue.

As a result some Canadian cities that would otherwise have several television stations have only one or two.

> It is estimated that some $12 million to $15 million a year of Canadian money is spent to buy commercial time on U.S. television stations. The indirect effect is more difficult to calculate, but international advertisers would probably have to spend about double that amount per year on Canadian television stations to achieve the same impact if the border spill-over did not exist. (CRTC 1971c, p 5)
>
> The Commission has indicated in previous policy announcements how unlimited penetration by United States stations on a wholesale south to north basis would completely destroy the licensing logic of the Canadian broadcasting system as established by the Broadcasting Act. If a solution is not found to integrate cable into the overall system, the impact, by fracturing the economic basis of the private broadcasters, would also disrupt the Canadian cultural, educational and informational imperatives of both the public and private sectors of the Canadian broadcasting system. (p 6)

The development of cable television policy in Canada was and continues to be an evolutionary process. In a February 1975 announcement (accompanying a set of new regulations, policy statements, and a new position paper), the CRTC observed:

> Cable television has had a remarkable development in Canada.... There are now over 400 cable television systems licensed by the Commission to serve Canadians from coast to coast in small centres as well as in large urban centres.... During the year 1975, over 80% of the households in Canada will be able to subscribe to cable television service. During the last few years, revenues of the cable television industry have grown at a much greater rate than those of television and radio. Revenues of the cable television industry now total approximately 50% of those of television.
>
> In the light of these facts, cable television must be considered a technologically and financially mature member of the Canadian broadcasting system. (CRTC 1975a, pp 10-1)

Following yet another public hearing, to consider some 133 briefs submitted in response to the February position paper, the Commission published a comprehensive policy statement in December 1975. The Commission described its policy objectives as follows:

> In summary, cable television licensees should:
>
> a) make a contribution to the quality and diversity of the Canadian broadcasting and program production industries;
> b) assume an increasing responsibility to contribute to the strength of the total broadcasting system;
> c) contribute a unique social service in the form of a community programming channel;
> d) improve the quality of cable television service and the relations between the cable television industry and the public it serves. (CRTC 1975b, p 3)

The CRTC's approach to the development of these policies during the study period is considered in detail in section 7(c). But this section does set out the important points: cable penetration was high in 1970 and increased steadily through 1974; its major effect on conventional Canadian broadcasting was to increase the availability of alternative (principally US) programming services and, consequently, to "fragment" the Canadian viewing audience.

Technological Trends

"Cable" appeared on the Canadian broadcasting scene as both a technological innovation and as a cultural factor. The cultural consequences of cable were sufficiently significant to prompt a look forward to attempt to predict the form of future technological developments and to try to prepare for their cultural consequences. In 1969 the federal Department of Communications announced plans for a series of "Telecommission" studies of the existing and future prospects of telecommunications in Canada.

Questions about the form of future technological developments are both economic and social. Many of the engineering elements of future systems already exist: what is not clear is in what combinations or configurations they will emerge on a large scale.

The uncertainties in the rate of development can be seen in the case of home video players. Engineering work on the design of relatively inexpensive video disk players and video tape cassette equipment suitable for home entertainment purposes has been underway for many years. At the beginning of the 1970s it was anticipated that by now this equipment would have been widely marketed to the public, and that it would already have begun to have a dramatic impact on the conventional television broadcasting industry. This has not happened, although work in this area continues and the production of equipment for home use is now scheduled by several manufacturers. There have been some problems in bringing costs down to the point where a significant portion of the population probably would opt to purchase such systems. In addition, in the case of those systems with playback capabilities only, the overall development requires the establishment of a system for the production and distribution of video recordings. The establishment of a common technical format standard remains an outstanding problem. Nevertheless, one video disk player system is now being test marketed in Germany, and two systems are to be introduced in the US in late 1976 -- at a retail cost of $400 to $500. In every case the cost of single preprogrammed disks is projected at less than $10 (Mennie, p 34). It would now seem that home video disk systems will be widely marketed. But the time frame, the extent of home penetration, and the impact on conventional broadcasting remain uncertain.

Another technical possibility is the direct broadcast satellite. Television signals could be transmitted from a satellite in a synchronous orbit for direct reception at home. Again, costs are a factor in determining the feasibility of such a development. High powered satellite transmitters would be required, and additional home reception equipment would be necessary. Such a development also raises a series of questions about international control and cooperation in broadcasting. As in the case of the video disk systems, the point at which direct satellite broadcasting might begin now seems more distant than was predicted some years ago. Projected costs are still high and this approach would have to be economically competitive with cable distribution. In the short run it would seem that satellites will be used primarily for network transmissions to stations and to provide services in isolated areas.

The Department of Communications' 1971 summary of the Telecommission studies, INSTANT WORLD (DOC), devoted a great deal of attention to the possible development of an integrated system of home telecommunications services. This concept is commonly referred to as "the wired city." Although current cable systems are one-way transmission systems for the delivery of broadcasting signals, it is possible to construct systems which could use existing cable lines for two-way transmission, and for the provision of other services in addition to broadcasting. At the heart of such a development would be the use of computer systems to control communication between the central system and individual homes. The list of possible services which might be included in such a system is virtually endless. The sorts of information storage and retrieval facilities now provided to users of computer "terminals" could be provided to the general public -- for personal data processing use or for more simple reference purposes. Home shopping services could be provided. Remote reading of utility meters would be possible. Electronically delivered "newspapers" could be provided, either on a television screen or through an attached printing device. Such printing devices could also handle a great deal of material currently distributed via conventional mailing systems. And the possibility of instant electronic two-way communication connecting every home in the country has raised in some minds the potential of electronic town meetings with instant referenda, or at least public opinion polls (Parker, p 638).

The uncertainties of the direction of such developments and the problems to be solved are perhaps best illustrated by considering the implications of a wired city development for the conventional telephone system. In the overall scheme of the technical capabilities of a wired city system, incorporation of telephone service as one element of the larger system would not be difficult. But this serves to illustrate the magnitude of such a wired city development: as of 1969 the total investment in telephone and telegraph plant and equipment in Canada was already more than $6 billion.

One possibility within the wired city system would be the provision, on demand, of programs selected by individuals according to their own needs or interests. Such a personalized program service would, of course, have a major impact on the conventional broadasting system. But the costs of storage, retrieval, and playing such programming are still prohibitive so far as service to the public at large is concerned, and the development of economically feasible systems for the provision of such services does not appear likely for quite some time.

In summary, it is impossible to predict the precise direction of future technological developments in the broadcasting area. Nor is it possible to predict the extent to which such developments will affect broadcasting as it is now known. It is clear that there will be changes, but in what time frame it is difficult to say.

However, despite the uncertainties about the forms and dates of future technological developments, one aspect of their relationship to conventional broadcasting is clear. The effect of such developments -- whether they be video disks, direct broadcast satellites, wired city systems, or some combination of these and other new approaches -- will be to increase the range of choice of material available. In this sense, it is clear that the audience fragmentation effect of cable will also be a characteristic of future technological innovations.

b) THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

Services, Distribution, and Coverage

The CBC operated seven major domestic services: two television networks, English and French; two AM radio networks, English and French; two FM networks, English and French; and a multilingual Northern Service (in English, French, Indian and Inuit languages and dialects) providing medium and shortwave broadcasting to the Canadian north. These services were broadcast by the combined systems of CBC and affiliated private stations outlined in Figure 7-5.

The distribution of network service to stations and network relay stations was accomplished by a combined system of leased land lines, microwave facilities, and domestic communication satellite channels. Two channels of the Anik satellite were used to distribute English Television network service (at Atlantic and at Pacific times) directly to 8 of the 17 CBC stations and to 19 of the 50 network relay stations in Figure 7-5. Through the use of these two satellite channels, a transmission centre in Toronto, program delay centres in Winnipeg and Edmonton, and terrestrial microwave facilities, English Television programs were delivered at appropriate local times to the Atlantic, Eastern, Central, Mountain, and Pacific time zones. A third Anik channel was used to distribute French Television network service from Montreal.

The national English Television network was in fact made up of provincial and regional networks which operated independently to provide certain program services.

As indicated in Figure 7-6, as of the end of 1974 the combined system of CBC and affiliated stations provided English Television service to 91.2% of the total Canadian population, or to 97.2% of the population group which spoke English most often. Figure

Figure 7-5. CBC AND AFFILIATED STATIONS AND REBROADCASTERS, 15 November 1974

RADIO	AM Services		FM Services		Short Wave	Total
	English	French	English	French		
CBC Stations	26	14	5	4	10	59
CBC Rebroadcasters	3	1				4
CBC Low Power Relay Transmitters	215	75				290
Affiliated Stations	56	19				75
Affiliated Rebroadcasters	14	13				27
TOTAL - RADIO	314	122	5	4	10	455

TELEVISION	English	French	Total
CBC Stations	17	8	25
CBC Network Relay Stations	50	9	59
CBC Frontier Coverage Package		1	1
CBC Rebroadcasters	86	26	112
Affiliated Stations	29	7	36
Affiliated Rebroadcasters	144	25	169
Private Rebroadcasters	12	2	14
TOTAL - TELEVISION	338	78	416

Source: CBC 1974a, p 1.

Figure 7-6. CBC COVERAGE BY MEDIUM AND LANGUAGE

NETWORKS / Population Groups	Proportion of Population Covered	
	Television	AM Radio
ENGLISH NETWORKS		
Total Canadian Population	91.2 %	95.6 %
English Most Often Spoken	97.2 %	98.7 %
FRENCH NETWORKS		
Total Canadian Population	67.6 %	81.1 %
French Most Often Spoken	98.1 %	98.8 %

Based on CBC and affiliated stations in operation or licensed prior to 1 October 1974. Source: CBC 1975b, p 42.

7-7 shows the geographical coverage provided by the 351 CBC and affiliated English Television stations and rebroadcasters authorized as of 31 March 1974.

English Television Program Services

The weekly schedule of network program service for Winter 1973/74 appears as Figure 7-8. The full network service consisted of slightly more than 76 hours per week. However, the full service was not carried by all the stations in the system. A distinction was made between "reserved" and "available" programming. The affiliation agreement between the CBC and its affiliates required the affiliates to carry a minimum amount of programming designated by the CBC as "reserved." All other time periods were programmed by the affiliates -- to discharge their local service responsibilities, to

Figure 7-7. MAP: CBC ENGLISH TELEVISION COVERAGE
CBC and Affiliated Stations, 31 March 1974


STATIONS
▢ Transmitter Theoretical "B" Contours
• TV Repeaters (5 watts or less)
▴ Anik Satellite Rebroadcasters

Source: CRTC 1974c, p 47

provide programs of particular interest to their communities, and to earn local advertising revenue. During Winter 1973/74, reserved programming amounted to 41 hours per week, or 54% of the total network service. Reserved programming accounted for 76% of all programming in the 7:30-11:30 pm network time periods. "Available" programs could be carried on a sustaining basis by affiliates without charge. However, if local commercials were sold in an available program, affiliates were assessed a charge equivalent to 30% of their local one minute commercial rate. CBC owned and operated stations carried the full schedule of both reserved and available programming. Reserved and available time periods are shown in Figure 7-9(a).

The CBC English Television Network might be described as "semi-commercial." Although advertising time was sold in most light entertainment programs, certain programming designated "sustaining" was not offered for sale. All network news and current affairs programming was noncommercial (although CBC stations did sell commercial time in some locally produced news and current affairs programs). In Winter 1973/74, 40.25% of the network schedule consisted of noncommercial programming; these sustaining program periods are shown in Figure 7-9(b).

The Winter 1973/74 English Television Network block schedule for a representaive week (without "specials") consisted of programming of which 72.1% (54.9 hours per week) was Canadian in origin. Programming imported from the United States accounted for 25.3% (19.3 hours per week). Canadian and imported program periods are shown in Figure 7-9(c). "Information" and "entertainment" program periods are shown in Figure 7-9(d).

Resources and Expenditures

For the year ended 31 March 1974 the CBC received $232,796,000 in Parliamentary appropriations for operating expenditures for all services. Gross advertising revenue amounted to $60,202,000, of which $56,916,000 was provided by English and French television. Figure 7-10 provides percentage distributions of the total operating expense according to service and expenditure classifications.

Figure 7-10. DISTRIBUTIONS OF TOTAL CBC OPERATING EXPENSE, 1973/74
All Services - Year Ended 31 March 1974

SERVICE CLASSIFICATIONS	
Programs	60 %
Network Distribution	9 %
Station Transmission	5 %
Operational Supervision and Services	9 %
General Administration	[illegible] %
External Service Operations	2 %
Selling	2 %
Payments to Private Stations	2 %
Agency Commissions & Allowances	2 %
Capital Loan Interest	4 %

EXPENDITURE CLASSIFICATIONS	
Salary & Wage Expense	47 %
Performers, Authors, Composers & Other Rights	11 %
Film Rights and Commissioned Productions	6 %
Recording & Film Processing	3 %
TV Staging & Production Costs	3 %
Maintenance of Technical Equipment	1 %
Building Rental & Maintenance	3 %
Lines, Microwave & Satellite	7 %
Payments to Private Stations	2 %
Agency Commissions & Allowances	2 %
Capital Loan Interest	4 %

Source: CBC 1974b, pp 69, 70.

Figure 7-8. CBC ENGLISH TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM SCHEDULE, WINTER 1973/74

<table>
<tr><th>Time</th><th>Sunday</th><th>Monday</th><th>Tuesday</th><th>Wednesday</th><th>Thursday</th><th>Friday</th><th>Saturday</th></tr>
<tr><td>9:30</td><td rowspan="4">Local</td><td colspan="5">Mon Ami
The Friendly Giant</td><td rowspan="7"></td></tr>
<tr><td>10:00</td><td colspan="5">Schools</td></tr>
<tr><td>10:30</td><td colspan="5">Mr. Dressup</td></tr>
<tr><td>11:00</td><td rowspan="2">Meeting Place</td><td colspan="5" rowspan="2">Sesame Street</td></tr>
<tr><td>11:30</td></tr>
<tr><td>12:00</td><td colspan="6">Local</td></tr>
<tr><td>12:30</td><td>News Profile
A Way Out</td><td colspan="5">Luncheon Date</td></tr>
<tr><td>1:00</td><td>Dollars And Sense</td><td colspan="5">Local</td><td rowspan="2">Children's Cinema</td></tr>
<tr><td>1:30</td><td>Country Canada</td><td colspan="5">Audubon Wildlife Theatre</td></tr>
<tr><td>2:00</td><td>Adieu Alouette</td><td colspan="5">Juliette And Friends</td><td rowspan="4">Sports</td></tr>
<tr><td>2:30</td><td>Canadian Film Makers</td><td colspan="5">Local</td></tr>
<tr><td>3:00</td><td rowspan="2">World Of Music</td><td colspan="5">Take 30</td></tr>
<tr><td>3:30</td><td colspan="5">The Edge of Night</td></tr>
<tr><td>4:00</td><td>Youth Confrontation</td><td colspan="5">Family Court</td><td rowspan="2">Sports</td></tr>
<tr><td>4:30</td><td>Arts '74</td><td>Drop In</td><td>The Fit Stop</td><td>Drop In</td><td>A Place Of Your Own</td><td>Drop In</td></tr>
<tr><td>5:00</td><td>Music To See</td><td>Professor Moffett</td><td>Marc's Grab Bag</td><td>The Electric Company</td><td>What's New</td><td>Hi Diddle Day</td><td rowspan="2">Bugs Bunny</td></tr>
<tr><td>5:30</td><td>Hymn Sing</td><td colspan="5">Gilligan's Island</td></tr>
<tr><td>6:00</td><td rowspan="2">The World Of Disney</td><td colspan="5" rowspan="3">Local</td><td>Update</td></tr>
<tr><td>6:30</td><td>Music Machine</td></tr>
<tr><td>7:00</td><td>The Beachcombers</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>7:30</td><td rowspan="2">The Waltons</td><td>Lotsa Luck</td><td></td><td>Howie Meeker
Mr. Chips</td><td>Maude</td><td>The Irish Rovers</td><td>Replay</td></tr>
<tr><td>8:00</td><td>The Partridge Family</td><td>Mary Tyler Moore Show</td><td>This Land</td><td rowspan="2">The Carol Burnett Show</td><td>All In The Family</td><td rowspan="5">Hockey Night In Canada</td></tr>
<tr><td>8:30</td><td>Dick Van Dyke Show</td><td rowspan="2">Cannon</td><td rowspan="2">Police Story</td><td>It's A Musical World</td><td>MASH</td></tr>
<tr><td>9:00</td><td rowspan="2">The Collaborators
*
The National Dream</td><td rowspan="2">Musicamera</td><td rowspan="2">The Play's The Thing</td><td rowspan="2">The Tommy Hunter Show</td></tr>
<tr><td>9:30</td><td>This Is The Law</td><td>Front Page Challenge</td></tr>
<tr><td>10:00</td><td>The Marketplace</td><td rowspan="2">The Nature Of Things +
Man Alive
*
Images of Canada</td><td>Up Canada!</td><td>West</td><td rowspan="2">Take 60 /
Take 30 +
Newsmagazine</td><td rowspan="2">The World At War</td></tr>
<tr><td>10:30</td><td>Ombudsman / Present Tense</td><td>Some Honourable Members</td><td>Countrytime</td><td>Singalong Jubilee</td></tr>
<tr><td>11:00</td><td>The Nation's Business</td><td colspan="5">The National News
Viewpoint</td><td>Provincial Affairs</td></tr>
</table>

Symbols: / = Alternate Weeks, * = Consecutive Series, + = Two 30 Minute Programs. Based on CBC1973b, p 54.

Figure 7-9. PROGRAM PERIOD CLASSIFICATIONS
CBC English Television Network Program Schedule, Winter 1973/74



Figure 7-11. AVERAGE HOURLY TELEVISION PROGRAM COSTS, 1969/70 and 1973/74

	Cost of Programs Broadcast		Hours of Programs		Average Cost Per Hour	
	1969/70	1973/74	1969/70	1973/74	1969/70	1973/74
ENGLISH TELEVISION						
Network						
CBC Produced	32,849,000	54,538,000	2,735	3,497	12,011	15,596
Procured	5,089,000	4,190,000	1,102	888	4,618	4,718
Local Stations						
CBC Produced	21,152,000	23,753,000	6,936	8,079	3,049	2,940
Procured	2,292,000	2,649,000	11,121	14,142	206	187
FRENCH TELEVISION						
Network						
CBC Produced	30,480,000	46,085,000	2,927	2,959	10,413	15,575
Procured	5,478,000	5,913,000	2,737	2,745	2,001	2,154
Local Stations						
CBC Produced	3,234,000	7,700,000	573	1,387	5,644	5,552
Procured	116,000	156,000	673	316	172	494

Sources: CBC 1970b, p 71 and CBC 1974b, p 72.

Figure 7-12. ENGLISH TELEVISION PROGRAM BUDGET PURCHASING POWER, 1969/70 - 1973/74

	Total Cost		Increase In Hours Of Programs[1]	Average Cost Per Hour	
Programs	Absolute Increase[1]	Effective Increase[2]		Absolute Increase[1]	Effective Increase[2]
NETWORK					
CBC Produced	66 %	13 %	28 %	30 %	-12 %
Procured	-18 %	-44 %	-19 %	2 %	-31 %
LOCAL					
CBC Produced	12 %	-24 %	16 %	-0.3%	-34 %
Procured	16 %	-21 %	27 %	-1 %	-38 %
TOTAL	39 %	-6 %	22 %	14 %	-22 %[3]

Notes:
1. "Absolute" increases are based on hours and costs from Figure 7-11.
2. "Effective" increase figures take into account a decline in dollar purchasing power based on wholesale price index averages for 1969, 1970, 1973, and 1974 (Fawcett, p 7.20). 1973/74 dollars are thus calculated as having 68 % of the purchasing power of 1969/70 dollars.
3. Based on consumer price index changes, the effective increase in average per hour costs for all programs would be -9 % (as opposed to the -22 % figure based on wholesale index changes).

The cost of programs, distribution, and transmission of the English and French television services for 1973/74 amounted to $178,262,000; the total for the 1969/70 year was $120,815,000. Figure 7-11 compares average hourly television program costs for 1969/70 and 1973/74. Over this same period high inflation rates reduced the purchasing power of the dollar significantly. Figure 7-12 translates the raw hours and cost figures from Figure 7-11 into effective percentage "increases."

An appreciation of the trends evidenced in Figure 7-12 is essential to even a basic understanding of the English Television operating environment during the case study period. Note especially the following points.

Inflation and Declining Dollar Purchasing Power

The wholesale price index (1935-39 = 100) rose from 282.4 in 1969 to 469.3 in mid 1974. The consumer price index (1961 = 100) rose from 125.5 in 1969 to 169.6 in mid 1974. Based on changes in the wholesale index, 1973/74 dollars had only 68% of the purchasing power of 1969/70 dollars. Based on the consumer index, the drop was to 80%. The wholesale index has been taken here as the better indicator of changes in the types of costs incurred by the CBC because, as indicated in Figure 7-10, salary and wage expenses accounted for 47% of the Corporation's expenditures.

Note that the decline to 68% purchasing power must be applied to the absolute increases as well as the basic 1969/70 figure -- so that for purchasing power to have remained constant over the case study period an absolute increase of 47% would have been required. Consequently, although the total outlay for English Television programs increased 39% between 1969/70 and 1973/74, the effective purchasing power of the program budget actually decreased 6%.

Increases in Canadian Content and Hours of Service

Over the case study period an increase of 24.5% was made in the proportion of Canadian programming on the English Television Network. And the hours of network service were increased from 71.2 hours per week in 1969/70 to 76.2 in 1973/74. The Canadian content of a "representative winter week" (a statistical summary of the basic block schedule, compensating for planned differences from one actual week to another but excluding news and other "specials") rose from 42.2 hours per week (59.3% Canadian content) in 1969/70 to 54.9 hours (72.1%) in 1973/74.

These increases are evident in the 28% increase in CBC network program production shown in Figure 7-12. Displacement of imported (principally US) programs by Canadian programs accounted for most of the decline in the hours of procured network programming.

Increases in the Number of CBC Stations

The "local" hours and cost figures in Figures 7-11 and 7-12 are totals for CBC owned and operated stations -- which numbered 12 in mid 1970 and 15 in mid 1974. This increase in the number of CBC stations accounts for much of the 16 and 27% increases in hours of CBC produced and procured local programs. Although budgets and hours of production and of procured programing vary from station so as to make "per station" averages misleading, behind the 12 and 16% absolute increases in local program costs is a 25% increase in the number of stations that contributes to the dramatic (34 and 38%) drops in average per hour CBC produced and procured program costs.

Combined Effects and Trends

The combined effects of the increases in the proportion of Canadian programming, in the hours of service, and in the number of CBC stations between 1969/70 and 1973/74 produced an increase of 1,905 hours per year (20%) in network and local CBC production, and, despite a drop in hours of procured network programming, a 22% increase in total hours of programming. At the same time the effective total outlay for this programming fell 6%. Note that the CBC network production outlay dropped only 12% on an average cost per hour basis while network procurement, local production, and local procurement budgets all fell over 30% on an effective hourly basis.

Chapter 11 will consider the questions of CBC efficiency and of resource adequacy in detail and will consider whether there was an imbalance between the demands made of the CBC and its available resources. The point to note here is simply that, throughout the study period, English Television was producing progressively more and more Canadian programming on an effectively shrinking resource base -- that it was "stretching" its programming resource base.

c) THE REGULATORY AGENCY

The Canadian Radio-Television Commission was the structural centrepiece of the 1968 Broadcasting Act's "single system" of Canadian broadcasting. In 1965 the Fowler Committee had recommended the creation of a Canadian Broadcasting Authority to be responsible for the direction, supervision, and control of the whole broadcasting system. The Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG) had been created in 1958 to take over the regulation of broadcasting from the CBC -- in part to deal with resentment of the role of the CBC as both regulator of and competitor with the private stations. But the BBG's regulatory era had seen its own problems: confusion over BBG and CBC jurisdiction, questioning of the propriety of licensing the ownership of one medium by another medium, and charges of political favouritism arising out of some BBG rulings.

The CRTC's actual powers were a significant extension over those which had been given the BBG. The Broadcasting Act stipulated that "the Commission shall regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system with a view to implementing the broadcasting policy enunciated in section 3 of this Act" (Act, s 15). The CRTC was itself empowered to grant radio and television station licences. Because the BBG could only make licensing recommendations to Cabinet, it had been considered by some to be somewhat "toothless" as a regulatory agency (Blackburn 1970, p 43). The CTRC was also given jurisdiction over community antenna television systems. The BBG had no real power over cable because this form of signal distribution was not included in the 1958 Broadcasting Act. The 1966 White Paper described the approach to cable that was eventually taken in the 1968 Act as follows:

> The new legislation will provide that community-antenna television systems shall be treated as components of the national broadcasting system, subject to licensing, regulation and control by [the regulatory agency].
>
> The [agency] will be empowered to examine, at public hearings or otherwise, all applications for new licences or the renewal of existing licences for such systems. Among the matters subject to regulation or incorporated in the conditions of a licence will be the inclusion of Canadian channels, the preservation of the integrity of the programs received and carried by the systems, the formation of networks, and adequate degree of Canadian control of corporate licensees, and -- as already noted -- questions of multiple ownership and control.
>
> Study is being given to special problems of jurisdiction involved in the regulation of closed-circuit television operations and the reception of transmissions from antennae in the United States fed through a coaxial cable or microwave system to Canadian communities for local distribution over cable networks. (Stanbury, p 11)

The creation of the CRTC also held the promise of breaking the pattern of regulatory crises during the periods of CBC and BBG control. For instance, Section 17 of the Act provided a somewhat more detailed specification of the powers of the regulatory agency over the CBC, and set down procedures for consultation between the Commission and the Corporation and for the referral of unresolved issues to government.

Finally, it should be noted that the CRTC's mandate was significantly more activist than is traditionally the case with regulatory agencies. Section 3(b) in that part of the Act outlining "Broadcasting Policy for Canada" declared that "the Canadian broadcasting system should be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians so as to safeguard, enrich, and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada." And Section 3 concluded that "the objectives of the broadcasting policy for Canada enunciated in this section can best be achieved by providing for the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system by a single independent public authority [the CRTC]."

The new Commission was faced with the develpment of a series of new policies simply in order to carry out the non-activist parts of its role. And all of the Commission's work, and all of its policy development, was set against the cultural, political, social, and economic objectives of the Broadcasting Act. It is, in fact, not at all difficult to interpret the Act as deliberately creating the CRTC principally as an instrument of cultural, political, and economic nationalism. Other interpretations vary primarily in terms of force and emphasis: the central point that the CRTC was an instrument of nationalism is inescapable. That part of "Broadcasting Policy for Canada" dealing with the CBC further underlined the importance attached to cultural nationalism. The Act declared that the national broadcasting service should "contribute to the development of national unity and provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity" (Act, s 3.g.iv).

The CRTC came into being, then, as a unique sort of regulatory agency: it had the powers and the responsibility to shape the future of broadcasting in Canada; it inherited a set of major (and pressing) problems from the agency it replaced; and it was charged with a role in strengthening the cultural fabric of the country.

The CRTC received a great deal of public attention in Canada, and seemed to be perceived as vastly more central to the lives of Canadians than the FCC was considered to be by Americans. A number of factors may have accounted for this close scrutiny of the CRTC, especially in the print media and in government. Communnication in general may be more central to the lives of Canadians, and there was a long standing tradition of relatively widespread public debate about broadcasting policy. Some CRTC rulings, especially those governing the availability of US television station signals on Canadian CATV systems, had very direct effects on the availability of electronic entertainment to Canadian citizens. And the CRTC's activist stance and participatory approach certainly attracted more attention than would been the case with a more passive agency.

In 1973/74 the Commission issued 548 separate regulatory decisions. By the end of March 1974 the CRTC operations had grown to a staff of 400, at an annual expense of $6,300,000. Although extensive analysis of the CRTC's work is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to review the major directions taken by the Commission and to examine how the Commission's positions and decisions were perceived in Canada.

Ownership, Control, and Canadian Content

The Commission's first major moves were in the area of ownership and control of broadcast undertakings. A 20 September 1968 government Order-in-Council reduced permissable foreign ownership of Canadian broadcasting undertakings to 20% of the voting shares and required all members of the Board of Directors to be Canadian citizens. A new Order-in-Council, issued on 27 March 1969, extended the ownership limits to CATV and made some changes in the detailed regulations pertaining to the participation of holding companies and to the foreign ownership of investment in broadcasting undertakings. These rulings affected some $150 million worth of broadcasting holdings across Canada, and involved the CRTC in the supervision of a series of divestitures involving foreign interests which included the General Tire and Rubber Company, Gulf and Western Industries Limited, Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., and the Canadian Marconi Company. Beginning in 1968, the CRTC also moved to limit the concentration of ownership within Canadian broadcasting; the Commission evolved a set of policies respecting ownership of multiple broadcasting interests, regarding local identification as a criterion for ownership, and regarding cross-media ownership.

In February 1970 the CRTC issued a set of proposed changes in the minimum Canadian content regulations for television and AM radio. The Commission cited those sections of the Broadcasting Act which empowered it to make regulations "respecting standards of programs and the allocation of broadcasting time" to encourage the development of "varied and comprehensive programming" that is "of high standard, using predominantly Canadian creative and other resources" (CRTC 1970b, p 36). The Commission held a public hearing on its content regulation proposals in Ottawa in mid April 1970. It received a total of 117 submissions in connection with this hearing -- from individuals and from groups and associations of broadcasters, advertisers, composers, performers, consumers, producers, directors, broadcast employees, film makers, social service agencies, concerned citizens, and so on. In the resulting decision the Commission noted that public comment had been "of great value in the preparation of these new regulations" (CRTC 1971b, p 18).

The programming regulations issued in 1970 increased the minimum Canadian content level for CBC television from the 55% level established by the BBG in 1962 to 60%, both in prime time and in the schedule as a whole. The crediting of certain foreign programming as Canadian was discontinued, and a limit of 30% of total content was placed on programming imported from any one country. The new regulations for radio required AM stations to broadcast a minimum of 30% Canadian music. Although the Canadian content level increase in television was incremental and produced an observable but not dramatic effect on program services and the broadcasting industry, the Canadian music content requirements in radio were generally credited with stimulating a dramatic growth in the Canadian recording industry. Robert Lewis commented:

> Within a year, Canada had discovered a whole new stable of song-writers, producers, performers and hip capitalists. More than thirty single records and ten albums had made the international lists in twelve months. Three singles sold more than a million and three Canadian records were gold sellers in the U.S. More important, Canadians had discovered their own pop music. In Toronto alone, there were six new recording studios, instead of one the year before.... Canadian composers collected almost half of the revenue from rights in Canada [in 1973] as against eighteen per cent in 1969. (Lewis, p 14)

Cable and Activist Regulation

During the period from 1970 through 1974 the CRTC was also involved in a number of additional matters including limiting the frequency and duration of commercial interruptions, planning the orderly expansion of broadcast service coverage, developing a policy for the development of FM services distinctive from those provided by AM, participating in the establishment of an industry code governing advertising to children and children's programming, and dealing with challenges to its jurisdiction.

But the Commission's greatest headache was cable. The extent of CATV penetration in Canada and the consequences for the Canadian broadcasting system were outlined in section 7(b). The problem had been foreseen in the 1965 Fowler Committee Report:

> Our terms of reference specifically excluded community- antenna television services (CATV), but we inevitably found ourselves drawn into consideration of this complex subject because of its actual and potential effects on television generally....
>
> Two basic areas of public interest are in conflict as a result of this new development. The consuming public has clearly demonstrated a sharp demand for this new expansion of television program choice....
>
> There are, however, many single-channel areas where regulatory policy to nourish or support the licensee has been negated by the sudden intrusion of a number of new signals which dilute the audience and damage commercial support. (Fowler 1965, pp 251,3)

The CRTC's first major policy move in the CATV area came in 1969 when it banned cable companies from using microwave for what it termed "the wholesale importation of programmes from distant U.S. stations." This first move provoked the first round of severe criticism of the Commission. In practice, the ruling allowed cable systems near the border to pick up US stations and deliver their signals to subscribers but prohibited operators whose systems were distant from the border from using microwave to deliver a comparable selection of US signals to their subscribers. A full complement of US programming choices could be provided in Hamilton, but none could be made available in Edmonton. The people in Edmonton, and in vast stretches of the BC interior, the Prairies, and Northern Ontario, were not pleased. Eventually the microwave prohibition was lifted as new regulatory approaches to the problems of cable were developed. In assessing the cable situation in 1975, Jack Miller, radio and television columnist for THE TORONTO STAR, commented:

> The first time a cable company asked to use microwave to bring in U.S. stations, and the first time the CRTC granted such a request -- Canadian television was shoved onto a road that has been all downhill, with the bottom still not in sight.
>
> The CRTC argued that it could not resist overwhelming public and political pressure to allow the microwave revolution....
>
> As for the consumers, they were the ones who started the trouble by declaring a "right" to U.S. stations which were far beyond normal broadcast range, and since they'll go on getting them, they should pay the real price. (Miller 1975a, p 18)

The cable policy which evolved consisted of a complex set of regulations specifying a hierarchy of signals which systems might deliver, requiring cable systems to originate local service programming on a "community" channel, permitting the deletion of individual commercials from the signals of US stations, and providing for the substitution of the Canadian signal for the US one whenever a Canadian station carried a program at the same time as it was being broadcast by a US outlet.

The problem which faced the Commission was the creation of a scheme whereby Canadian cable subscribers were provided with the range of services, both Canadian and US, which they wanted, whereby the economic base of Canadian commercial broadcasting would not be destroyed by advertising on US stations distributed in Canada by cable, and whereby the Canadian cable industry, like the other elements of the overall broadcasting system, could be made to help "safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada."

Throughout much of the media coverage of the CRTC (including much of that used in this study) ran a great deal of attention to the Chairman of the Commission, Pierre Juneau. The position was highly visible: Juneau spoke on behalf of the Commission to broadcasters, to government, and to the public in general. He was portrayed as an activist and occasionally as a "Czar of Broadcasting," and it is important to note both Juneau's position and the CRTC's mandate in assessing these public perceptions of his role. John Porteous reported on a May 1972 interview:

> PORTEOUS: "You've been called a Czar of Broadcasting and I've read that you rather feel uneasy about that title....
>
> JUNEAU: "Well, I do read about this in the papers but I don't really believe it.... I think it's one of the ways the newspapers have of dramatizing things whereas the reality is something different. The fourteen members of the commission play a real role and we influence each other very much and the other members have very strong feelings about what they're doing." (Porteous, p 16)

Perhaps the more significant consideration is that Juneau almost invariably described the Commission's role as being responsible for implementing the provisions of the Broadcasting Act. Frank Penn reported on a June 1970 interview:

> PENN: "But why bother disturbing a broadcasting status quo with which the majority of Canadians seem well satisfied?"
>
> JUNEAU: "Really, the answer to that one should come from Parliament. After all, it was Parliament which produced the Broadcasting Act. But besides the obvious -- and entirely valid -- answers about creating a Canadian system with a Canadian viewpoint, and the encouragement of Canadian talents to work and develop here, the idea of a truly Canadian broadcasting system makes profound economic sense." (Penn 1970, s 2, p 1)

So far as the CRTC's mandate was concerned, it should be noted that in many ways the Broadcasting Act was an activist piece of legislation and, to the extent that the CRTC has pursued the Act's objectives, both the Commission and its Chairman were perceived as activists.

The following excerpts, from an address by the Chairman to the Empire Club in Toronto in 1972, indicate some of the areas of concern to the Commission:

> Whether we like it or not -- and let's face it, this situation is not all a matter of choice -- we have, in Canada, a communication system which, in fact, is freer than any other in the world -- including the United States.
>
> If you look at the facts, you find that the only voices that may be victims of censorship are the voices of Canadians.
>
> Not censorship by any state institution, which is the form of censorship that usually comes to mind, but censorship caused by the nature of technology itself, censorship by mass marketing philosophies, censorship by multi-national industrial planning, censorship by the rigidity of scheduling.
>
> Was the battle against censorship in the history of democracy waged to protect world market strategies?
>
> Was it fought so that, in the field of ideas, the lowest common denominator could dictate to the rest of the population? No. The struggle against censorship was fought so that all views could be heard. Not only the views that concided with what the largest consumer group might buy. (CRTC 1972a, pp 4-5)
>
> Allow me to reiterate that the CRTC is not a private organization pursuing its own objectives, nor is it an instrument of the Government of the day. It was created in 1968 by an Act of Parliament which was supported by all parties in the House. (p 6)

> If our mental landscapes, our creative aptitudes are not safeguarded and promoted, I am afraid the same fate awaits us as that which befalls a new TV show that doesn't get enough rating points, and suffers a premature exit. Except that in this case, we will, in fact, cancel ourselves. Because to obliterate real works of the Canadian imagination is to obliterate ourselves.
>
> To preserve and develop our ability to create and produce our own imagery is something we simply cannot do without. To enable ourselves to see everything, including ourselves, through our own eyes and our own systems of production and diffusion, will require a long and persevering effort. (p 22)

The Commission gave notice of its intention to extend Canadian content regulations to the production of commercials in April 1974, held a hearing in October 1974, and issued a revised set of proposed regulations in July 1975, and, in January 1976, set 1 July 1976 as the date for implementation of the new "Canadian content" policy on commercials (CRTC 1976).

FM Radio Policy and Program Content Concerns

In January 1975 the CRTC published FM RADIO IN CANADA -- A POLICY TO ENSURE A VARIED AND COMPREHENSIVE SERVICE, a major policy statement on the future development of FM radio (CRTC 1975c). The new policy was generally regarded as activist. Jack Miller commented:

> Everyone who gets a new FM licence -- and everyone who has one now and hopes to get it renewed -- is going to have to make his program service different not only from the general AM pattern, but different also from every other FM station in town.
>
> But going beyond that, every FM station will have attached to its licence a copy of all the promises the owner made about its program performance when he applied for the licence....
>
> The push is to "foreground" programming, which is described as something prepared, calling for attention by the audience, running at least 15 minutes, exploring or following a recognizeable theme, and broadcast at some time of the day when there's an audience out there (no fair burying it at 3 a.m.)....
>
> The conscious push is not exactly toward a return to old-time radio, which was full of massive scripted productions (which tv took away -- and shows no signs of relinquishing). But the thought is in that sort of direction, to the point of spelling out such idealistic concepts as community access programming and a return to some "live" music.
>
> The quest is for a trend away from background music and toward something to agitate, rather than lull the mind. (Miller 1975b, pp]4-6)

The FM policy indicated the extent to which the Commission was concerned with programming and the cultural content of broadcasting. One basic concern was the shaping of the Canadian broadcasting system by "the North American merchandizing environment." The Chairman was quoted as follows:

> A proliferation of channels without corresponding investment in expression, creativity and production is inevitably leading us to increased importation, increased commercialism, lower standards in every form of radio and television, including programming for children. Our broadcasting system has become involved to a large extent in the entire North American mechandizing mechanism. As individuals and as citizens of this country, we do not want broadcasting to be only an

> extension of the market plaza. Although we don't want the state in the bedrooms of the nation, we do care about who controls the access to the TV rooms of the country. Over the years we have maintained a concern as a nation about the marketing managers of North America becoming the gate-keepers of broadcasting. Are we any more ready to become a lump in the massive North American broadcasting mould? A sub-market in the buying charts of Madison Avenue?" (Lewis, p 12)

In a sense the CRTC was itself caught up in this same North American merchandizing environment. Its proposals for the development of a strengthened and enriched system of Canadian broadcasting had to be framed against the context of a mixed system of public and private broadcasting, and there were limits to the demands which could be made of the private sector. The audience fragmentation resulting from high cable penetration levels weakened the financial position of many Canadian television stations. And the wisdom of the Commission's decision to license Global as a third English network in Ontario was questioned when the network encountered particularly severe financial problems during its first year of operation. Although the CRTC saw in the Global development both the opportunity to recapture some Canadian advertising money being spent on US border stations and the prospect of an expansion of the Canadian independent production industry, the network's revenue performance was not sufficiently strong to sustain the level of service originally promised. Global lost an estimated $9 million in its first eight months, the original operators lost financial control, and the CRTC was faced with having to rule on the change of control and on new programming plans.

Shaping the CBC

The Commission's activism and its concerns about the cultural content of programming and the influence of the mechandizing environment extended to its dealings with the CBC. In late 1971 the Corporation filed a series of new station and network applications with the CRTC. The applications were for the first phase of the development of a two stream radio service, commonly referred to as Radio One/Radio Two. The CBC summarized its plans as follows:

> CBC Radio One (AM) will concentrate on a wide range of information and musical entertainment of a varied nature. Its general character is reflected in current CBC AM daytime programming which has undergone certain changes during the past year but which continued to reflect standards established and followed by the Corporation over the years. The Radio One style is brief and condensed.
>
> CBC Radio Two (FM) will be extended and more leisurely in its programming, with emphasis on music, to which it is technically suited, drama and the arts. Radio One and Radio Two will be complementary services each distinctively Canadian and distinctively CBC. (CRTC 1971d)

A public hearing on the applications was held in March 1972. In June 1972 the Commission announced rejection of the Radio One/Radio Two plan. The CRTC commented that the proposals appeared to contain an overly centralized program production structure, to be unduly influenced by the popularity standards of urban areas, to be overly concerned with audience ratings at the expense of program distinctiveness and excellence, and to neglect the CBC's function of reflecting to a national audience the total range of the living culture. (CRTC 1972b, p 3)

Robert Douglas, writing in BROADCASTER under the title "CRTC Shatters CBC Two-Stream Radio Policy," analyzed the decision as follows:

> The CBC is faced with piecing together a new radio program policy out of the shattered remains of the two-stream radio system rejected by the Canadian Radio-Television Commission in June.

> The task is tough because the CRTC is demanding a turnabout in CBC thinking about its role in Canadian radio broadcasting. And it is not clear, at the moment, how much -- if anything -- can be salvaged from the policy proposed at CRTC hearings in Ottawa in March....
>
> While [CBC President Laurent] Picard has taken a generally constructive approach to the CRTC decision, some CBC programmers were initially shocked and bitter.
>
> Even a union chief, Paul Racine, president of the Syndicat General du Cinema et de la Television, joined in criticism of the CRTC decision. In a Montreal statement, he said the CRTC decision "smacks of an anachronistic elitism which does not take into account the changes in radio in the last 20 years".
>
> He was apparently commenting on CRTC remarks that the CBC radio policy was too commercial, imitating the style of private radio....
>
> The basic thrust of the CBC argument at the March hearings was that its radio audience was tiny. Canadian taxpayers, who paid for the CBC, deserved a service that could reach a wider audience.
>
> Its fast-paced AM programming could appeal to a greater number of people than the old-style CBC radio while its FM service could attract listeners seeking a deeper treatment of issues.
>
> Opponents feared that the corporation was becoming too conscious of ratings and was patterning its programming on the mass-appeal style of private radio. They also said many Canadians were being cheated of the full CBC service because they could get only a small portion of its programming from private affiliates.
>
> The CRTC decision obviously draws heavily from the views of these opponents. It also reflects the CRTC's long-standing concern about extending CBC service to all corners of the nation.
>
> The commission has come down so strongly on the side of the opposition that a totally new approach to radio programming seems required. The CRTC will have to be involved in a new effort to design a radio program policy. (Douglas, p 12)

Over a year later, in October 1973, the Commission announced that "the CRTC now believes that CBC has taken decisive initial steps to resolve the questions raised," and granted approval of six new FM station licences and a French language FM network licence. The announcement indicated a continuing and detailed concern with the types of broadcasting services provided by the national broadcasting service:

> In the June 29 announcement, the CRTC stated its opinion that the CBC should phase out the carriage of commercials on its French and English AM networks.... The matter will be one of the subjects of discussion at the forthcoming public hearing concerning the renewal of CBC licences....
>
> The Corporation has taken steps to supervise more closely the morning and evening peak hour local programming where a tendency to drift towards private radio formats had been most evident....
>
> The Corporation has also indicated to the Commission that it is seriously increasing its efforts to portray each part of the country to the others....
>
> The Commission will continue to pursue these matters in public deliberations concerning CBC policy and in its discussions with the Corporation. (CRTC 1973a, p 3)

At a June 1973 public hearing in Vancouver the CRTC considered applications from three private groups and from the CBC to provide television service on VHF Channel 10 in the Vancouver and Victoria areas. Much of the discussion dealt with technical matters related to channel allocations and coverage (CRTC 1973d, pp 263-360). The Commission denied all applications, and observed:

> The Commission was not impressed with the programming plans proposed by the CBC in its application. Furthermore, the Commission does not agree with the contention of the CBC that Channel 10 must be used to service Victoria and at the same time be used to correct coverage deficiencies of CBC-TV station CBUT now licensed for the Vancouver area. (CRTC 1973e, p 2)
>
> Notwithstanding its decision to deny the CBC application for the use of Channel 10 to serve Victoria, the Commission is convinced that a CBC owned and operated station must be located in Victoria and the full CBC television service extended to Victoria and Vancouver Island at the earliest opportunity. (p 2)

The rejection of the Corporation's programming plans for the proposed Victoria station was not expected by the CBC. But it was not inconsistent with the concern about the nature of CBC program service content which had entered into the Commission's original rejection of the Radio One/Radio Two plan. The Commission's detailed concern with program service content was the source of some concern to the CBC as it approached the major review of CBC performance during the study period, the public hearing required as part of the process of renewing the Corporation's nerwork licences -- first issued in 1970 and due to expire on 31 March 1974. That licence renewal process, which yielded so much of the documentation used in this study, is reviewed in detail in Chapter 10.

Chapter 8

The Participant Observer

a) CASE STUDIES AND PERSONAL VALUES

A case study such as this is inevitably shaped by the background, experiences, and interests of the individual participant observer. This "shaping" is not peculiar to studies in communication research. In his preface to THE VERTICAL MOSAIC, an analysis of social class and power in Canada, Professor John Porter commented: "Throughout the book I have tried to make explicit the various theories or theoretical considerations ... which help make sense of the evidence I have presented. Perhaps less explicit are personal values which have had an influence on the kinds of problems I have sought to analyze" (Porter, p xii).

What I have written in the main part of this study is the product of who I am, of where I have been, of whom I have known, and of what I have seen and heard. In the interests of a better understanding of my perspective, this section borders alarmingly close to being "the confessions of a participant observer of broadcasting in Canada."

b) GENERAL ORIENTATION

> *The crowd was attentive and waiting expectantly. By eight thirty they were growing restless. The children started to wriggle from their parents' knees and women began to chatter. Then the monster came to life with a high-pitched, screeching sound that frightened the children and made them cry. Just as the audience became restless again, the thing would squawk back into life with a hiss, crackle, pop, and roar. Then Albert would fiddle with a knob or a wire and it would go dead. People were beginning to move about, and the women were urging their husbands to take them home, when something wonderful happened: we heard a violin playing, quite distinctly, after which a voice announced that we were listening to KDKA, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.*
>
> *The radio came also to our home. One Saturday in late fall, a man in a shiny Gray Dort Touring drove in with a smile on his face. Earlier I had noticed my father hanging around the woodshed and looking down the concession a great deal, as if he expected someone. There was a hint of something in the air, and it wasn't snow. (Boyle, pp 22-4)*

The excerpts are from MOSTLY IN CLOVER, Harry Boyle's reminiscences of a childhood spent on a farm in Huron County, Ontario. Beyond childhood, Harry Boyle became a writer and broadcaster: with radio station CKNX in Wingham, Ontario, with the Stratford Beacon Herald, and with the CBC. At CBC he became Program Director of CBC radio's Trans-Canada Network, was the creative force behind the prestigious CBC WEDNESDAY NIGHT series, and worked as an Executive Producer in television. In 1968, Mr. Boyle was appointed Vice Chairman of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission, and in 1975 he became Chairman.

Volumes and volumes have been written about the importance of broadcasting to Canada and to Canadians. And yet, for me at least, there is still something missing -- something elusive, but of critical importance. In all of Harry Boyle's writings and pronouncements about broadcasting in Canada, there is the sense that he is dealing with something which he believes to be very precious and unique. Something special happened to Harry Boyle when radio came to Huron County. I can't explain it, really. I doubt that he can.

A technological generation later, television came to our farm in Oxford County, Ontario. One Saturday in the early fall of 1955, a man in a dusty panel truck drove in with a smile on his face. My father, like Harry Boyle's, had organized a surprise. There was a hint of something in the air, and it enlarged my window on the world. I hesitate to push the comparison with Harry Boyle's experience, but it seems reasonable that the electronic media should be of relatively more importance to those living in the relative isolation of farming communities. A possible extension of that may be that the electronic media are of much more importance to those who live in relatively sparsely populated countries such as Canada.

There was something about television that fascinated me. I decided somewhere in the course of Grade 7 to "go into television." A random walk career path eventually landed me there in 1970 after some 14 years of rather more vigorous than average arm chair quarterbacking the CBC. A few of the stops and detours in the intervening period have some relevance to this study.

The years spent going to high school in Stratford, Ontario gave me a chance to watch at close range the development of another unique Canadian cultural institution, the Stratford Festival, and the opportunity during one summer to do some technical work for the visiting National Theatre School.

A number of post-Sputnik era pressures led me to choose an engineering course for the years 1962 through 1966 at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. I also had the mistaken impression that the study of electrical engineering would be of considerable practical value in the technical production of television programs. In order to compensate for the lack of direct contact with broadcast technology, I became heavily involved in a campus radio station project, and eventually became chairman of the McMaster Board of Student Broadcasting. The Board produced weekly public service programs for each of the late Ken Soble's radio stations in Hamilton, CHML and CKDS-FM, and for the program exchange service of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters. We built and equipped studios at McMaster, but were allowed access to CHML facilities for especially complex production work.

Partly because I had gotten overly involved in meeting the production commitments to CHML and CKDS, I became temporarily disillusioned with broadcasting, and took advantage of a summer job opportunity to get involved in the computer business. While at McMaster, I spent two summers working for IBM Canada Limited in Hamilton, concentrating on the development of training programs to introduce civil, mechanical, and electrical engineers to scientific computing techniques. Upon graduation I returned to work for IBM in Hamilton, as a systems engineer concentrating on the implementation of large scale computing systems. In January 1968 I began work at IBM's Canadian headquarters with the product marketing support group, providing technical, systems engineering, and marketing assistance to field personnel. During late 1968 and early 1969 I became heavily involved in the design and production of video taped education packages at IBM, both in Toronto and in Washington, D.C. But the opportunities to continue this television work were limited. There was no broadcasting work available to inexperienced would-be production people in Canada in 1969: it was an "austerity" year. Of the options available to me, the most attractive was to begin graduate studies in communication at Stanford.

The IBM experience, though seemingly a detour on the road to involvement in broadcasting, has actually turned out to have been valuable. It provided the first opportunities for me to travel extensively across Canada. It let me try my hand at television production. The nature of the systems engineering and product marketing work required me to become familiar with the management styles, structures, and practices of a very large number of customer organizations across Canada. And it allowed me to learn a great deal about what lay behind the positive aspects of IBM's reputation as being a well managed enterprise.

c) STANFORD AND CBC EXPERIENCE, 1969-1972

Beginning in September 1969, I have alternately been with the Institute for Communication Research at Stanford and with the CBC. The first year's work at Stanford concentrated on a general examination of communication theories and mass media research. I also worked for the Controller's Office at Stanford as a part time consultant to a university resources modeling/simulation project in association with the Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education.

Following the first year of studies at Stanford, I spent five months with CBC Ottawa as a trainee producer in radio and television public affairs. My radio work included contributions to CBO's afternoon information radio program, NOW ... JUST LISTEN, and the production of six experimental programs in the CBO series SATURDAY NIGHT AND SUNDAY MORNING. I also worked as an editor and producer for the CBC Radio Network -- on the sound documentary series FIVE NIGHTS A WEEK, on COMMENTARY (known earlier as PREVIEW COMMENTARY), on CAPITAL REPORT, and on MATINEE. My television experience was more limited: I produced the Ottawa contributions to the network VIEWPOINT series, and was attached to the CBOT public affairs magazine program, THIS DAY TONIGHT, as a researcher.

The major focus of my second year at the Institute at Stanford was a basic audience research study for the San Francisco public television station. This work, reported in "KQED and its Audience" (McKay 1971), was done under the supervision of Professor Wilbur Schramm, Director of the Institute, with funding support from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the Ford Foundation. I also worked part time as the executive producer of a technical film for the Stanford/Ford Foundation computer based OASIS university management information system development project.

Following this second year at Stanford, I spent the six month period from July through December 1971 on contract to CBC Vancouver as an associate producer in television current affairs. Most of my television studio and film experience came from working as one of the two associate producers assigned to HOURGLASS, the weekday current affairs magazine. Other work included production of a film documentary for the network TAKE 30 series, of the Vancouver contributions to VIEWPOINT, and of B.C. PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS.

My third year at Stanford brought me into contact with a wide variety of public broadcasting research projects: a follow-up audience study of KQED's NEWSROOM program; consulting on the Ford Foundation's public television Station Independence Project; data analysis assistance to Schramm projects on instructional television in El Salvador, Mexico, and American Samoa; and participation in the Stanford evaluation team attached to the Federation of Rocky Mountain States educational technology demonstration using the NASA ATS-F satellite over Denver, Colorado. But my major effort during 1972 was in working with Schramm, Professor Lyle Nelson, Chairman of Stanford's Communication Department, and Douglass Cater, Director of the Aspen Program on Communications and Society, on a study of the financial condition and financial future of US public television. Assistance from the Ford Foundation allowed us to gather, as background, detailed operating cost information from a number of public television stations and production organizations, including the Children's Television Workshop (CTW) and the National Public Affairs Center for Television (NPACT). Assistance from the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies allowed us to gather together the senior managers of the various US public television agencies for a critical assessment of the first draft of the report, "The Financing of Public Television," in late July 1972. The final report (Schramm & Nelson) was released to the annual National Association of Educational

Broadcasters convention on 30 October 1972, and published in condensed form as a special supplement to the January/February 1973 COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW.

d) CBC EXPERIENCE, 1972-1974

In October 1972 I moved to the CBC English Services Division headquarters in Toronto to begin work on a nine month joint Stanford/CBC project which was to have formed the basis for my dissertation. The arrangements for the project specified: "We agree that your dissertation should look at the interplay between programming, research, and management decision making in the field of 'program objective setting and performance evaluation in public television.'"

In late 1971 a Project Group had been established to study and make recommendations for a Program Evaluation System. Based on the three reports of the Project Group, a detailed research proposal was prepared for the Stanford/CBC project. It envisaged various research activities leading to one of four possible dissertations. The proposed areas of activity were:

- Improvement in the setting of program objectives -- It had been pointed out that it would be desirable to begin regularly describing the characteristics of the target audiences for programs in terms other than total overall audience size.
- Analysis of the operation of the Program Evaluation System -- This particular evaluation approach was of interest because its specifications called for the "systems" approach which had won some acceptance in business and industry but not had been used extensively in public broadcasting institutions, especially in applications dealing directly with program content and quality. In addition, there was the matter of long range planning for "an ideal, but practical, evaluation procedure which should be worked towards over the next 3 to 5 years."
- Analysis of available evaluation data -- The specifications for the Program Evaluation System stipulated that a wide range of detailed background information should be assembled for use in the actual evaluation of programs. It seemed that exploratory data analysis might well reveal useful relationships within the available input data, possibly allowing separation of factors over which a producer does not have control at the time of production (scheduling, extent of promotion, series budget, and type of program) from reaction to the production itself (audience size, composition, appreciation, and critical comment).
- Development of Additional Measurements -- Potentially the most rewarding part of the project was the possibilty of adding to the conventional set of measurements available for use in evaluating programs. The development of a new set of "dimensions of audience response" to programming seemed to hold the greatest promise for advancing the state of mass media audience research. (McKay 1972, pp 15-27)

In the end, the nine month half time project turned out to be a two year full time involvement with English Television, and the dissertation topic changed from a detailed examination of program evaluation to a more general case study of management decision making. Rather than provide a detailed chronological report of observations made over the two year period and then attempt to leap from them directly to generalizations, the approach taken here is to organize the observations around issues raised in public. What follows is a summary of my involvement as a participant observer: detailed comments about important aspects of specific projects are imbedded in later chapters.

Figure 8-1 gives a bar chart overview of the timing and duration of the major activities during the period from October 1972 through September 1974. The summaries which follow are keyed, by number, to the elements in Figure 8-1.

(1) Program Evaluation System Familiarization and Study

The initial months of my involvement focused on study of the existing Program Evaluation System and familiarization with the functions and operations of the English Television management group, specifically with "the Planning Group" and the Network Schedule Coordination Committee. Specific evaluation oriented activities included observation of the deliberations of program evaluation "Panels," a review of completed evaluation reports, investigation of possible sources of additional evaluation input, compilation of detailed audience demographic data for test use in the evaluation of one program, examination of the relationship between the audience research and program evaluation functions, and extensive consultation with the Secretary (director) of the evaluation system.

During this period a number of severe problems being experienced within, and as a result of, the operation of the existing system were identified. The Project Group reports, the blueprint for the Evaluation System, proposed the gathering of an extensive data base for consideration of the three-member Evaluation Panels which were to write the program evaluation reports. In practice, only a small fraction of the proposed data base was being furnished to the panels: some information, notably actual program costs, was unavailable in the time frame required by the Evaluation System; other input, such as audience mail, was apparently not considered relevant to this type of evaluation process. Rather than relying on a solid base of objectively measured data, the evaluation reports were based primarily on subjective comment -- by groups of 15 to 20 individuals who had been asked to view specific programs and submit written reactions, and by the report writing panels.

Inevitably, the subjective judgements of the panels differed from the subjective judgements of the program producers. Added to these differences of opinion was the fact that the evaluation reports concentrated overwhelmingly on fault finding: seldom were references made to outstanding performances on camera or to significant contributions by the production or technical personnel. At the base by the early 1973 call for a review of the Evaluation System was serious concern about the impact of the operation of the system on production unit morale. The matter subsequently became one of public record with the publication of a second section front page story in THE GLOBE AND MAIL dealing with the impact of program evaluation on the network's "flag ship" Current Affairs program, WEEKEND (Kirby 1973a). Although the story was somewhat inaccurate in describing how the WEEKEND report was prepared, its assessment of the effects on the program unit was valid. (Kirby's story was also the first real demonstration to me of the importance of newspaper columns as a means of communication between the production areas and management.)

The attitudes of management towards the Evaluation System were mixed. As with producers, the subjective judgements of the evaluation Panels not infrequently differed from the opinions of management. In addition, because there were no generally accepted guidelines for evaluation reporting, in some instances management perceived evaluation panels to have overstepped the boundaries of their assignments -- proposing what were considered to be wholesale changes in the network schedule, commenting on unrelated programs, and suggesting increased resource allocations on a scale considered well beyond the network's means. In February 1973 two parallel "reviews" of the program evaluation system and of audience research reporting were commissioned.

(2) Program Evaluation System Review

This work was carried out jointly with the Secretary of the Evaluation System. Interviews were conducted with 10 producers, 5 program Area Heads, 3 Planning Group executives, and with Research. Extensive notes were taken during the confidential interviews with producers and Area Heads. The review was completed in September 1973. Operation of the system continued, substantially unchanged, throughout the fieldwork period, although the number of evaluations conducted was reduced.

Figure 8-1. PARTICIPANT OBSERVER ACTIVITIES, OCTOBER 1972 - SEPTEMBER 1974



Note: See text for descriptions of numbered activities.

(3) Audience Research Reporting Review

During the period of familiarization with the Evaluation System, it had become apparent that some functions being assumed by evaluation might be performed more systematically by a revised and/or expanded audience data reporting system. It had been discovered, for instance, that although the CBC-operated Audience Panel system weekly yielded detailed program by program audience data, notably demographic and geographic breakdowns, this information was not forwarded to producers or to management. The relationship between the program evaluation system and Research was extremely formal and limited. Questions about audience research reporting and about audience research requirements were included in the evaluation system review interviews with producers and Area Heads. In addition, long, tape recorded interviews were conducted with those network executives most concerned with audience performance. These sessions concentrated on the use made of the existing reporting system, the identification of additional information needs, and reaction to proposals for revised reporting formats. The review was completed in July 1973 and the recommendations were approved, but no major change in the reporting system was made during the fieldwork period.

(4) Program Objectives Setting Review

One of the known problems related to program evaluation, proposed as one possible area for dissertation study, was the extremely general nature of the program purpose and target audience objectives set for programs and program series. A major revision and expansion of the program objectives specification section was included as part of an individual assignment to coordinate a major revision of the Network Program Proposal forms. This was viewed as a first step in a gradual process of "tightening up" program objectives specification. The revised proposal forms came into use in mid-1973 for proposals for the 1974/75 program year, but no concentrated effort was made to encourage or require producers or their Area Heads to specify objectives more precisely than in the past. The objectives specification process was reviewed again in early 1974, but only briefly, and without making any changes.

(5) Program Content Supervision Task Force

As part of the 1973/74 objectives for the English Services Division, it had been proposed that there be established a computerized system for the recording of content information about radio and television programs of a controversial nature. Although some other uses for such a system were no doubt contemplated, it was generally understood that this proposal was intended primarily to provide a means of preparing responses to questions about program content raised in Parliament. Such questions typically called for the collation of data from a large number of program units, had short deadlines for reply, and caused appreciable disruptions in both program unit and management operations. It was also recognized that such a system could be used to take over the logging of political coverage during federal and provincial election campaigns. In order to ensure balanced coverage during these periods, all material of a partisan nature was manually logged by occasion, by type of presentation (scripted news story, filmed appearance, etc.), and by duration (to the second).

My assignment to this six-member task force came as a result of my systems engineering experience with computerized data communication systems. The assignment was more difficult than originally realized, and the group worked seven day weeks to meet its first phase reporting deadline. After gathering and studying sample reporting documents and making site visits in Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal, the task force concluded that the accurate logging of content information could only be done by personnel directly associated with the programs involved, and that this additional work would only be undertaken if there were some incentive for the program units involved. Identification of an incentive scheme was not difficult, but the approach suggested did imply the creation of a considerably larger information retrieval system than was no doubt contemplated by the divisional management. The task force proposed the creation of a single system integrating the new content recording operations with the existing indexing systems for Program Archives, the Film Library, the News film library, a Current Affairs item storage area, and (eventually) the regional film libraries. We had learned that, under the prevailing circumstances, it was frequently cheaper for producers to assign camera crews to shoot "stock shots" as required than it was to search the proliferation of separate indexing systems in separate locations for existing material. (The News film holdings, for instance, were catalogued in four separate systems -- according to year and type of material; there was a list by reel of the Current Affairs holdings, but no index.)

The full scale system designed by the task force was intended to eventually serve the full range of information retrieval needs of the radio and television production units. The projected costs were recognized to be high, but no detailed cost estimating was attempted in the initial investigation. The "concept phase" recommendations of the task force were submitted in a 106 page report in mid June 1973. Included were some proposals for improvements not dependent on the establishment of a computerized system. Later that week the members of the task force received a memorandum stating that divisional management hoped to meet with the group "shortly" to discuss the next stage. Some months later, a written review of 1972/73 divisional objective achievement contained the observation that the financial implications of the task force recommendations were under consideration. The only apparent action to result from this study came, indirectly, during the summer of 1974. A proposal was prepared within TV News to experiment with the computer based New York Times Data Bank information retrieval service. Incorporation of the NYT service into the larger system had been proposed by the task force over a year earlier. Installation of the equipment and the beginning of experimentation with the service took place after the end of the fieldwork period.

(6) Planning System Assistance and Reviews

The "Planning System" -- the mechanism by which proposed programs and activities for the next full planning year were selected for feasibility study and, if approved, were allocated personnel, budgets, and facilities -- is the subject of a detailed examination in Chapter 9. Because this system affected such a large proportion of the total activity of the network management group, the question of its revision or improvement was always, at least to some extent, open. Intensive scrutiny of the system's logic took place in the spring of both 1973 and 1974 -- immediately prior to the setting of the Planning System timetables for those years. Although a number of minor alterations were made each time, no large scale changes were attempted.

During the late summer of 1973, I coordinated the preparation of sets of 1974/75 Network Program Proposals to be forwarded to the regional Production Managers for feasibility study. This provided an opportunity for the close scrutiny of all sections of all accepted proposals.

(7) CRTC Submission Preparation

Involvement in preparations for the CRTC network licence renewal hearing (held in February 1974) began in July 1973 with work on the preparation of the English Television written submission to the Commission. This work, done primarily by three people, involved me in the drafting of some sections, in the editing of others, and in the coordination of revisions. The later stages of this work required extensive consultation with the CBC's Ottawa Head Office.

(8) Station Relations Department Study

In mid 1973, a three-member administrative study group was commissioned to review the functions, organization, and staffing of the TV Station Relations department -- the department which acted as the operational interface between the English Services Division and the private stations affiliated with its television network. My work concentrated on the analysis of reporting lines, functional relationships, and the current and proposed functions of the department. The recommendations, submitted in October 1973, were implemented as proposed.

(9) Global Television Impact Study

In the fall of 1973 the President asked the division to make an analysis of the announced programming, personnel, coverage, and operations plans of the newly licensed Global Television Network, to refine earlier estimates of the impact on CBC program audiences and commercial revenues, and to report on any other significant developments. This independent project continued intermittently until Global began actual operations in January 1974.

(10) CRTC Hearing Preparation and Follow-up

As explained in the Introduction, preparing for the network licence renewal hearing was a major undertaking. Chapter 10 is devoted to a careful examination of events prior to, during, and following the hearing.

As the written submission to the Commission was being prepared, it became clear that not all questions could be anticipated and answered in such a document. As various groups gave public notice of their intention to intervene in the proceedings, the possibility arose that detailed questions about specific issues might be directed to the ESD Vice President and/or the Managing Director of Television. In addition, it was recognized that there would be requirements for factual material to be used in prepared statements.

The amount of research required to investigate just the charges being made public by the intervenors was recognized as considerable but, given that the findings would be of value even if there were few requirements for specific details during the hearing, the decision was made to proceed with the work. As preparation of the written submission neared completion, Don Richardson and I were assigned to these investigations on a full time basis, were provided with special secretarial and clerical assistance, and were chartered to request whatever other assistance we required.

We monitored the growing volume of public comment relating to the licence renewal, reviewed position papers and statements of the CRTC, and added some questions which we felt were likely to be raised. After condensing the issues raised into 20 general categories, we began our research. We received widespread assistance in our efforts to gather the required factual material and draft possible responses. Our inquiries ranged from "access" to "ZONK" (a proposed children's program), and were finally summarized in an indexed, 223 page briefing book for divisional and Corporate management. As part of our look at "regional flow and reflection," we initiated a detailed analysis of the content of two weeks of network programming -- one week in December 1973, one in January 1974. Some of this data was incorporated into the President's opening presentation to the hearing.

Those of us who had been closest to this work participated in divisional and corporate reviews prior to the hearing and were available to assist management throughout the five days of the hearing. Although the briefing book material was used in the drafting of two prepared statements, it was not required for responding to specific questions.

(11) HOURGLASS Resources Study

Following the CRTC hearing I was assigned to conduct a thorough comparative review of the personnel, financial, and physical resources provided for the 6:30-7:30 pm local evening information programs at the nine major locations where the CBC owned and operated local stations. These integrated packages of news, sports, weather, and current affairs material were referred to generically as "HOURGLASS" programs -- using the program title of the original Vancouver model from which the other local programs were adapted. Although the original assignment focused on the equalization of these various resource bases, the study was quickly expanded to include a reconsideration of the "minimum local programming standards" which had been set two years earlier. Investigations for this study required site visits to the program units involved -- in Vancouver, Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Halifax, and St. John's. Although resource allocation suggestions were provided to management as requested, and changes in the minimum standards were proposed, the scope of the work was enlarged (a second time) to include a review of the definition of the role of these programs within the overall CBC television service being provided by these owned and operated stations. The general report on the role of these HOURGLASS programs and on approaches to setting objectives for them was submitted at the end of the fieldwork period. In late October 1974, after returning to Stanford, I traveled to Vancouver for a national meeting of CBC information program producers and, especially, for a meeting with the Executive Producers of the HOURGLASS programs and the newly appointed Current Affairs Area Head at which the findings in the "resources" study were reviewed and discussed.

(12) Audience Age Profile Study

During the final months of the fieldwork period I undertook an analysis of one demographic characteristic of CBC audiences -- age. Although attempts to refine the specification of program target audience objectives had been made without success, it was still felt by some producers and executives that there might be an "aging audience" problem. Changes between 1970 and 1974 in the audience age profile for the CBC's Toronto station were studied, these profiles were compared with those of other Toronto stations, and the age characteristics of CBC and CTV network program audiences were compared. The findings and the management reactions to them are considered in Chapter 14.

(13) Technical Manpower Study

Included among the general observations in a 1971 divisional report on regional organization was the comment that, relative to Vancouver, Winnipeg and Halifax appeared to be comparatively overstaffed in the TV Technical area. Although the Winnipeg and Halifax management groups had been unable to isolate any excesses, the original observation had developed a talent for getting repeated. As I was setting out on the HOURGLASS site visits I was asked to conduct a formal study -- but of the 1974 rather than the 1971 situation. The study confirmed what was generally suspected: given the variations in the nature and volumes of production, in types of equipment, and in organizational structures, the staffing levels were fully appropriate. The methodology of the study was of at least as much interest as its conclusion: it was necessary to establish a detailed set of measurements for the comparative analysis of the production loads and resources at the three regional locations, and to plumb the depths of the elaborate "establishment control" system required to keep the CBC's staff position headcount within the limits set by the Government.

(14) Windsor TV Planning Assistance

During 1974 the CBC began planning for the takeover of its Windsor English Television network affiliate, CKLW-TV. The takeover had its origins in a 1970 CRTC interim licence transfer decision -- which itself followed a 1969 Cabinet directive that changes be made where necessary to ensure that the ownership of broadcasting undertakings in Canada be at least 80% Canadian. Planning for the CBC Windsor operation was complicated by the unusual degree to which this Canadian city is influenced by the presence of Detroit immediately across the river which forms the international boundary with the United States. A set of resources proposals and recommendations, based on findings in the HOURGLASS study but taking into account the southwestern Ontario regional situation, were prepared for the group planning the local information programming service for the Windsor operation. The overall Windsor plan was approved by the CRTC in a July 1975 decision.

In addition to the assignments outlined above, certain other short activities deserve note here because they enter later discussions.

In March 1973 the Secretary of the Program Evaluation System made arrangements for me to attend a CBC training seminar given by Dr. M.F. Malik entitled "Information Design." It touched on the analysis of "information chains" as an approach to production planning and design, concepts of the audiences for television programs, the psychophysiological measurement of viewer responses, trends in the development of television services around the world, new technological developments, and appropriate audience research approaches. Apart from direct learning, attendance at the seminar provided a good opportunity to assess the attitudes towards training and research of a wide cross section of CBC management and production personnel.

The CBC released me for a week in February 1973 to assist the National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB) conduct a three-day training institute on "identification of community needs and audience measurement" in Washington, D.C. In return, I received an opportunity to examine closely the audience research and program evaluation activities of PBS.

In February 1976, NAEB provided travel funding to permit participation in a special meeting of US public broadcasting researchers at the Wingspread Conference Center near Racine, Wisconsin. From that meeting of 32 specialists emerged a reorganized research group within NAEB and the creation of research coordination services for public broadcasting researchers (NAEB 1975a). The meeting also provided a useful update on conditions in US public broadcasting and an opportunity to compare them with the Canadian situation.

An opportunity arose during March 1975 to confer with Harry Boyle, then Vice Chairman of the CRTC, while he was visiting the San Francisco area. These "backgrounding" discusions focused on the Commission's general approach to the 1974 licence renewal process and on some of the generalizations which appear in later chapters.

During July 1975, a Canada Council research travel grant made possible a return to CBC English Television headquarters in Toronto to confer with those closest to this study. The travel grant also provided for a visit to Ottawa to discuss issues which had emerged in the drafting of this case study report with the Chairman of the CRTC, Pierre Juneau, and with CBC Head Office officials.

Commissioned work from the Aspen Institute Program on Communications and Society in 1975, involving writing and editing for a book on the future of US public broadcasting, provided an opportunity for further comparative analysis of the financial and general conditions of Canadian and US public television.

At the end of the fieldwork period, contractual connection with the CBC was terminated, but I was permitted to retain for dissertation purposes copies of all documents then in my files. Arrangements were also made to forward to me copies of the CBC's "Daily News Summary" of press comment and other routine internal reports which I had been receiving on a regular basis -- so that I would be kept up to date on major new developments during the dissertation writing period (October 1974 - May 1976).

Chapter 9

The Management Decision Making Setting

a) THE CORPORATE SETTING

Although the main focus in this study is on decision making by the management of the English Television Service, as explained in Chapter 5, it is really not possible to draw boundaries around a part of the CBC and study that portion in isolation. Later parts of this chapter focus on the English Television management group, but it is first necessary to sketch an outline of the overall Corporate setting.

As established by Parliament in the Broadcasting Act, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is an independent statutory body created to serve the interests of the Canadian public. The CBC reported to Parliament through the Secretary of State, and was required to submit an annual report to the Minister to be placed before Parliament. Ashley and Smails have noted that the CBC appears to have been given a great degree of statutory independence: "Of all Crown corporations (other then the Canada Council, which is not an agent of the Crown) the one whose board appears to have been given the greatest degree of statutory independence is the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation" (Ashley & Smails, p 28). Throughout the study period approximately 80% of the CBC's funding was provided by Parliament on the basis of recommendations made by the Government. The Corporation's routine financing was arranged with government through the Secretary of State Department, the Department of Finance, and the Treasury Board Secretariat. The CBC's accounts and financial statements were examined annually by the Auditor General of Canada.

Routine parliamentary reviews of CBC activity were conducted primarily by the Commons Standing Committees on Broadcasting, Films and Assistance to the Arts, and on Public Accounts. As noted earlier, a number of special investigations of broadcasting and of matters involving broadcasting have also brought the CBC under governmental scrutiny.

Throughout the period under study the CBC continued to receive government financial support on a year by year basis. The impact of this annual financing approach on the Corporation's ability to make long range plans has been the subject of frequent comment. The arrangement would seem, for instance, to have given the CBC less operating independence than the BBC, which has operated under a Royal Charter renewed every ten years, and has been financed by receiving set licence fees rather than annual Parliamentary appropriations. Less often noted is the fact that this annual funding arrangement ties the CBC to the government's Parliamentary Calendar, to its timetable for Estimates, and to its Fiscal Year. Although advance consultation with the Treasury Board significantly lessened the degree of uncertainty, the process did impose a definite financial planning timetable on the Corporation. The government Fiscal Year ran from 1 April through 31 March, the Main Estimates were submitted to Parliament in mid February, and the CBC's budget submission therefore had to be finalized in early January each year.

As explained in Chapter 7, the Broadcasting Act charged the Canadian Radio-Television Commission with the regulation and supervision of all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system and detailed the powers of the Commission with respect to the CBC. The routine dealings between the CBC and the CRTC consisted largely of station licence matters: applications for technical changes in or renewal of existing licences, and licences for new stations as radio and television coverage in English and French was extended to new parts of the country. The CBC also appeared before the Commission when major policy matters were under consideration. The most thorough CRTC reviews of the Corporation's policies and activities were linked with network licence applications.

Figure 9-1 depicts the primary working relationships between the CBC and elements of government. In addition to these working relationships, the Corporation was involved in cooperative planning activities with the Department of Communications. The development of the Northern Broadcasting Plan, for instance, was a joint undertaking by the Secretary of State, the Departments of Communications and of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the CRTC, and the CBC. The Department of Communications supervised technical compliance by all broadcasters with the provisions of the Radio Act, but note that although the CRTC reported through the Minister of Communications, the CBC reported to Parliament through the Secretary of State.

Figure 9-1. PRIMARY WORKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CBC AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT


CBC
Agencies and Departments
President
Executive Vice President
Development
Finance
Planning
Corporate Affairs
Engineering
Secretary of State
Treasury Board
Finance
CRTC
CBC
Treasury Board
President
Executive Vice President
Development
Finance
Planning
Secretary
Deputy
Director
Senior Program Director
Program Officer
LEGEND
Primary Contact
Secondary Contact

Figure 9-2. CBC CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, 1974


Board of Directors
President
Executive VP
"Head Office"
VP 1 Corporate Affairs
VP Planning
VP Finance
VP Administration
2 Departments
Director of Development
General Counsel
VP Engineering
VP Public Relations
VP Special Services Division
VPGM English Services Division
VPGM French Services Division
Director of Ottawa Area

Abbreviations: VP - Vice President, VPGM - Vice President and General Manager.
Notes: 1. And Assistant to the President.
2. Departments: Program Policy, Research, Sales Policy and Planning, Statistics.

b) THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE

The "Corporation," as legally defined in the Broadcasting Act, consists of the President and 14 other directors. The President is the chief executive officer of the Corporation, and presides at meetings of the Corporation (ie- of the Board of Directors). The Act further specifies that there will be an Executive Vice President, responsible for "the management of broadcasting operations."

In the reorganization of the Corporation begun in 1968, three main operational divisions were created: English Services, French Services, and Special Services. Under this arrangement the domestic operating divisions established their own headquarters -- in Toronto for the English Services Division (ESD), and in Montreal for the French Services Division (FSD). The domestic divisions operated independent English and French radio and television networks.

In the Corporate structure at the end of the case study period the Special Services Division grouped together Radio Canada International (shortwave and transcription services), Northern Services, Armed Forces Services, Overseas and Foreign Relations, and CBC Foreign Offices. Special Services was administered from Ottawa.

Services in the area of the federal capital, on both English and French radio and television stations, were the responsibility of the Ottawa Area which reported directly to Head Office. The Ottawa Area stations carried ESD and FSD network program services and engaged in network production activities for the language divisions.

Control of "Corporate" affairs and matters common to all divisions was retained in Ottawa. Figure 9-2 shows the main elements in the Corporate organizational structure as of mid 1974.

Not shown in Figure 9-2 (or in figures which follow in this chapter) are a series of management committees which were important parts of organizational structures. The Joint Management Committee, for instance, brought together the Executive Vice President, the Director of Development, and the heads of the English, French, and Special Services Divisions. This Committee was charged with the development of annual and strategic corporate plans for review with the President and with the Board, and with the establishment of corporate management processes. It also had responsibilities for ensuring the implementation of approved plans, for evaluating results, and for manpower development throughout the Corporation.

In mid 1973 a Head Office study team was established to examine the Head Office organization and to make recommendations on the role, responsibilities, and organization of Head Office, and on the nature of the working relationships both within Head Office and between it and the operating divisions. Changes resulting from that review were not implemented during the fieldwork period and are not reflected here because the basic organizational structure remained essentially unchanged.

c) THE DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE

The basic ESD and FSD structures were somewhat similar: the divisions had responsibility for both radio and television services, including both network and local station operations. In each case a "media management" split separated most radio from television operations; matters common to both media (such as Administration) reported at the divisional level. Figure 9-3 depicts this media management structure within ESD. (In FSD, "information" programming for radio and television was combined.)

Figure 9-3. ENGLISH SERVICES DIVISION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, 1974


"Divisional" Management
Vice President and General Manager
Director of Planning
Director of Finance
Director of Administration
Director of Marketing
Director of Engineering
Director of Public Relations
Assistant General Manager
Policy
Business Affairs
Managing Director of Radio
Managing Director of Television
Regional Directors (6)

Overlaid on this media management structure was a geographically determined "regional management" structure. Within the regions, management was again divided into radio and television components. As of 1974, the six ESD regions were grouped as follows: British Columbia, Alberta, the Prairie Provinces (Saskatchewan and Manitoba), Toronto, the Maritimes (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island), and Newfoundland. Figure 9-4 gives an indication of the effective interlocking nature of the corporate, divisional, media, and regional management structures. (In this section, and throughout this study, "effective" organizational structures and reporting lines are shown. In most cases this amounts to a simplification of the formal structure; in other cases the importance of semi-official relationships has been emphasized.)

The existence of the interlocked media and regional structures was an important characteristic of the overall organizational pattern, especially in ESD. Because of the concentration of French speaking Canadians in Quebec, regional operations accounted for a smaller proportion of FSD's total activities than was the case with ESD.

Not depicted here are the structural arrangements for FSD operations within ESD regions or for ESD operations at FSD locations. Also not shown here are divisional committees such as the Senior Policy Group which brought together the senior divisional and regional managers in a joint policy and planning body.

d) THE ENGLISH TELEVISION STRUCTURE

After the CBC was divided into divisions by language, and after the divisions had in turn been divided along media lines, responsibility for "English Television" came to rest on the Managing Director of Television (MDTV). Although certain functions, such as Administration, Engineering, Finance, and Public Relations reported at the divisional level and did not come under the direct control of the Managing Director of Television, the MDTV position combined responsibilities for two vital areas: the creative quality of English Television programs, and the financial performance of ESD TV. In any broadcasting organization in which there is a budget, it is inevitable that at some

Figure 9-4. INTERLOCKING MEDIA AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
English Services Division Television Service, 1974


English Services Division
Divisional Management
Media Management
Regional Management
Managing Director of Radio
Managing Director of Television
Regional Director
Production Resources Managers (2)
Program Directors (2)
(Regional) Director of Television
(Regional) Director of Radio
Area Heads (9)
Program Director
Production Manager
(Network) Program Units
(Location) Program Units

Notes: 1. Bracketed figures indicate numbers of similar organizational elements.
2. Dotted lines indicate working relationships which supplement the formal structure (shown in solid lines).
3. This figure is provided for illustrative purposes and is not intended to be comprehensively representative.

point creative and financial matters come under joint control. That point in CBC English Television was the Managing Director of Television. The MDTV's position in the basic English Television organizational structure is shown in Figure 9-5.

Within the group which reported to the MDTV, "creative" responsibilities rested primarily with the two program directors: the Director of Information Programs and the Director of Entertainment Programs. In addition to program content matters, these program directors were responsible for the budget performance of the program areas under their control. Because of their responsibilities for the content of programming services, the Director of Information Programs and the Director of Entertainment Programs were amongst the most publicly "visible" figures in the CBC. Although these program directors had responsibility for the general performance of regional programs, their attention was concentrated more on network programming.

The financial responsibilities of the MDTV included not only budgeting and the control of expenditures but also ESD TV's commercial revenue performance. This is an important observation in view of the debate about commercial activity influence on the operation of the programming service: this matter is dealt with at length in Chapter 11. But it is important to note here, on the one hand, that both the program directors and the Director of TV Sales reported to the MDTV, and, on the other hand, that there was a clear organizational separation immediately below the level of the Managing Director.

Certain responsibilities for regional programming were delegated to program Area Heads, but the basic responsibility for these programs rested with the regional Directors of Television. Like the MDTV, the regional Directors of Television had combined creative and financial responsibilities, including the actual operation of ESD TV production facilities and regional commercial revenue performance. Although there were "network" program units, production operations were performed by the various regions; network distribution operations were handled by the Toronto region.

The National Resources Manager and the Chief Financial Analyst were the MDTV's resources and financial controllers. Neither had a "department" to administer: the orientation of their work was clearly towards the information and control needs of the MDTV. Each had responsibilities for both network and regional matters: budgets for regional television operations were allocated by the MDTV's office. The Chief Financial Analyst was heavily involved in the setting of budgets, released the budgets to the network program areas and to the regions, and was the chief monitor of expenditure and revenue performance. The work of the National Resources Manager was more oriented towards planning, especially the planning of additional or upgraded production facilities and the acquistition of production equipment. Although actual facilities construction was supervised by Engineering Headquarters (from Montreal), the National Resources Manager was heavily involved in the budgeting process and in the control of the English Television staff "headcount."

The Manager of Program Purchasing was involved in the acquisition of "procured" programs, negotiating on behalf of the MDTV. Responsibility for the acquisition of certain classes of programs was delegated to Program Purchasing, some program procurement was done by the program directors, and some by Program Purchasing in consultation with the MDTV. Most decisions on the procurement of US entertainment programs for network service were made in an annual "buying" trip to Hollywood by the MDTV, the Director of Entertainment Programs, the Manager of Program Purchasing, and one or two invited advisors (such as a Regional Director).

The Director of TV Network Scheduling worked in conjunction with the Directors of Information and Entertainment Programs and with the MDTV in the development of the network program schedule. In addition, the actual program-by-program scheduling of the network and satellite operations, by the Supervisor of TV Network Scheduling, fell under

Figure 9-5. ENGLISH TELEVISION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, 1974


Planning Group
Managing Director of Television
Director of Information Programs
Director of Entertainment Programs
Director of TV Network Scheduling
National Resources Manager
Chief Financial Analyst
Area Heads
-News
-Current Affairs
-Agriculture & Resources
-Arts, Science & Religious
-Schools & Youth
Area Heads
-Drama
-Music & Variety
-Sports
-Features & Special Events
-Scheduling
-Station Relations
-Evaluation
-
-
-
Director of TV Sales
Manager of Program Purchasing
Regional Directors of Television

his control. Under normal circumstances, proposals to preempt regular programming were formulated by the Director of TV Network Scheduling, based on the recommendations of the program directors, and were approved by the MDTV.

In addition to bearing network scheduling responsibilities, the Director of TV Network Scheduling also functioned as an unofficial chief of staff for the MDTV. Functions involved in this role included the coordination of Planning System activity, the supervision of special projects, the representation of English Television on certain Corporate undertakings, and conducting meetings on behalf of the MDTV. In addition, and more formally, the Television Station Relations Department (which was ESD TV's operational link with its affiliated private stations) and the Program Evaluation System reported to the Director of TV Network Scheduling.

As indicated in Figure 9-5, there was a central English Television "Planning Group" consisting of the MDTV, the Directors of Information and Entertainment Programs, the Director of TV Network Scheduling, the National Resources Manager, and the Chief Financial Analyst. All had extensive prior experience related to their roles within the group, and those most closely associated with program service content matters had direct production experience within the CBC: three of them on air, one as a program supervisor. One member of the group came directly from a regional location. One had gained his experience outside the CBC: the Chief Financial Analyst came to the Planning Group from a financial position in private industry.

An indication of the working relationships within the division is provided by the physical geography of the organization. Although most CBC operations in Montreal have been consolidated into one location, in Toronto the Corporation was housed in a large number of separated locations. ESD divisional management and the offices and staffs of the Managing Directors of Radio and Television were located in one rented office building; the program Area Heads, the Director of TV Sales, and the Manager of Program Purchasing were dispersed at three separate locations, each several blocks distant.

The ESD TV Planning Group and its immediate support staff were located on a single floor at the divisional headquarters location: divisional management on the sixth and fifth floors, television management on the fourth floor, radio on the third, and divisional support functions on the second. The terms "Planning Group" and the "fourth floor" were loosely interchanged: Figure 9-6 shows the organizational structure of the fourth floor, the principal geographical setting of this case study. Both the Analyst/Assistant attached to the Office of the MDTV and the Research Associate (the participant observer) were primarily assigned to "project" work for the Planning Group.

Figure 9-6. THE "FOURTH FLOOR" ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, 1974


* = "Planning Group"
* Managing Director of Television
Analyst/ Assistant
* Director of Information Programs
* Director of Entertainment Programs
* Director of TV Network Scheduling
* National Resources Manager
* Chief Financial Analyst
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant Director
Assistant Director
Supervisor of TV Network Scheduling
Research Associate

e) PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

The 1965 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BROADCASTING began with a statement which has been repeated regularly ever since: "The only thing that really matters in broadcasting is program content; all the rest is housekeeping." (Fowler 1965, p 3) When it is repeated, this phrase is usually used to underscore some argument about the importance of the "creative" aspects of broadcasting.

Creative or artistic endeavours in television fall at some point on a continuum that stretches from the individual artistic efforts of a painter to the routinized activity of an automobile assembly line. "The creative process" is a phrase which must be used with care in speaking of television. It can be taken to apply to the leaps of imagination in the mind of a producer shaping an individual program, but "the creative process" can also be understood to apply to the systems which produce a flow of programming from signon to signoff, seven days a week, fifty-two weeks a year, year after year. The "process" aspect of artistic and cultural creation in television sets it apart from the traditional art forms, and has been the subject of a stream of studies, discussions, and debates on the management of television organizations. Examination of public discussion about the nature of the creative process within CBC English Television is reserved until Chapter 11, but a basic sketch of how a program got on the CBC television network is useful background for understanding the role of the Planning Group and the group's working relationship with program production units.

Figure 9-7 shows the position of producers within the basic 1974 organizational structure of ESD TV. Although the division between "information" and "entertainment" programs was somewhat arbitrary, few classification problems arose. The boundaries between program "areas" were, in many instances, similarly arbitrary. As indicated in Figure 9-7, the organizational pattern varied somewhat from one program area to another: in some cases Area Heads primarily dealt directly with Producers; in others responsibilities were delegated to Assistant Area Heads and Executive Producers. (Further changes in the organization of some program areas were made after completion of the fieldwork.)

Figure 9-7. THE ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION OF PRODUCERS
English Television Network, 1974


Managing Director of Television
Director of Information Programs
Director of Entertainment Programs
Assistant Director
Assistant Director
Area Head, Agriculture & Resources
Other Areas:
- News
- Current Affairs
- Arts, Science & Religious
- Schools & Youth
Area Head, Music & Variety
Other Areas:
- Drama
- Sports
- Features & Special Events
Assistant Area Head, Music
Assistant Area Head, Variety
Executive Producers & Producers

Depending on the size of the program unit, either an Executive Producer or a Producer may have been in charge. Directly attached to an Executive Producer's program unit would typically be some combination of producers, producer/directors, directors, associate producers, story editors, program researchers, production assistants, script assistants, and/or program secretaries. Contracted writing and performing personnel came under the control of producers. Film cameramen, film editors, scenic and graphic designers, and other support personnel were assigned to program units from service departments, sometimes on a contining basis, sometimes according to a daily schedule.

A distinction should be made between those "program ideas" which were suggestions for the content of individual programs and those which were proposals to produce a program or series of programs based on a particular concept. Studies of the generation of ideas for individual programs conducted in the US and the UK were reviewed in Chapter 2; the interest here is in the ways in which decisions were made to commission the production of a program or series for which a concept had been advanced.

Most ideas for CBC produced programs originated somewhere in the organizational span that stretched from Producers up to the Directors of Information and Entertainment Programs. Some program series ideas came from other areas within the Corporation, some from broadcasting professionals outside the CBC, and some came from the public at large. Any attempted statistical analysis of the sources of program ideas would be frustrated by the fact that the development of a "notion" for a program into a formal proposal was an interactive and iterative process -- involving people at all of the organizational levels shown in Figure 9-7, principally those levels from producers to the two program directors. Although they are not shown in Figure 9-7, which depicts the network structure, the regional Directors of Television and Program Directors also participated in the network program development process. Ideas for programs which originated in the regions came together with those from network producers at the Area Head level.

The pattern of development of program concepts differed not only from area to area but from program to program. Most program ideas originated with producers: some were in response to public demands for programs to serve specific purposes, some were suggestions for types of programs not before considered. Some program ideas originated at levels above producers: in such cases a search would be made for a producer interested in developing the idea more fully.

More program ideas were developed in any given year than it was possible to produce. The selection of those to be included in the major annual network production feasibility study was made by the Area Heads and, in turn, by the program directors. This selection process was also interactive and iterative.

During this selection process, a formal Network Program Proposal document served to summarize the program idea and the production requirements. The following excerpts from the notes which accompany the forms explain the origin and function of the Network Program Proposal document:

> "Program Proposal" documents are not intended to take the place of full and free discussion of potential program ideas. Such discussion is essential, and should involve a wide variety of people including Producers, Executive Producers, Area Heads, and the Directors of Entertainment and Information Programs.
>
> The basis for these discussions may well be a written "program idea." The important point is that the discussion of program ideas should be a somewhat informal process of consultation rather than a legalized procedure for gathering approvals in a specified sequence.
>
> A Producer is asked to prepare a Program Proposal after the program idea has been fully discussed and when the Director of Entertainment or Information Programs wishes to have a network program idea further developed or when he wishes to give it serious consideration in its existing form.

While there may well be further suggestions or changes, the Program Proposal should be able to reflect the results of serious consideration and discussion of the program idea.

After the Proposal has been discussed, amended (if necessary), and accepted by the Area Head, the Director of Entertainment or Information Programs, and the Managing Director of Television, it is then included in the network feasibility study to determine if the necessary production resources can be made available. Final authority to begin production comes after the feasibility study has been completed.

The Program Proposal outlined two sets of program objectived dealing with the program's purpose and its intended or "target" audience. The main statement of program purpose answered the question, "Why should this program be produced and telecast?" A checklist was also provided for other program purposes: in addition to serving their audiences, some programs were intended to serve as recruiting and development vehicles for talent, as opportunities to test and develop program ideas and formats, or to fulfil CBC commitments such as providing free political telecast time.

The target audience was described in terms of: a "general" or "more sharply defined" audience, the audience age groups for which the program was intended, any assumptions about specific levels of education, and any other "special" target audience characteristics.

The Program Proposal also incorporated a program outline (concept, format, content), talent and staff requirements, a proposed production schedule (pattern and sequence of production steps), a production resources request (electronic, film, and design resources), and a program cost estimate (including both direct and indirect costs).

Although program development and the discussion and refinement of ideas set out in Program Proposals was a continuous process which continued, at varying levels of activity, throughout the year, the selection of the bulk of programs to be produced for a telecast year was made in conjunction with the annual cycle of the English Television "Planning System."

f) THE PLANNING SYSTEM

The 1968-1971 reorganization of the CBC was principally intended as a means of enabling operational decisions to be made "as close as possible to the action" (to the production and distribution of programs) and as a move from an organization based primarily on geography to a less complex organization based on language (although, as noted earlier, a geogrpahically organized structure is overlaid on the language divisions).

At the same time the Corporation moved to adopt a planning and budgeting system similar to that implemented by the federal government. In its 1969-1970 ANNUAL REPORT the CBC described this development:

> An important part of the restructuring process underway in the Corporation is the development of new means to assure the best possible use of money and people to produce the best possible Canadian television and radio programs.
>
> One of these "housekeeping" measures is the design and implementation of a computer-based management information system to improve the basis for decision-making throughout the Corporation. The information system will complement a planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) which will involve Corporation-wide setting of objectives, the definition of activities required to

> reach them and a review of the organization needed to accomplish the task....
>
> Some indication of the scope of the project may be seen in the fact that, during the year, over 600 senior employees representing a cross section of CBC occupations and geographical locations attended, at various times, week-long seminars intended to achieve full understanding throughout the Corporation of the plans for the Management Information System and for PPBS. (CBC 1970b, p 8)

At the risk of oversimplification, it may be useful to note that the PPBS approach was originally developed as an industrial management tool to make it possible to evaluate proposed budgets against the activities they were designed to support. An integral part of the approach is the setting of specific objectives to be accomplished by each activity. This makes possible the evaluation or assessment of performance against these objectives at intervals during the year and at the end of the budget period.

Apart from its inherent attractiveness as a management tool within the Corporation, PPBS permitted the CBC to meet Treasury Board requirements for planned program budgeting. (In this context "program" refers to an organized set of activities rather than to a broadcast.)

The Planning System which was developed within ESD TV also served another objective of the 1968-1971 reorganization: it was designed to facilitate an increased role for the regions in program planning and production. Whereas most FSD television production was carried out in Montreal, English Television production was decentralized into eight major production centres: Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Halifax, and St. John's. (In addition to these major production centres, ESD had responsibility for local operations in smaller centres which, in 1974, included: Saskatoon, Regina/Moose Jaw, Charlottetown, Moncton, Sydney, Corner Brook, and Goose Bay.)

The Planning System was used to coordinate the allocation of English Television's budgeted resoures, both capital and operating, for network, regional, and local operations.

Because budgeting was a vital element in the planning process, because the Corporation was funded by the federal government on an annual basis, and because telecast seasons followed a yearly pattern, the ESD TV Planning System had been designed to have an annual cycle. The timetable for the cycle was scheduled backwards from the budget submission deadlines of the Treasury Borad, Head Office, and the English Services Division. The timetable was also linked to the dates, following budget submission, when English Television received its budget allocations.

Although the Planning System timetable varied slightly from year to year, and was subject to revisions required by unforeseen circumstances, it is useful to examine a representative timetable. Figure 9-8 depicts the planning cycle for the 1974/75 programming year.

- Although program development was a continuous process, Program Proposal preparation tended to be concentrated in the six month period prior to the submission deadline at the end of June. Note that the June 1973 deadline was for programs in the 1974/75 year.
- During July and August the Area Heads and the Directors of Information and Entertainment Programs selected those proposals to be included in the telecast schedule. During the period some proposals were revised as a result of consultations with producers.
- During August the program directors submitted a "block schedule" for the programs in their respective areas to the Planning Group, and work began to integrate these two sets of proposals into a single block schedule for the network program service. During September the block schedule was finalized, a projection by quarters of the productions planned for telecast was prepared, and these schedules, together with



Figure 9-8. PLANNING SYSTEM TIMETABLE, 1974/75 PROGRAM YEAR

the corresponding Program Proposals were distributed by the Planning Group to the regional production centres for feasibility study. At about the same time the Planning Group issued a set of "planning parameters" to the locations detailing program service objectives and budget planning guidelines.

- A detailed feasibility study was conducted at each location to determine whether the production centre had sufficient resources to produce the network, regional, and local programming proposed, and to establish the budgets required by the proposed production load. The feasibility study included the draft scheduling of the proposed production load into the available facilities and support departments on a program by program basis. In those cases where the proposed load exceeded the production capacity of the location, recommendations for revised production plans or schedules were prepared and discussed with the producers and managers involved. Each location prepared a "Planning Book" outlining its program service and production plans and its proposed budgets.
- During November the Planning Group visited the production centres to review the plans which had been developed and to resolve outstanding problems.
- At the end of November the regional Planning Book submissions were consolidated into an English Television plan. This was in turn combined with the radio plan into a divisional plan to be submitted to Head Office at the end of the year.

Before leaving Figure 9-8 it is useful to note the length of time which elapsed between the deadline for Program Proposal submission and the appearance of the new programming on the air. The fiscal year was not coincidental with network television "seasons." Because regular season program series continued past the 31 March close of the fiscal year, the period from April through June was in part planned as a "fifth quarter" of the preceeding fiscal year -- as a continuation of part of the regular season production and telecast pattern. Because viewing levels drop off during summer months, this period was used for testing new programs and program ideas. But, because programs developed during the summer season could not be abruptly scheduled into the production and telecast schedule for the immediately following quarter, successful summer series could not normally be included in regular season programming until the following year. The effective start of the program year, therefore, came at the beginning of October. The regular season program year which fell inside the fiscal year extended to the end of March.

The regular season Program Proposals submitted at the end of June 1973 were therefore intended to form the backbone of the October 1974 through March 1975 regular season schedule -- 15 to 21 months later. Although some changes were made much closer to the start of the program season, the basic outline of the 1974/75 schedule was established before the 1973/74 regular season began.

The relationship between the Planning System and the creative development of program services is both important and complex. The Planning System had both recognized advantages and disadvantages. Some observers suggested that the principal advantage was related to operational efficiency and that the main disadvantage was related to inflexibility in program service planning. But, because many other aspects of the overall planning environment must be taken into consideration, detailed discussion is reserved for later chapters where it can be linked with the examination of both public issues and observed conditions.

Chapter 10

The 1974 CBC Licence Renewal Process

a) LEVELS OF DIALOGUE

What ultimately in Canada became the relatively large public spectacle of the CRTC's 1974 renewal of the CBC's licences for its networks can, like so much of the background outlined in the chapters before this, be viewed at three different levels. At the lowest level are the legal and procedural requirements of the 1968 Broadcasting Act and the CRTC regulations made under the authority of that Act. At an intermediate level are substantive issues -- matters whose handling by the CBC were of concern to the Commission. And, I suggest, at yet another level were philosophical concerns about the conditions and directions of human society in general and of Canadian society in particular.

The record of "the process" at its lowest level is a simple record. The CBC applied for the renewal of its network licences. Following an opportunity for public scrutiny of the applications, and a public hearing, the CRTC approved the renewal of the licences, with conditions.

There is no such record of the philosophical concerns in the minds of those who took part in the licence renewal process. There are no position papers on attitudes to the concept of nationalism or on prevailing perceptions of Canadian identity. More specifically, there are no precise statements on or about the cultural role of the CBC within Canadian society. But, as Heather Hudson noted, such concerns were clearly present:

> Hours of testimony at the recent CRTC hearings on CBC network licence renewals for radio and television focused on the cultural impact of broadcasting and the role of the CBC in contributing to Canadian culture and identity. "This hearing isn't about broadcasting; it's about culture," said one observer. (Hudson, p 14)

Inevitably, most of the record of the exchanges which took place in connection with the renewal of licences is at the intermediate level. The preparations for the hearings -- by the CRTC, by the CBC, and by elements of the public -- were addressed to issues. The public hearing dealt with issues, as did the licence renewal decision. It is important to point out as an observer that, although the substance of the debates is reflected in the available documentation, much of the spirit which prevailed is missing from the written record. The substantive issues are considered beginning with the next chapter; this chapter outlines the conditions under which consideration of those issues took place.

b) THE CRTC POSITION

In mid 1973 the CRTC informed the CBC that, with respect to the network licence renewals, the Commission's preoccupations regarding the Corporation were best reflected in a set of notes prepared for Cabinet in 1971, and that those notes could be taken as a position paper. Unfortunately for the purposes of this study, the CRTC's notes cannot be cited here. The request for permission to use the document was "regretfully" refused by the Privy Council Office on 4 September 1975: it was the policy of the government not to release, at that time, memoranda to Cabinet dated 1971.

An indication of some of the preoccupations of the CRTC can nevertheless be found in public comments made during the period leading up to the licence renewal hearing. The general policy directions being pursued by the CRTC in the 1970-1974 period, including its CBC Radio One/Radio Two decision, were reviewed in section 7(c). In a November 1973 interview for MARKETING, the Chairman commented again on the North American merchandising environment and on the CBC's position relative to other broadcasting services.

> JUNEAU: Basically we recognize you can't impose minority tastes and needs on the majority of the people. But neither can you, on the other hand, have a system which is so constantly aiming at more or less the same majority that you ignore rather important minorities....
>
> We have one element the Americans don't have to the same extent -- we decided in 1935 to create the CBC. We also decided to create a regulatory mechanism (the CRTC) which has been given a somewhat more forceful mandate by Parliament than they have in the U.S.
>
> But apart from those two factors our broadcasting system is very much a part of the North American marketing system....
>
> MARKETING: Are you now more favorably inclined toward the idea of a non-commercial, or less commercial, CBC-TV?
>
> JUNEAU: We have long felt the CBC should phase out advertising on radio. On the television side, the situation is much more complex. Without getting into Laurent Picard's estimate of $80 million or $90 million as a total cost, just the loss of $45 million in advertising revenue is pretty big in itself. I don't think he would get very far with the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board if he asked for $45 million more next year.
>
> Nevertheless, our view has been reinforced that there should be a very conscious, systematic and vigorous review of advertising policy in the CBC.
>
> Certainly, more and more people question that there is so much resemblance between the policies of the CBC and the policies of the entirely commercial operations.
>
> They ask: "Why, if we've got to pay so much for a public network, have we got to put up also with so much of the same kind of programming?"
>
> That's not entirely fair, of course, because more and more of the CBC's programming is different. But it is still basically within the same commercial environment....
>
> MARKETING: So you're not thinking about a completely non-commercial CBC?
>
> JUNEAU: Not for the forseeable future.
>
> MARKETING: Will the review of CBC advertising policy be left entirely to the CBC or do you expect the CRTC will play a part?
>
> JUNEAU: I have a feeling there is a trend within the CBC in that direction. Let's face it, there are lots of people, within the CBC and outside it, who have a vested interest in keeping the CBC as a strong commercial vehicle -- people whose careers would be curtailed if the CBC had a stronger public service orientation.
>
> But at the management level the CBC and the CRTC are certainly not at loggerheads on the question.

> MARKETING: When might this question reach an active discussion stage?
>
> JUNEAU: I expect it will be a very important topic of discussion at the next licence renewal for the CBC. That hearing will take place early in the New Year. One has to keep the financial aspects very much in mind. But I think a public discussion of it is healthy whatever the outcome....
>
> If it turned out the CBC required so much money to improve its service and it was quite clear that money was not available, then fine -- nothing changes yet. At least everybody will have a clear understanding of the situation and can stop talking about it for another year. (Wilson, pp 18ff)

A 30 January 1974 story in the "Report on Business" section of THE GLOBE AND MAIL reported that the CRTC was bracing itself for argumentative sessions at the hearing and that one major controversy expected by the Commission concerned commercials on CBC radio and television. Juneau was quoted as saying that while the CRTC had "some general views on the question," it would not take a precise position until it heard all of the arguments (Globe 1974a).

c) PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND INTERVENTIONS

In a practical sense, the 1974 hearing originated because the period of the licences for the operation of CBC networks was coming to a close. Section 17 of the Broadcasting Act limits the period of licences issued by the CRTC to "terms not exceeding five years." The CBC licences were due to expire on 31 March 1974.

The public activity pattern of the CRTC focused on the public hearings provided for by Section 19 of the Act. Subsection (1) requires that "a public hearing shall be held by the Commission in connection with the issue of a broadcasting licence, other than a licence to carry on a temporary network operation." Subsection (3) provides that "a public hearing shall be held by the Commission in connection with the renewal of a broadcasting licence unless the Commission is satisfied that such a hearing is not required." Subsection (3) additionally provides that "a public hearing may be held by the Commission in connection with any other matter in respect of which the Commission deems such a hearing is desirable."

The formal licence renewal applications were filed by the CBC on 31 October 1973. As early as three months before that, the date of the hearing on the applications had been informally set by the CRTC for 14 January 1974. On November 28 the Commission issued public notice of its decision "to devote its Public Hearing commencing February 18, 1974 in Ottawa, Ontario, to consideration of applications for the renewal of C.B.C. licences." The hearing scheduled for January 14 was cancelled (CRTC 1973b).

The Commission's Notice of Public Hearing included an "information" section similar to that regularly incorporated into hearing notices. That section explained that, under the provisions of the CRTC Rules of Procedure, any interested person could file an intervention for the purpose of supporting, opposing, or modifying an application (CRTC 1971a, s 13). It also detailed the procedure for filing interventions, for viewing the CBC applications, and for obtaining additional information from the Commission (CRTC 1973c, p 14).

Although the customary advertisements giving public notice of the upcoming hearing were placed by the CRTC in newspapers across the country and announcements were made on CBC stations as required by CRTC regulations, most Canadians first learned of the licence renewal hearing through informal channels. In particular, media writers used their newspaper columns to inform the public and to encourage individuals and groups to participate in the process. Typical of the factual reports about the hearing was this mention by Bob Blackburn in his regular Toronto SUN column:

> [W]hat the current corporation regime has been doing with Canadian history is one of the things that helps me find a positive outlook when I'm wondering whether there's any bloody justification for having a CBC at all.
>
> There is.
>
> If you don't agree with that conclusion, you have a great chance to do something about it. Most CBC licences are up for renewal next spring, and on Feb. 18 a public hearing of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission will listen to anybody who doesn't think they should be renewed. Some pretty heavy and responsible people are making formal interventions, and if you want to say your own piece, you have an opportunity. (Blackburn 1973a)

In her Montreal STAR column, Joan Irwin added some personal observations:

> The CBC network licences come up for renewal at a public hearing of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission on Feb. 18, and there isn't a doubt in the world that the corporation is going to have to defend itself as never before in its history....
>
> The CBC brass is going to have to come up with more than pious hopes and vague promises when it appears before the CRTC in February. I don't know if the commission can find a way to save the CBC from itself, but it looks as if it's going to have to try. (Irwin 1973)

Some columnists, including Connie Nicholson of THE TRAIL DAILY TIMES, initiated their own programs to ensure public input to the hearing:

> Now's your chance, the CBC is on the mat. Well don't just sit there -- throw a brick!
>
> CBC's licence to operate its English language TV network expires on March 31. Before the licence can be renewed the network must get the approval of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission.
>
> The formal request for renewal has been made, and copies of the application are available for the asking. (See addresses listed at the end of this column)....
>
> We have lost something valuable, but we could get it back if we tried. And now's the time, while the Canadian Radio-Television Commission is renewing the CBC's TV licence. If you would rather write to the Times, or to me personally, I promise to send all suggestions on to the CRTC hearings. (Nicholson)

In THE VANCOUVER SUN, columnist Lisa Hobbs invited readers to participate in her "Hobbs CBC Survey" and published letters from readers and responses to questions which included: "What does the CBC give you that you could not get on CTV or a commercial American network?", "Should CBC have commercials like other stations?", and "Has CBC fulfilled its parliamentary mandate?" (Hobbs 1973, 1974a-d)

Much of the attention devoted to hearing preparations focused on a Toronto based intervention group, The Committee on Television (COT). An undated press release issued in late October 1973 outlined the COT approach:

> The Committee on Television -- all of whose members are supporters of public broadcasting in Canada -- will appear before the Canadian Radio-Television Commission to intervene. The Committee will argue that a licence renewal [for English Television] should not be granted to the CBC in its present form and will propose that reorganization of the Corporation be made a condition of renewal.
>
> In its brief to the CRTC the Committee will challenge the CBC on the quality of its programming. The Committee expects to conduct research and examine the

> evidence for and against the following hypotheses: (i) that public affairs programming has declined in quality during the last several years to the point where it has become irrelevant to the country; (ii) that CBC drama has similarly declined and reached a new level of inconsequence in the last few years; (iii) that the regions of Canada have been seriously ignored on the CBC and as a result CBC television has presented Canadians with an unbalanced picture of Canadian life; (iv) that while great progress has been made in the film industry in Canada in recent years almost none of this has been reflected on the CBC. Indeed, this movement has developed in isolation from the CBC; (v) that while a renaissance has been enjoyed by a number of the arts in Canada in the 1970's -- particularly theatre and literature -- the CBC has reflected little or none of this; (vi) that evidence of the CBC's decline is shown by its diminished international standing as measured by international prizes; (vii) that the role of the producer as a creative individual has been seriously undermined within the CBC.... (COT 1973, p 1)

The COT initiative was very widely reported in newspaper and magazine stories which included: "Group Protests 'Automatic' CBC License" in THE TORONTO STAR (Adilman), "Big Name Canadians Demand CBC Improve or Lose its Licence" in THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Kirby 1974a), "Wanted: New TV Images" in the Vancouver PROVINCE (Walsh), "More Emphasis Urged on TV Program Content" in THE WINNIPEG FREE PRESS (Fitzrandolph), and "Group Formed to Challenge CBC Programming Policy" (Canadian Film Digest). The COT intervention plans were reported in regular television columns (eg- Hobbs 1973b) and in "The Canadian Report" in TV GUIDE:

> Knocking the CBC has long been a favorite but frustrating Canadian pastime. Answerable to the public only through Parliament, the Corporation has seldom felt the need to give its critics the satisfaction of a reply....
>
> "There's no expectation that the CBC will actually lose its license," [COT member Morris] Wolfe told TV GUIDE. "Our aim is to move the elephant one quarter of an inch. We're particularly concerned about the lack of regional programming. At the moment there are only 10 CBC-TV shows coming out of the regions -- and many of those look as though they were made in Toronto." (Marshall)

Robert Fulford and Wolfe, both COT members, examined the CBC in articles in the November and December issues of SATURDAY NIGHT (edited by Fulford) under the headings: "Incredibly the CBC Gets Worse and Worse" (Fulford 1973a), "Something Has Gone Very Wrong With The CBC" (Wolfe 1973), and "Again, the CBC" (Fulford 1973b).

One of the more interesting aspects of the COT activity was revealed in a story in TELENATION, the newsletter of the Canadian Broadcasting League:

> Can anyone believe that the CBC is the best of all broadcasting worlds? If the answer is "no", it is the duty of the consumer to try to change the CBC.
>
> The Committee on Television is going to try, while fully realizing the difficulties involved. Right now it has received some funds from a group called "Memo From Turner" (which is funded by the Dept. of Health and Welfare) and is seeking further financial support from both private and public sources.
>
> Membership of the Committee will be increasing. It has the support of the Council of Canadian Filmmakers and the Canadian Broadcasting League.... (CBL 1973)

My inquiries indicated that "Memo From Turner" was funded by the federal government's Department of Health and Welfare as an "innovative service" in the "non-medical use of drugs" area. The connection with broadcasting was never made clear and, to my knowledge, the use of federal government departmental funds to support an intervention against a Crown corporation was never questioned in public. (It was, however, generally believed within the CBC that, on occasion, the CRTC had paid the travel costs of intervenors opposing CBC applications.)

A total of 305 interventions amounting to, by CRTC count, some 3,000 pages were filed with the Commission prior to the hearing. One columnist's review described the interventions as "a deluge of more than 300 briefs, most of them highly critical of CBC programs" (Kirby 1974b). A Canadian Press wire service story reported that "the chief criticism has been filed in a 187 page brief by The Committee on Television" and that "most criticism came from eastern and western Canada and the fringe-reception areas of the north" (Nelson 1974).

Included in the 305 interventions were detailed briefs, petitions, single page letters, and telegrams. From these the CRTC selected 29 organizations and individuals to make presentations at the hearing.

The CRTC Rules of Procedure provide an opportunity for an applicant to reply in writing to interventions. Interventions may be filed up to 15 days before the commencement of a hearing; if a written reply is to be made, it must be filed within 10 days of receipt of the intervention (CRTC 1971a, ss 15, 16). In the case of the CBC hearing, most interventions were filed close to the deadline. Both the CRTC and the CBC experienced logistical problems in processing and reproducing the "flood" of documents in the two week period immediately preceeding the hearing. Although some consideration had been given to preparing written replies, the volume of interventions was such that time permitted only a quick scrutiny of each and the notation of any unanticipated criticisms. No written replies were made to interventions prior to the hearing.

d) CBC PREPARATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Formal CBC preparations for the hearing began early in May 1973 with the planning of the written submissions to be filed in support of the licence renewal applications. Head Office undertook preparation of a Corporate Statement to support the verbal presentation to be made by the President. The operating divisions were charged with the preparation of separate briefs on English Television, English Radio, French Television, French Radio, and Northern Service.

The first draft of the English Television submission consisted of sections prepared by a large number of individuals. The second and subsequent drafts were prepared by three of us in the "fourth floor" group in consultation with divisional and Corporate management. Head Office requests for changes centred on appropriate terminology for "local" programming and on statements describing resource constraints. "Local" program service is not included in the CBC's mandate in the Broadcasting Act: the term "community service" was substituted extensively (eg- CBC 1973b, p 18). More serious consideration was given to the modification of the descriptions of resource limitations in the section on "Regional Production Resources." To the statement that "there is thus a physical limitation on the expansion of the flow of regional information and entertainment" was added the phrase "unless new approaches can be developed" (p 23). A similar qualifier was added to the last paragraph of the section on "Canadian Content and Production Capacity" (p 42).

Although the ESD Vice President and General Manager had considered the submission "our one opportunity to present a major statement on behalf of CBC television services ... and a prospectus of the future," public scrutiny of the document was apparently minimal. The main reference to the submission during the hearing was the Chairman's criticism that Section 3(b) of the Broadcasting Act was not mentioned (CRTC 1974a, pp 267-8). The criticism was repeated and extended in the renewal decision:

> This section, dealing with the responsibility to "safegaurd, enrich, and strengthen the cultural, political, and economic fabric of Canada," is generally recognized as one of the most important aspects of the Broadcasting Act. (CRTC 1974b, p 9)

In fact, only sections 3(f) and 3(g), which apply exclusively to the CBC, were reproduced in the submission, and these were included to explain the organization of the document's contents. We had assumed that the applicability of the other eight sections of "Broadcasting Policy for Canada" was unquestioned. We were similarly surprised by Joan Irwin's assumption about the "apparent" origin and intent of a statement in the section on "A Balanced Service" (CBC 1973b, p 2):

> The CBC was apparently nettled by some unflattering comparisons between its programming and that of PBS during a Toronto CRTC hearing earlier this year.
>
> In the English-language television brief for the upcoming CRTC hearing on CBC licence renewals there is this sentence: "The CBC is a public broadcaster as opposed to an educational broadcaster (although many of its programs are "educational"). The distinction is that it programs to a mass audience as well as to specialized audiences."
>
> So there. (Irwin 1974a)

As explained earlier in section 8(d), our work on the submission was followed by scrutiny of public comment, including the interventions, and the preparation of a briefing book for management. Special discussion papers on "national unity and national identity," "balance and fairness," "minority voices," and "commercial policy" were commissioned and reviewed. Many of these investigations turned out to be exercises. We attempted, for instance, to assess the validity of the COT charge that "evidence of the CBC's decline is shown by its diminished international standing as measured by international prizes" (COT 1973, p 1). The charge had been repeated in SATURDAY NIGHT: "Internationally, the CBC doesn't exist. CBC shows are almost never broadcast anywhere else in the world. They almost never win international prizes" (Fulford 1973a). It turned out that international prizes were less than an accurate indicator of program quality. For some years the CBC had entered many competitions in an attempt to use the prizes and exposure to boost foreign sales of programs but, when it was found that sales were not significantly influenced by success in competitions, this activity was scaled back to reduce costs. Even so, we found both awards and sales increasing: two international awards in 1970, four in 1971, five in 1972, and eight in 1973; 41 program sales in 1970/71, 65 in 1971/72, and 409 in 1972/73. When the COT intervention was filed, the only mention of awards or foreign sales was a single sentence: "We wonder if evidence of this decline [in the quality of programing] isn't shown by the CBC's diminished international standing as measured by international prizes" (COT 1974, p 81).

These background investigations were undertaken primarily to help prepare ESD to answer specific questions about English Television at the hearing. By mid October 1973 it had been established that the President and Executive Vice President would be questioned on corporate matters and that the divisions would be questioned separately. In the end, however, the divisions were not questioned in detail and the senior English Television officer, the Managing Director of Television, was not questioned at all.

During January and early February 1974 there were a number of developments at the corporate level that were widely interpreted as being part of CBC preparations for the hearing. One series of developments consisted of Cabinet approval of changes in the method of CBC financing to become effective in the 1975/75 year. These changes included: provision of funds for capital expenditures on a "payment vote" rather than a "loan vote" basis, with the treatment of accumulated past capital debt (on which the CBC paid interest to the government) to be decided on at a later date; provision for up to $5 million of capital funds to be carried over to the following year for delayed projects; and provision for up to 1.5% of total operating funds to be carried over to the following year.

In the week immediately preceding the hearing, the Secretary of State, Hugh Faulkner, announced a Cabinet decision to provide a $50 million grant for the CBC Accelerated Coverage Plan (ACP) to extend radio and television services to more than 300 isolated communities -- to "800,000 to 900,000 Canadians who are inadequately served by the broadcasting system" (Globe 1974b). ACP had been devised as a special development program to separate the financial requirements for coverage extension from those for operations. Throughout the development of ACP, the CRTC supported the plan in discussions with government -- in accordance with its April 1971 public announcement on "Broadcasting Services to More Remote Areas" (CRTC 1971e). Faulkner described the approved plan as enabling the CBC to double its rate of extension. "With its distribution network virtually complete, the corporation can now turn its attention more fully to creative programming" (Broadcaster 1974). Jack Miller observed: "The allies lining up to defend the CBC go right into the federal cabinet.... Faulkner was saying don't blame the CBC if it's been slow in extending its networks to the last two per cent or so of the population who are still waiting. Some people were ready to blame it loudly" (Miller 1974a).

The one development most closely affecting English Television was President Picard's 23 January 1974 announcement of the appointment of Don MacPherson to succeed Eugene Hallman as Vice President and General Manager of ESD, and of Denis Harvey as ESD, Deputy Assistant General Manager. Comments on the appointments varied. Some saw Hallman as the victim of pressures to make changes prior to the hearing. Blaik Kirby wrote:

> Gene Hallman has been the boss of the CBC English networks for 5 1/2 years and the head of programming for eight years before that. Whatever the CBC is, it is largely what he has made it.... Essentially, he has rebuilt the radio and TV networks. He has managed to make the CBC so efficient in its use of its inadequate facilities that they now produce a great deal more than they were designed for.... (Kirby 1974c)

Others were more critical. Jack Miller saw the move as an admission that "things aren't what they should be, or even what they used to be" (Miller 1974b). Ian MacDonald saw the move as resulting from controversial management exercise of editorial control in an anthology drama series (MacDonald 1974a), but editorials (eg- Journal 1974a) and other reports saw the management change as less than coincidental. Joan Irwin commented: "Something had to be done to show a new direction and sense of purpose in the ESD and this is it" (Irwin 1974b). The new appointments, though announced in the latter part of January, did not become effective until after the public hearing.

e) THE PUBLIC HEARING

Atmosphere

The physical setting for the public hearing was described in the Introduction, but of greater importance to an understanding of the proceedings is an appreciation of the prevailing atmosphere -- an atmosphere of confrontation. At the time of the hearing it was difficult to understand just how or why this climate had started to develop. This remains the case, although it is possible to identify some of the factors which contributed to the feeling of impending conflict.

Within the CBC there was considerable uneasiness about the Commission's attitude and intentions. Some of this uneasiness stemmed from past experiences: the frustrations of the 1970 hearing and a personal clash between the Chairman and the ESD Assistant General Manager at that hearing, the CRTC's rejection of the Radio One/Radio Two plan and the tone of that decision, and the Commission's denial of the CBC application for use of VHF Channel 10 in lower British Columbia and a clash between the Chairman and the regional Director of Television at the 1973 hearing held in connection with that application. Prior to the hearing, both the CBC and CRTC seemed to have perceived each other as having already taken opposing positions on the issue of commercial activity in television. A pre-hearing Commission request for financial data on the purchasing of US entertainment programs seemed to indicate further concern about the relationship between commercial activities and "mass audience" programming.

A further CRTC information request asked, for all CBC stations producing programs, the amount of money to be spent annually for talent on local programming and how much of this money was to be spent on persons other than regular station staff. Members of the CRTC staff conducted a series of visits to CBC locations across the country, but there was no consultation with English Television management. Some regional managers were puzzled by these visits; the internal reports from locations included these comments:

> There was really nothing of any great consequence discussed, and I was honestly left wondering afterwards as to the real purpose of his visit, subtle or otherwise. One point discussed was our regional (local) contributions to the network, and I was quick to add to his list made up solely of [one program series] that we are frequent contributors in virtually every type of program, i.e. Sports, Arts & Sciences, MAN ALIVE, THIS LAND, WEEKEND, MARKETPLACE, etc., etc. He expressed pleasurable surprise that we were as heavily involved in this type of programming which so frequently shows up as presumably Toronto productions....
>
> I have no idea what he thought of the quality of our programming since he had not seen any of it up until the time I talked with him....

A 27 January 1974 appearance by Pierre Juneau on Montreal radio station CJAD's open line show attracted CBC attention. Included in the CRTC Chairman's comments were observations about CBC Canadian content levels and scheduling conflicts between CBC and CTV:

> I think CBC, in all its programs, is doing a bit better than 60% Canadian programming. In variety and drama, a majority is American. We have brought the total up to 60% and are quite proud of that....
>
> We at CRTC believe we should not dictate to stations on when they should schedule their programs. CBC puts an information program against CTV's, which may not be right.... CTV selected the 10 pm Sunday spot much before CBC did.

At the time the comments were made, the network Canadian content level was actually 72.1%. The level for the complete 1972/73 year had already been reported as 68.4%. Given that increasing Canadian content had been a top CBC priority, CBC managers were disappointed at what they considered to be the Chairman's understatement of their accomplishments. The scheduling comments both revived an old debate and reinforced a CBC perception of the CRTC as being more appreciative of CTV problems and achievements than of CBC conditions. The 10 pm Sunday scheduling issue was first raised in 1966 when CTV launched its current affairs magazine program, W5. The CBC had scheduled current affairs programs at 10 pm Sunday beginning in 1961, when CLOSE-UP was moved from Tuesday to Sunday night. The pattern of scheduling was as follows: CLOSE-UP (10-10:30 pm), 1 October 1961 through 25 August 1963; HORIZON (10-11 pm), 13 October 1963 through 30 August 1964; THIS HOUR HAS SEVEN DAYS (10-11 pm), 4 October 1964 through 8 May 1966. SUNDAY, the 1966/67 replacement for SEVEN DAYS, was announced on 10 August 1966, but the program did not go on air until 6 November. W5 began in the 10-11 pm Sunday period on 11 September 1966, but was moved to the 9-10 pm slot during its second season, on 28 January 1968. Given this pattern, it had never been clear to the CBC that "CTV selected the 10 pm Sunday spot much before CBC did," and, in 1974, the basis for Juneau's comments was still not understood.

A series of minor incidents contributed to the expectation of confrontation. Each in itself was not that significant, but to those inside the CBC there appeared to be a pattern. An interview with a program director, ostensibly to form the basis for a student essay, turned out to have been conducted for The Committee on Television intervention group. A columnist reported on the formation of another intervention group which "at this stage wishes to remain anonymous" (Hobbs 1973b).

The volume and tone of both the opposing interventions and pre-hearing press attention contributed to a sense of impending attack within the CBC. The COT intervention, for instance, included these passages:

> Supporters of public broadcasting in this country have reason .... to feel betrayed by the melange of triviality, inconsequence and bureaucratic paralysis which has now become the hallmark of public broadcasting on our English-language television network. (COT 1974, p 2)
>
> Has the management of the CBC now become the Senate of Canadian broadcasting? Would this pride of "foggy bottoms" not serve us better by a judicious system of early retirement? (p 11)
>
> The CBC English-language network has become a sea of mediocrity, dotted only by a few distinguished programs. Canadian taxpayers and citizens are being shortchanged.... The true, if unwitting, enemies of public broadcasting are now at its helm. Those within the CBC who perceive the situation are hopeless to change it; the rest have yet to acknowledge the impasse. (pp 12-3)
>
> There is an illusion of change, produced by job switching within the Corporation. The game of moving desks and titles around is played with undiminished vigour, particularly within the executive ranks. (p 97)
>
> We have described in this brief a grossly inadequate programme service resulting from a paralyzed bureaucracy. This situation, we argue, is so grave as to threaten the future of the CBC and of public broadcasting in Canada. Our position is to be saved it must be reformed, and to be reformed it must be reorganized. (p 133)

Appendix III of the COT brief listed 63 artists, authors, academics, and community leaders who had read and endorsed the submission's Introduction and Recommendations. Among those associating themselves with the COT brief were fifteen writers and journalists (including Margaret Atwood, June Callwood, Hugh MacLennan, W.O. Mitchell, and Farley Mowat), thirteen broadcasters and filmmakers (including Christopher Chapman, Elsa Franklin, Douglas Leiterman, and Peter Pearson), eighteen academics (including Donald Creighton, George Grant, Pauline Jewett, Marshall McLuhan, and Hugo McPherson), and two Members of Parliament (Edward Broadbent and David MacDonald).

It should be pointed out that the growth of the atmosphere of confrontation was not entirely apart from CBC action. A COT researcher was refused access to the CBC Reference Library in Toronto; while some people within the CBC were attempting to have that decision changed, the same individual returned and used the Reference Library - on the legitimate pretext of researching for a magazine article. A public address made in late January 1974 by a CBC program director was described as having "lashed out at critics who say that the CBC is dominated by American programming, that it is falling behind the opposition in current affairs programming and that it is not measuring up to foreign networks." The program director said that misinformed attacks on the CBC made him "damn angry and resentful," partly because:

> There is need for improvement and changes in public broadcasting in this country, but for heaven's sake we need the needles put in the right place by critics whose credibility is not destroyed by gross inaccuracies. (Sun)

In at least two cases routine requests for information were regarded with unnecessary suspicion. The CRTC requested an aircheck (audio portion) of English Television Network programming in the period 9:30 to 11:00 pm for 18 December 1973. It turned out that the programs (FRONT PAGE CHALLENGE, UP CANADA!, and SOME HONOURABLE MEMBERS) had been exceptionally informative and interesting, although this had not been indicated in the CRTC request. A request from GLOBE AND MAIL columnist Blaik Kirby for statistics on production volumes in Toronto and other regional centres was initially

Figure 10-1. ORDER OF APPEARANCE, 1974 CRTC HEARING ON CBC NETWORK LICENCE RENEWALS, Ottawa, 18-22 February 1974

Items		Transcript Pages
MONDAY, 18 FEBRUARY		
Morning	Opening comments - CRTC Chairman Pierre Juneau	1-5
	Presentation - CBC President Laurent Picard	5-119
Afternoon	Statement - CBC French Services Division Vice President and General Manager, Raymond David	120-145
	Statement - CBC English Services Division Assistant General Manager, Marce Munro	146-157
	Commission questioning of - Picard, David, Munro, and CBC Executive Vice President, Lister Sinclair	158-274
TUESDAY, 19 FEBRUARY		
Morning	Interventions and related questioning	
	1. Ministers Responsible for Communications in the Maritime Provinces	276-316
	2. Council of the Northwest Territories	317-335
	3. Canadian Broadcasting League	336-386
Afternoon	4. Pierre Berton	388-409
	5. National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians (NABET)	410-435
	6. Mary Van Stolk	436-469
	7. Writers' Union of Canada	470-480
	8. Association of Canadian Advertisers / The Institute of Canadian Advertising	481-511
Evening	9. Association of Canadian Television and Radio Artists (ACTRA)	512-566
	10. Union des Artistes	567-607
WEDNESDAY, 20 FEBRUARY		
Morning	11. Association of Television Producers and Directors (Toronto)	[sic] 994-1059
	12. Ukranian Canadian Committee	1060-1098
	13. Canadian Union of Public Employees	1099-1157
Afternoon	14. Association Professionnelle des Journalistes de L'Outaouais	1158-1198
	15. Committee on Television (COT)	1199-1272
	16. Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement / Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories / Metis and Non-status Association of the Northwest Territories / Inuit Tapirisat of Canada	1273-1310
	17. Council of Canadian Filmmakers / Society of Filmmakers	1311-1333
THURSDAY, 21 FEBRUARY		[sic]
Morning	18. British Columbia Committee on the CBC	608-682
	19. Women for Political Action	683-711
	20. Consumers' Association of Canada	712-725
	21. Marcelle Racine and Pierre Gavreau	726-759
Afternoon	22. Association des Réalisateurs	762-806
	23. CBC Radio Network Advisory Committee	807-822
	24. Association canadienne-française de l'Ontario / Comite-action de Sudbury	823-848
	25. Private Affiliates Committee of CBC Networks (TV)	849-881
Evening	26. The Town of Shaunavon (Saskatchewan)	882-898
	27. Canadian Polish Congress / Ukranian Canadian Committee / Federation of Italian Canadians	899-933
	28. W.H. (Bill) Neville	934-955
	29. Canadian Labour Congress	956-993
FRIDAY, 22 FEBRUARY		[sic]
Morning	CBC Reply to interventions - Picard, Sinclair	1335-1360
	Commission questioning - Picard, Sinclair, David, & Munro	1361-1473

thought to be related to charges that the CBC was excessively Toronto oriented. The information was actually intended and used for a feature story on the inadequacy of CBC facilities in Toronto (Kirby 1974d).

Presentations and Questioning

The order of appearance for the public hearing is summarized in Figure 10-1. Page numbers in the official transcript (CRTC 1974a) have been included in the figure for reference convenience and as an indication of the time devoted to each item. A summary of the presentations and interventions is included in the CRTC's renewal decision document (CRTC 1974b, prt 2, pp [illegible]9-145). Excerpts from the transcript and the decision are used extensively beginning in Chapter 11.

Public Assessment

Media coverage of the hearing was extensive. The first series of press reports dealt with the CBC's opening presentation. THE GLOBE AND MAIL reported:

> CBC President Laurent Picard yesterday tried to shatter the dull image of the CBC and blast its critics as losers, all in one passionate speech lasting close to three hours.... He spoke extemporaneously, in a quick, voluble and intensely informed manner. His message: The times are changing, and so must the network -- but the CBC is efficient, up to date, and needs only more money to be great. One broadcaster said no previous CBC President would have been capable of such a tightly organized, wide ranging grasp of the philosophy, needs and future of broadcasting.... Mr. Picard made an obviously determined effort to change the CBC's image as an overstaffed, stuffily informative outfit producing programs that are no fun to watch. He said much of the criticism of the CBC can be attributed to the fact that people demand far more than can reasonably be expected, given the CBC's budget, inadequate facilities and the signal distribution problems posed by the vastness of the country.... In a direct attack on the Committee on Television, a Toronto group that is to appear before the CRTC to criticize the CBC tomorrow, Mr. Picard said many CBC critics were harking back to outdated 'confrontation' programs of the 1960s.... He compared CBC program service to that in Japan. The station in Osaka, which served a population of 30 million, had less local programming than the CBC station in Corner Brook, Nfld.... (Kirby 1974e)

Reports in the Montreal GAZETTE (MacDonald 1974b), the Toronto SUN (Blackburn 1974a), the Ottawa CITIZEN (Penn 1974a), and THE TORONTO STAR (Miller 1974c) commented in similar fashion on Picard's presentation.

As it began its coverage of the intervention presentations, the press noted the atmosphere of confrontation. THE TORONTO STAR reported:

> The prospect of a battle for control of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, between the CBC's executive and the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC), loomed yesterday.
>
> The potential confrontation emerged when chairman of the CRTC, Pierre Juneau, upheld the right of the federal government commission to impose conditions on the renewal of CBC radio and television broadcasting licenses....
>
> Picard was angered yesterday [Tuesday, 19 February] by the way a number of complaints were handled. When communications ministers from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island spoke of poor coverage, they got sympathy from commission member Armand Cornier [sic], who said he had been urging CBC television

service for northern New Brunswick for six years and had got "nothing but promises."

Picard said that the CBC twice has presented plans to the CRTC to cover new areas in the Maritimes, and each time the commission has rejected them.

After Bryan Pearson, member of the Council of the Northwest Territories from Frobisher Bay, spoke of poor service in much of the territories, Picard said privately that the CBC had presented a complete plan for far-North radio and TV coverage last summer to a select federal government committee, but it had been stalled in the committee ever since. The CRTC is one of the committee's members. (Tor Star 1974a)

As the hearing of the interventions came to an end, the Montreal GAZETTE wondered in an editorial "whether the CBC can, instead of bristling or sulking, respond straightforwardly and in an accomodating way to the criticism for which the CRTC is currently providing a hearing" (Gazette 1974). Reaction to the CBC "reply" on the final day of the hearing was mixed. Reports in the Ottawa CITIZEN and the Toronto SUN were critical:

> What pleased the nabobs of the people's network, as much as anything else, was the publicity that accrued from the hearings. Apart from the Corporation's puffery of itself, there were many flattering references from members of the commission -- one member going so far as to say that people in his part of the country were 100 per cent satisfied with CBC programming.... (Lynch)
>
> Despite the Commission's encouragement to reply at length, the CBC dismissed it all in about 20 minutes of pious platitudes. The Commission questioned President Picard and his top brass for four more hours, getting scant and superficial answers, before giving up.... (Blackburn 1974b)

In contrast, columnists Kirby and Miller noted "understanding" and a new "peace"; Joan Irwin perceived a strengthening of the CBC position. They wrote:

> On the final day of the hearing, instead of pinning the CBC down with tough questions or demanding improvements, the CRTC expressed understanding and sympathy. The commission's attitude made it seem highly unlikely that critics of the CBC would get what they want -- specific conditions attached to its licence, requiring improvements in programming. CRTC members were, however, talking about "guidelines" for the CBC.... Despite the fact that the CBC was unable to promise anything specific in the way of improvements in either programs or facilities, the producers [who were present at the hearing] said their morale had been noticeably raised by Picard's energy, enthusiasm and his professed dedication to better programs as the CBC's top priority. The Treasury Board may determine whether that morale can remain high. (Kirby 1974f)
>
> The significant points from the marathon session, then, were these: - The CBC and CRTC came to terms with each other's problems and wound up at peace; - There were some implications of points the CRTC will be taking up with private broadcasters; - Picard, the CBC president, was the hit of the show.... He gave a huge lift to most of the CBC staffers in the room, who went away feeling they had a leader they could warm to, and that they had some hope for a brightening CBC horizon, after a lot of grey years. (Miller 1974d)
>
> As Picard dealt with every question head on, not as a Harvard Business School star alumnus but as a confident, committed Canadian, a feeling of hope became almost palpable in the hearing room.... The CBC is in a far more solid position now than it was at the end of its last licence renewal hearing. The CRTC will probably want to make a statement on its expectations of the public broadcasting service during the next four or five years, perhaps as a preamble to the licence renewals. We won't have to wait long because the licences expire on March 31. (Irwin 1974c)

f) THE LICENCE RENEWAL DECISION

The CRTC decision was released in Ottawa at 10 pm on Sunday, 31 March 1974 -- a half hour before the licences began, in Newfoundland, to expire at midnight local time. Ian MacDonald noted: "A weekend announcement is unprecedented in the regulatory agency's six-year history. Chairman Pierre Juneau has called a news conference for ... Monday morning, which suggests that the announcement is of a significant, not routine nature" (MacDonald 1974c). The CRTC decision document, RADIO FREQUENCIES ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY, consisted of a 92 page decision and a 145 page report on the public hearing. In addition to attaching conditions to licences, the decision "strongly recommended" a series of further changes. Both the contents and the tone of the decision came as a complete surprise to almost everyone outside the Commission. Attached to the television network licences were the following "proposed" conditions:

> (a) Commencing October 1, 1975, the licensee shall not, during any clock hour, broadcast programming containing advertising material the aggregate duration of which exceeds 8 minutes.
>
> Commencing October 1, 1976, and on each anniversary thereafter during the term of this licence, the aggregate amount of programming containing advertising material in each clock hour throughout the following year shall be reduced by 1 minute....
>
> (b) Commencing October 1, 1976, an average of 50% of the programs broadcast by the licensee between the hours of 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. in each four week period commencing October 1 and terminating June 30 in each year, shall be Canadian in content and shall be broadcast as part of the licensee's reserve time requirement.
>
> (c) Commencing January 1, 1975 the licensee shall not broadcast commercial messages in programs directed specifically to children.... (CRTC 1974b, pp 77-8)

Also included in the decision were the following observations and "recommendations":

"Mass Medium or Public Service?":

> The CBC must not consider its audience as an agglomeration of 20 million more or less accessible revenue-producing customers, but rather as an active community of people, with real and varying communication needs.... (CRTC 1974b, p 11)
>
> The Commission has noticed on the part of the Corporation a diffidence in drawing out the full significance of its fundamental purpose as expressed in the Broadcasting Act. This diffidence and absence of elaboration can only lead, and in the opinion of the Commission has led over the years, to a lack of purpose, determination and vigour in implementing the objectives established by Parliament for the national broadcasting service. (p 18)
>
> There is no justification, except the constraints of advertising and the imperatives of mass concepts, for the exaggerated predominance of American entertainment programs on the English-language television service during prime time hours and the relative absence of the best programs from the rest of the world. (p 19)

"The CBC's Expression of Canada":

> The CBC has recognized that there has been a failure to show effectively what each part of the country has to offer and to listen to what people in each part of the country have to say. There has been a lack of feeling and imagination in sensing the need of Canadians throughout the country -- not just those living in

> the two main broadcasting centres of Canada -- to express their views and emotions to the whole country and, if possible, to the rest of the world. (p 22)
>
> An exaggerated concern with the American way of doing things seems to have inhibited the English television network and sapped its confidence in the ability of Canadian talent to provide programs which would fully achieve the objectives of Canadian broadcasting. (p 27)
>
> It is not unfair to say that of all [the] regular, established regional network productions, only one can be said to exploit the elements of the physical and social life and the particular characteristics of the region in which it is produced. (p 29)

"The Commercial Context":

> The CBC obtains about twenty per cent of its total operating budget from commercial sales, but there is growing concern that this source of revenue exerts a disproportionate pressure on the programming policy of the CBC. (p 36)
>
> As long as television is in a commercial, mass-marketing strait-jacket, there is little long term hope that it will become freer of the violence, cheap sensation and facile treatment of serious human questions that so easily attract audiences in such an environment.... (p 39)

"The Public's Right To Be Informed":

> The Commission considers that far greater attention must be paid to those standards of professional broadcast journalism, including the rules of debate, the right to reply, and the requirement of evidence in support of assertion, which alone can ensure the public's equally vital freedom to receive accurate information and informed commentary on all sides of important questions of public concern. Prejudice, shallow, ill-informed opinions and irresponsible comment have no place on the nation's most powerful public platform. (p 51)

"An Open, Responsive Public Service":

> There is no doubt the CBC will have difficulty fulfiling the broad public mandate laid down by Parliament if it allows itself to become inward-looking and defensive, or if it is insensitive to the society around it. (p 53)
>
> It is obvious to the Commission that the CBC must be more receptive to all ideas and proposals, and that it must not discourage creative effort by insensitivity or bureaucratic indifference. (p 60)

"Financial Support of the CBC":

> As long as the CBC is inhibited in its ability to interpret this country by being so entangled in mass marketing strategies and so much influenced by multinational merchandising strategies, it will be unable to contribute adequately to the objective it shares with the private sector -- "to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada" -- and it is futile to expect the private sector to adhere to this goal alone or in a vacuum.
>
> Obviously, this cannot be achieved without additional funds. It goes without saying that the cost of operation, like that of any large organization, can be reduced. Everyone has "horror" stories about real or imagined CBC extravagances.... But cost efficiency is not the only or most important point. The CBC needs significant, enthusiastic and tangible public support to increase production, to improve the quality of programs and to extend and improve the facilities required to provide a better service to all Canadians. (pp 74-5)

Within the CBC, reaction to the decision was a mixture of shock, disappointment, and anger. Analysis of the decision began within English Television immediately. The first areas of concern were those affected by the proposed licence conditions: commercial revenue, prime time scheduling, and children's program advertising. The CBC positions on these and other matters raised in the decision are reviewed in Chapter 11.

Public reaction to the decision was extensive and varied widely: some perceived the CRTC as "just doing its job," but others were severely critical. Those who supported the CRTC's approach seemed to see the decision as speaking as much to the Government, Parliament, and the people of Canada as to the CBC:

Bob Blackburn, in the Toronto SUN:

> All the foofaraw this week is about the CRTC's opinion that the CBC hasn't been doing its job as well as it might. It's the CRTC's responsibility under the law of this land to see to it that the CBC does its job. The CBC, according to the CRTC, has not been doing it, and damn well better start.
>
> It's showdown time. The CRTC has not told the CBC anything as significant as it's told the government. The CBC doesn't have to say it. The CRTC already has: If the Government won't make it financially possible for the CBC to do what the law says it must, then the Broadcasting Act, an act of the people of Canada, is a piece of paper which could best be used in the bathroom....
>
> The important thing to consider is that you, through the democratic process, have decreed that the CBC should do certain things, and the people you have elected to see to it are so blooming scared that they're afraid even to ask if you'd pay for it.... (Blackburn 1974c)

Frank Penn, in the Ottawa CITIZEN:

> As the CRTC sees it in all conscience, if it is to do its own job with proper impartiality and dedication to the precepts of the Broadcasting Act, it's time the broadcasting chips fall where they may. It has officiously served notice on the CBC to begin jettisoning some of its load of commercials or lose its licence, but the only real neck that's being laid on the block is the CRTC's.... The CBC won't be put out of business, Parliament isn't being blackmailed, the CRTC isn't demanding the impossible. What it does want to know is whether the Braodcasting Act means what the CRTC interprets it to mean, and if it does, whether Parliament wants the CRTC to implement it or not.... (Penn 1974b)

Most press comment was more directly critical of the CRTC's decision and general approach. Two writers in the Ottawa CITIZEN termed the report "daring but clumsy" and the approach "tactless and half-baked" (Young), and suggested that "Mr. Picard, who came before the February hearing with a lively commitment to regenerate English-language television, is entitled to feel offended by the CRTC's brutal indictment" (Cohen). In the Montreal STAR, Joan Irwin wrote:

> The activities and reasoning of the CRTC become daily more difficult to fathom. On Sunday night the CRTC released its voluminous announcement of the CBC licence renewals -- 92 pages of generalized but withering commentary on the CBC leading to the imposition of conditions designed to phase out commercials on TV and eliminate them on radio. Yesterday, at a press conference convened to explain the announcement, CRTC Chairman Pierre Juneau spoke warmly of the CBC's management and staff, of their difficult role and of 'the chances for renewal' under present CBC leadership.... (Irwin 1974d)

Ian MacDonald noted that the Government had not been consulted:

> Incredibly, neither Juneau nor his financial analysts have offered any assurances as to how the CBC and its affiliated stations are to be compensated for the commercial revenues they've been ordered to relinquish. During a 90-minute televised news conference Juneau frankly admitted that the government had not been

> consulted or advised of the CRTC decision.... CRTC officials said all they were trying to do was to strengthen the hand of CBC President Picard in dealing with the question of advertising on the public broadcasting system.... Which further boils down to the question, who runs the CBC?.... -(MacDonald 1974d)

In THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Geoffrey Stevens argued that the decision invaded "the normal jurisdiction of the CBC's management" and asked, "Is it properly the function of a regulatory agency to read moral lectures to a Crown corporation?" (Stevens) Editorials severely criticized the tone of the document, the timing of its release, and what was descrbed as the CRTC's attempt to "bully" the CBC and -- especially -- Parliament and the people (Globe 1974c; Journal 1974b; Mtl Star; Wpg FP).

As noted in section 7(c), Section 17(2) of the Broadcasting Act provided for consultation, at CBC request, between the Corporation and the Commission with regard to conditions which the CRTC proposed to attach to CBC licences. Section 17(3) provided for referral of unresolvable differences between the Corporation and the Commission to the federal government. The CBC requested an opportunity to consult with the Commission regarding the conditions. The process of resolving the differences began with a meeting between the CRTC Executive Committee and the CBC Board of Directors on 28 May 1974. In August 1974, Blaik Kirby reported on that meeting:

> [It] was devoted to establishing that what the CBC planned and wanted was not just Picard's decision; he had his board behind him. To keep from being isolated at the pinnacle, the CBC board is planning to abandon its secret deliberations and to become more visible....
>
> The CRTC backed down from its insistence on a wide range of idealistic changes in the network's operations.... The CRTC has -- without ever saying so -- recognized that it cannot force Parliament to give the CBC great boosts in budget, and it dare not bring the differences between CBC and CRTC to an agonizing Cabinet decision. It will have to settle for what is practicable....
>
> In the meantime, the CBC goes blissfully on, with the CRTC decision in force if not in effect. (Kirby 1974g)

The conflict remained unresolved at the end of the case study period. A 10 December 1974 CP news story reported that, according to an unidentified CBC source, a compromise appeared likely on the CRTC demand that the CBC cut back commercial activity. The source said that although a 9 December 1974 meeting of CRTC and CBC board members, thought by some participants to be the crucial meeting in the series that had been going on since Easter, did not resolve the issues, further discussions were to be held (Citizen 1974).

Almost a year after the decision had been issued, on 5 March 1975, CP reported that a compromise had been reached that would give Cabinet the final say on the proposal to cut back television advertising. A 4 March 1974 joint statement by Communications Minister Gerard Pelletier (to whom the CRTC reported) and Secretary of State Hugh Faulkner (through whom the CBC reported to Parliament) indicated that the CRTC was retreating from its demands on the prime time scheduling of Canadian programs. The CBC, meanwhile, would carry out its original plans to eliminate most radio advertising and to gradually eliminate children's television program advertising. The Ministers also reported that the CBC and the CRTC had agreed to establish a joint committee which would confer three times a year on ways of improving the broadcasting system (Gazette 1975).

In the summer of 1975 both Picard and Juneau departed from their posts -- Picard to take a management position in industry, Juneau to enter federal politics with the prospect of becoming Minister of Communications. Although Juneau's move was expected by some observers to be followed by a switch in the CBC reporting line from Secretary of State to Communications, his failure to win an elected seat in Parliament in an October 1975 by-election left the direction of future structural arrangements uncertain as work on this case study was being completed. Picard was replaced by A.W. Johnson, previously Deputy Minister in the Department of National Health and Welfare; Vice Chairman Boyle was appointed to Juneau's post.

Chapter 11

Public Issues

Although the background material presented Chapters 1 through 10 is important to an understanding of the CBC's institutional environment during the 1970-1974 period, and although much of that material holds an interest and importance of its own, beginning with this chapter the focus is narrowed significantly. Chapters 12, 13, and 14 provide sets of "characteristics" which can be thought of as generalizations applying to this one organization. In order to establish bases for the development of these limited generalizations, it is necessary to examine decision making in a variety of situations.

In each decision making situation it is possible to identify multiple factors supporting the development of more than one characteristic or generalization. This chapter's review of English Television's discharge of its Broadcasting Act mandate to actively contribute to the flow and exchange of regional information and entertainment, for instance, contributes to several generalizations both about public television in Canada (in Chapter 12) and about management decision making within English Television (in Chapter 13). In this particular instance, there is little contribution to generalizations about communication research utilization (Chapter 14) but, on the other hand, this chapter's review of the CBC's orientation towards its potential audience contributes significantly to the analysis in Chapter 14.

This chapter reviews, in varying levels of detail, the main "issues" of public discussion -- the visible problems which management decision makers faced during the case study period. Included are summaries of the areas of concern, some excerpts from public comment, descriptions of the CBC positions, and comments based on observation during the fieldwork period.

The "issues" have been grouped in five sections, as follows:

- "Nationalism" Issues (pages 135-161),
- "Regional" Issues (pages 161-185),
- "Recognition and Portrayal" Issues (pages 185-190),
- Audience Orientation (pages 190-201), and
- Costs and Financing (pages 201-223).

Each section concludes with a set of "Comments," which summarize and extent the observations in that section and, in a cumulative fashion, bring forward important points from previous sections.

a) NATIONALISM ISSUES

In noting, at the outset of the 1974 licence renewal hearing, that "a strong CBC is vital to the health of Canadian broadcasting which has been characterized as the central nervous system of Canadian nationhood," Pierre Juneau was drawing attention to the CBC's role as an instrument of nationalism. The role is not an informal one: the Broadcasting Act charges the Corporation to provide a service that is "predominately Canadian in content and character," and to "contribute to the development of national unity and provide for a continuing expression of national identity" (Act, ss 3.f, 3.g.iv). And the Act specifies that "the programming provided should be of high standard, using predominantly Canadian creative and other resources" (Act, ss 3.b, 3.d).

During the case study period there were changes in the general feelings of nationalism in Canada. These changes, commonly taken as a "rise" in nationalistic feelings, were described by Robert Fulford, editor of SATURDAY NIGHT, in 1974:

> The rise of cultural nationalism has been one of the striking aspects of life in English-speaking Canada dring the early 1970s. If this surprises visitors to the country and those who hear of it from a distance, it also surprises many older Canadians. Certainly no one predicted that it would appear so suddenly and in so many fields at once, reaching into everything from legitimate theatre to popular music.
>
> The development of economic nationalism was, by comparison, predictable. There had been many indications that Canadians were becoming dissatisfied with the extent to which foreign corporations, mainly U.S.-owned, control the Canadian economy. But in the arts, as late as the mid-1960s, there were few signs of articulate discontent. English-speaking Canada imported most of what its people read, watched, listened to, and talked about, and for the most part English-speaking Canada seemed content. This was not true in Quebec and never had been. Protected by the French language, Quebec culture thrived as an independent entity. It is in English-speaking Canada that the change has taken place....
>
> There is no evidence that the American presence is substantially diminished, and no real possibility that it will be in the foreseeable future. But beside the American presence there is now a separate Canadian presence. It is still fragile and much worried-over, and it appears to need the support of government regulations and subsidies. Nevertheless, its existence is more evident than at any previous time in this century.... (Fulford 1974)

The impact of the rise of cultural nationalism, and -- to a lesser extent -- of the development of economic nationalism, on issues considered in this case study is complex. For one thing, the nature and strength of nationalistic feelings were not uniform throughout the Canadian population. Fulford observed:

> Not all Canadians regard the new mood as ideal. Some established publishers and writers find the nationalistic publishers bumptious, and some of the established theatre people feel the same way about the new wave of directors and playwrights. Anti-Americanism, which in the past has often reflected the meanest side of the Canadian spirit, is seen as a grave danger; picketing a public art museum for hiring an American curator (that happened in 1972 in Toronto) is widely regarded as, at best, a breach of Canadian good taste. Moreover, there are some who believe that certain branches of American cultural organizations have proved, by their interest in Canadian creative work, that they are valuable to the Canadian scene....
>
> In some sense this cultural nationalism may be an outgrowth of that most curious experience, the celebration in 1967 of the hundredth anniversary of the Canadian confederation. That year-long party left Canadians with mixed feelings -- a giddy sense of accomplishment about Expo 67 combined with a certain puzzlement over just what was being celebrated so feverishly. Possibly, a generation from now, historians will decide that the cultural nationalism of the early 1970s was merely a natural part of the maturation process every country works through on its way from colonial status to full independence. (Fulford 1974)

The origins of the CBC's role as an instrument of nationalism are easily seen running throughout the history of public broadcasting in Canada reviewed in section 6(d). As noted there, the basic intent of the 1968 Broadcasting Act had been to make the Canadian broadcasting system a means of strengthening both Canadian identity and

Canadian unity, and it had assigned the CBC special responsibilities in that connection. In 1974 some Canadians argued that the CBC was not adequately contributing to the development of national unity and that English Television was, in several ways, "not Canadian enough." The intent of the Act was not in question, but there were differences as to how well the Corporation was discharging its mandate. To varying extents those differences in assessment arose because of differences in feelings of nationalism from one Canadian to another, in expectations, and in perceptions. And the assessment process was further complicated by occasional confusion over the interrelated but not synonymous terms "unity" and "identity." The CRTC dealt with the basic distinction by quoting the work of one of its own distinguished members, Dr. Northrop Frye:

> Thus when the CBC is instructed by Parliament to do what it can to promote Canadian unity and identity, it is not always realized that unity and identity are quite different things to be promoting, and that in Canada they are perhaps more different than they are anywhere else. Identity is local and regional, rooted in imagination and in works of culture; unity is national in reference, international in perspective, and rooted in a political feeling.... (Frye, p ii)
>
> The essential element in the national sense of unity is the east-west feeling, developed historically along the St. Lawrence- Great Lakes axis, and expressed in the national motto, "a mari usque ad mare". The tension between this political sense of unity and the imaginative sense of locality is the essence of whatever the word "Canadian" means. Once the tension is given up, and the two elements of unity and identity are confused or assimilated to each other, we get the two endemic diseases of Canadian life. Assimilating identity to unity produces the empty gestures of cultural nationalism; assimilating unity to identity produces the kind of provincial isolation which is now called separatism. (p iii)

The distinction is crucial and bears repeating: identity -- local and regional, rooted in imagination and in works of culture; unity -- national in reference, international in perspective, and rooted in a political feeling. This section looks at four areas of public discussion under the heading "nationalism" issues. The classification is based on connections between policies and operations, and is not an attempt to isolate "unity" issues. In the final analysis, the "regionalism" and "recognition and portrayal" issues considered in the sections which follow are also "unity" issues; in the Canadian context, unity implied an appreciation of identity, a recognition of diversity as well as a common purpose.

National Unity Contributions

Section II of the CRTC decision, "The CBC's Expression of Canada," dealt at length with the national broadcasting service's role in contributing to the development of national unity. It commented:

> The role of the CBC as the national service which must reflect the identity of the country and contribute to its unity, has, from the start, attracted more attention than any other aspect of the CBC. It still provokes a great deal of discussion. (CRTC 1974b, p 22)
>
> One can understand that there might be doubts about this [national unity] objective because it is subject to narrow, nationalistic interpretation, yet there is no country in the world where broadcasting, or indeed cultural policy, is not expected to contribute to the unity of the country. (p 23)

At the 1970 hearing CBC President George Davidson reported that "we have not yet tried to prepare a document in which we give our interpretation of the words which now appear in the [1968] Broadcasting Act as being our national mandate" (CRTC 1970a, pp 246-7). By 1974 the Corporation had devoted specific attention to the interpretation of its national unity mandate obligations. In 1971 Davidson prepared and distributed a major memorandum on "The CBC and National Unity." A new statement on national unity was subsequently incorporated into the CBC "Program Policy" manual distributed to management and staff. And national unity was the subject of specific comment in the English Television submission to the CRTC:

> The CBC does not interpret its obligation to national unity in a negative sense: the injunction in the Broadcasting Act cannot be construed as an invitation to censorship. The national broadcasting service must be a clear mirror in which the Canadian people can see themselves in all their diversity -- and thus confront the subtle and elusive substance of their unity. Those who would deny that unity are themselves part of the diversity, and to exclude them would be to falsify the reflection of the Canadian people to themselves in the national network service. (CBC 1973b, p 32)
>
> The stress the national service has increasingly placed on the Canadian historic heritage (in programs such as FIRST PERSON SINGULAR, THE TENTH DECADE, and THE NATIONAL DREAM) as well as on the physical fabric of the country and its preservation (in series such as THIS LAND, THE NATURE OF THINGS, and COUNTRY CANADA) is also related to national unity.... (p 33)

There was agreement between the Corporation and the Commission on the political aspects of national unity development. The CBC position can be summarized as interpreting its obligation as being to contribute to the development of Canadian social unity. This CBC position and the submission comments about censorship and diversity quoted above are consistent with the CRTC observation that the phrase "contribute to the development of national unity" does not imply a particular attitude to federal-provincial relations in a jurisdictional dispute, the suppression of questions about the constitutional arrangements proposed by a particular government, or discrimination against individuals on the basis of their expresed political convictions (CRTC 1974b, pp 23-4).

The Commission's criticism of CBC contributions to national unity essentially argued that the Corporation was not adequately contributing to Canadian social unity -- that interpretation was correct but that implementation was deficient. Included in the decision was criticism of CBC performance in one area -- "shared program experiences" -- in which the Corporation had argued that its contributions were significant.

Shared Program Experiences

The provision of "shared program experiences" figured prominently in English Television's operational approach to contributing to national unity. Its CRTC submission argued:

> The national service can build unity by providing a daily pattern of shared program experience at all levels. At its emotional peaks, that shared experience embraces the great events of the time: the national and international crises that have tested nerve and patience; the elections, conventions and debates that shape the future of the nation; the festials -- Expo, Royal visits, the installation of a Governor General, provincial centenaries, the wedding of a Princess, the Olympics to come; and the annual sporting climaxes -- the Stanley Cup, the Grey Cup, and the World Series.
>
> At a more pedestrian level, the balanced service ... is made available to nearly all Canadians day in and day out. It is there, as part of the common experience of being a Canadian, to be participated in by all.... (CBC 1973b, p 32)

Within English Television, contributing to national unity seemed seldom dealt with in isolation from other matters or in abstract terms. And it would be an overstatement to say that these shared experience contributions to national unity were an automatic byproduct of routine television network operations in Canada. Nevertheless, both other objectives and CBC traditions tended to ensure that programs which contributed to national unity would find their way into the network schedule. The CBC's 70% Canadian content objective was a strong factor in this regard: although the contributions of individual programs varied, 55 hours a week of network programming produced in Canada inevitably made a contribution to feelings of Canadian unity (and identity).

Another significant factor in ensuring the provision of shared national experiences was what may be termed the CBC's "native understanding" of its public service role. Although few managers or producers ever articulated a comprehensive description of English Television's national public service role, a shared understanding of that role appeared to be operating constantly. Recognition of special CBC responsbilities was an "understood" fact of life. This sense of what the CBC ought to be doing in any particular instance was not entirely uniform, but neither organizational position nor period of association with the CBC seemed to be a good predictor of the nature or strength of an individual's commitment to the Corporation's public service role. In specific situations there was surprisingly little disagreement as to the appropriate course of action.

Observation during the fieldwork period of the process of scheduling "news specials" provided one opportunity to assess how this traditional or native understanding of English Television's role affected daily operations and contributed to the provision of national public service programming. During certain periods decisions on the preemption of regular programming for special news coverage were required on a daily basis. Agreement on whether special coverage was warranted was usually reached quickly and easily; assessing the importance of such special coverage so as to arrive at an appropriate scheduling pattern seemed more difficult. The set of options was complex, especially if live event coverage were possible. Live coverage of daytime events, though more timely, would reach a smaller fraction of the public than a report telecast in prime time. Frequently both types of coverage were provided. For English Television, live coverage introduced a major set of operational complications affecting the program delay pattern which delivered routine programming four hours later on the west coast than on the east coast. An 8 pm news special from Ottawa, if telecast live, would be seen in Vancouver at 5 pm -- before many people had returned home from work. In Winnipeg, 7 pm local public affairs programming would be displaced, and, in Halifax, a portion of a 9 pm hour long entertainment program period would be preempted.

Even the scheduling of news specials to be seen at the same local time across the country required decisions on a complex set of options. Specials would normally be seen by viewers served by affiliated stations only if they are scheduled in reserved, as opposed to available, network program periods. Preemption of sustaining programs normally had a minimal financial impact, whereas displacement of commercial programs affected, directly and indirectly, both the network and its affiliates. Specials could displace either Canadian or imported programming, either originals or repeats, either entertainment or information, either Toronto productions or programs from other regions, either extremely or less popular programs.

Despite these numerous options and complications, observation indicated that the primary factors influencing news special decision making were: the understood public service role of the network, the "news value" of the particular special, and viewer reaction to the loss of the displaced programming. Attempts to avoid repeated displacement of the same program series had the effect of distributing the preemptions throughout the schedule, replacing both information and entertainment programs, both sustaining and commerial.

It can be argued that the most effective means of dealing with a particular concern is not necessarily to produce a special program or series dealing with that concern. When viewed from the perspective of findings in the persuasive communication research tradition, for instance those dealing with the effects of distraction from the primary message (Breitrose), it would seem that a conscious commitment to Canadian unity running as a background theme through a wide variety of programs could be significantly more effective in contributing to national unity than obviously deliberate efforts in this area. Thus, "entertainment" programs such as FRONT PAGE CHALLENGE can be viewed as having made a significant though not conspicuous contribution to national unity.

Very few regularly scheduled programs were produced for a single purpose, to meet only one specific objective. Thus, although both THE NATIONAL news telecast and HOCKEY NIGHT IN CANADA, for instance, were considered to have a role in contributing to national unity, neither was considered to have that as its exclusive role. Both seemed to be regarded principally as components of "a balanced service of information, enlightenment and entertainment" (Act, s 3.g.i) -- that is, as television programs rather than as specific vehicles for national unity themes.

More deliberately intended to provide shared national experiences were the programs produced by the Features and Special Events department. The submission noted that in the 1973/74 year these programs included "traditional" actuality coverage (the opening of Parliament, the national Remembrance Day service, New Year's messages from the Governor General and the Prime Minister, the Grey Cup parade, and the Santa Claus parade), "special events" (the Royal visit, Princess Anne's wedding, the installation of the new Governor General, and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference), special programs (MICHENER: THE MAN AND THE OFFICE, TRIBUTE TO ANDREW ALLAN, TO THE SEA IN SHIPS, SONG OF THE ISLAND, SETON'S MANITOBA, D-DAY DODGERS, THEATRE CANADA, and RAILROADS EAST/RAILROADS WEST), and two program series (GALLERY and TO THE WILD COUNTRY).

Despite the submission arguments, the CRTC decision was critical of the extent to which the CBC provided such shared program experiences:

> There has been much comment on the fact that the Corporation seems to miss opportunities to actually create a collective Canadian experiences on a wide national scale -- to provide real occasions for Canadians to share ideas and emotions. Many Canadians look back on the Russia-Canada Hockey series, for instance, with a kind of shared pride that make discussions of "cultural nationalism" seem superfluous. The Corporation is uniquely capable of initiating such occasions which give us a sense of the elements of identity we share from coast to coast. (CRTC 1974b, p 31)

The CRTC's argument was not that the CBC wasn't contributing to national unity, and not that it wasn't providing shared viewing experiences, but rather that it was not adequately creating collective experiences on a wide scale. That argument will be considered in combination with others at the end of this section.

Canadian Content

Increasing the level of Canadian content in response to the mandate requirement for a service "predominantly Canadian in content and character" was a major CBC objective throughout the case study period. In the 1969/70 year, Canadian content had been 59.0% for the schedule as a whole and 51.9% in prime time. Those figures were calculated under the classifications established by the Board of Broadcast Governors (which designated Commonwealth programming as partially Canadian and telecasts of World Series games as Canadian programming). New regulations introduced in October 1970 had the effect of defining Canadian content more strictly and of requiring of the CBC networks 60% Canadian content both in the schedule as a whole and in prime time. Throughout the case study period, the CBC strived to achieve levels of Canadian content in excess of the minimums required by the CRTC. The CBC's own target for network service was 70% Canadian content.

For 1972/73, the overall schedule and prime time Canadian content figures were 68.4% and 67.3%. The Canadian content of a "representative winter week" rose from 59.3% in 1970 to 72.1% in 1974. The English Television submission noted:

> These increases in Canadian network programming were achieved in all program areas. The information programs in prime time increased, variety [programs] increased substantially, and drama was up slightly. Children's programming in the weekday 4:30-5:30 pm period was almost completely Canadianized, and two "soap operas" from the United States were eliminated from the daytime schedule and replaced with Canadian strip programs. These gains were, of course, offset when SESAME STREET was introduced into the schedule. (CBC 1973b, p 42)

Behind the percentage figures were significant absolute increases in the hours of Canadian programming: from a total of 2305 hours in 1969/70 to 2659 in 1972/73, and from 805 hours in prime time to 1075 hours. By Winter 1973/74, an increase of 1% in the Canadian content level would have required an additional 40 hours of Canadian programming per year. As noted in section 7(b), pages 83-84, these increases in Canadian content were made during a period when the effective purchasing power of the total English Television programming budget fell by 6%.

By 1973 it was considered by the Planning Group that further stretching of English Television's financial and physical programming resources would be difficult. English Television argued the point in its CRTC submission:

> Although this achievement represents a service which is predominantly Canadian, it does not represent the final objective in terms of Canadian content. The Corporation must be concerned with the quality as well as with the statistics of Canadian content. The Act refers not merely to content, but to character, and it is a priority to ensure that those programs which count as Canadian according to the prevailing definition do in fact faithfully reflect some aspect of life in this country, and that they do not constitute a pablum irrelevant to meaning or purpose, programmed simply in order to meet a statistical quota. (CBC 1973b, p 41)
>
> In 1975, there will be an increase in the network production capacity with the inauguration of the new consolidated production centre in Vancouver. With adequate funds and manpower to utilize that plant to its capacity, the productivity will become available with which English Television Network Canadian content could be raised to the current target of 70% for the network as a whole and for prime time.
>
> However, increasing Canadian content is not the only rising demand on production capacity. Section 2.3 ["Regional Production Resources"] discussed the impact on regional production resources of the demands for increasing the flow of regional programming. In summary, these demands raise questions about the capacity of the network to increase Canadian content beyond 70%, while retaining quality standards and competitive effectiveness, without a major increase in total production capacity or the development of new approaches, or both. (p 42)

While the CBC laid claim to success in increasing Canadian content, public attention began to focus on the side effects. Val Clery reported on Picard's appearance before the CRTC:

> During his bravura presentation he proudly flashed graphs and statistics that showed the CBC to be the leader among public broadcasting systems throughout the Western world in distributing the most programs over the widest network for the least cost. CBC producers, he boasted, turned out four times the amount of programming of, for instance, their opposite numbers in the BBC. Had it occurred to him, I wondered, that below him in the CBC pyramid the pressures inevitable in such cost-efficiency were taking their toll in substandard programs? What about the program staff battling obsolescent equipment and ill-organized services and finely pared budgets to produce all that is demanded and produce it well? (Clery, p 50)

Perhaps because so much emphasis had been placed on increasing the quantity of Canadian production, the CBC was disappointed that the CRTC decision seemed to downplay the Corporation's Canadian content achievements. The decision commented:

> The Commission recognizes that the CBC exceeds the proportion of 60% of Canadian programming required by the CRTC and that it intends to increase this proportion if adequate resources are made available. (CRTC 1974b, p 33)

> The CBC's absolute priority should be imagination and excellence. This excellence in Canadian circumstances cannot exist without confidence in the value of Canadian expression. However, the commitment to excellence is not accomplished only by achieving an appropriate proportion of Canadian programs.... (p 19)

The English Television submission had also recognized the need for quality as well as quantity, so the point was not new and the observations therefore constituted criticism of program quality. The thrust of the Corporation's presentation at the hearing had been that a great effort had been made to increase the volume of Canadian programming and that in the immediate future special attention and additional resources would have to be devoted to program quality improvement.

Neither the English Television submission nor the CRTC decision revealed the extent to which increasing the statistics of Canadian content had been a CBC preoccupation during the 1970-1974 period. The drive to higher Canadian content levels affected English Television in many ways and in many places. The Canadian content level was monitored constantly by the Planning Group so that the effect of any single scheduling decision could be known in advance. At the time that the quarterly block schedules for a program year were constructed, it was only possible to estimate the actual Canadian content level that would be achieved. Sports telecasts, because of their duration and the variable number of playoff games, could affect Canadian content levels significantly: a full seven game World Series in the same year as a short series of National Hockey League playoff could potentially drop the network's Canadian content level for the year by 0.6%. On the other hand, news and other Canadian specials not included in the original block schedule could increase the Canadian content level if they displaced imported programming. As the end of each reporting year approached, the year-to-date Canadian content level began to have a stronger effect on program scheduling. The numbers of repeats of Canadian programs could, for instance, be increased -- displacing imported programs and increasing the overall Canadian content level.

Although the Canadian content target level thus affected the daily scheduling of the network, the effects on program production were more dramatic. The budget stretching to support progressively more and more Canadian program production was described in section 7(b), pages 79-84. Equally as dramatic was the stretching of physical and human resources. Val Clery's suggestion that "the pressures inevitable in such cost-efficiency were taking their toll in substandard programs" raises a complicated set of interrelated considerations. Although the objective of increasing Canadian content was certainly not the only factor contributing to an increased concern with efficiency, it was at least one of the major factors. Because concern with resources and efficiency consumed so much time and energy within English Television during the case study period, and because these considerations enter so many of the "issue" examinations which follow, it seems appropriate to deal with the question of efficiency at this point.

CBC Efficiency

In 1974 the CBC seemed to face two main criticisms about its level of efficiency: that it was too efficient, and that it wasn't efficient enough. Prior to the hearing Lisa Hobbs reported in THE VANCOUVER SUN on responses to her call for comments about English Television service:

> Why do so many feel so strongly about the CBC? That's difficult to answer, although visions of well-heeled execs tossing away taxpayers' money with abandon

> seems to play a large role. In any case, comments on the CBC have been specific, whether for or against. Here is a cross-section of excerpts of reader viewpoints....

One of Hobbs' Vancouver readers had written:

> (a) I deplore the fact that CBC is a code name for Toronto- Montreal-Ottawa. You must curb the waste and use the savings to establish something like our [PBS] Channel 9. (b) The new CBC should be broken into regional networks to avoid being parochial. (c) Re-establish the CBC Times [program guide]. (d) Cut out the waste. (e) Cut out the waste. (Hobbs 1974d)

Others, like Clery, who conducted their own inquiries after the hearing and release of the decision, became alarmed at the effect of efficiency on creativity. Morris Wolfe, a key member of The Committee on Television, wrote at length about "Making Plays On The Assembly Line":

> The series title [THE PLAY'S THE THING] has the ring of the prestige dramas of the past. But THE ASSEMBLY LINE'S THE THING would, in fact, be more appropriate. One of the most important things to have changed at the CBC since those days is the way in which such programmes are put together. In the "golden age" the producer was the main judge of what needed to be done and how long to spend on it. No more.
>
> .... Shooting schedules ought to be flexible. Some plays need more time, some less. Some plays work best on film, some live on tape. Even critics know that. But that kind of flexibility has disappeared from the CBC -- partly because it's now producing many more programmes with proportionately less money, partly because it's easier to run things if they're done according to a formula. The formula for THE PLAY'S THE THING called for all the plays to be shot on tape.... Each of the plays was to be shot in five days -- three in the studio and two on location -- with a couple of days for rehearsal. Even the crummiest movie shoots no more than a few minutes of material a day; how then can one expect to produce a one-hour prestige drama in five days? As one producer puts it, "It isn't exactly a production method amenable to art." (Wolfe 1974b, p 54)

Concern with the Corporation's level of efficiency was not new in 1974: what was new was the concern that the drive to higher levels of productivity was having a negative effect on program quality. Historically, the CBC had been regarded by many as being much less than efficient and, given that long standing perception, Picard's attention to resources and productivity in his presentation to the CRTC was perhaps understandable. Early in the case study period, in 1970, the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media had contributed its own critical comments to the efficiency debate:

> Out of an operating budget of approximately $200 million, programme expenses -- radio, television, and international service -- account for some $108 million, or about 54 per cent. While the overhead costs of operating a 9,000-person organization must necessarily be high, we wonder about the cost efficiency of a broadcasting organization which needs a dollar of input to produce 54 cents worth of programme. (Davey 1970a, p 202)

Some perspective on the Davey Committee comments can be gained by reference to the 1973/74 distributions of CBC operating expense provided in Figure 7-10, page 79. By 1973/74, the proportion of expense reported as going to programs was 60%, but the overall shape of the distribution was basically the same as in 1969/70 (CBC 1970b, p 67). The remaining 40% was not, however, all accounted for by administrative overhead: network distribution and station transmission (coverage) took 14%; external service operations, selling, payments to private stations, and agency commissions took 8%; capital loan interest took 4%. Administrative overhead actually accounted for 14% -- 5% for general administration, 9% for operational supervision and services. The Davey Committee statement also seemed to leave the impression that program production activities themselves were not cost efficient, but the comment that the Corporation "requires a dollar of input to produce 54 cents worth of programme" was actually an observation about the proportion of its budget which the CBC was able to devote to programs. There was really no assessment of the quality or quantity of programming which the Corporation was able to provide with the available 54% of its budget.

If the Davey Committee analysis of overhead costs was somewhat faulty and failed to take into account, for instance, the $26.5 million required for coverage in 1969/70, its comments on production practices seemed to take it onto even shakier ground:

> We are aware that certain television programmes are produced by the CBC at very low cost. Some benefit by economy, and look pleasantly taut; others just look cheap. When Pierre Berton appeared before this Committee, he made the point that editing videotape is time-consuming and expensive, as well as often being unnecessary if appropriate preparation is done. It is not our intention to instruct broadcasters in the details of their business, but we accept the view of Mr. Berton and others that some economies might well be considered, and that the kind of editing practices he described are harmful to the production, misleading to the viewer, and ultimately expensive to the taxpayer. (Davey 1970a, p 202)

Five years earlier the Fowler Committee report had been severely critical of many aspects of CBC operations, but its conclusions on efficiency had differed somewhat:

> [T]he introduction of the videotape recorder has transformed television studio operations, and has practically eliminated from program schedules any dependence on live studio performances. The expression 'live-on-tape' is in common use and indicates that the pre-recording of programs on videotape is now common practice. By this means, better control over schedule deadlines has been achieved with a consequent improvement in studio utilization. This one major development has enabled the CBC to increase its output to the point where, despite the problems of overcrowding and dispersal of facilities, the system has been able to cope with the heavier schedules of recent years....
>
> The purpose of these brief comments is to commend the ingenuity and effort applied by the CBC to the maintenance of a high standard of technical efficiency, and also to indicate that further technological developments may have a profound effect on plans for the future. (Fowler 1965, p 198)

There are inevitable dangers in generalizations of any sort about an organization with some 9,000 employees. The level of production efficiency observed during the case study period was, not surprisingly, not uniform. It varied from location to location and from day to day, but there was a definite overall pattern which warrants comment. The following comments are based on personal experience working as a producer in Ottawa and Vancouver, the results of the study of local Current Affairs program resources and production practices at eight locations, findings on the technical efficiency at three production centres, and informal but extensive contact with and observation of Toronto production practices in the 1972-1974 period.

Production Efficiency Observations

During the case study period the number of studios at the English Television production centres remained constant, but there were significant changes in the utilization patterns. The increased volume of English Television network production has already been noted. In addition, there were increases in local production for French stations at English Television production centres across the country, and demands for higher volumes of local, interprovincial, intraprovincial, and Northern Service production.

Concern with production output ran throughout English Television -- involving producers and managers, especially the regional Production Managers and the National Resources Manager. A number of techniques were used to derive higher volumes of production from the existing physical resources. The Planning System described in section 9(f) was used to help adjust the production loads on the various centres -- to transfer production from completely loaded locations to those with some available capacity.

In any television organization the most economical means of generating hours of program output in the early 1970s was in-house electronic camera studio production recorded on video tape. The overall costs of using the other available recording medium, photographic film, were generally higher. Live studio production, though technically similar to recording on video tape, required more elaborate production preparations and higher setup time requirements. And the costs of remote electronic camera production, whether live or onto a mobile video tape unit, were high: more elaboarate production preparations, transportation of people and equipment, and significantly more complex setup requirements contributed to the high cost. Live remote production additionally required a complex and expensive set of transmission and communication circuits between the remote unit and a production centre.

One means by which English Television increased its production output during the case study period was to assign mobile units to studio service. The technical conversion of CBC equipment from black and white to colour remained incomplete even at the end of the case study period. The afternoon Current Affairs program TAKE 30 originated in black and white throughout much of the case study period. The largest studios in Vancouver and Halifax remained black and white equipped throughout the period; in Toronto, three studios were unconverted throughout most of the period. By parking the colour mobile units adjacent to these studios and deploying the mobile cameras on the studio floor, it was possible to carry on colour studio production. In Halifax, two mobile units were required to supply three colour cameras. "Studio" programs produced this way included THE IRISH ROVERS, COUNTRYTIME, SINGALONG JUBILEE, JULIETTE AND FRIENDS, MARKETPLACE, THIS IS THE LAW, FRONT PAGE CHALLENGE, and NEWSMAGAZINE.

In many cases the hours of studio utilization were extended, but both the reluctance of perfomers and participants to work or be present at highly unusual hours of the day and the availability of technical manpower normally precluded three shift studio operations.

The studio time required for a program can be broken down into four blocks: scenic and technical setup, rehearsal, actual production, and strike (or teardown). In some cases there were reductions in the amounts of rehearsal and production time made available to producers. In the case of pre-recorded programs, there was increased use of post-production techniques, including video tape editing, to maintain program quality despite decreases in the availability of full studio facilities. Also in the case of pre-recorded programs, changes in studio scheduling practices increased program output per average studio utilization hour. Where possible, multiple programs were produced "per studio occasion" -- reducing the number of occasions and the setup and strike time per program. In some block production cases, producers were allocated studio time to produce two programs every second week. In one case a full season of a daily afternoon program was pre-recorded during the preceding summer -- several programs per day, three and four days in a row, week after week. In such cases the ability to comment on current happenings and to make changes suggested by viewer reaction to previous programs in the series was lost.

In some centres, video tape editing was scheduled around the clock, seven days a week. Not uncommonly, producers and directors with obligations to deal with their program units, managers, and the public during normal business hours found they were also editing beginning at 3 am. Some video tape editing which would have improved program quality was not done because no editing facilities could be made available. This was especially true of the local current affairs programs at the medium sized production centres. The increased demand for editing time appeared to stem mainly from two factors: greater use of post-production techniques to compensate for tighter studio schedules, and the perhaps understandable desire of producers to enhance the production values ("the look") of their programs.

There were inefficiencies. Some inexperienced producers did not make optimum use of their available studio time. In some cases the amount of editing time required seemed excessive. But these instances appeared to be exceptions to the general pattern.

Figure 11-1, based on Picard's presentation to the CRTC, compares the 1970 television production output of several national public broadcasting services. Despite dramatic differences in coverage requirements, these figures indicate that in 1970 the English Services Division was producing 5.7 times as many program hours per person and 4.3 times as many program hours per "effective" dollar as the BBC.

Further consideration of CBC efficiency will enter into consideration of a number of issues in later sections. At this point it is important to note that the increase in

Figure 11-1. PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM EFFICIENCY COMPARISONS, 1970

Organization / Country	Resources[1]			Service		
	Personnel	Budget ($ Million) Actual	Budget ($ Million) Effective[2]	Population (Million)	Square Miles[3] (Million)	Hours of TV Production
ACTUAL						
CBC / Canada	9,000	255	255	21.3	3,850	13,200
- French	3,300	90	90			3,600
- English	*5,700*	*165*	*165*			*9,600*
BBC / UK	21,500	285	475	50.5	94	6,400
NHK / Japan	16,000	275	550	103.3	142	13,200
ORTF / France	13,500	400	667	49.0	213	8,000
RATIOS[4]						
CBC / Canada	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.4
- French	0.6	0.5	0.5			0.4
- English	*1.0*	*1.0*	*1.0*			*1.0*
BBC / UK	3.8	1.7	2.9	2.4	0.02	0.7
NHK / Japan	2.8	1.7	3.3	4.8	0.04	1.4
ORTF / France	2.4	2.4	4.0	2.3	0.06	0.8

Notes:
1. Although "Hours of TV Production" are included, Personnel and Budget figures in all cases are for both radio and television.
2. "Effective" Budget figures compensate, approximately, for differences in currency purchasing power. See CRTC 1974a, pp 83-5.
3. Because the Budget figures are totals including distribution and transmission, area figures have been included as an indication of coverage requirements.
4. "Ratios" -- The CBC English Services Division figures have been taken as a base and have been set at 1.0. The ratios for other services are relative to that base.

Sources: Based on CBC 1974c, p 39 and CRTC 1974a, pp 83-5.

Canadian content from 42.2 hours per week in 1969/70 to 54.9 hours per week in 1973/74 was achieved on a resource base which, due to inflation, was effectively shrinking, and that the increases had been made possible primarily by holding program cost per hour increases below the prevailing inflation rate, by altering production practices so as to increase the hours of program output per production facility, and by simply adding to the existing workloads of available personnel.

US Programming

It is impossible to consider Canadian nationalism without reference to the United States. The process of defining and defending Canadian independence in relation to the power and prestige of its enormous neighbour runs as a constant theme throughout sections 6(c) and 6(d). The consequences of proximity emerge in section 6(b), throughout Chapter 7, and in section 10(b). At the beginning of the case study period, the Davey Committee observed:

> A nation is a collection of people who share common images of themselves. Our love of the land and our instinctive yearning for community implant that image in the first place. But it is the media -- together with education and the arts -- that can make it grow....
>
> We all know the obstacles involved in this task. Geography, language, and perhaps a failure of confidence and imagination have made us into a cultural as well as economic satellite of the United States. And nowhere is this trend more pronounced than in the media....
>
> We are not suggesting that these influences are undesirable, nor that they can or should be restricted....
>
> What we are suggesting is that the Canadian media -- especially broadcasting -- have an interest in and an obligation to promote our apartness from the American reality. For all our similarities, for all our sharing, we are somebody else. (Davey 1974a, p 11)

Also in 1970, the Association of Canadian Television and Radio Artists (ACTRA) filed a brief with the CRTC entitled "Crazed By Dreams: Ours / Theirs." On the cover, respectively above "Ours" and "Theirs" were large coloured reproductions of the flags of Canada and the United States. Four years later Canadian feelings of being "someone else" were at least as strong as in 1970, and ACTRA reappeared before the Commission, with a submission which argued as follows:

> After all, we are not really interested in paying two hundred and fifty (or sixty or seventy) million dollars a year merely to perpetuate what are essentially American patterns of broadcasting. This is, surely, the theme that underlies most of the criticism of the CBC in recent years, whatever its source and however it is expressed.... (ACTRA, p 16)
>
> We would propose that the Commission now limit the amount of foreign programming on the Corporation to fifteen percent, and that in addition, it be specified that in the prime time hours, 7:30 to 10:30 p.m., the CBC carry no foreign programs at all, except in exceptional circumstances. (p 18)

The CRTC decision dealt with US programming on English Television at length (eg- CRTC 1974b, pp 19, 27) and proposed a licence condition:

> The Commission has explained earlier that, in its view, the CBC has, over the years, been too much influenced by marketing constraints and mass strategies.
>
> There is every indication that this has denied Canadian programming prominence

> in peak hour scheduling on the English network. Further Canadian content increases, while important, will not be sufficient if such material is rarely scheduled when the majority of Canadians are watching television, that is between the hours of 8:00 and 9:00 p.m.... (CRTC 1974b, p 26)
>
> The Commission proposes to attach a condition to the CBC's television licences requiring that 50% of the programs broadcast between the hours of 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. during the fall and winter program period be Canadian in content.... (p 34)

In much the same way that consideration of Canadian content levels raised associated questions of resources and efficiency, consideration of US programming on CBC television also raises an interrelated set of issues. Included in these associated issues are two additional major areas of disagreement between the CBC and the CRTC: audience orientation, and policy on commercial activity.

As for US programming itself, there were four main concerns: the volume of imported programming, its nature, its scheduling, and its role as a broadcasting model.

A public opinion survey conducted independently for the CBC during November 1972 and April 1973 included the question, "Does CBC-TV have too much / too little programming from other countries?" With regard to US programming on English Television, 50% of those surveyed felt the proportion was right, 24% wanted fewer US programs, 20% more, and 6% did not respond to the question (CRTC 1974a, pp 37-8, 45-6).

Despite the ACTRA suggestion to increase Canadian content to 85%, the volume of US programming was not a major issue. At the hearing the CBC indicated that it was an objective, secondary to program quality improvement, to increase Canadian content to 75% for nine months of the year -- provided adequate resources were made available for both production and distribution (CRTC 1974a, p 20). There seemed to be relatively little pressure on the Corporation for such a commitment, although the CRTC "welcomed" this undertaking (CRTC 1974b, p 32).

The types of programming imported from the US were the source of greater concern. In the Winter 1973/74 block schedule (Figures 7-8 and 7-9, pages 80 and 81), almost half the programming (47.5%) was "information," and 78.6% of that was Canadian. US imports classified as "information" programs accounted for 15.9% of the information total; they were SESAME STREET, THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, and BUGS BUNNY -- all daytime children's programs. In the case of SESAME STREET, Canadian inserts averaging seven minutes per program replaced material more directly aimed at US young people. There was no US information programming in prime time, and the importation of the children's programming was not seriously criticized.

A smaller proportion (63.8%) of the "entertainment" programs was Canadian, and US programs accounted for 33.8% of the entertainment total. What was of concern to the CBC's critics, including the CRTC, was the concentration of US entertainment programming in prime time. Two thirds of the prime time (6 pm to midnight for CRTC reporting purposes) network programming was entertainment; of this, 42.5% was US. Between 8 and 11 pm, programming was 29% information, 43% Canadian entertainment, and 29% US entertainment; between 8 and 10 pm -- 4% information, 54% Canadian entertainment, and 43% US entertainment; the CRTC comments on the 8 to 9 pm period were noted above.

During the 1970-1974 period, the volume of US entertainment programming had, in fact, been reduced significantly. Five hours of US programming a week had been removed from the daytime schedule: the soap operas had been replaced with Canadian variety programs. In prime time, the network had removed 4 hours a week of US programming and had added 2.5 hours of Canadian entertainment and 2 hours of information programming. But the remaining 8.5 hours of US entertainment programming drew a great deal of attention from intervenors and, as noted above, from the CRTC.

One concern with imported programming in prime time was that its presence interfered with the development of Canadian entertainment programming production activity. With refreshing candor, the ACTRA submission declared its self interest at the outset: "Put in the bluntest terms, the pool of talent that ACTRA represents probably wouldn't exist without the CBC" (ACTRA, p 1). ACTRA's expressed concern about the importation of entertainment programming seemed more pro-Canadian than anti-American:

> [T]he CBC has recognized the great force entertainment programming has, in television in particular, because it has always been confident enough of the drawing power of such programs to load the main commercial burden on their backs. At the same time, while recognizing the popularity, and consequent effectiveness, of this kind of programming, it has effectively denied us a truly Canadian content in this area. In drama and in the area we think of generally as narrative programming, which in most broadcasting systems takes up a major portion of the prime broadcast day, lies a powerful method for a culture to explore its deepest concerns, some of which are hardly articulated in other ways, to celebrate itself, to examine its soul. The fact that much of this is done on an apparently frivolous level, in situation comedies for example, should not obscure the value and power of such programming.... Why is there no English Canadian programming that taps such resources? (ACTRA, pp 13-4)

Shortcomings in the Canadian entertainment programming area had been recognized by the CBC. A major revitalization of the Drama department had been undertaken and attention had been directed to the needs of the Variety department. Appearing before the Commission, the CBC was candid about shortcomings in its light entertainment programming. Picard observed: "Light variety and entertainment is a weak part of the English network, and they will have to concentrate on that" (CRTC 1974a, p 103).

The major concern with US programming in prime time, however, was its effect on the "Canadian character" of English Television service. The CRTC reported on the interventions:

> Approximately 15% of the briefs expressed the wish for cultural independence and a reflection of Canadian life, set against the increasing flood of American programming. The public television network was not considered a strong or viable alternative to the American influence; one brief accused the CBC of being an "American pipeline" in style and product. (CRTC 1974b, part 2, p 140)

Reference back to Figures 7-8 and 7-9(c), pages 80 and 81, will show that, except for THE WORLD OF DISNEY, all US programming in prime time (6 pm to midnight) in the Winter 1973/74 block schedule was actually slotted between 7:30 and 9:30 pm. The US programs were: THE WALTONS, THE NEW DICK VAN DYKE SHOW, LOTSA LUCK, THE PARTRIDGE FAMILY, CANNON, THE MARY TYLER MOORE SHOW, POLICE STORY, MAUDE, THE CAROL BURNETT SHOW, ALL IN THE FAMILY, and MASH.

Concern with the volume and scheduling of this US programming stemmed from much more than simplistic Canadian content objectives. As noted earlier, the CBC's audience orientation and its commercial policies and practices were also involved. Excerpts from the four page "General Program Statement" in the English Television submission to the CRTC described the network's approach to schedule construction and some of the reasoning behind that approach:

> The network program schedule is structured to correspond to the viewing habits of English-speaking North Americans. Its heart is in prime time -- in the three to four hour tract between the supper-hour news and information programming and the 11:00 pm national news. Each night's programs are arranged in a sequence designed to attract and hold an audience -- by amusing it in the early evening and by leading it on to more intellectually demanding fare as the evening advances and the "family" audience evolves into an "adult" audience....
>
> A similar pattern is maintained by the four commercial networks with which the CBC competes, but not by the educational network in the United States. Experiments in changing the traditional pattern have not proved encouraging, and any move

> earlier for the national news would place it in competition with the commercial network programs which many viewers would have started watching earlier and would not wish to leave....
>
> The nine-and-a-half weekly hours of imported programs in prime time are important in attracting audiences (and therefore in maintaining competitive effectiveness) as well as in contributing to the balance of the service. This mass audience programming, used as a lead-in, attracts many viewers to more specialized programs and generates much of the commercial revenue which is required to support the affiliated stations and CBC program production. (CBC 1973b, p 2)
>
> The schedule must contain popular imported programs, information programs, and programs of specialized appeal in a way that will maximize the audiences for each. Programs of specializd appeal must not be banished to programming "ghettos", nor can they be placed in time periods where they would interrupt audience build-up, or where they would be exposed to excessively destructive competition. Conversely, the need at times to provide viewers with real programming alternatives means that some specialized programs (on Wednesday nights in the current schedule, for instance) must face very strong competition. (p 3)
>
> The revenue targets that the schedule must realize are not merely an element in Corporate finance. They reflect a fundamental facet of the relationship between the network and its private commercial affiliates. (p 5)

The CBC's level of funding is taken up in more detail later in this chapter. The CBC's Corporate Statement to the CRTC concluded a section on financing with this observation: "The plain fact is that the national broadcasting service is under-financed -- and this at a time when there is a greater public need for it than at almost any other time in its history" (CBC 1973c, p 19). On the opening day of the hearing, Commission Chairman Juneau himself remarked, "Well, I have some figures on CBC finances which we may come back to during the week. I think it is about time that the myth that the CBC is over-financed should be exploded" (CRTC 1974a, p 271).

The CBC's demand/resource imbalance worked to amplify the importance of the approximately 20% of total revenue which was received from commercial operations. The nature of the CBC's ongoing operations and financial commitments was such that a large proportion of the Corporation's total expense was fixed. Distribution, transmission, and staff personnel costs were extremely inelastic; the most elastic parts of the CBC budget were program costs -- program procurement costs and direct production costs. Given the general inadequacy of the funds available for programs, it was important for the Corporation to realize the commercial revenue targets built into the budgets worked out with the Treasury Board. Any significant shortfall in commercial revenue would have had to have been borne primarily by program budgets.

In the 1973/74 fiscal year, gross advertising revenue for the English and French television services totalled $56,916,000. "Net advertising revenue," after payments to affiliates, agencies, and networks amounted to $44,650,000. Selling expenses of $5,540,000 for radio and television combined would appear to reduce the clear television revenue to the $40 million range. Although revenue figures for individual networks were not published by the Corporation, in the three previous years English Television had contributed approximately 60% of the television total -- so that its contribution to gross revenue in 1973/74 can be estimated to have been approximately $35 million, and the net contribution roughly $25 million.

Thus, in addition to providing the national television broadcasting service in the English language, English Television managed a commercial enterprise which was unquestionably "big business." The television revenue targets in the CBC budgets worked out with government have required the Corporation to earn about 25% of all television advertising revenue in Canada. And, given its financial shortages, the CBC had a natural incentive in its commercial activities -- the long range protection of its program budgets.

The ESD TV organizational arrangements for joint control of creative and financial matters were outlined in section 9(d), pages 108-111. In addition to the organizational separation between programming and sales functions, a complex set of sales policies and practices had been established for the purpose of preventing undue influence of commercial considerations on program decision making. Nevertheless, "undue influence" was one of the most frequent charges made by those who opposed the CBC position that it should continue commercial television operations. There are two aspects to this concern with the consequences of engaging in marketing activities. One was that there may have been a subtle but pervasive influence on daily decision making. The aspect which attracted the most public attention, however, was that commercial considerations entered into network block program schedule construction.

The English Television strategy for earning its share of the CBC's revenue, while at the same time maintaining its level of public service programming and increasing Canadian content to 70%, was to rely heavily on the commer[illegible]ttractiveness of popular US programming scheduled in the 7:30 to 9:30 pm period. I[illegible]ng, it was able to operate its service in noncommercial mode 40% of the time.

Historically, English Television had not been able to produce many Canadian entertainment programs to attract audiences as large as those that tuned in US programs on the network. In January 1974, 12 of the 16 regular programs attracting the largest English Television network audiences were US imports (BBM 1974b, p 30). Although several factors contributed to this situation, costs were significant. English Television network program production costs in 1973/74, given in Figure 7-11, averaged $15,600 per hour. At the beginning of the Winter 1973/74 quarter, VARIETY estimated US network series production costs at $190,000 to $210,000 per hour. This US programming, though expensive to produce, was available to the CBC at a small fraction of its original production cost. US program procurement thus not only provided popular programming but also freed English Television from the production of large volumes of expensive programming.

In addition, by packaging attractive advertising availabilities in the popular imported programs together with availabilities in less popular but more abundant Canadian programs, ESD TV was really using the 9.5 hours of US programming in the 1973/74 schedule to bolster the commercial performance of the overall network schedule.

Direct revenue considerations were not the only factors in the scheduling of popular US programs in prime time. THE WORLD OF DISNEY, for instance, was considered by the CBC to be an excellent program in its own right. Similarly, English Television considered THE WALTONS to be a program of high quality. These same programs might well have been included if the same management group had been constructing a totally noncommercial schedule. And, quite apart from their individual value, these two programs fit into a traditional North American scheduling and viewing pattern of providing programs of interest to families in the early parts of Sunday evening.

DISNEY and THE WALTONS also raise another factor which influenced the pattern of program scheduling -- the "lead-in" or "locomotive" effect. As will be explained later, the lead-in effect seems to be part fact and part myth. Despite the lack of good, available research on the subject, it is clear that -- at least to some extent in at least some instances -- an individual is more likely to become a viewer of a particular program if he was a viewer of the immediately preceding program on the same channel. Expressed differently, there is a tendency for audiences to "stay with" (or be "dragged along" by) a sequence of programs on one channel -- particularly, it would seem, if those programs are similar in nature or content or if they appeal to similar types of people. There is also some suggestion that viewers will "stay with" a program actually in anticipation of a popular program to follow. One time period in the Winter 1973/74 schedule in which the lead-in effect seemed to be operating was 6 pm through 8:30 pm Sunday. The programs scheduled in this period -- THE WORLD OF DISNEY (6-7 pm), THE BEACHCOMBERS (7-7:30 pm), and THE WALTONS (7:30-8:30 pm) -- attracted respectively the largest, fifth largest, and sixth largest audiences of all regular English Television programs in the January BBM network survey. Conventional wisdom held that this scheduling pattern, which grouped together three programs of interest to family audiences, was a significant factor in explaining the sizes of audiences for those programs. There was also the suggestion, not necessarily accepted by those within the CBC associated with THE BEACHCOMBERS, that DISNEY and THE WALTONS were responsible for exposing an unusually large number of potential viewers to the CBC production and, consequently, for contributing to that Canadian program's popularity.

Although it is possible that the importance of the lead-in effect was -- at least in some instances -- overestimated, as noted in the excerpts from the "General Program Statement" in the submission, a conscious element in the network's scheduling strategy was the placement of the 9.5 hours of popular US programming so that, through the lead-in effect, it would contribute to the viewership of Canadian programs in later time periods.

Finally, the scheduling of the popular US programming raised yet another major issue between the CRTC and the CBC -- the audience orientation of English Television or, in the Commission's words, its "preoccupation with mass audience concepts." In the decision, the CRTC expressed part of its concern about audience orientation as follows:

> Over the years, the CBC, and in particular the English- language television network, has been drawn by the constraints of the marketing environment into a mode of operation increasingly based on mass appeal. (CRTC 1974b, p 10)
>
> The Commission agrees with the CBC that the national broadcasting service should endeavour to remain a popular service and that it should guard itself against becoming a preserve of esoteric minorities. However, the Commission is of the opinion that a preoccupation with mass audience concepts, stimulated by the contemporary North American marketing environment is inappropriate for a publicly supported broadcasting service. (p 18)

There was concern that the popular US programming was serving as an inappropriate mass audience model for Canadian programming. At the hearing, A.K. Marshall, Vice President of the Canadian Broadcasting League, and CRTC Vice Chairman Boyle discussed this matter, eventually with reference to the CBC's own popular action drama series, THE COLLABORATORS:

> MR. MARSHALL: .... It seems to me that in the selection of foreign programs for the CBC it is a serious failure in the assessing of the cultural situation of Canadians to provide us with POLICE STORY and such similar programs.... [I]t is not the amount of foreign programming ... that bothers me about what I see on CBC, it is the amount of American programming which has limited cultural relevance to our situation. Now particularly in regard to POLICE STORY -- which is a program which offends me very deeply because its values are alien to those we have, and I think that it essentially does not reflect what happens in Canadian cities, even our biggest border cities -- I think that in the selection of foreign programming just alone we could make it easier to set an atmosphere in which better Canadian programming could be created, and I would suggest that we get rid of some of the American programs that don't really reflect, or tell us anything useful about living in Canada. (CRTC 1974a, pp 359-60)
>
> MR. BOYLE: [O]ne of the difficulties it seems to me is that there is a constant North American preoccupation in seeking material to fit already proven forms, and this is really what Mr. Marshall is talking about with POLICE [STORY], this is a proven form. If you put enough violence and you put a few cops in it, you make a situation and get enough chases and blood and bang bangs, you've got a real going thing....
>
> MR. MARSHALL: If we dont't need POLICE STORY, I wonder too if we need THE COLLABORATORS, as a spin-off as you speak of. I would like to see room in the CBC in terms of structure and spacing in relation to commercials, and in relation to the way in which they think, in structuring blocks of time so that it wouldn't make them want to put those formulas in, that we could adopt new spaces, new thinkings. (pp 362-3)

In moving to regulate network scheduling in the 8 to 9 pm period, the CRTC was attempting to deal with several of its concerns simultaneously. It was seeking greater prominence for Canadian programs and reductions in the influences of US culture, commercial considerations, and "mass audience" concepts.

In focusing on the 8 to 9 pm period, the Commission selected the period in which English Television had chosen to schedule 71% of its prime time US programming; the US content in the 8 to 9:30 pm period was 57%. Reaching the 50% Canadian content level between 8 and 9 pm by the 1976/77 season was probably not impossible for English Television, although the impact of the CBC's obligations as host broadcasting organization for the international conference on the environment in Vancouver and the Summer Olympics in Montreal, both in mid 1976, complicated the picture considerably. As early as June 1973 it had been planned to increase the Canadian content in that period from 29% to 36% in the 1974/75 season; reaching 50% required only the substitution of one hour of Canadian for US programming. Nevertheless, the CBC reacted sharply to the 8 to 9 pm licence condition -- not so much because of the requirement itself as because of the program control implications it perceived for the future.

Licence Conditions and Independence

More than the two television licence conditions relating to advertising, the prime time Canadian program scheduling condition raised questions as to what types of licence conditions the CRTC could legally and sensibly impose on CBC licences. From a legal standpoint, the Commission's powers were sweeping. The Broadcasting Act empowered the CRTC to make regulations respecting "standards of programs and the allocation of broadcast time," "the character of advertising and the amount of time that may be devoted to advertising," and "such other matters as it deems necessary for the furtherance of its objects" (Act, ss 16.b.i, ii, ix). With respect to licences, the Act empowered the CRTC to issue broadcasting licences and renewals "subject to such conditions related to the circumstances of the licensee" as, in the case of the Corporation, the Commission "deems consistent with the provision, through the Corporation, of the national broadcasting service contemplated in section 3 [of the Act]" (Act, ss 17la, c).

From a practical standpoint, although the Act placed no prohibitions on the types of conditions the CRTC might attach to CBC licences and it provided no guidance as to whether it would be appropriate to attach to CBC licences the various conditions suggested by intervenors. Included in these suggestions were "requirements" that specific programs be telecast: a bilingual daily national news program, a regular bilingual variety program, a weekly program of one hour's duration dealing with French-speaking Canada (Berton, pp 11-2), and "a weekly programme of two hours, at a good time, devoted to showing Canadian films -- features and shorts, traditional and experimental, English and French" (COT 1974, pp 130-1). Other suggested conditions, dealing with management and organization, would have made mandatory the use of bilingual news correspondents (Berton, p 11), reorganization of the CBC into two parts -- a "Service Establishment" and a "Programme Corporation" (COT 1974, p 137), publication of a plan for expanded regional production giving specific air time and budget commitments (p 129), and the establishment of a multicultural and multilingual section within the Corporation (CPC, p 24).

Taken to its extreme, attachment of conditions to CBC licences dealing with operational matters could clearly constitute dysfunctional interference in the management of the Corporation. The critical question was where does one draw the line? Should the CRTC have been able to "require" (rather than "recommend") that the CBC to telecast "on each network, not less than 12 times per year, the first television showing of a Canadian feature film" (CRTC 1974b, p 33)? Should it have been able to require creation of "a special fund within the budget of the Corporation to finance special programs or series of programs, and to fund exchanges of staff and program participants designed to help reflect English-speaking Canada to French-speaking Canada and vice versa" (p 32)? Should it have been able to require that "to provide adequate television throughout the province of New Brunswick" the CBC "acquire and operate the facilities of CHSJ-TV in Saint John and its rebroadcasting stations" (p 69)? Would a specific number of hours of programing in "new formats for more regular and attractive programming of events and developments in the fields of Canadian literature, art, film and theatre" (p 33) have been an appropriate renewal requirement?

The Broadcasting Act provides no practical guidance here. What it did do, in establishing consultation and referral mechanisms (Act, ss 17.2, 17.3), was recognize that the Commission and the Corporation might differ on what were appropriate licence conditions and provide for the ad hoc resolution of these differences by federal Cabinet ministers.

The possibility of inappropriate licence conditions weakening the CBC was raised in the Canadian Broadcasting League's submission to the CRTC (CBL 1974, p 1). The League recommended renewal of the CBC licences "for a maximum period and without the imposition of limiting or hampering restrictions upon the autonomous operation of the Corporation by the Corporation's publicly appointed Board of Directors" (p 9). This recommendation was taken up at length at the hearing:

> THE CHAIRMAN: .... [I]t seems fundamental in the whole brief of the League ... that we should be, I mean we as a country and we in the Commission ... careful about not heaping too much criticism upon the CBC when there are so many important factors that are outside the CBC's power.... Because of that you seem to end up with a conclusion that there should be no conditions imposed.... (CRTC 1974a, pp 375-6)
>
> MR. BILLOWES: .... I think, Mr. Chairman, the implication here is more concerned with our fear that the CBC has already been drawn too close to parliament, to parliamentary control through financing, and we do not want to see it drawn any closer; we want to see it more autonomous if anything. (pp 378-9)

The CBC position on the decision's 8 to 9 pm scheduling condition was that it represented unacceptable interference in the Corporation's management of its program service, comprising the CBC's autonomy and setting a dangerous precedent. As explained in section 3(f), pages 35-39, maintaining "balance" in a network program service schedule and optimizing the level of service to the public as a whole is a complex task. It was the position of English Television that the determination of the program "mix" was not a process in which the CRTC could participate in a scattergun fashion.

Press reaction to the conditions, sampled in section 10(f), was mixed but tended to favour the CBC's position. THE CALGARY HERALD, for instance, editorialized as follows:

> It is not surprising that the CBC has asked the Canadian Radio-Television Commission to discuss the conditions recently set for renewal of the CBC's broadcasting licences.... In the final analysis, would it be the CRTC or the CBC which would establish the production norms to be followed? The conditions applied to the licence renewal suggest that the CRTC would inevitably emerge as some kind of cultural czar. (Herald)

Ian MacDonald put the matter more bluntly: "And so, it's a question of the CBC's priorities, and who sets them. Which further boils down to the question, who runs the CBC?" (MacDonald 1974d)

In the end, the CRTC's proposed 8 to 9 pm scheduling condition was withdrawn, but the joint statement by the Minister of Communications and the Secretary of State (Gazette 1975) did not deal with the reasoning behind this move. Whether withdrawal was because of arguments made against the condition itself or because of the general implications for CBC autonomy was not publicly disclosed. Whether or where the Cabinet Ministers might have drawn a line between matters for CRTC regulation and the autonomous business of the Corporation is unfortunately not known.

The Canadian Film Industry

Because this is an overview study, some areas of concern receive much less than the possible amount of attention here. The relationship between English Television and the Canadian film industry is one such area. But the 1974 discussion about that relationship is notable as an example of a particular type of demand made of the CBC -- a demand related in part to the CBC's mandate, in part to a policy of the Government not reflected in the Broadcasting Act, and in part to expectations of CBC contributions to the resurgence of cultural nationalism. One aspect of the surge of nationalism in Canada was special concern for the development of a Canadian feature film production and distribution system. In her introduction to A HANDBOOK OF CANADIAN FILM (1973), Eleanor Beattie noted the role of the Government, production developments, and outstanding distribution problems:

> With the founding of the Canadian Film Development Corporation in 1967, Canada made a serious commitment to feature film production: this organization was allotted ten million dollars of public money "to foster and promote the development of a feature film industry". As a result, Canada has seen a break-through in the area of production; more than 80 feature films have been made with the assistance of the CFDC within the last five years. Many have received international recognition. However, there has been no corresponding breakthrough in the area of distribution-exhibition of these films.... (Beattie, pp 15-7)
>
> The result is that only a small percentage of the films produced in this country ever reach a Canadian audience. When they do, they are generally exhibited without proper promotion, in independent theatres in major centres only. Without access to the exhibition network, films produced by the Canadian industry are costing us many millions of dollars with very little cultural or economic return. This is a fraud. (pp 17-9)

There were several arguments -- some cultural, some pragmatic -- to support demands that English Television make extensive use of independently produced Canadian films. One was that independent producers have different perspectives on the nature of the country, and that their insights -- perhaps unique -- could contribute to the diversity of the CBC's expression of Canada. The importance of this diversity of perspective argument is greater in the case of broadcasting organizations which produce high proportions of their programming internally and have large staff production establishments -- and the CBC was such an organization.

Another argument was that it was in the Corporation's own interest to have a developed film industry as a production resource, but it was the CBC's position that cost considerations and differences between film and electronic production techniques weakened the force of this particular argument.

The development of the French language feature film industry in Canada -- or, perhaps more appropriately, the Quebec film industry -- had been much more rapid and extensive and, in the opinion of many, more culturally significant than was the case with the English language industry. Given English Television's problems in portraying French Canada (taken up later in this section), it was possible that the use of French Canadian films and filmmakers could present English Canada with fresh insights into the social and cultural condition of French Canada.

One set of the arguments heard in 1974 revolved around the contention that the CBC, as a national cultural institution, had a responsibility to consciously help foster the federally supported development of a national film industry. One aspect of this was that English Television could play a role in making Canadians aware of this development -- both through direct use of Canadian films and through descriptive programming about Canadian films and filmmakers. A more directly financial aspect of these arguments was the contention that the CBC was in a good position to help stimulate the growth of the developing private industry.

Sorting out its role in relationship to the private Canadian film industry -- balancing its own interests as a broadcasting organization against its potential role as a national cultural patron -- had long been a problem for the CBC. In recent years the Government had taken the position that the CBC had a responsibility to the private film industry. On 4 July 1972 the Secretary of State, then Gerard Pelletier, announced the creation of an Advisory Committee on Film "consisting of representatives from the five federal cultural institutions (NFB, CBC, CFDC, Canada Council and Public Archives) and five representatives from the public sector." The announcement continued:

> The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation has agreed to increase its use of films made entirely in Canada, both NFB and private productions. It has also undertaken to co-operate with the NFB and independent companies to reach co-production and multilateral production agreements. The Advisory Committee on Film will be regulary informed of progress towards this end. (Pelletier, p 4)

In view of the above arguments and developments, by 1974 the CBC was being asked to explain why Canadian feature films were not regularly shown on English Television, particularly when the French network was making extensive and successful use of Canadian features. In reviewing the issues which had been raised during the first four days of the February licence renewal hearing, the CBC's Executive Vice President, Lister Sinclair, commented as follows:

> .... The first thing I would like to mention, and I will only say one sentence about it, and that is the problem of film on English television. Oh dear! I don't think I will say any more than that, because I don't want to be accused -- I don't want the Corporation to be accused -- of making promises, but oh dear! (CRTC 1974a, p 1342)

Later in the same session, Commissioner Rosalie Gower asked for clarification:

> MRS. GOWER: Mr. Sinclair, I feel a certain reluctance to let you get away with "Oh dear!" regarding Canadian films. I find it somewhat ambiguous.
>
> Is it "Oh dear, yes we will look at it," or "Oh dear, no it can't be helped"?
>
> MR. SINCLAIR: It's "Oh dear, yes we'll look at it; yes, we'll do something about it; yes, we'll do a great deal about it." It's "Oh dear as far as the eye can see in that direction."
>
> MRS. GOWER: Thank you, Mr. Sinclair, that's much more satisfactory. (CRTC 1974a, pp 1366-7)

The background behind all this was an incredible tangle of programming and resource considerations, entrenched positions, and personal differences. A high proportion of the French Canadian films produced in recent years was considered by English Television to be too sexually explicit for television use, and there were serious reservations about the quality and/or cost of many of the English language Canadian features. The total volume of available films during the case study period, though growing, was still not sufficient to maintain the ongoing weekly scheduling of Canadian features, even assuming all to be suitable for showing on a public television network. The basic problem was that feature films -- either Canadian or imported -- didn't fit into the network's regular scheduling pattern. As explained earlier in this section, that schedule was the English network's response to the combined influences of its public broadcasting responsibilities and its advertising revenue quota. Given the significant costs of rights acquisition, the daytime scheduling of Canadian features would not have been economical. Prime time scheduling of these films by displacement of the popular US programming would have disrupted the commercial strategy which relied so heavily on the imported hours and half hours. Displacement of prime time Canadian programming would have had serious consequences both for balance in the schedule and for efforts to develop Canadian television talent.

The network's response to the film industry had been to purchase what it considered to be the best Canadian features available and to schedule these by preemption of the regular prime time schedule. THE OFFERING, GOIN' DOWN THE ROAD, JOURNEY, MON ONCLE ANTOINE, and THE ROWDYMAN were seen in this way during the case study period. And a new Sunday afternoon program, CANADIAN FILMMAKERS, was introduced at the beginning of the Winter 1973/74 quarter.

Also involved in this situation were a host of other factors. The Secretary of State and the Advisory Committee on Film were dealing with Corporate officials from the Ottawa CBC Head Office; program schedules were being constructed by the Planning Group in Toronto. Some attempts were being made by the Planning Group to subsidize Canadian filmmakers through the purchase of "fillers" and short subjects -- but the procurement scales, though considered adequate by the Corporation, were considered to be much too low by the film producers. These filmmakers were principally in contact with the CBC's program procurement officers, not the Planning Group. Tension between the CBC and the film industry dated at least back to 1959, when the Association of Motion Picture Producers and Laboratories submitted a brief highly critical of the CBC to the Prime Minister. Section 39(g) of the Broadcasting Act was interpreted by CBC legal advisors to limit the Corporation's dollar involvement in feature film production to amounts not significantly in excess of the television rights value of the features. And the Broadcasting Act does not put the CBC in a legal position of responsibility with respect to fostering the development of the Canadian private film industry.

Nevertheless, the key factors in this complex situation seemed to be the programming, cost, and commercial considerations. Chances of cooperative endeavours to work out solutions acceptable both to the CBC and to the film industry were, however, greatly reduced by the nature of the exchanges between them. It seemed unlikely to the CBC that its dependence on the private Canadian film industry would ever be sufficient to satisfy the interests of that industry. In attempting to deal with what it considered to be inappropriate demands on its broadcasting resources, the CBC developed a very defensive position with respect to the film industry. Reaction against this stance ran throughout the interventions filed by representatives of the filmmakers, and it is not difficult to see -- given the atmosphere of frustration which had developed on both sides -- how it was that the CBC's use of Canadian feature films provoked so much comment at the hearing.

In the middle of all this, what tended to get overlooked was the fact that in many ways the relationship between Canadian filmmakers and the CBC had been a productive and mutually beneficial one. Perhaps better than dollar figures in illustrating this are the following excerpts from notes prepared early in 1974 by Sam Levene, Executive Producer of the TELESCOPE and GALLERY series, on some of the independent filmmakers who had contributed to those programs:

> The following freelance directors have worked for Telescope and Gallery since 1970: David Acomba, Robert Asgeirsson, Bob Barclay, Allen Bibby, Rene Bonniere, Alastair Brown, Carl Charlson, Doug Cowan, Tony Douglas, Johnny Foster, Richard Gilbert, Michael Hirsh, Patrick Loubert, Paul Lynch, Don Owen, Ene Riisna, Perry Rosemond, Michael Rothery, Don Shebib, Colin Smith, Al Stewart, Warner Troyer, Grahame Woods.
>
> That's a total of 23 people. An additional ten people have worked for us who are employed by CBC. These 33 individuals have created a total of 81 half hour colour films to date, with more still to come. Here are some notes on some of the above mentioned people:
>
> David Acomba directed for Telescope in 1970. In 1973 he was named Best Director by the Canadian Film Awards and his feature "Slipstream" was named Best Film.
>
> Robert Asgeirsson is a young, aspiring Vancouver director- cameraman who did his first complete film for network television for Gallery in 1973.

> Allen Bibby is also Vancouver-based. He specializes in adventure films. For Gallery he shot an entire film while clinging to the side of a 1600-foot rock-wall....
>
> Alastair Brown is an example of a young man who wandered in, completely untried and unknown, but with a very appealing program idea. He was allowed to direct it, under supervision, and the results were successful.
>
> Johnny Foster is one of the country's pioneer cinematographers. He returned to television by shooting for Telescope in 1971, and his 1973 film for Gallery, which he both directed and shot, won a craft award at the 1973 Canadian Film Awards and was a finalist for Best Film in its category. Subsequently, he has shot a one-hour documentary for TV Features....
>
> Paul Lynch, at the time unknown, directed two Telescopes, followed by one of the most successful Gallery's of last season. He has now completed his first feature film. His work for this unit plus a letter of recommendation from us helped him secure CFDC backing for this feature....
>
> Don Shebib, of course, is our most renowned feature filmmaker.... The first film he made after finishing at the UCLA film school was for Telescope in 1964. He worked for us after completing his second feature in 1972 and is currently directing a film for Gallery.

The CRTC decision, in line with the policy of the Government, charged the Corporation with consciously assisting the private industry:

> The Commission urges the CBC to play a strong role in the development of the Canadian feature film industry both by participation in the financing of films, and by their regular scheduling on the French and English television networks....
>
> It is further recommended that where the CBC has the opportunity to do so it seriously investigate the use of its considerable purchasing power of foreign made feature films as a lever to effect the distribution of Canadian features in other countries. (CRTC 1974b, p33)

It seemed surprising to the CBC, given the CRTC's participation on the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Film, that the Commission appeared unaware of the Corporation's position on participation in the financing of films, of its actual purchasing power in foreign markets (not significant), or of the fact that such international dealings as it did have were with film producers and distributors, not exhibitors.

The decision also dealt with the scheduling of feature films: "Specifically in this regard, the Commission strongly recommends that the CBC present on each network, not less than 12 times per year, the first television showing of a Canadian feature film" (CRTC 1974b, p33). The CBC regarded the "12 times per year" suggestion as a step towards a quota system which could inflate prices. In the period immediately preceding the hearing, in the midst of public discussion of use of films by the Corporation, Canadian feature prices had risen by approximately two thirds; following the release of the decision, the asking price for one major Canadian feature doubled.

For the Planning Group, the Canadian features problem was a nightmare. It turned out that not only had the network management group not been consulted about the CBC's dealings with the Government's Advisory Committee, but it had not been fully informed of the outcomes. It was, however, aware of intense pressure from the industry to contract out significantly higher proportions of its film work -- processing, editing, and production. And it was aware of the aspirations of the new wave of English language Canadian filmmakers.

But the Planning Group was working within two sets of constraints: the fact that there are only so many hours per week in a network television schedule, and the fact that as a result of the Corporation's undertaking to increase Canadian content it was being forced to produce more and more Canadian programming on an effectively shrinking resource base.

The group felt that it had procured and appropriately scheduled the best Canadian features. Given the content of many of the other available films and the public's standards of taste for CBC programs as reflected in letters, calls to CBC switchboards, and Question Period in Parliament, the group felt justified in taking the position that many of the available films were not suitable for prime time television showing. And it found itself bidding for television rights for the suitable features in competition with the CTV and Global networks. Relative to average in-house production costs, and particularly relative to foreign television program procurement, Canadian feature film programming was expensive programming quickly becoming more expensive.

But, beyond procurement, the group did not feel that it was in a position to act as patron to the film industry. Priorities had to be established to govern the distribution of the limited program funds, and financing the development of the Canadian feature film industry could not, in the Planning Group's view, be a priority. The group wondered whether this was not more appropriately the role of the Canadian Film Development Corporation, and it was frustrated that it could not make it be understood that it did not have the financial resources to underwrite the industry development costs that even the presentation of, say, 12 features a year would entail.

The decision, during the licence renewal hearing, to promise to increase considerably the programming of Canadian films was made at the Corporate level, adding yet another element to the mix of commitments, objectives, and priorities in contention for the air time and resources managed by the group.

Comments: Nationalism Issues

BACKGROUND: Given that "there is no country in the world where broadcasting is not expected to contribute to the unity of the nation," given the special Canadian problems of defining and defending its independence in relation to the United States of America, and given an early 1970s surge of Canadian cultural nationalism, it is not surprising that increasing attention was paid to role of the CBC in contributing to national unity. In the absence of other requirements or expectations, in the absence of the need to balance promoting Canadian cultural development and fostering national unity against other objectives and priorities, it clearly would have been possible for English Television to have devoted more efforts and resources to these nationalism aspects of the mandate. But there were other objectives and priorities and, in the final analysis, public discussion of specific issues was really about overall "balance" -- in program services and in resource allocation.

SHARED PROGRAM EXPERIENCES: The provision of shared program experiences to contribute to Canadian unity was virtually assured by the 60-70% Canadian content level and by English Television's traditional national public service programming role. It is conceivably possible that there could have been more special programs to create "collective Canadian experiences on a wide national scale." However, several factors tended to keep the volume of such programming relatively constant. Such shared viewing experiences were one set of elements in the overall "balanced" service: provision also had to be made for other types of Canadian programming. The schedule had to incorporate popular imported programming for commercial reasons related to the financial circumstances both of the CBC itself and of its affiliated private stations. The drive to higher levels of Canadian content cut into the financial resources, leading to the generation of relatively high volumes of inexpensive studio programming and leaving only limited funds for initiating shared experiences (as opposed to covering existing ones). Actuality coverage was more expensive than studio production, and the use of the available mobile units for traditional coverage, sports coverage, and colour production in unconverted studios severely limited the availability of such units for actuality programming.

CANADIAN CONTENT: Increasing the Canadian content of the English Television schedule virtually assured an increased contribution to the development of Canadian unity. But, again, it seems possible that the effective contribution could have been greater. Much of the additional Canadian content was produced on budgets and under circumstances not necessarily conducive to the creation of programming of imagination, distinction, and excellence.

US PROGRAMMING: The shared viewing experience and increased Canadian content contributions to national unity were largely overshadowed by the continuing (though somewhat diminished) prominence of popular US entertainment programming in peak viewing periods. In this respect, the need to meet commercial revenue quotas and inability to fund the production of replacement Canadian programming of high quality were major factors in perpetuating what had been termed the "over-Americanization" of the English Television prime time schedule.

THE CANADIAN FILM INDUSTRY: Given that a strong Canadian film industry would, on its own, contribute to national unity, it was at least possible to argue that the CBC had an obligation -- related to its own national unity obligations -- for fostering the development of that industry. A second argument was that the perceptions of individuals outside the CBC could add new perspectives to the Corporation's national unity contributions. A third argument was that the CBC simply had a responsibility to help the general development of the industry. That argument, however, seemed more connected with the cultural and economic nationalism of the early 1970s than with the Corporation's own mandate to program so as to contribute to national unity. All other considerations aside, it would have been possible for English Television to have telecast more Canadian films and for it to have commissioned more independent film production. But the "other considerations" were considered by English Television to be crucial. These included taste and quality considerations, scheduling impact on revenue earning position, and -- especially towards the end of the case study period -- costs.

Taking the background and these four issue areas into consideration in combimation we find:

- a resurgence in Canadian cultural nationalism leading to mandate requirements for a CBC service distinctively Canadian in content and character,
- expectations in some quarters of major CBC contributions to the further development of Canadian cultural nationalism,
- substantial agreement on the nature of the CBC's political and social roles in contributing to the development of national unity,
- significant increases in the absolute volume and the proportion of Canadian content in the English Television network service schedule, and a corresponding reduction in imported programming,
- the provision of viewing experiences shared at the national level, some conspicuous and some not, ensured to some extent by the CBC's public service traditions and the level of Canadian content,
- CBC traditions in public service programming, or a native understanding of its public service role, clearly seen in the provision and scheduling of special news programming,
- efficiency increases in the volume of Canadian production per resource unit,
- continuation of a pattern of scheduling a high proportion of the imported US entertainment programming in peak viewing periods, publicly justified in part by traditional "family viewing" scheduling approaches, in part by the "lead-in" effect scheduling approach, and in part by requirements to maintain CBC and affiliated station competitive commercial effectiveness, and -- in practice -- relieving English Television of requirements to produce Canadian programs of equivalent quality and appeal,
- the regulatory agency expressing considerable dissatisfaction with the extent of CBC contributions,

- public concern regarding US programming related more to its prominent scheduling than to its volume,
- some criticism that imported programming was being selected more on the basis of its potential mass appeal than on its relevance to the Canadian context,
- an emerging English language Canadian feature film production industry experiencing problems in arranging widespread theatrical distribution in Canada,
- a policy of the Government and CBC Corporate commitments calling for the increased utilization of Canadian feature films on English Television,
- a lack of coordination and communication regarding the use of Canadian feature films between those discussing and formulating policy in Ottawa and those scheduling and operating programming services in Toronto,
- existing opportunities for more actuality coverage, for more Canadian programming of excellence in peak viewing periods, and for greater reliance on Canadian produced feature films, and
- the national broadcasting service arguing that it was making significant contributions and that its operating constraints, primarily resource constraints, prevented it from following the courses of action advocated by others.
- the regulatory agency proposing a licence condition requiring 50% Canadian content between 8 and 9 pm (an increase of one hour per week qr 14% over the Winter 1973/74 level),
- a suggestion that the proposed condition would not have significantly transformed the overall character of the English Television prime time service,
- the national broadcasting service arguing that the proposed licence condition would constitute interference in the operational management of the CBC, and
- eventual withdrawal of the licence condition proposed.

b) REGIONALISM ISSUES

The term "regionalism" is used here to group together a set of issues which relate, in varying degrees, to the local and regional aspects of Canadian identity. Use of such an imprecise term as "regionalism" is somewhat dangerous: it can contribute to the misconception that each and every specific concern related to regional diversity is identical in origin and thrust. On the other hand, however, these distinct concerns have typically been considered under the umbrella term "regionalism," and the resulting confusion is one of the most important characteristics of attempts to deal with these various concerns. In REGIONALISM IN THE CANADIAN COMMUNITY Paul Fox commented on this potential confusion:

> The term "regionalism" is very vague and subject to many different interpretations. In Canada one can think readily of geographic regions, climatic regions, economic regions, political regions, resource regions, planning regions, and no doubt many more. We have all been long familiar with the traditional conceptualizations of Canada as a country divided into geographic, climatic, economic, and political regions. With the recent attention paid to the development of natural resources and to economic planning, we are now becoming familiar also with the concepts of resource regions and economic development regions. But this elaboration adds to the confusion in the use of the term. Obviously, there are many different kinds of "regions," and many different ways of classifying each kind. In fact, there may be as many definitions of "region" as there are persons defining it. (Fox, p 3)

For purposes of arriving at working definitions for this study, it is useful to review the most directly relevant sections of the CBC's mandate: "The national broadcasting service should ... be extended to all parts of Canada, as public funds become available, be in English and French, serving the special needs of geographic regions, and actively contributing to the flow and exchange of cultural and regional information and entertainment, and ... provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity" (Act, s 3.g).

It is also useful to return to Frye's comments about the distinction between unity and identity and the essential tension between them:

> Once the tension is given up, and the two elements of unity and identity are confused or assimilated to each other, we get the two endemic diseases of Canadian life. Assimilating identity to unity produces the empty gestures of cultural nationalism; assimilating unity to identity produces the kind of provincial isolation which is now called separatism. (Frye, p iii)

Background sections 6(c) and 6(d), tracing the history of the country and its public broadcasting system, provide not only indications of the origins of cultural nationalism but also running commentaries on the role of tension between regions in shaping the nation and the CBC. As Fox suggests, there are many types of regions. But the Broadcasting Act speaks specifically of "geographic" regions which, in the Canadian context, tend to correspond with political and -- to a lesser extent -- cultural regions. Much of what follows deals with regional tension as an aspect of the overall public television environment in Canada and of the English Television environment. One group of issues deals political/geographical region demands for equalization of services and of the distribution of CBC expenditures; the other group of issues deals with the more abstract requirement to contribute to the development of Canadian unity by promoting a more widespread understanding of regional identities, of diversity.

Consideration of these issues must take into account both the continuing regional tensions and specific policies of the Government for dealing with them. CANADA 1974 reported:

> In 1968 the federal government announced its intention of formulating a comprehensive cultural policy. Committed to the principle of cultural democratization, the new policy was to ensure the diffusion of culture to all segments of Canadian society. This would be achieved by a more equitable distribution of financial resources and by closer co-operation and co-ordination of activities among the federal cultural agencies and the three levels of government. (SC 1973d, p 56)
>
> In 1970, the government stated that its priorities for cultural development were the democratization and decentralization of culture. While democratization on the one hand would ensure access to the arts and encourage cultural expression at all levels of society, decentralization, on the other hand, would facilitate the diffusion of culture throughout the various regions of Canada. (p 57)

One federal agency affected by the policies of the Government was the National Film Board of Canada. CANADA 1974 reported:

> Production facilities are being decentralized from the operations headquarters in Montreal to bring film makers in closer association with the people of the various regions. The Vancouver production office has been expanded, one in Halifax opened in 1973, with offices in Winnipeg and Toronto to follow. (SC 1973d, p 102)

In 1974 extension of CBC television service "to all parts of Canada" remained incomplete even though the Corporation began television service in some major urban centres in 1952. This gave rise to tensions which not only were clearly regional in nature but also are of importance in understanding complaints that the CBC seemed insensitive to the needs of certain regions of the country. These extension of coverage problems are taken up later in this section. Attention here focuses first on "contributing to the flow and exchange of cultural and regional information and entertainment," and on "serving the special needs of geographic regions."

Regional Flow and Exchange

The intention of the Broadcasting Act is clear. The CBC should actively work to make Canadians aware (and appreciative, or at least understanding) of regional differences. Despite the fact that regional flow and exchange was discussed at least as much as any other issue at the hearing, as in the case of national unity there was no substantial disagreement on the nature of the CBC's role. At the hearing, the Executive Vice President spoke about that role:

> "The regions of Canada," I think, is the most important aspect of Canada. In case there is any doubt about what we feel about it, we know very well that the regions of Canada have no doubt whatsoever about their identity, their cultural identity, their spiritual identity....
>
> We don't think that our function is to help them find their identity.... Our job is to help them express that identity, not only to their own people, but above all to the rest of the country; and I would say that is the great priority these days... -- to permit the regions to express themselves clearly and loudly and eloquently, in emotional terms, to the rest of the country. (CRTC 1974a, pp 1350-1)

Both the English Television submission and the CRTC decision moved directly from affirmation of the role of the national broadcasting service to consideration of specific mechanisms -- some relevant to meaningful flow and exchange, some not. There are four main classes of mechanisms relating to:

- the content of network programs,
- regional exchange of non-network programs,
- management structures and processes, and
- decentralization of production.

Decentralization of Production

Decentralization of production was considered by the CBC to be of major importance: "To achieve this [regional flow and exchange], network programs must be produced in all major urban centres in Canada" (CBC 1973b, p 20). And English Television network production was, in fact, highly decentralized. Prior to the hearing, we selected a normal week (as free as possible of "specials") and analyzed its content on a minutes and seconds basis as explained in activity 10, section 8(d). One objective was to determine the actual regional production contribution to the network. We found for the period 15-21 January 1974 that:

- just over 35% of the CBC produced programming on the network (both reserved and available time) consisted of programs completely produced outside Toronto,
- a further 9% of the total consisted of regionally produced items and segments contained in programs assembled in Toronto, and
- taking into account foreign and independently produced items packaged into programs in Toronto, actual Toronto production acounted for 52% of the CBC network production total.

Those of us who analyzed production statistics for the 1970-1974 period and then examined the actual content of the January 1974 week quickly became aware that we could be drawn into an endless and complicated statistical game in which it was possible to prove virtually anything. The CRTC decision, for instance, reviewed a different program season (Fall 1973/74) when the regular schedule was disrupted by a major and abrupt reorganization of Current Affairs program services, and chose to set aside certain specific qualifications (the higher volumes of regional production during summer months, regional exchange of non-network programs, and items and segments produced in the regions (CRTC 1974b, pp 28-9)). This analysis led to the following conclusion:

> Despite these qualifications .... [i]t is not unfair to say that of all these regular, established regional network productions, only one [presumably THE BEACHCOMBERS] can be said to exploit the elements of the physical and social life and the particular characteristics of the region in which it is produced. (CRTC 1974b, p 29)

The distinction between decentraliztion of production (regional production for the network) and regional flow and exchange (including exploitation of the elements of the physical and social life of particular regions) is the most crucial and most frequently overlooked distinction to be made in considerations of regional flow and exchange. Failure to make this distinction leads to two equally serious misconceptions. One is that decentralization of production leads automatically to meaningful flow and exchange. The other misconception is that such regional flow takes place only through regional participation in network production.

Decentralization of production did help facilitate regional flow in several ways. It made possible regular series such as THE BEACHCOMBERS which did consciously exploit regional characteristics. It also led to the incorporation of aspects of regional culture and circumstance into the production of other series of a less deliberately regional nature. The Halifax variety series, SINGALONG JUBILEE and COUNTRYTIME, for instance, though described by the CRTC as "two country and western programs," were considered by others -- including the CBC -- to have a Maritime flavour.

Decentralization of network production also served a series of purposes over and above those relating directly to program content. It was a response to pressure on the Corporation to spread its production spending, both capital and operating, across the country. It facilitated the development and support of regionally based talent. (An indication of the importance attached by the CRTC to such regional talent development is that prior to the hearing, the Commission requested from the CBC a statement listing, by station, the talent amounts to be spent in 1973/74 for talent on local programming.) Decentralization of production also served practical purposes: it permitted efficient use of production facilities required for the provision of local and regional services through the distribution of the network production load as described earlier in section II(a).

The "problem" with decentralized production which concerned the Commission was the level of actual regional content in regional productions for the network. These programs were frequently described as looking "as though they were made in Toronto" (Marshall, p 26.1). Perhaps more accurately, there was a tendency for these programs to appear to have been produced in a blimp hovering over the geographic centre of the country, or of the continent. The real concern seemed more related to the absence of any regional aspects in some of these programs than to the presence of a Toronto "look" or Toronto influences.

There is a definite tendency for productions at any production centre to emulate what is considered to be the best programming of a similar sort elsewhere. Perhaps the most notable recent cases of this patterning are to be found in the sequence of half hour "social" dramas -- starting with ALL IN THE FAMILY -- which have been developed in the United States on the British model, TIL DEATH US DO PART. Less obvious, but nevertheless significant, especially in variety and other entertainment program areas, are patterns of production technique adoption. For instance, the use of direct access replay and slow motion video recorders has transformed the "look" of television sports programming wherever this equipment has been made available to producers and directors. To some extent the tendency for programs to look alike derives from the technical possibilities, limitations, and practicalities of the television medium itself. But it also derives from certain of the basic characteristics of both mass media and mass society reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. On the basis of his study of a British production unit, Philip Elliott concluded that television production tends to ensure cultural repetition and continuity and that a shift towards programming for emotional responses to familiar symbols is the result of a gradual progression towards media showing more and more mass characteristics in content and organization (Elliott, pp 143, 166).

Without becoming too deeply involved in the philosophy of mass society, it may be useful to note two aspects of the relationship between mass media characteristics and concern for regional flow and exchange. The first point is that there are a set of factors which tend to make programs, wherever produced, look alike. CBC television entertainment productions from Vancouver, for instance, inevitably drew on New York and Hollywood models. So did CBC productions from Toronto. To some extent this may have been part of what the CRTC termed "an exaggerated concern with the American way of doing things" (CRTC 1974b, p 27). To some extent, however, it would appear to have resulted from concerns both with the state of the medium's art and with the expectations of an audience exposed to high volumes of US production. And to some extent this similarity in programming would appear to have resulted from attempting to produce programs with budgets that permitted only certain production approaches and did not allow for any significant amount of experimentation.

The second point arising from the relationship between mass society and regional flow is that it may not have been appropriate for every CBC national network program to have had a heavy regional tone of one sort or another. This is not a position that was ever suggested during the fieldwork period, and it certainly does not arise from the CRTC decision or any of the interventions. Such a suggestion is a heresy if evaluated only against public comment about the CBC's role as a Canadian cultural institution. Even so, to the extent that a common national culture may supplement what is termed the Canadian cultural "mosaic," it does seem possible that, in the extreme, there could be an exaggerated concern with regional particularism at the expense of national experiences which could be shared comfortably by all. It is not the function of this study to assess such matters, but it does seem important to suggest that some regional programming may appropriately be lacking in specific regional content. There may well have been a valid role in the national television schedule for programs such as HYMN SING, IT'S A MUSICAL WORLD, and HOWIE MEEKER'S HOCKEY SCHOOL which were not predominantly regional in content. And this question, which is related to decentralization of production but not necessarily to regional flow and exchange, should be considered separately from whether life in Winnipeg or Vancouver or St. John's was adequately represented in the content and character of the overall network service.

Although decentralized production was generally considered to consist of regular series of complete programs originated at locations other than Toronto, a significant proportion of the output of the regional production centres consisted of "Toronto-coordinated" programming. One mechanism -- mentioned briefly in the English Television submission (CBC 1973b, p 21), but not taken into account in the CRTC decision -- was the production of individual programs in a given series by several centres on a rotational basis. This approach allowed centres whose other production commitments did not permit full series production to contribute to the network schedule. Some series were consciously designed to exploit this mechanism -- to provide a given series with a different regional perspective on a daily or weekly basis.

During the January 1974 sample week, MEETING PLACE originated from Montreal, YOUTH CONFRONTATION from Edmonton, MUSIC TO SEE from St. John's, and the three editions of DROP IN seen that week were produced in Ottawa, Edmonton, and St. John's. Network sports coverage included Commonwealth Games swimming trials from Vancouver, curling from Winnipeg, and hockey from Montreal.

During the summer seasons, the daily afternoon information program TAKE 30 was replaced by 30 FROM..., a series of programs from various regional centres consisting to a great extent of material originally produced for local telecast. In addition, occasional programs in series which most frequently originated from Toronto were produced by other centres. In the January 1974 sample week, for instance, COUNTRY CANADA was completely produced in Winnipeg.

Decentralized production of specials also contributed to regional flow. The sample week, though selected to be as free as possible of scheduled special programming, included A CRUDE COMPLAINT -- a special program on oil resources in Canada produced cooperatively by CBC Edmonton and CBC Vancouver.

Finally, decentralized production contributed items and segments to programs assembled in Toronto. In the sample week, "Toronto" productions contained over five hours of material produced elsewhere; regionally produced segments were incorporated into NEWS PROFILE, CANADIAN FILM MAKERS, ARTS '74, THE MARKETPLACE, OMBUDSMAN, SESAME STREET, TAKE 30, UP CANADA!, THIS LAND, THE NATIONAL, and VIEWPOINT.

At the end of the case study period English Television had undertaken production of a twice weekly half hour drama series specifically designed to contribute to regional understanding. HOUSE OF PRIDE had been designed as the story of a contemporary Canadian family which had spread out across the country. The complex production plan callled for for recruitment of writers in various regions so that local reflection would be genuine. It also called for coordinated production, within a common overall story line, in Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax -- in the areas where the elements of the family had settled (and where CBC facilities existed). The Program Proposal for the series noted:

> The main purpose is to entertain, but an important by-product is that the radical concept of the program will enable the audience to enter the lives of people in different parts of the country -- to see the fifferences and similarities of lifestyle, the good and the bad, the advantages and the disadvantages -- by means of a dramatic vehicle.

HOUSE OF PRIDE was clearly devised as a vehicle for carrying overtly regional themes through exploitation of the decentralized production system.

Decentralization of production can thus be seen as contributing and potentially contributing to regional flow and exchange, but subject to the qualification that not all such production was intended to make such a contribution. A case in point was the 9 part series of documentaries on the peoples and cultures of the South Pacific, IN THE SOUTH SEAS. Production was by CBC Vancouver, and although geographic proximity made Vancouver a logical choice as production centre, and although the undertaking served to decentralize documentary production activity and contribute to regional equalization of opportunity within the CBC, the series was clearly not intended to reflect Vancouver or British Columbia to the rest of the country. In that respect it contrasted sharply with the HOUSE OF PRIDE plan and illustrates the point that a clear distinction between decentralization of production and regional reflection is important.

Regional Program Exchange

In addition to decentralization of production, there were other mechanisms within the CBC to facilitate regional flow and exchange. The most readily visible of these was the regional exchange system through which CBC stations made their local programming available for use by other stations, usually on a delayed basis. (Regional exchange can be thought of as an internal CBC program syndication service.) Production costs for these programs were borne by the producing station, and they were supplied essentially free of charge to other CBC stations wishing to use them. During the case study period these programs were also offered to affiliated stations on the same basis as "available" network programs. The CBC and CRTC differed on the importance of these exchanges. The CRTC decision noted regional exchange as a "qualification" to its criticism of the CBC's expression of Canada (CRTC 1974b, p 29). The CBC English Television submission devoted three pages to the subject, and argued as follows:

> The result is to increase the extent to which regional production is exposed across the country, far beyond what is possible on the network itself, and in a flexible manner which reflects the needs of differing communities while at the same time assisting those stations which are resource-poor in meeting their Canadian content levels.

> During the 1972/73 fiscal year, some 49 programs and series produced at nine CBC owned stations were distributed to other stations for a total of 2,700 program exposures.... In addition, 87 episodes originally produced for community distribution were later telecast by the network. (CBC 1973b, p 27)

Some programs in regional exchange contributed very significantly to regional flow and exchange, others did not, and some indirectly contributed to regional tensions.

Additional exposure of programs such as KLAHANIE and PACIFIC NORTHWEST ADVENTURES from Vancouver, ST. LAWRENCE NORTH from Montreal, LAND AND SEA from Halifax, and ALL AROUND THE CIRCLE from St. John's clearly constituted regional exchange of information and entertainment. Other programs, such as TEE TO GREEN from Edmonton and CHILDREN OF THE WORLD from Montreal, made contributions to local services which were not so related to regional concerns. A few of the programs in regional exchange which were produced for CBLT, the English Television owned and operated station in Toronto, contributed to the perception of the network as being excessively Toronto oriented. Programs such as THE FIRST FIVE YEARS and NEW HORIZONS, produced on very limited local program budgets, dealt with the general problems of raising children and with matters of interest to senior citizens, but the focus in each case was almost exclusively on Toronto people and conditions. Each program in one CBLT series, A SECOND CAREER, contained a 60 second segment of Toronto addresses and telephone numbers of interest to local women considering rejoining the workforce. The series was later carried on other CBC stations, but letters from viewers indicated that in at least some cases the local information for Toronto was not replaced, as the series producer had intended, with more appropriate local information by each of the other stations. Cost was no doubt one factor here: CBC local station program budgets were small at the beginning of the study period and, as shown in Figure 7-12 on page 82, they effectively decreased over the study period. The cost of "localizing" these programs at the regional centres was apparently considered to be greater than the benefit to service. Standing management instructions to local stations were that supper hour news and current affairs programming should be the first priority in local operations. Both procurement of inexpensive imported "strip" programs and use of free regional exchange programs were means for local managements to devote high proportions of available resources to their first priority and still fill all local program periods.

Network Program Content

Another mechanism for facilitating regional flow and exchange was local talent development programming for network telecast. Talent development programs for network telecast were a regular part of each Summer schedule. In Summer 1974 there were 11 development series on the network -- from Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg (2 series), Toronto (2), Montreal (2), Halifax (2), and St. John's. These tended to be viewed as on-air pilots for regular season network series. In the Winter 1973/74 schedule, the Vancouver series IT'S A MUSICAL WORLD was a new regular season program which had been developed in this way.

Examinations of English Television's contributions to regional flow and exchange typically stopped after consideration of decentralization of production, regional exchange, and regional production included in centrally produced network programs. Such examinations failed to recognize, no doubt unintentionally, that Toronto productions also contributed to regional flow and exchange.

Although any assessment of the meaningful contribution to regional understanding can be buttressed with statistical measures of various sorts, in the final analysis any overall assessment cannot be totally objective. It was noted above, for instance, that the various regionally produced network programs had varying degrees of regional content and character. No statistical regional character weighting factors can be applied to the production volume figures: the contributions made by these programs must be assessed subjectively.

Assessment of the contribution of Toronto produced programs must also, in the end, be subjective. Toronto participation in the coordinating of rotating regional series and the packaging of regionally produced material into Toronto programs have already been noted. But regional concerns were also incorporated into programming produced by Toronto based program units. THE NATIONAL DREAM, IMAGES OF CANADA, and THIS LAND, for instance, were Toronto productions -- programs produced by the network in and about various regions of the country.

My own impression, after analyzing production centre and program content figures, and after reading the program content logs for the sample weeks, was that perhaps the greatest contributions to regional understanding were being made by the Toronto produced programs -- specifically those magazine format series which brought together into single programs items from or about various regions. In January sample week, OMBUDSMAN was split between stories in Halifax and Winnipeg, half of MARKETPLACE was devoted to a Quebec story, two thirds of UP CANADA! came from Vancouver, all of TAKE 30's evening edition was devoted to Newfoundland and Labrador, and about 70% of the content of the daytime editions of TAKE 30 was regional. It can be argued that the natural occurrence of this regional material in programs with a national perspective was at least as effective a means of helping the regions of Canada understand their similarities and differences as the creation of special vehicles to carry overtly regional themes.

Throughout the case study period, at least most of the Toronto producers were acutely aware of the regional demands for non-Toronto material. Programs such as THE MARKETPLACE, for example, consistently sought non-Toronto locations for those stories which could be documented in any part of the country. To the extent that demand for such non-Toronto programming exceeded the human or production resources of the regional centres, these network programs engaged the services of regionally based freelance producers, directors, researchers, interviewers, cameramen, and technicians. Towards the end of the case study period, it became increasingly common for News and Current Affairs programs to include a "regional roundup" -- a series of reports on the same subject from each region in a west to east or east to west sequence.

The network's problems in establishing a generally acceptable regional balance can be seen at the micro level in its network news programming. The COT intervention was far from alone in charging English Television with ignoring the Maritimes, the West, and the North:

> THE NATIONAL, for example, still fails to live up to its name.... The programme tends to emphasize the news and attitudes of central Canada. Ontario stories such as labour disputes, an investigation of Ontario Hydro, and probes into some highway and hospital deaths, appear on THE NATIONAL in disproportionate numbers. (COT 1974, p 42)

Figure 11-2 reports the results of content analyzing English Television's national newscast for the two sample weeks mentioned earlier. Comparable population figures are also provided, and it is interesting to note that -- relative to population -- Ontario and Quebec regional coverage was proportionately the lowest.

Over and above volume, the content of program items dealing with regional matters was criticized. The COT intervention argued that "the image of Canada our CBC television screens give us suggests that the network's mandate to foster national unity has been taken to mean to help everyone in Canada see things as middle-class English-Canadians in Toronto see them" (COT 1974, p 41). Morris Wolfe contended that "there's still a tendency to treat the people in the regions as stereotypes" (Wolfe 1974a, p 40).

Even without further sampling, it should be clear from these comments (together with others cited earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 10, and the CRTC statistics on the interventions) that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the overall performance of English Television in contributing to the flow and exchange of regional information and entertainment.

Figure 11-2. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF "THE NATIONAL"
13-19 December 1973 and 15-21 January 1974

Items	Minutes (Total: 241.2)	Proportion of Content	Proportion of Population	Ratio : Content ÷ Population
International	85.9	36 %		
National	83.8	35 %		
Regional	71.5	30 %		
BREAKDOWN OF REGIONAL ITEMS				
British Columbia	8.5	12 %	10 %	1.2
Prairies	18.1	25 %	16 %	1.6
Ontario	18.1	25 %	36 %	0.7
Quebec	14.2	20 %	28 %	0.7
Maritimes	8.4	12 %	10 %	1.2
The North	4.2	6 %	0.2%	30.0
BREAKDOWN OF ONTARIO ITEMS				
Toronto	4.7	26 %	34 %	0.8
Other	13.3	74 %	66 %	1.1

Note: Population figures are from the 1971 Census of Canada (SC 1973b).

Management Decision Making

Analysis of the environment, structures, and processes of management decision making in the "regional flow and exchange" area ties many of the various sections of this study together. Evidence to support virtually every generalization made in this study about public television in Canada and about management decision making in CBC English Television emerges here. So does the most critical comment by the Corporation's producers.

The organization's environment had a significant impact on management decision making in CBC English Television. It is not surprising that this should have been the case within an institution engaged in public communication. The 1974 licence renewal process operated against a background of considerable regional tension in Canada. The tensions between the senses of unity and identity, which Frye argued are essential, were not new: they run throughout Canadian history. During the case study period, the continental energy shortage heightened these tensions, bringing the federal government and the provinces into conflict over the allocation, exportation, and taxation of oil and natural gas resources. Bumper stickers, which received great press attention in eastern Canada, appeared in Alberta saying, "Let the Eastern Bastards Freeze in the Dark." Prospects of federal-provincial agreement on Canadian constitutional reform remained dim throughout the period. And there were special tensions in the communications area, with the provinces challenging federal jurisdiction over cable.

There was an expectation in some quarters that the CBC succeed in reducing regional tension. The brief of the regional producers' association dealt with that expectation as follows:

> If our largest avenue of communication in this country has been achieving the obvious goals, why is there more and more regionalization of thought, action and emotion in Canada? Why is it twenty years of English language T.V. and close to forty years of radio finds us faced with such things as western alienation and cultural backlash; and how is it possible to hear such questions as "What does Quebec want?" Surely a national communication institution such as the CBC's radio and television networks can be held at least partly accountable for that. (L'Association, pp 4-5)

The CBC, as the most readily visible federal presence in the daily lives of Canadians, operated in an environment where every mistake could be noted and reported and where every opinion or perception could be disputed. The CBC's handling of regional issues was in full view of the television audience, where the handling of matters such as the Western Economic Opportunities Conference in Calgary and the effects of the 1973 railway strike on Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island could be examined on an item by item basis (Wolfe 1973, p 46).

Partly because of its national visibility, the CBC had become an inviting target for attack by federal politicians. For example, following the July 1974 federal election, Member of Parliament Gerald Baldwin issued a press release saying that a new feeling of Western alienation soon might threaten Confederation more than Quebec nationalism ever had. He indicated the West "has had enough of such pseudo-national and Eastern-dominated organizations such as the CBC, whose Toronto-based clique engages in patronizing put-downs of the West." He accused the CBC of "blatant partisanship" during the election campaign and suggested the Corporation should have a section "that is more oriented to the Western point of view," perhaps in a form similar to Radio-Canada, the French language division of the CBC (Globe 1974d).

The level of financing of the CBC was clearly one significant factor in explaining the widespread dissatisfaction with English Television's contributions to regional flow and exchange (and with its service of "the special needs of geographic regions"). Delays in the extension of coverage to certain areas of the country, in the establishment of production centres in every provincial capital, and in the modernization, consolidation, or expansion of existing regional centres were the result of a severe imbalance between demands and available capital funds. The slow rate of increase in local program budgets seen in Figure 7-12 was the result of attempts to provide a balanced service of local, regional, and national programming on an operating budget insufficient to support high volumes of quality production at all levels.

Although this was not true of comment about all aspects of English Television operation, there was a tendency for criticism about regional matters to lose its perspective. An interesting way of illustrating this is to look at some of the criticism, not of the CBC, but of the CRTC. Ironically, at the same time that the Commission was attempting to focus attention on what it considered to be shortcomings in CBC contributions to regional flow and exchange, it was itself being faulted for being insensitive to regional concerns. Prior to the hearing, several columnists and intervention groups in British Columbia urged individual citizens to write to the CRTC about the CBC licence renewals. As a result, included in the over 300 interventions were a large number of single page letters from British Columbia residents. In selecting the interventions to be heard at the hearing, the CRTC tended to choose those submitted by major groups and to cover the range of comment by picking some interventions to be representative of concerns expressed in others which, due to time limitations, could not all be presented at the hearing. The only criticism of the CRTC's selection of interventions that I am aware of concerned the regional distribution of the selection. In her VANCOUVER SUN column, Lisa Hobbs reported that 70 interventions had been submitted from Ontario and that 18 were to be heard, that 76 had come from Quebec and that 6 were to be heard, but that only one of the 95 from British Columbia had been selected for presentation at the hearing (Hobbs 1974f).

Despite the statistics reported by Hobbs, the CRTC's genuine concern is not to be questioned. Given the mood of the regions, this concern seems well justified. But the Commission's decision did little to ease the task for English Television. Like the CBC, the CRTC tended to focus on operational mechanisms: a "special fund" within the budget of the Corporation to finance special programs or series of programs produced by regions for the networks, and greater use of instantaneous transmission and switching capabilities of the satellite system for live programming (CRTC 1974b, pp 32-3). What the Commission did not seem to realize was that, within the budgeting system of the Corporation, the creation of such a "special fund" was either unneccessary (because the same effect could be achieved by the setting of objectives and priorities) or else implied the creation of a separate line authourity for the administration of "regional" programming (the approach which the reorganization of the Corporation into language divisions had been designed to avoid). As for the use of the instantaneous transmission and switching capabilities of the satellite system, the fact was that a fully developed plan for a national "satellite show" using mobile ground stations had been in existence for some time, but that the associated costs were not considered to be within the budgetary reach of English Television.

One of the primary objectives of the reorganization of the CBC just prior to the case study period was the strengthening of regional participation in the national services. The organizational structures which were developed to meet this objective were reviewed in Chapter 9, on pages 107-111. The system of overlaid "media" and "regional" management structures had been specifically designed to facilitate attention to regional concerns and to facilitate regional flow and exchange. The mini-structures or systems which existed at the contact points between the media and regional structures had also been designed with regional concerns in mind. The Planning System described in section 9(f), pages 114-117, was a structural arrangement intended to facilitate regional participation in network programming. And the intent of the various structural arrangements could not have been lost on CBC managers during this period: the major organizational change to the media/regional structure took place at the beginning of the case study period, and there were very few subsequent changes.

The linkage between the Parliamentary mandate and policy formation and implementation at the Corporate level is clear: it was readily apparent, for instance, in the reorganization of the CBC's management structures. But within English Television, policy formation and implementation had an operational focus. Concern for contributing to regional flow and exchange was balanced, on a program by program basis, with other competing and conflicting responsibilities and objectives in the block schedule "matrix."

Operational decision making within English Television was highly constraint oriented. One of the principal functions of the Planning Group was resource allocation. The seriousness of English Television's demand/resource imbalance, and the need to meet the commercial revenue quota imposed on it, made this attention to constraints at least understandable. It seems reasonable to speculate that one consequence of this attention to resource stretching was to distract attention from consideration of the nature of English Television's audience. Although the orientation of the network's schedule was not exclusively towards mass audiences, the prominence of the revenue-generating popular US programming gave the service a strong mass orientation, and such an orientation would seem to have complicated consideration of how best to reflect regional diversity and contribute to regional understanding.

In dealing with the public on the issue of regional flow, the CBC was defensive. Again, this seems understandable because it felt that attempts had been and were being made to deal with regional concerns, although public comment described English Television as exclusively Toronto oriented and as making no significant contribution to regional flow and exchange. The network devoted one complete section of its submission to the CRTC to "The Flow of Regional Information and Entertainment" (CBC 1973b, pp 20-31). Picard's presentation to the Commission stressed the high degree of production decentralization (CBC 1974c, pp 6, 6A, 42). During questioning at the hearing, the ESD Assistant General Manager responded to a question about regional flow with further detailed information about decentralized production. And the Vice President, Corporate

Affairs, added information about the regional program exchange system (CRTC 1974a, pp 1416-19).

This defensive stance towards the public would at least seem to have had the effect of complicating the task of identifying and solving real internal problems. One such internal problem, and one which became public during the renewal process, was severe tension between the Planning Group and certain regionally based producers. The intervention filed by the regional producers' association, which is independent of the "Toronto" association, contained the following observations:

> The attitude in Toronto seems to be that all the talent that is any good is in Toronto. Such phrases as "the Tommy Banks Show should originate from Toronto because all the talent in the world comes through Toronto" and "if they are so good why aren't they in Toronto" often meet regional producers.... (L'Association, p 10)
>
> Producers in Vancouver, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Montreal and other producing centres of the CBC will tell you that it is not the isolated decision makers in Toronto who know best what needs to be said from each region.... (p 12)
>
> The coagulation of CBC mentality and Toronto parochialisms mean that few broadcast expressions from the other regions of Canada are placed in proper focus when it comes to our international sales process.... (pp 21-2)
>
> Because of the decisions in Toronto, many stations in the CBC system are finding that they are doing less and less locally-oriented and locally-produced programs. The air time has been taken away -- just that simply .... as well, finances and resources are restricting. (pp 22-3)
>
> How can a decision be made in Toronto that every area of Canada must see a certain program? Therefore, local and regional contexts should exist and programming decisions should be allowed on that basis. (p 25)
>
> In the regions producers constantly are told that their programs are not going to see national exposure because they do not meet certain standards -- and yet that same regional producer sees a Toronto originated program that fails to meet the same standards. Constantly we are told that regional producers lack the ability, resources, machinery and talent pools to produce good programs on a continuing basis. (p 26)
>
> Constantly producers are forced to confront the CBC mentality with the question "Are we communicating through programming or are we housekeeping a bureacracy? .... (pp 34-5)
>
> The creative process is handcuffed by the charts, systems and procedures -- always with the justification that those systems are necessary so that the creative process has a vehicle in which to ride. We do not quarrel with that -- but we do challenge that which is unjustifiable: The creative process is subject to the whims of the system, is subservient to the disciples of the system, and is in fact often a mere byproduct of the system. (p 35)

If nothing else, the brief indicated the presence of a serious morale problem within the ranks of the regional producers. It cited lack of internal communication as a factor in this connection (L'association, pp 15, 17, 36). And it raised a host of other issues, commenting on them with what I consider to be varying degrees of accuracy and appropriateness. It seems to me that it overstated the Toronto orientation of the network and management concern with "systems," and failed to reveal that in the background behind many of the examples given were tensions at the personal level. Even so, in suggesting a lack of attention to the work and aspirations of regional producers, the brief hinted at a fundamental condition of management decision making in English Television. That condition, which explains so much about the apparent lack of concern for matters such as regional flow and exchange, can be described as one of "distraction."

The Planning Group was clearly committed to the principles of the Broadcasting Act, including contributing to regional flow and exchange. And there was acute awareness of regional feelings about Toronto programming. In 1972 one of the program directors commented as follows:

> There is in fact a very wide representation of production talents across this country on the network, and there is awareness now that not all the talent in this country is in Toronto but it is also in Regina and in Haliax and in Winnipeg, in Edmonton, in Vancouver, in London and elsewhere. (CBC 1972a, p 10)

Some evidence of concern with regional matters can be seen in the fact that much of the Canadian programming procured by the Planning Group had a regional focus. In the Winter 1973/74 schedule, the procurements from NFB were ADIEU ALOUETTE (about contemporary Quebec) and WEST (about Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba). Other procured programming about the regions of Canada included the AUDUBON WILDLIFE THEATRE series and the TO THE WILD COUNTRY specials. Futher evidence of management concern with regional reflection would seem to be found in the decision to proceed with the complex HOUSE OF PRIDE project, though it is an interesting comment on the complexities of dealing with regional tension that the fact that this project to promote regional understanding was being coordinated from Toronto was highly resented by some producers at some CBC locations.

To the extent that English Television contributions to regional flow were judged to be inadequate, this appeared to result from a lack of attention and a lack of resources adequate to meet requirements and expectations. The CBC was over-committed and the resulting attention to resource stretching, or the management of constraints, had the effect of distracting attention from other matters, among them internal communication, morale building, and actual program service content. The Planning Group relied heavily on its systems and mechanisms, particularly the Planning System, to "take care of" regional flow. But the problem of dealing with regional tensions was complex and required much more attention than the group, faced with a range of other important problems, seemed able to devote to it.

Coverage and Facilities

Coverage

Coverage planning and budgeting were Head Office functions, and were not an area of Planning Group responsibility. The coverage requirements have been noted in this study principally as a factor affecting the overall financial position of the Corporation. At the public hearing CRTC Chairman Juneau used figures on the number of people served per transmitter to "complete" Picard's "very vivid tableau" of the CBC's coverage requirements (CRTC 1974a, pp 1466-8).

Section 6(b), pages 51-56, provided an outline of the CBC's geographic coverage requirements, and Figure 6-4, page 55, compared the basic coverage parameters with those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The English Television program distribution and coverage system was described in section 7(b), pages 76-78. The proportion of total CBC operating expense devoted to network distribution and station transmission was given in Figure 7-10, page 83. The Cabinet decision to proceed with the Accelerated Coverage Plan was noted in section 10(d), pages 124-125.

In 1973/74 the operating costs of network distribution and station transmission totalled $44,072,875, just over 14% of the total Corporation operating expense (CBC 1974b, p 59). Although in reporting capital expenditures the CBC did not separate coverage from production facility expenditures, throughout the case study period an extremely high proportion of the total went into two areas: coverage, and the Montreal and Vancouver consolidation projects which will be discussed in the next subsection. The Act specifies that coverage "should be extended to all parts of Canada, as public funds become available" (Act, s 3.q.ii). The first intervention appearance at the hearing was by the Ministers Responsible for Communications in the Maritime Provinces (CRTC 1974a, pp 276-316), and a review of that presentation indicates that coverage was their primary concern. That concern was the subject of a specific recommendation in the CRTC decision: it instructed the Corporation to "proceed with the necessary negotiations" to "acquire and operate the facilities of CHSJ-TV in Saint John and its rebroadcasting stations" (CRTC 1974b, p 69). The CBC was surprised by so specific a suggestion: it had not yet determined that acquisition of the CHSJ facilities was the most appropriate approach and -- in the event that it was -- the Corporation saw the CRTC directive as weakening its bargaining position.

But such differences were over technique and timing: extension of services "to all parts of Canada" was a priority common to people in areas not yet served, their elected representatives, the CRTC, and the CBC at the Corporate level. The proportion of the Corporation's capital devoted to coverage was not called into question. The importance of extension of service was recognized by English Television but, because coverage was a Corporate responsibility and program production a divisional one, and because so much was being allocated to coverage and the Montreal consolidation project, the Planning Group had developed a scenario in which CBC English Television would come to have the most extensive, complex, and complete distribution system in the world, but no programs to transmit over it. The CRTC decision argued that "it is futile and simplistic to oppose transmission and programming," but also noted: "The hard fact is that in Canada it is not possible to concentrate on software only." (CRTC 1974b, p 72)

Production Facilities

English Television involvement in planning and budgeting for production facilities, however, was more direct, although the Planning Group worked within the limits of a capital budget set at the Corporate level. An indication of the condition of ESD production facilities was provided in the discussion of CBC efficiency in section 11(b) At the public hearing, the President noted that in the 1962-1972 period there was a $32 million "obsolescence gap" in the replacement of existing capital equipment (CRTC 1974a, pp 94-5). The English Television submission noted establishment of new stations in Saskatoon, Charlottetown, Sydney, Goose Bay, and Labrador City, acquisition of its Windsor affiliate, and plans for a Calgary station (CBC 1973b, pp 22-3). The CRTC decision noted "the obvious need" for the CBC to have program production centers in the provincial capitals of British Columbia and New Brunswick (CRTC 1974b, p 69).

Throughout the period, service to southern Saskatchewan was provided from a combination of production office and film facilities located in the capital, Regina, and studio facilities in a small, acquired station in Moose Jaw, 45 miles away. The arrangement had originated in 1969 as a "temporary" expedient but, although there were plans for new facilities in Regina, no date had been set for the start of consolidation. My report on the operation of the local FYI Current Affairs unit, activity 11 in section 8(c), pages 162-163, contained these comments:

> It's impossible to put down on paper the extent to which I sensed that the insanity of the facilities arrangements in Regina/Moose Jaw affects the morale and energy of the FYI unit....
>
> An incredible amount of everyone's time is taken up with attempting to cope with the logistics problems imposed by the split location situation. Provincial politicians won't drive to Moose Jaw, so somehow they have to be covered in Regina. To lay on a crew in Regina depletes the studio crew so that nothing can be done in the studio while the crew is in Regina. The deadline for filmed news stories,

> allowing for processing and travel, is just after noon. And what comes out is black and white. Inserts in the Moose Jaw studio are difficult because the studio control room is also the station master and has to be free for station breaks....
>
> Everyone was quite friendly to me, but in a friendly way they've all inevitably become extremely cynical. No small wonder.

The CBC's problems with existing production facilities weren't confined to "Regina/Moose Jaw." On a larger scale, French Television had faced similar problems in Montreal, but a major consolidation project, on a new site acquired for the purpose in 1964, eased the problems considerably. In discussing studio projects in its 1973-1974 ANNUAL REPORT, the CBC reported:

> In Montreal the main activity was connected with the completion of Maison de Radio-Canada which now houses some 3,000 employees and is the production centre for the French radio and television networks, the CBC's local English and French stations, Radio Canada International, the CBC Northern Service and the Armed Forces Service. The new building was officially opened by the Prime Minister on December 5, 1973. It is one of the world's largest and most modern radio and television centres and the only one of its kind in North America. (CBC 1974b, p 93)

Even so, the Montreal consolidation project resulted in a less than ideal solution. In December 1975, BROADCASTER reported on the problems:

> Most of the problems now affecting La Maison de Radio-Canada were, at least in hindsight, predictable.
>
> First, although the original plans contained provision for expansion, squabbles with the governments of the day, from the early 60's until actual building construction began in 1967, limited La Maison to being a consolidation project gathering in facilities formerly scattered across Montreal on 22 buildings. As a result, even before it was finished, La Maison was too small.
>
> Now, two years after its official opening and four years after the first handful of occupants moved in, more than 1,400 occupy office space intended for 980 in the 23-storey office tower. Not long ago, more than 50 staffers were moved out into nearby offices over a tire store.
>
> Studio consolidation is yet to be accomplished.
>
> Two television studios are unfinished. Their upper halves were both false-floored at ground level and given over to office space, while the lower half of one shell was turned into a carpentry shop and the other became a storage area.
>
> A radio auditorium studio is also in the shell stage. Loose filled with earth, its would-be roof serves as the floor of an outside patio on the south side of the building.
>
> The studios were the victims of an austerity program introduced in the midst of construction due to soaring construction costs and inflation. In all, $16 million worth of facilities were chopped in order to keep the total cost to approximately $75 million set by the Treasury Board in 1964. The government would not budge and the CBC had no choice but to cut corners. (Guilfoyle, p 16)

In Vancouver, television production was housed in a number of locations surrounding studios which were, in fact, converted automobile showroom and garage space. Ceiling height in the larger of the two studios, used for programs such as THE IRISH ROVERS and IT'S A MUSICAL WORLD, was 11 feet. In September 1970, the Treasury Board authorized the CBC to proceed with a consolidation project at an estimated cost of $22 million. As the project neared completion in December 1975, BROADCASTER reported:

> Until now, the corporation's Vancouver operation originated from six

> inadequate morale-busting locations -- television production from an armpit of an ancient building on Georgia St., the radio side from a slum within the Hotel Vancouver. (Edwards, p 18)

A Vancouver TV Sports Announcer/Producer was more explicit:

> To give you an example, the newsroom which is located between the second and third floors, must only be between 75 and 100 feet in total length. On any given afternoon, there could be as many as 25 people working in there. You go out of the newsroom, through the film editing area, which is like a dungeon, into the boiler room and you have to walk under all the furnace ducts to get to the studio. (Ed's note: I did it and there's only three feet from floor to furnace pipes.) It's just unreal. I've taken a couple of people up there to watch me do a show and they couldn't believe it. You may have noticed the teletype machines are in the furnace room. I'm sure that it'll be the one thing that people will recall twenty years from now. The trip through the furnace room. Some don't want to leave the old place but I think they'll soon forget it in the new surroundings.
>
> This building will bring everyone together at long last and we'll be able to meet and get to know each other. I'd always been leery about inviting people back to the old studio for interviews because the poor impression it gave some of the bigger names in sport was quite evident. Now we have no hesitation about telling people to meet us here. (CBC 1975c, p 4)

The new Vancouver facilities include six television studios and improved production capacity significantly. They also seem to have improved morale. BROADCASTER quoted Regional Director Bob McGall as saying, "It's almost magical what the new building has done for our people" (Edwards, p 20).

For English Television during the case study period, the Vancouver consolidation project represented the only approved major project which would produce a future increase in network program production capacity. The external pressures on the Corporation were for the establishment of additional local and regional production facilities. The CBC submission noted the various local and regional programming demands on English Television (CBC 1973b, pp 18-9). The CRTC decision noted the competing demands for capital, and argued that both coverage and production facilities are important:

> The question is not one of priorities between needed extensions of service on the one hand and important building and consolidation plans on the other. Facilities are the tools of programming. Programs are the reason for extension of service. All are linked together, and the CBC must be able to fo forward on many different fronts concurrently. If the CBC is to grow, improve and expand it will require the needed support for purchase of buildings, towers and equipment. (CRTC 1974b, p 68)

But the decision also expressed concern about the geographic distribution of production facility spending:

> However, the Commission's worry is that building programs in major centres could in themselves distract the CBC from dealing with and solving other problems. This must not happen. Priorities must be established which take into account responsibilities that have long demanded attention. (CRTC 1974b, p 68)

Although the Commission wasn't explicit about what it considered to be "building programs in major centres," no doubt the consolidations already undertaken in Montreal and Vancouver were in mind. And, reading between the lines, it is possible that the prospect of a consolidation project in Toronto was the source of at least part of the Commission's "worry."

Toronto Consolidation

A history of the various contemplated Toronto consolidation projects could form a case study in itself. It was a complex issue over which there were marked differences of opinion, and in which a large number of factors were involved. An early indication of the Toronto problem can be found in the Fowler Commission Report, which was issued in 1957 -- 5 years after the start of television service, and 17 years before the end of the case study period. In 1957 the Royal Commission reported as follows:

> For the future television facilities of the CBC, we have been forced to the conclusion that it will be necessary to provide large capital sums over the next five or six years, for the construction of efficient television production facilities in the two main production centres, Toronto and Montreal, in order to save money in operations and capital costs later.... The fact is that present facilities in Toronto and Montreal are inadequate and inefficient to do the scale of job now being attempted. We will see that, in response to public demand, the scale of television operations is likely to grow substantiallly in several ways. Hours of operation and extent of geographical coverage are almost certain to increase. There is a strong pressure for greater production of Canadian television programmes and the increased use of Canadian talent.
>
> These expansions of television service will increase the load on the two main production centres in Toronto and Montreal.... To try to add necessary new studios and equipment to the present patchwork of production facilities in Toronto and Montreal would probably be physically impossible and certainly would compound the existing confusion. We think all that we can do is take a deep breath and plunge into the creation of television production centres, in or near both cities, to replace the present complicated facilities and provide reasonable room for efficient future growth. (Fowler 1957, p 173)

Eight years later the Fowler Committee reported:

> We were asked to examine and comment on the plans for consolidation of CBC broadcasting facilities, particularly in the two main national network centres of Toronto and Montreal. These plans have now been in preparation for some years, and in both centres there is ample visual evidence that the scattered operation, the degree of over-crowding, and the obsolete or obsolescent state of the technical plant combine to impose costly inefficiencies which urgently need to be remedied....

The Committee reviewed the Montreal consolidation plans, questioned "the generous scale on which the plans have been drawn," concluded that the architectural form of the proposed facility was inappropriate, and recommended "that the present CBC plan for consolidation in Montreal should be discarded" (Fowler 1965, pp 200-10):

> We must emphasize here that an entirely new design will have to be undertaken. A reduction in the planned number of television studios, rehearsal halls, and offices cannot be satisfactorily effected by lopping off a piece here and a piece there from a completed design derived from different, and in our view excessive, requirements. An entirely fresh start is necessary. (Fowler 1965, p 208)

However, as noted in the preceding subsection, by the end of the case study period work on a new consolidated facility in Montreal, Maison de Radio-Canada, had been completed. The design was substantially the same as that which the Fowler Committee had reviewed; as noted above, production capacity was adjusted downward in the midst of construction, due to soaring construction costs and inflation.

With respect to Toronto, the Committee urged reconsideration of the proposed site:

> The CBC owns a 35-acre site in Don Mills, which is intended for its new consolidated operation, and the choice of this location has been a matter of controversy in recent years. It is contended by some elements within the Corporation that, in adopting the extensive layout proposed at Don Mills, the CBC will sacrifice the great advantages of a downtown locale for its creative people. This is not just a matter of mere convenience but a source of real concern that the relative isolation of Don Mills will tend to destroy necessary continuing contacts between those involved in television production and their natural associates in the cultural milieu of the urban centre. The same objection is raised by the city planners, who deplore the removal of a vital cultural activity from the centre of the city to the suburbs. Just as the Montreal civic authorities want the CBC to contribute to the revitalization of an old part of the city, it is held that the CBC and its creative people play and should continue to play a large part in building a strong cultural life in downtown Toronto. (Fowler 1965, pp 208-9)

The Committee found that "the conditions in Toronto and Montreal are not equally bad":

> In Toronto, although the main site remains badly over-crowded, some rationalization has reduced the number of separate locations to the point where perhaps the worst immediate problem is the widespread scattering of administrative and other office functions... (Fowler 1965, p 197)
>
> The dispersal of facilities is a less acute problem, although the main location on Jarvis Street is badly over-crowded. Nevertheless a substantial degree of consolidation has already been accomplished, and there are opportunities for a careful re-examination of future requirements. (p 208)

Although the Committee found not only the Montreal but also the Toronto plans "too extravagant and inflexible," it did agree with Toronto consolidation in principle. It commented:

> The older facilities on Jarvis Street need to be replaced quickly. The television building is badly overcrowded, the television studios are poorly equipped, and the radio building needs to be entirely renewed. The possibility of finding a suitable new downtown location free for development is limited, but has not yet been exhaustively explored. Alternatively, a full examination should be made of the potential of the existing Jarvis Street and other locations, supplemented by whatever adjacent space could be acquired.
>
> We must emphasize that our aniaysis clearly confirms the need for immediate relief, both in Montreal and Toronto.... (Fowler 1965, p 209)

Subsequently, planning for the Don Mills site was abandonned and a new downtown site, in the vicinity of where the 1805 foot CN Tower now stands, was acquired. But public evidence of new planning does not show up until the 1973/74 ANNUAL REPORT:

> Planning is proceeding for the construction of a Broadcasting Centre in Toronto which will consolidate in one location the present widely dispersed operations in that city. The requirements have been determined and the architectural, structural, mechanical and electrical consultants are now developing the design of the complex, in conjunction with CBC staff specialists. (CBC 1974b, p 94)

A year later, the 1974/75 ANNUAL REPORT noted that planning was complete but that the project was at a standstill:

> Planning is proceeding for the construction of a broadcasting centre in Toronto to consolidate the CBC's widely scattered premises there. The conceptual design development and cost estimates have been completed by consultants, working in conjuction with CBC staff specialists, and government approval is awaited before

going further with the project. (CBC 1975b, p 47)

The 1957 Fowler analysis was accurate. There had been increases in hours of service, in extent of coverage, and in Canadian production volume. So was its analysis of the consequences of not replacing the "inadequate and inefficient" existing facilities: "To try to add necessary new studios and equipment to the present patchwork of production facilities in Toronto and Montreal would be physically impossible and certainly would compound the existing confusion" (Fowler 1957, p 173).

At the 1974 hearing, the President included in his presentation visuals a map of the Toronto facilities showing 12 scattered major locations, and he termed the Toronto plant "a slum" (CBC 1974c, p 49; CRTC 1974a, p 95). The intervention filed by the Toronto Producers and Directors argued for new Toronto facilities:

> We know of the demands made on the CBC's budget for program distribution equipment. We know of the demands made for the renewal of production plants in other CBC points across the country, some of which also desperately require repair or replacement. But we want to stress the urgent need for the upgrading of the production resources in Toronto. Because of the antiquated equipment in Toronto, the quality of the programming we produce is jeopardized. Consolidated program facilities are essential if we are to continue doing our job properly.
>
> We recognize that the cost is not small. We must stress that the stakes for Canada are high. We must have the resources to produce quality programming of a technical standard to compete with any in the world. (ATPDT 1974a, p 10)

The "Additional Statement" by some members of the Toronto Association had spoken of "the critical equipment crisis" and of being "told by management that all we can expect is a 'bandaid' operation until the 1980's" (ATPDT 1974b, pnt 22). At the hearing one of the CBC's most respected producers, Norman Campbell, described his working conditions; the following is an abridged version of his initial comments:

> If I am doing, say, a musical comedy, or an opera, or whatever, which has a Russian atmosphere, I am in my office, which is at Bay and College Streets in Toronto. If I wish to use the resources of a reference library, which as you know in any university is generally contiguous to where you are, I have to walk to a place known affectionately as "Mac's Milk" on Church Street, quite a few blocks away.
>
> If I want to then get the recording of the work I'm doing, of Rimski Korsakov, I then have to go to the Radio Building. If I require the score of Rimski Korsakov, I then have to go to a building at 90 Sumach Street, which is a couple of miles away.
>
> If I want to rehearse, I can rehearse in that same building on a concrete floor, or I can, if I am working with dancers who don't like dancing on concrete floors, go to some rented facility somewhere in the city.
>
> If I want to see film that is going to be used as Russian background, I have to go down to Front Street.
>
> When I did the opera Hansel and Gretel, the orchestra was a mile and a half away in the top floor of Eaton's store.
>
> Once you're shooting in Studio 7, you have to tell your dancers, "Please, don't dance quite as vigorously, because if you do, if you go up in a lift, we will see the ceiling."
>
> We have marvellous maintenance men who are just taxed beyond belief with old "band-aid" equipment. We have cameras now in the studio which have come from the remote units they use for outdoor games. And if you hear a whirring noise, you are hearing the fans that blow them to keep them cool. If you hear a speech like "I

love you, Hortense," and you hear a "whizzzzzzzzzzzzzz" ... (laughter) you do not have electrical interference, it is the fan blowing. But apart from that ... (laughter) ... there is not a facility problem. (Laughter) (Applause) (Based on CRTC 1974a, pp 1024-7)

The discussion concluded with the following exchange between Campbell and CRTC Commissioner Gordon Hughes:

> MR. CAMPBELL: I wonder if I might just add to that a serious note, Mr. Hughes. I think we are all, and have been for many, many years, looking forward to some form of consolidation. The exact form of it doesn't concern us. What does concern us is that it be a consolidation of the minds, that is, a consolidation of attitudes and feelings that we are all together; and then of the physical requirements to make this possible so that we are able to be together at the moment of of inception of ideas, that writers, actors, dancers, producers and top brass are all thrown into the mix together, so that we are able to realize that we all have problems and immediately get to work on the solution.
>
> MR. HUGHES: One can understand that. It makes just tremendous sense, you know; it's so simple you wonder why you have to talk about it. (CRTC 1974a, p 1028)

Why did they have to talk about it? Why had 17 years passed with only patchwork changes to what the Fowler Commission had found to be "inadequate and inefficient" facilities?

The absolute cost was a major factor. In 1957, the Royal Commission had estimated the total projected cost as "in the order of $50 million" (Fowler 1957, p 208). By the time that plans went to Cabinet in 1975, the estimate was "in the neighbourhood of $120 million" (Kirby 1975a).

Requirements for improved production facilities at other locations were another set of factors. The Fowler Commission had found the Montreal problems more serious than those in Toronto. The Vancouver conditions had indeed been "morale-busting," as I found while working there in 1971. Response to the demands for new local and regional facilities at Saskatoon, Charlottetown, Sydney, Goose Bay, Labrator City, Windsor, and Calgary had been understandable. The requirement to improve the Regina/Moose Jaw arrangement remained obvious. And there were the pressures for facilities in Victoria and Saint John.

And, without opposing production and transmission or arguing about the appropriate balance between them, coverage extension was taking a large proportion of the available capital.

Practical considerations had a significant impact. Construction in Montreal had not been undertaken until the demands on the construction trades represented by the heavy building period of Expo '67 had passed. The development and abandonment of the Don Mills plans had been a delaying factor. The gradual conversion of Toronto studios for color television production had reduced the equipment obsolescence problems slightly. A "mini consolidation" of offices into a smaller number of larger rented facilities during the first half of the case study period had eased some problems (though it left many unchanged and created some new ones). Both the planning and capital equipment requirements of the Olympics Radio and Television Organization were so extensive that it had been necessary to integrate ORTO planning with other major projects, and ORTO faced a fixed deadline for coverage of the 1976 Summer Olympics in Montreal. And, as the pattern of investment in the major consolidation projects in Montreal and Vancouver reveals, the CBC was sequencing or "phasing" these major undertakings (CBC 1973d, p 43; CBC 1975b, p 63).

There was also pressure on the CBC to contract out higher proportions of its production load. The 1965 Fowler report had been critical of the "make or buy" decisions made by the CBC (Fowler 1965, pp 172-7). The 1974 CRTC decision reviewed the arguments for increased use of outside production resources, and concluded:

> There is no doubt that startling program innovations often appear from small, lean groups outside the inevitable constraints of larger establishments. Moreover, as the President pointed out, there are many kinds of smaller-scale programs and services that a large plant is just not designed to handle economically.
>
> It is, in the opinion of the Commission, important that there be a reassessment of the balance between providing services and making programs within the Corporation and buying outside -- and that this reassessment should be reflected in budget allocations. (CRTC 1974b, p 59)

Also bearing on the situation was skepticism in some quarters about the relevance of large, consolidated network production centres to the needs of the future. The Fowler Committee, for instance, expressed one of its "grave reservations" as follows:

> We believe that the future of television is dynamic and so unpredictable that, as a matter of policy, capital expenditures should be restricted to the necessary minimum for the maintenance of modern production processes, recognizing that some conscious loss of immediate efficiency is a small price to pay for the resultant flexibility of decision that this posture would afford in the years to come. (Fowler 1965, p 207)

One argument was that the continuing development of reliable portable equipment would lead to a shift from studio work to production "in the real world." This potential trend was certainly a factor to be considered in facilities design, but the probable impact on studio and, especially, post-production facility requirements was not such as to constitute an argument against a consolidation and upgrading of Toronto facilities. Some unanticipated consequences of major consolidations carried out by the BBC and NHK were also cause for careful scrutiny of the Toronto consolidation plans. A review of the BBC situation, for instance, tended to support a downtown site for facilities. But, again, the BBC and NHK experiences constituted cause for careful planning rather than an argument against consolidation itself.

A final factor entering the decision making process was the requirement that the CBC, in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of the Broadcasting Act, obtain prior Cabinet approval for any facilities project in which expenditures exceeded $250,000. The 1975 estimate of the cost of Toronto consolidation, $120,000,000, exceeded that limit by 480 times. By the end of 1975, although planning for consolidation of the Toronto facilities was complete, Cabinet approval of the plan had not been given and seemed unlikely for some years. The Government had launched a series of inflation fighting measures, not the least significant of which was a major reduction in federal spending. Thus, with Toronto consolidation postponed indefinitely, planning within ESD focused once again on options in the intermediate future -- on plans for various types of further "mini-consolidation" to provide some easement as an alternative to any comprehensive consolidation.

At this point it is appropriate to review and add slightly to the participant observer background provided by Chapter 8. I was born and raised in Ontario. I have worked in Toronto, both for private industry and the CBC. On the other hand, I have also worked for the CBC in Ottawa and Vancouver, have travelled extensively across the country on my own, for IBM, and for the CBC, and have spent some years outside of Canada. In addition, during the 1972-1974 fieldwork period in Toronto, my own work routinely took me to seven CBC Toronto locations -- on foot, by subway, in CBC "shuttle" vehicles, in my own car, and by taxi. Special projects required a review of facilities at other locations. Because many of my personal friends were CBC producers and directors, I had an opportunity to spend a great deal of my own time "hanging around" CBC studios, control rooms, and film and video tape editing facilities. It seems necessary to point all this out because I wish to extend this analysis of the delay in Toronto consolidation beyond the list of factors given here thus far.

Even taking into account all of the factors considered above, I find it difficult to explain the delay in proceeding with Toronto consolidation. But I have not had access to the decision making processes of the Cabinet, the Treasury Board, the CBC Board of Directors, or senior Corporate management, and so, because decisions on major projects are made at that level, I can but speculate on the relevance of other factors.

It seems to me that the delay in undertaking Toronto consolidation was related at least in part to the fact that it was to take place in Toronto.

There is no solid evidence to support this contention. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that what the CBC itself described as "the resurgence of regional particularism" (CBC 1973b, p 18) was not a factor.

In 1957 the Fowler Commission argued that it did not think the efficient solution to the Toronto and Montreal facilities problem was production decentralization "which would involve the construction of facilities in other places" (Fowler 1957, p 173). But in 1965 one of the Fowler Committee's "grave reservations" about consolidation was that "there should be less dependence on Montreal and Toronto for program production, and that greater use should be made of the production potential of other centres for contributions to network programming" (Fowler 1965, p 207).

The CRTC's concerns and reservations were noted above. And regional resentment of Toronto's role within English Television was examined extensively earlier in this section. For reasons which were complex and the subject of public debate, Montreal's role within French Television was not questioned nearly as much. One suggested explanation was that Montreal had an accepted role as the cultural centre of French speaking Canada, but that the concept of principal cultural centres was inappropriate for English speaking Canada. In informal conversation, senior CBC officials described public attitudes towards Toronto as virtually unique in the world: the accepted concentrations of cultural activity in Paris, London, Rome, New York, and Hollywood were noted and contrasted to the Canadian situation.

It is at least possible to argue a long run causal relationship between the role of Toronto within English Television and the concentration of English Canadian cultural activity in the Toronto area. Without entering the debate about the long run appropriateness of the situation, it was nevertheless true that in the short run there existed a talent concentration in the Toronto area. One indication of that concentration emerges from analysis of the geographic distribution of listings in the 1973/74 CANADIAN PROFESSIONAL FILM DIRECTORY. Taking the 523 Canadian directors, assistant directors, cinematographers, and editors listed together, Toronto accounted for 69% of the Canadian total; the province of Ontario, including Toronto, accounted for 79% (CFE). Although the Government's decentralization of culture policy and further decentralization of CBC production would both suggest some geographic equalization in the long run, it seemed to the CBC that the concentration of available talent in Toronto, though diminished, would at least continue to be significant throughout the foreseeable future.

It is impossible to say whether or to what extent a reluctance to aggravate regional tensions within English speaking Canada may have been a factor in delaying Toronto consolidation. I suspect that at one or more levels, somewehere within the Corporate management / CBC Board / Treasury Board / Cabinet decision making structure, it was a consideration.

The operating cost consequences of CBC facilities scattering in Toronto were analyzed in detail in both Fowler reports and need not be reviewed here. It is important, however, to return to Norman Campbell's comments and consider the creative consequences. Throughout this chapter an attempt has been made to establish bases for concluding that two of English Television's major problems were morale and internal communication. Although physical working conditions do not alone account for these problems, I suggest that Campbell's vision of a "consolidation of the minds" where "writers, actors, dancers, producers and top brass are all thrown into the mix together" would go a long way towards solving these problems within English Television.

Creativity in television does not stem from the efforts of individuals working in isolation. It is a cooperative endeavour. In his initial remarks, Norman Campbell referred to the customary central location of libraries within universities. Also within the university context, it is interesting to note the increasing importance attached to the building of "university centres" -- centrally located service, recreation, and relaxation facilities designed to bring faculty, staff, and students into informal contact for the exchange of ideas. The importance of similar opportunities for informal exchanges and mutual stimulation would seem to be as great in a cultural institution such as a broadcasting organization as in any university.

It is interesting to speculate that if the Toronto facilities are ever consolidated, the greatest benefits may be in creativity rather than efficiency.

The North

Detailed consideration of CBC television service to Northern Canada is outside the boundaries of this study. Provision of service in the North was handled by the CBC's Special Services' Division, although English Television network service constituted a high proportion of the programming provided. Service to the North has been the subject of quite critical study and it received a greal deal of attention at the 1974 hearing. It remains the subject of intense debate. So far as this study is concerned, service to the North is relevant primarily in financial terms.

The Canadian domestic satellite program was publicly justified heavily on the basis of the impact which Anik would have on Canada's North. One analysis found that there could be "no doubt that the strongest ostensible selling factor for Anik was the benefits for the North and its people that were to be the results of the programs" (Arctic Inst, p 21). By 1974, the satellite was in operation but the Northern Broadcasting Plan being developed by the CBC in consultation with the CRTC and federal government departments had not yet been approved or funded. A primary NBP function was provision of appropriate local and regional services. In the absence of these services and in view of the "service to the North" justification for Anik, complaints about CBC service from Northerners were not surprising.

The long run implication was that to even approach the level of service for which an expectation had been created in the North would require significant capital and operational expenditures in the future.

An illustration of the short run consequences emerged at the 1974 hearing. Because of the complex way in which the three Anik channels rented by the CBC were being used both for English and French network distribution and for English and French news film transmission between CBC production centres, two hours of program service per day to many communities in the North consisted of programs seen earlier that day. The President reported that the CBC was undertaking to rent a fourth Anik channel to eliminate one of the two hours of repeats. The additional satellite rental was $750,000 per year (CRTC 1974a, p 1399). Viewed differently, the annual cost of eliminating one of the two hours of repeats per day was greater than the total local program budget of an English Television station serving a population approximately 20 times as large as that of the Yukon and Northwest Territories combined.

Comments: Regionalism Issues

BACKGROUND: Just as there were requirements for support of Canadian efforts in the process of self-definition in relation to the outside world, the Canadian situation called for support for the process of internal accommodation. Although the issues in their immediate sense were different from those considered under the "nationalism" heading, any failure to deal with strong feelings of regional identity, and with special regional needs, was at least of equal importance to the long run preservation and strengthening of Canadian unity. However, recognition of regional needs implied requirements for CBC activity within regional boundaries, whereas contributing to inter-regional understanding implied requirements for CBC initiatives across such boundaries. Pubic consideration of "regionalism" issues was complicated by failures to distinguish between these two sets of requirements, between means and ends, and between unity and identity. And public debate about "regionalism" issues in Canada was further complicated by the fact that both the tensions and consideration of them were internal.

COVERAGE AND FACILITIES: The perspective of this study for viewing coverage and facilities matters is from the production facilities "side." Even so, the financial figures themselves argue the case that coverage extension was a high capital expenditure priority. By the end of the case study period English Television service had been extended to 97.2% of the English speaking Canadian population, and French Television to 98.1% of the French speaking population. The Accelerated Coverage Plan, approved by Cabinet in February 1974 at an estimated cost of $50 million, and estimated in 1976 at $70 million (Broadcaster 1976b), would increase coverage beyond those levels. Regional equalization of production facilities, on the other hand, remained incomplete, and there were outstanding demands for major undertakings, notably on Vancouver Island, in Saskatchewan, and in New Brunswick. And it seemed that the Northern Broadcasting Plan, once finalized and approved, would also require major capital expenditures.

REGIONAL FLOW AND EXCHANGE: Contributions to the flow and exchange of regional and cultural information and entertainment were virtually assured, at some level, by structural mechanisms, notably the decentralization of production which figured so prominently in the Government's "decentralization of culture" policy. But a tendency to confuse structural mechanisms such as regional management structures, production decentralization, regional program exchange, and special development funds with meaningful flow and exchange in program service complicated both the planning and public assessment of English Television's effective contributions. The regional flow and exchange contributions of programs produced from Toronto tended to be overlooked; on the other hand, there appeared to be a tendency to overestimate the effective contributions arising from operation of the various mechanisms.

Taking the background and the issue areas into consideration in combination we find:

- strong feelings of regional identity leading to requirements for CBC efforts to contribute to inter-regional understanding,
- substantial agreement on the nature of CBC's role in contributing to a national understanding of regional identities,
- emphasis on decentralization in the cultural policy of the Government,
- a significant concentration of available talent in the Toronto area,
- an expectation in some quarters that the CBC succeed in reducing regional tensions,
- the regulatory agency expressing considerable dissatisfaction with the extent of CBC contributions,
- a tendency to confuse mechanisms such as decentralization of production with the objective of promoting regional flow and exchange,
- overlooked contributions to flow and exchange not related to specific mechanisms,
- a reorganized regional management structure, decentralization of production, and regional program exchange mechanisms designed to contribute [illegible] regional flow,
- opportunities for utilization of the domestic satellite system for new types of programming to facilitate regional flow and exchange, limited in the short run by an inability to provide the required production resources,
- long range opportunities for greater decentralization of production limited in the short run by the geographic distribution of developed talent and production facilities and by insufficient allocations for intensive regional talent and program development,
- the national broadcasting service arguing that it was making significant contributions and that its operating constraints, primarily financial and

facilities constraints, prevented it from floowing the courses of action advocated by others,
- an expressed internal recognition of the importance of equalizing regional opportunities and contributing to inter-regional understanding,
- demands from at least some non-Toronto CBC production centres for increased decentralization of production and greater decision making autonomy,
- strong feelings of regional particularism leading to demands for increased local and regional program services and for equalization of services and expenditures,
- approval and financial support from the Government for significant expenditures on extension of service,
- outstanding requirements for production facilities in several provinces,
- widespread resentment of the role of Toronto program units and Toronto based management,
- an outstanding requirement for facilities consolidation or upgrading in Toronto, and
- the regulatory agency arguing that "facilities are the tools of programming" and that "programs are the reasons for extension of service."

c) RECOGNITION AND PORTRAYAL ISSUES

English Television and French Canada

There are obvious parallels between the reflection of the regions to the country as a whole and the reflection of French Canada to English Television viewers, and much of the analysis of "regionalism issues" could be repeated here.

There were tensions in the environment. The broadcast of even short segments in the French language inevitably resulted in a high volume of complaint calls to CBC switchboards. These callers, many of whom demanded to know "Why don't they speak English?", were of course not representative of all English speaking Canadians. Still, they were representative of a substantial number of Canadians, and their attitudes did have an effect on program decision making.

The structural division of the CBC, into French and English operating divisions with separate headquarters in Montreal and Toronto, did little to facilitate exchange between the two official cultural groups. Programming specifically about French Canada during the case study period consisted primarily of the 12 part NFB series, ADIEU ALOUETTE. Although English Television considered the NFB series to be excellent in quality, and important in revealing contemporary French Canada to English viewers, it was disappointed both by the size of the audiences to the programs (4% viewing, Wednesdays, 10:30-11 pm, 1972/73 season) and by the audience reactions (reflected in a very low CBC Research viewing panel "Index of Enjoyment"). The series was repeated in the 1973/74 season on Sundays at 2 pm, but on an available rather than reserved network basis.

Exchanges between CBC French and English Television consisted almost exclusively of serious music programs. FSD productions were seen on English Television in the 1973/74 year in the MUSIC TO SEE, WORLD OF MUSIC, and MUSICAMERA series, and on special occasions such as the CBC TALENT FESTIVAL finals telecast. In addition, the 1973/74 schedule included two English Television productions featuring the popular French Canadian performer, Ginette Reno. In areas where no French Television station had yet opened, some FSD programming was broadcast by English Television stations as regional exchange programming.

Public assessment of English Television performance, as in the case of regional flow, was critical. The interventions of Pierre Berton and of the Committee on

Television suggested licence conditions requiring special English Television attention to French Canada (Berton, pp 11-2; COT 1974, p 132). The CRTC decision observed:

> The fact that Canada is built on a bicultural structure provides a specific focus for the CBC's obiligation to reflect one part of Canada to the other. The Commission endorses the concern of many intervenors that the CBC, by past neglect of this obligation, may have reinforced the feeling of solitude and exclusion inherent when two distinct linguistic and cultural groups share a country.
>
> There have been "common endeavours" which have accomplished a unity of feeling and expression, and this was pointed out at the hearing. But the CBC is evidently not playing an adequate role in this regard if HOCKEY NIGHT IN CANADA is the only regular "national event" which transcends a feeling of separation between the two major groups. Consequently, the Commission would be evading its fundamental responsibility if it did not call on the CBC for a more specific commitment to programming which bridges the differences between English-speaking and French-speaking Canada. (CRTC 1974b, p 30)

The decision recommended the creation, by decision of the CBC Board, of "a special fund within the budget of the Corporation to finance special programs or series of programs, and to fund exchanges of staff and program participants designed to help reflect English-speaking Canada to French-speaking Canada and vice versa" (CRTC 1974b, p 32). As the COT intervention noted, these same concerns had been voiced in the Fowler Committee report nine years ealier:

> We believe the CBC has failed, and is failing today, to discharge adequately its duties to foster understanding between the two main cultural groups in this country. With rare exceptions, it does not produce programs that would assist English-speaking Canadians to understand the attitudes and aspirations of French Canada.... (Fowler 1965, p 37)
>
> The image of French-speaking Canada as presented to English-speaking Canada by the CBC, and vice versa, is at the present time totally inadequate. It is a sad judgement upon the CBC that it does not seem to have awakened to this situation before the general public became aware of it. (p 65)

In 1974, tension between the two cultural groups persisted, the CBC remained puzzled as to how best to reflect French Canada to English Television viewers, and contributing to understanding between the two major language groups was one of the matters still requiring attention.

Multiculturalism

The 1974 CRTC decision noted that it had been more than two years since the federal government had announced support for the concept of multiculturalism in a bilingual context. It went on to comment that "the Corporation has taken insufficient advantage of the variety of Canadian cultures to enrich the programming content of the broadcasting system as a whole." (CRTC 1974b, p 31)

Because the interventions dealing with multiculturalism also raise the question of CBC service in languages other than English and French, and because the implications differ, multilingualism will be dealt with here first. Multilingualism was not a matter which concerned English Television directly. CBC policy in this area was Corporate policy derived from the Broadcasting Act -- which declared that "the national broadcasting service should ... be in English and French" (Act, s 3.g.iii). CBC policy provided for some programming in native Indian and Eskimo languages, but not in other languages, except in special "acquired rights" situations. At the hearing, the President again stated the CBC policy and explained that the Corporation would participate with the CRTC and the Secretary of State in the review of the matter suggested by the Broadcasting Committee (CRTC 1974a, pp 1362-5, 1391-3). Mr. Juneau entered the exact recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee into the record (pp 1365-6), and the CRTC decision did not raise the issue further.

The CRTC decision did, however, recommend the creation of a special fund to finance programs "reflecting the multicultural diversity of the country" (CRTC 1974b, p 33). Interventions had called for the establishment of a multilingual and multicultural programming section within the CBC, and the setting aside of a specific amount ($3 million in 1974) for such programming (CPC, p 24).

The question of how best to reflect the multicultural nature of Canada was of considerable concern to the Planning Group. The first instinct was to create special programs. But the prospect of creating special program vehicles to promote national unity, to reflect regional diversity, to facilitate bicultural understanding, and to portray the multicultural nature of the country was not appealing. The group seemed to feel that there was a practical limit to the solution of special problems through the creation of more special mechanisms.

At the hearing both the Chairman and Commissioner John Shanski spoke of the will of people across the country to express themselves to one another. Mr. Juneau observed:

> .... I would hope that a great deal could be done perhaps in the line of what Mr. Shanski is saying, by a demonstration of a much greater level of sensitivity to people, so that they feel that we in Central Canada, people who control either organizations like the CRTC, or control organizations like the CBC, know they exist, are sensitive to them, care about them, respect their concerns.
>
> It seems to me that the less there has been of that kind of preoccupation the more demands for a legalistic approach have increased, and the more they will increase in the future.
>
> I think that Mr. Shanski is referring to the possibility of paying more attention to people. (CRTC 1974a, pp 1393-4)

Mr. Shanski hit at what was undoubtedly the heart of the matter: "These people want to be recognized in some way. They are Canadians and taxpayers.... They want to be recognized; and I think this is the whole substance of the deal" (CTRC 1974a, p 1396).

Women

Mr. Shanski's point applies with equal validity to the programming sections of the joint intervention submitted by the Women for Political Action and the Ontario Committee on the Status of Women. That submission also dealt with "recognition":

> Canada's female population contains thousands of women who have broken free of the stereotypical roles which previously confined all women. These women are never seen on CBC public affairs programs. Their points of view, experience or life style are never discussed. In fact, not one of the twenty-two [public affairs] programs which we monitored dealt with any of the issues that are prominent in the lives of modern Canadian women. (WPA, p 50)
>
> When we see ourselves portrayed on television, we realize our INVISIBILITY in new roles and, conversely, our VISIBILITY in traditional roles. The traditional roles which the television screen ascribes to us can be categorized as passive, not-too-bright servants, sexy and manipulative playthings or strident and complusive mothers and housekeepers. (p 2)

> Based on our extensive monitoring and research, we have concluded that women are misrepresented, under-represented and discriminated against by the CBC English Language Television Network. We believe that the struggle for a positive and accurate image of of women must be waged in the communications media. We are held back from exploring our full potential and, worse, we find ourselves in danger of becoming, or forever remaining the limited beings that television insists we are. (pp 84-5)

The intervention detailed the portrayal of women in children's programming, afternoon programming, prime time programming, and in commercials. The thrust of the recommendations was towards the elimination of offensive representations of women, the responsible and adequate coverage of women's issues, and the emergence of a positive and accurate image of women in contemporary Canada (pp 84-7).

Comments: Recognition and Portrayal Issues

A common theme runs throughout the debates on regionalism, biculturalism, multiculturalism, and the portrayal of groups of people such as "women" and "native peoples." It is the demand for recognition, for the adequate and fair portrayal of the role in society of new and existing groupings of individuals. Or, using the language of section 3(d) on "Mass Media and Mass Society," these demands are for a revised media definition of reality.

Section 9(e), pages 112-114, noted the "process" nature of television program development and production. Throughout this chapter there has been a great deal of attention to "mechanisms." There is an understandable connection. The high volume of output of a television operation implies an extremely high volume of resource allocation and program content decisions. The various mechanisms which have been examined here are all middle level management decision making systems of one sort or another. There would seem to be an appropriate place for such mechanisms, but all decisions in a broadcasting organization cannot and should not be made by mechanical management systems.

Management systems can help facilitate, say regional flow and exchange, but there would seem to be limits both to the number of concerns which can be addressed by such systems and to the level of detail at which they can effectively operate.

In the review of network program content in section 11(a), it was suggested that the natural occurrence of regional material in programs with a national perspective may be a more effective means of helping the regions of Canada understand their similarities and differences than the creation of special vehicles to carry overtly regional themes. The same argument can be made with respect to the portrayal of French Canada, ethnic groups, women, and a very long list of "minorities" and other groupings of "minorities" and individuals.

In a public speech made just prior to the 1974 hearing, one CBC program director dealt with demands for recognition as follows:

> The CBC is attacked for not giving adequate coverage to young people or old people or ethnic groups or women, or labor, or business, or left-handed paper-hangers. I suppose the CBC has been poked and probed, swabbed and needled by just about every pressure group in existence, all demanding that their message be sent forth to the Canadian people, and all in one way or another trying to shape reality in their favour. I think in the future these pressures will intensify, but it is crucial that a public broadcasting system always remember its central responsibility is to all Canadians and its programming must be reflective of the nation, not reflective of only certain groups within the nation. (CBC 1974d, p 15)

In essence, it was the argument of much of the public criticism and many of the interventions that English Television programming actually was reflective of only certain groups within the nation, principally middle aged, middle class central Canadians of British origin.

And it is at this point that we see something very important about the management processes within English Television at the time of this case study. It seems that there was, in fact, considerable substance to some of the criticisms of CBC portrayal of groupings of individuals within the country. In some cases these were faults which had been noted by management but for which solutions had not yet been found. And in some cases there appeared to be a lack of awareness, either of the detailed program by program content of the network service, or of the direction or importance of changes in the social climate of the country.

Discussion of Planning Group handling of regional flow and of French Canada reflection ended with "needed more attention" observations. In those two cases, it could be argued that management actions -- new structural arrangements or special systems -- were possible. However, in dealing with the portrayal of smaller groupings of individuals, the number of "special funds" or other management devices quickly grows to unmanageable proportions. In dealing with "recognition" and "portrayal," we are really dealing with program content at a very detailed level. And program content involves not only management but also the producers and those working under their direction.

There was not a great deal of discussion between management and producers about such abstract problems as how best to reflect the multicultural nature of the society or how to begin to revise the portrayal of women. In fact, there was relatively little communication between management and producers on any subject, and most of that took place on an individual basis.

In the determination of program service content, the management of a television organization must rely heavily on its producers. It must be in communication with them -- to make its concerns known, to pick up ideas and suggestions, to gauge the calibre of its people, to see to their individual needs, and to maintain or build morale. In English Television during the case study period, communication between management and producers focused heavily on operational matters, principally on resource details. Both the limited amount of communication and its operational focus resulted at least to a significant degree from the imbalance between the level of the network's commitments and objectives and the level of resources, and from the amount of management attention devoted to that imbalance.

Careful monitoring, consideration, and planning of the content of an on-going service as extensive as English Television requires an immense effort, an enormous number of man hours per day. Throughout the case study period, English Television was severely over-extended -- in terms of budget, physical resources, and human resources. The result was a pervasive preoccupation with resource stretching and a distraction from program content -- not just in management, but at all levels, including program units.

Taking these comments on regognition and portrayal and observations about the handling of "nationalism" and "regionalism" issues into consideration in combination we find:

- a continuing need for accommodation between the French and English language and cultural communities in Canada,
- a structural separation between the French and English CBC operating divisions,
- limited interchange of programming between the French and English Television services of the CBC,
- the regulatory agency recommending additional mechanisms for ensuring reflection of the French and English cultural communities to each other,
- a proclaimed Government policy of multiculturalism in a bilingual context,
- the regulatory agency recommending additional mechanisms for ensuring reflection of the multicultural nature of the country,
- relatively widespread dissatisfaction with regognition and portrayal of new national cultural developments, regional identities, contemporary French Canada,

the multicultural diversity of the country, women, and other groupings of individuals within the nation,
- charges that the English Television "definition of Canadian reality" was excessively oriented towards middle aged, middle class central Canadians of British origin,
- a concentration on the part of the national broadcasting service, the regulatory agency, the Government, and organized groups on operating mechanisms for ensuring adequate recognition and portrayal of specific groups,
- a suggested practical limit on the usefulness of mechanisms to ensure balanced recognition and portrayal leading to a suggested need for close attention to the overall balance of program content,
- a large number of public requirements and expectations and of CBC objectives and priorities competing for finite resources,
- requirements for a high volume of resource allocation decisions, and
- limited and resource oriented contact between management and producers.

d) AUDIENCE ORIENTATION

Consideration of the audience orientation of English Television runs throughout Chapter 10 and sections 11(b) and 11(c). This section is intended to draw elements of those discussions together and add some additional observations.

Mass and Specialized Audience Balance

The CRTC decision termed audience orientation "the single most important and fundamental problem facing the CBC" (CRTC 1974b, p 7). Although the title of the section on audience orientation in the Commission's decision, "Mass Medium or Public Service?", implied a choice between mass and specialized audience orientation, the text of the decision clearly recognized a need for balance:

> Should the CBC tailor its program policy to attract the largest possible number of people? Or should it go to the other extreme and appeal only to a specialized, minority audience? Clearly, both these approaches are unsuitable. The CBC cannot become an "ivory broadcasting tower" broadcasting only to specialized and narrow interests. Neither can it simply conform to the wishes of the lowest common denominator. (CTRC 1974b, p 8)

Here a distinct difference between the public broadcasting systems of Canada and the United States emerges. US public television's role is the provision of "alternative" programs, alternative to the programs provided by the three commercial networks which were well established long before "public" television emerged. This alternative service role for US public broadcasting has been commonly taken to imply specialized or minority audiences, and there is significant internal resistance in the system against engaging in "mass audience" programming.

In Canada, the CBC began with the ultimate in mass audiences, a monopoly. This historical difference makes comparative analysis of the two systems extremely difficult, although the US system was the subject of considerable discussion at the CBC licence renewal hearing. (Nevertheless, much of that discussion (eg- CRTC 1974a, pp 242-7), indicates a striking lack of information about the US system on the part of both the CBC and the CRTC.)

The hearing debate about English Television's audience orientation is difficult to follow. It tended to get caught up in arguments about the meaning of the term "mass audience," in discussions of the value of "pure models" in devising strategy, and -- especially -- in consideration of CBC commercial activity. It is impossible to separate

CRTC concern about English Television's audience orientation from its concern about CBC commercial activity.

In its section interpreting "A Balanced Service," the English Television submission argued: "By its nature television is a mass medium, and a national television network directed to meet all tastes must program adequately in mass terms in order to use the television medium effectively" (CBC 1973b, p 1). But the CRTC decision suggested a distinction between "popular" and "mass audience" programming:

> The Commission agrees with the CBC that the national broadcasting service should endeavour to remain a popular service and that it should guard itself against becoming the preserve of esoteric minorities. However, the Commission is of the opinion that a preoccupation with mass audience concepts, stimulated by the contemporary North American marketing environment is inappropriate for a publicly supported broadcasting service. (CRTC 1974b, p 18)

The main submission of the Association of Television Producers and Directors (Toronto) placed the debate in an historical context, argued that "balance" must change as society changes, and then addressed itself to the future:

> In the 1930's, as we began to experiment with Canadian public broadcasting, we put some emphasis on the wants and needs of listeners as citizens. We established some important precedents in opinion and controversial programs. In the 1940's, we pushed those experiments further and in addition accented the wants and needs of listeners as patriots, in war and peace, and we took a new pride in all sorts of Canadian achievements at home and abroad. In the 1950's and '60's, without forgetting our earlier approaches, we accented the wants and needs of the viewers as consumers. During these years we accepted, in large measure, the dominant American conception of the uses of television, and, like the American networks, we pursued "mass" audiences with an intense and occasionally absurd ardour.
>
> It can be argued that in the 1960's these three traditions were always visible in our schedules, if sometimes incongruously combined. But, at this moment, in the early 1970's, they are seen in an uneasy balance. But, if so, it is because of major conflicts of expectations in the minds of both the viewers and the programmers. And not surprisingly. In the world of broadcasting, as in the larger world around it, we are involved in massive changes of thought, values and goals. It is not easy to determine the emerging trends. It is even more difficult to align schedules with new public attitudes which have not yet crystalized....
>
> The mix must reflect rapid changes in public concerns and life-styles and must particularly emphasize what will turn out to have been important to Canadians. It cannot be rigidly set, mathematically apportioned or prescribed by any doctine -- policical or cultural. (ATPDT 1974a, pp 15-6)
>
> It was a concern with mass consumer marketing in the '50's and '60's that gave rise to an obsession with mass audiences measured by numbers. But this approach is no longer appropriate; we will have to adjust to fractured markets and fractured majorities as we will to a crowded TV screen. Our new concern will have to be with the viewer as an individual rather than as a faceless consumer.
>
> We don't want to be misunderstood. We want to continue doing programs for large audiences. But some programs must be done for smaller audiences.... (ATPDT 1974a, pp 18)

These concerns relate to the "balance, range, and optimization" comments on "The Special Role of Public Broadcasting" in section 3(f), pages 35-39. And they relate to the Broadcasting Act mandate that the national broadcasting service should be "a balanced service of information, entertainment and enlightenment for people of different ages, interests and tastes covering the whole range of programming in fair proportion" (Act, s 3.g.i).

In the early 1970's, the determination of balance in English Television was complicated not only by the "massive changes of thought, values and goals" noted above but also by the rapidly changing broadcasting environment. Audience fragmentation by cable, the establishment of a third (commercial) English language network and of independent "third station" (also commercial) operations combined to impose a new role on CBC English Television. But it should be noted that these trends were not geographically uniform: in some parts of the country the CBC still provided the only television service as it had in the 1950's, and it had, therefore, to maintain within its schedules a full range of programming (as opposed to "alternative" services).

The nature of its mixed public and private distribution and coverage system also had a bearing on English Television's audience orientation. The submission of the private affiliates to the CRTC claimed that close to 40% of Canadians receive their CBC service through the 37 privately owned French and English affiliated stations (Affiliates, p 2). By the end of the case study period, a number of English Television affiliates were in serious financial trouble, and the affiliates' intervention did not appear to overstate their problem:

> With operating costs increasing much faster than network revenue, with increased competition from the extension of the CTV and TVA networks, from the newly licensed Global stations and from outside stations through cable systems, the very existence of many CBC affiliates is threatened. (Affiliates, p 8)

The affiliates argued that "The CBC must continue its policy of including the most popular entertainment programs" in its schedules. At the hearing, Commission Counsel John Lawrence suggested that one reason the CBC used predominantly US programming in the 8 to 9 pm period was "in order to accomodate the affiliates." The summary report on the hearing included with the decision misrepresents the reply made by W.C. Wingrove, station manager of the London affiliate, CFPL TV, and Chairman of the English Station Section of the Affiliates' Committee. The summary states: "Mr. Wingrove agreed that it is important to them and added...." (CRTC 1974b, part 2, p 98), and the implication is agreement with Lawrence's contention. The transcript, however, indicates Mr. Wingrove's reference to have been to CBC stations:

> MR. LAWRENCE: The point I am trying to get at here ... is that the reason the CBC has to program so predominantly U.S. programming in this time spot is in order to accommodate the affiliates.
>
> MR. WINGROVE: Oh, I think it is important to them in their own stations.... (CRTC 1974a, p 875, emphasis added)

Although the discussion moved on to an inconclusive debate about the effectiveness of "lead-in" scheduling, for our purposes here it is sufficient to note that maintaining the general level of affiliated station audiences was, in fact, one admitted factor influencing the scheduling of popular programs on English Television (CBC 1973b, p 2).

There is a general tendency or temptation for broadcasters everywhere to conceive of their audiences as undifferentiated masses. Anthony Smith's observations about the origins of these tendencies were noted in section 3(d), pages 31-33. And, as Willard Rowland has observed, these same tendencies have plagued the development of an effective "alternative programming" strategy in US public television:

> Eschewing the goal of amassing large audiences at every given moment, public broadcasters have opted for the alternative of reaching a variety of smaller, special interest audeinces, thereby hoping over time to build up a large cumulative following. The conceptual difficulty here is that the image of those audiences remains cast in the traditional mass society mold. The audience totals may well be thought of in smaller terms, but those terms continue to be expressed as numerical grosses...There is little willingness to examine the suggestion that at its root the vision carried around in the heads of many public broadcasters remains one of largely undifferentiated audience collectivities.

> Researchers, planners and administrators throughout public broadcasting have for too long allowed their images of audiences to be shaped by the simplistic statistical terminology of American public opinion polling and marketing research.... [T]he limited demographics and entirely quantitative methodologies of these research models do nothing to break down the basic mass-audience stereotypes that tempt all broadcasters, commercial and public, in all societies. (Rowland, p 7)

In order to focus this discussion back onto the Canadian situation, one of the CRTC comments quoted earlier bears repeating:

> The CBC must not consider its audience as an agglomeration of 20 million more or less accessible revenue-producing consumers, but rather as an active community of people with real and varying communication needs. (CRTC 1974b, p 11)

Such observations tend to imply an exclusive concern with undifferentiated mass audiences, but the English Television submission argued that the CBC, as a public broadcaster, must program for both mass and special audiences (CBC 1973b, pp 2, 5). In this regard, it is useful to note a perceptive comment in the intervention of the Toronto Producers and Directors:

> We are conscious of the fact that the old rhetoric of "mass audience" versus "minority audience" is obsolete, and that now such a dualism is an obstacle to intelligent planning. As we did in radio, we must now in television think differently about audiences.... (ATPDT 1974 a, p 12)

This brings us back again to "balance, range, and optimization" and the arguments of section 3(f), and to the two clusters of range dimensions, loosely grouped in audience and in content terms. It is important to distinquish between these two clusters because, although they are interrelated, they are not identical.

Content Balance

Balance and range of programming in "content" terms is easily gauged by analysis of program schedules. Figure 11-3 provides a content analysis, by CRTC program categories, of English Television network programming in representative winter weeks for the years 1970 through 1974. Note that the figure gives content by category as a percentage of total hours of network service, and that the total hours increased by 5 hours per week during the period, and that Canadian content increased steadily. Figure 11-3 reveals certain trends, or adjustments in the "balance" of the schedule along content dimensions: more information programming, particularly informal education; less light entertainment, especially light drama; and an extension in the volume and range of arts, letters, and sciences programming. There is a relationship between these trends and the increases in hours of service and in Canadian content. The increases in informal education and in hours of service were linked: SESAME STREET alone occupied 5 hours per week in the network schedule. The reduction in light drama was linked to increases in Canadian content: light drama imported from the US decreased from 21.5 hours per week in 1970 to 13.5 in 1974. However, these linkages are less direct than might be supposed, and they do not imply direct causal relationships.

What is of interest here is the following question: Were these adjustments in the balance and range of programming the result of deliberate attempts to cover "the whole range of programming in fair proportion," or were they the consequence of operational factors such as the commitment to higher levels of Canadian content?

The English Television submission commented, I suggest quite accurately, that "the weekly schedule in its basic summer and winter forms is the matrix in which the aspirations and constraints of the television network are reconciled" (CBC 1973b, p 3). Large scheduling boards (similar in format to Figure 7-8) hung on "fourth floor" office

Figure 11-3. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTATIVE WINTER WEEK NETWORK PROGRAMMING, 1970 - 1974[1]

CRTC Content Category	% of Total Network Hours				
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
INFORMATION & ORIENTATION					
News & News Commentaries	3.7	3.0	3.7	4.5	5.1
Public Affairs, Talks, etc.	15.9	17.4	13.9	14.0	16.4
Religious[2]	-[2]	-[2]	0.7	0.7	2.0
Formal Education	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3
Informal Education	15.5	27.7	24.8	26.9	24.3
Subtotal	38.6	51.5	46.4	49.4	51.1
LIGHT ENTERTAINMENT					
Music & Dance	2.8	4.0	4.7	5.3	5.2
Drama, Poem, & Story	40.7	25.3	30.2	24.6	25.0
Quiz & Games	2.1	0.7	0.7	1.3	1.3
Variety / Music Hall	4.9	6.1	6.3	5.6	1.3
Subtotal	50.5	36.1	41.9	36.8	32.8
ARTS, LETTERS, & SCIENCES					
Music & Dance	2.1	2.0	1.7	2.0	4.0
Drama, Poem, & Story	-	0.3	-	1.0	1.3
Criticism of the Arts	-	-	-	0.7	1.3
Science Research	0.7	2.7	2.0	2.0	1.3
Subtotal	2.8	5.0	3.7	5.7	7.9
SPORTS & OUTDOORS	8.1	7.4	8.0	8.0	8.2
Total Hours of Network Service	*71.2*	*74.2*	*74.5*	*75.2*	*76.2*
Canadian Content	59.3%	65.6%	67.8%	68.7%	72.1%

Notes: 1. "Representative Winter Weeks" are statistical summaries of the basic block schedules. Adjustments are made to compensate for planned content differences from one actual winter week to another, but news and other "specials" are excluded from the analysis.

2. "Religious" programs were not reported separately until 1972.

Sources: 1970-1973 figures from CBC 1973b, p 4; 1974 figures from CBC 1974b, p 37.

walls, and draft block schedules (on CBC form 581) circulated within the Planning Group constantly. Form 581 was the basic focus of the work of the group -- including its resource allocation and production planning activities. The block schedule, and its "projection" on a program episode basis, had to be finalized before the Planning System production feasibility studies (described in section 9(f), pages 114-117) could begin. The submission noted this connection:

> Above all, the schedule reconciles ideal program aspirations with production reality. Programming from eight major production centres and from independent producers must be harmonized with procured foreign programming -- and all within the financial framework of a fiscal year detached from the calendar of the television season. (CBC 1973b, p 5)

The Canadian content objective obviously had some effect on the shifts in program balance and range. The reduction in US light drama in the schedule was a factor in the shift towards more information and serious programming, but so too was the manner in which that imported programming was replaced. The network's problems in producing popular (and, hence, commercially effective) light entertainment programs were noted earlier. Under such circumstances, an intensive talent and program development in that area would have been very expensive. But the increase in information programming cannot be taken as strictly an economy measure. The major thrust into the exploration of Canadian history -- in THE TENTH DECADE, FIRST PERSON SINGULAR, THE DAYS BEFORE YESTERDAY, IMAGES OF CANADA, and THE NATIONAL DREAM -- was not inexpensive. And the expansion of information programming in prime time included procured programming which did not contribute to Canadian content: THE WORLD AT WAR was a British procurement.

Consequently, it would appear that in the reconciliation of "aspirations" and "constraints" in the schedule there were deliberate attempts to extend the range and to maintain, and in some cases shift, the balance of programming in content terms -- along interest and taste dimensions.

Audience Balance

Balance and range of programming in "audience" terms can also be gauged by analysis of program schedules, but the modes of analysis are different. One approach is to examine the placement of programs within the block schedule; the other is to consider the network's audience itself.

The first approach raises related questions about the "lead-in" scheduling strategy and about "undifferentiated mass" audience orientation. Although excerpts from the submission's "General Program Statement" dealing with the structure of the network program schedule appeared in the discussion of US programming in section 11(b), portions of them bear repeating here:

> Each night's programs are arranged in a sequence designed to attract and hold an audience -- by amusing it in the early evening and by leading it on to more intellectually demanding fare as the evening advances and the "family" audience evolves into an "adult" audience....
>
> Experiments in changing the traditional pattern have in the past not proved encouraging, and any move earlier for the national news would place it in competition with the commercial network programs which many viewers would have started watching earlier and would not want to leave....
>
> The nine-and-a-half weekly hours of imported programs in prime time are important in attracting audiences (and therefore in maintaining competitive effectiveness) as well as in contributing to the balance of the service. This mass audience programming, used as a lead-in, attracts many viewers to more specialized programs and generates much of the commercial revenue which is required to support the affiliated stations and CBC program production. (CBC 1973b, p 2)
>
> The schedule must combine popular imported programs, information programs, and programs of specialized appeal in a way that will maximize the audiences for each. Programs of specialized appeal must not be banished to programming "ghettos", nor can they be placed in time periods where they would interrupt audience build-up, or where they would be exposed to excessively destructive competition. Conversely, the need at times to provide viewers with real programming alternatives means that some specialized programs ... must face very strong competition. (p 3)

The statement actually reveals two audience orientations and again raises the matter of balance. One orientation was towards a singular mass audience: each night's programs are arranged in a sequence designed to attract and hold "an" audience. But there was also an orientation toward "programs of specialized appeal."

The CRTC concern was that the balance which had been established was excessively oriented towards mass audiences. In its serious questioning of the effectiveness of the "lead-in" strategy (eg- CRTC 1974a, pp 876-81), the Commission seemed to be suggesting that the placement of the popular US programming was much more a function of a preoccupation with mass audiences during peak television viewing periods than of concern for attracting viewers to more specialized programs. Observation during the fieldwork period did not reveal any deliberate preoccupation with undifferentiated mass audiences; to the extent that the audience balance of the schedule was weighted towards such mass audiences, such an orientation seemed to be more a function of operational factors than of a conscious preoccupation with mass audiences -- that is, more a matter of default than intent.

Audience Interests and Tastes

Earlier it was noted that there is an interconnection between balancing in content and in audience terms. Specifically, in balancing to serve an audience of "people of different ages, interests and tastes," there is significant overlap of "interest and taste" and "content" dimensions. Establishing appropriate balance and range in content terms goes a long way towards ensuring such balance and range in interest and taste terms. Examination of the role of audience objectives and of audience research within English Television suggests that balance and range were principally established along content dimensions.

Within English Television the natural tendency to think of audiences as undifferentiated collectives was at least as visible at the program unit level as within management. Evidence at this tendency emerges from the target audience objectives specified by producers in their Program Proposals. Statistical analysis of those objectives has not proved useful, but some general observations can be made. The revised Proposal asked whether a given program was intended to reach "a general mass audience" or "a more sharply defined audience"; "mass audience" responses were significantly predominant, even within those classes of programs considered by management to be important in serving specialized interests. It asked for the age composition of the target audience; in some cases this section was left blank. The Proposal asked whether a program "was aimed at viewers with any specific level of education"; the responses were overwhelmingly "no". It asked about "any other special characteristics of the Target Audience"; detailed comments in this connection were exceptional. All of this is quite understandable: the shifts in the network's role were taking place not as a result of conscious decisions to reconsider "mass audience" concepts but because of changing circumstances -- audience fragmentation and demands for adjustments in program balance and range. Under such circumstances it would seem that deliberate attempts to constantly reconsider audience orientation were required, and that such reconsideration -- though admittedly difficult -- should have taken place both at the production and management levels, and that it should have been coordinated.

In practice, there seemed to be little coordinated consideration of target audience objectives in program planning. Although the "Production Schedule," "Production Resources Request," and "Program Cost Estimate" sections of Program Proposals were frequently the subject of review and revision, such was not the case with the program purpose or target audience specifications in the "Program Objectives" section.

Objectives for the network existed at two levels: at a very high level in corporate and divisional objectives, and at a low level in individual program objectives. Corporate and divisional objectives did not have a specific audience orientation. They dealt with matters such as the overall quality of programming, the strengthening of program areas such as News and Drama, and internal matters such as training. But middle level objectives, to connect the individual program objectives to the goals of the service as a whole, were notably absent. Such objectives could have served to underscore a mass audience orientation, but this was not the case. There were no overall audience rating or share targets, and no minimum audience size targets. The question of acceptable minimum audience sizes was discussed informally from time to time, but the setting of specific minimum targets -- such as the 500,000 or 1,000,000 figures noted by the CRTC (CRTC 1974b, p 18) -- was not considered relevant to the planning of English Television's "balanced" service. The question of such targets came under careful consideration during the reviews of the Program Evaluation System and of audience research reporting described in section 8(d), pages 97-99. In those discussions, perhaps more than at any other time or place in this study, those of us involved in "project" work were able to sound out the audience orientation of English Television management. It has been interesting to replay the recordings of those sessions. My role in those situations was to help attempt to devise ways of assisting producers and the Planning Group in reaching their audience objectives, goals, or aspirations. What emerges from a review of those discussions is a clear concern for programming to other than "mass audience" collectives, for specialized audiences, and for individuals. The "native understanding" of special CBC responsibilities described in section 11(a) emerges here, as does a strong sense of frustration about what were perceived to be the inevitable complexities of the service balancing task.

Balancing Overload

Institutional case studies experience problems at points such as this. As noted in section 5(b), page 49, the decision making process of a public organization is a most difficult thing to analyze: not only may there be hidden factors which are impossible to pinpoint, but rarely is any one person, including a participant observer, in possession of every single element involved in any given decision. This may well be the case in this study's examination of the network's audience orientation. There are some pieces which "don't fit," apparent inconsistencies for which there are no observed explanations. There are two ways of proceeding in such instances: one is to leave the matter as an open question; the other is to speculate -- to construct an explanation based on what actually was observable. Such a constructed explanation may be Those portions of this analysis of audience orientation which follow are speculative explanation. The pattern of connection of interrelated factors suggested is not simple, but it is based on relatively extensive exposure to the decision making processes under virtually ideal participant observation conditions. And, in my view, the characteristics of the decision making processes in English Television during the case study period which this explanation suggests form an essential part of the arguments about commercial activities and about financing which follow.

It is not especially important for this study to assess the appropriateness of the audience range and balance of the network during 1970-1974. A static analysis at a point in history is of little value in the development of generalizations. In addition, there are two practical factors which argue against making such an assessment. One is that the total service optimizing process -- the search for a balance point common to a large number of aspiration and constraint dimensions -- is an exceedingly complex process. The other factor is that differing assessments of the appropriateness of the balanced service provided in the 1970-1974 period were a principal element in the public conflict between the CBC and the CRTC. The balancing process required is a delicate one, and it seems useless to contribute in any way to the polarization of the positions taken by the Corporation and the Commission.

Both the absence of any "mass audience" target objectives and management concern for specialized audiences and individuals have been noted. The argument that conscious attempts were being made to extend range and adjust balance in program content terms was also made earlier, and the connection between balance in content and balance in audience interest and taste has been noted. I suggest that the interplay of these factors was such as to produce a reasonable though certainly not optimum balance in the service, and that in their 1974 discussions both the CBC and the CRTC demonstrated a striking lack of understanding not only of each other's aspirations and problems but also of the relative inevitability of at least the locus of the service optimization point chosen under the prevailing conditions.

It would seem reasonable to suggest that there is a limit to the number of factors which can be considered in any given decision making process. In this case there is nothing to suggest that the Planning Group was not attempting to provide a completely balanced service. The piece that does not fit is the fact that there was little evidence of deliberate attempts to ensure appropriate balance and range specifically in audience terms. To some extent, this may have resulted from a recognition of the relationship between balance and range in program content and in audience interest and taste terms. But observation of the total decision making activity pattern suggests another explanation -- a balancing "overload."

The balancing process in the CBC was clearly significantly more complex than in any other broadcasting service in North America, if not in the world. English Television had the unique responsibilities of all public broadcasters to serve all segments of the public. In this respect it shared the specialized interest and alternative programming role of public broadcasting in the United States. But it also carried a special set of responsibilities as a national cultural institution that were not unconnected with a need for the sharing of common experiences by large audiences. These two factors implied a requirement for a wider range of services than was the case either in the commercial networks or in other educational or public broadcasting services. Two other sets of factors further complicated the balance seeking process. One of them was the need to balance along dimensions which were uniquely important in the Canadian context, notably geographic and cultural dimensions. The requirement for regional balance, for instance, was infinitely more important in the CBC than in PBS. And the requirement for cultural range was much greater in a nation which had begun to think of itself as a "cultural mosaic" than it would have been in a "melting pot" context. The other set of complicating factors were the special operating circumstances of the CBC itself, notably its unique combination of public service and commercial advertising activities, and the severe imbalance between its service commitments and its resources.

It may be, therefore, that there was an overload of dimensions in the schedule itself, that as many dimensions were being balanced as could be accommodated simultaneously, and that the consideration of significantly more audience information could have had little effect under the circumstances. The overall dimensions of the schedule, just over 76 hours per week in 1973/74, implied some limits on range, particularly in a situation where the balance requirements were so diverse.

It is also possible that there was an overload of dimensions in the schedule decision making process, that as many factors were being balanced as could be handled simultaneously, and that additional input would have overloaded the processes. Such an explanation is certainly not inconsistent with the problem of "distraction" noted in section 11(b).

Observation suggests that there were, in fact, overloads both on the schedule itself and on the decision making processes, and it seems important to examine the implications of those conditions for the network's ability to maintain appropriate balance and range in programming in changing social and broadcasting environments.

Under such changing social and broadcasting conditions it would seem to be important that all available tools should have been used to ensure appropriate balance and range in audience terms. The suggestion here is that one set of such tools, largely unused during the case study period, could have been provided by communication research. Although such a suggestion may be dismissed as "to be expected" within a study such as this, the suggestion of a more central role for audience and other types of communication research is not made lightly or without serious consideration.

Throughout the case study period there was concern on the part of some producers and managers that there might be an "audience age" problem. "People of different ages" are specifically mentioned in the Broadcasting Act as a consideration for the CBC in establishing its "balanced" service (Act, s 3.g.i). Towards the end of the fieldwork period I undertook a voluntary and preliminary analysis of the age characteristics of English Television audiences. The findings themselves suggest the possibility of a severe audience balance problem. Those findings on the age characteristics of the CBC

English Television audience in the Toronto area and the reaction to them are considered in detail in section 14(b), but for purposes of this discussion it is sufficient to note that:

- the overall adult audience average age had increased at lest 4.5 years more over a 4 year period than had the average age of the population,
- viewing of English Television by young adults in the 18-24 and 25-34 year old groups had declined significantly over the period,
- management felt it should be aware of the problem but did not feel that it should change programs for that end alone, and
- no further investigation of the apparent problem was requested.

As noted at the beginning of this section, the English Television schedule was already being balanced along a set of content and audience dimensions unique in North American television. Ensuring appropriate audience balance by age may have been a practical impossibility: age may have been one dimension more than the balance of a 76 hour per week schedule could accommodate. Even so, I suggest that overload on decision making processes was the principal factor inhibiting deliberate attention to audience age characteristics. The characteristics of those processes and the consequences of the volume and nature of decisions required is summarized in Chapter 13.

Chapter 14 is devoted to an examination of research utilization patterns and of the implications for researchers. But it is important to note here that audience research was not a primary source of input to the service balancing process, that there were no clearly visible explanations for that situation, and that it is possible that an overload both on the dimensions of the schedule itself and on the decision making processes may have been a significant factor contributing to that research utilization condition.

Comments: Audience Orientation

Although it is possible to consider program content issues such as those in sections 11(a) through 11(c) relatively independent of resource levels, both the level of operations funding and commercial activity must be taken into account in considering English Television's audience orientation.

For English Television throughout the 1970-1974 period there was no choice to be made between mass and specialized audience service. It was both, and the important questions were really about balance.

Section 11(a) noted that contributing to national unity seemed seldom dealt with in isolation or in abstract terms. In much the same way, audience orientation was seldom dealt with in isolation from other considerations. There were, however, relatively more general discussions of that orientation and of general factors to be taken into account in schedule construction, in the service balancing process.

Among the factors entering the balancing process we find:

- mandate requirements that the national broadcasting service be predominantly Canadian in content and character,
- a Corporate commitment to 70% Canadian content,
- an operational requirement to balance between Canadian and imported programming,
- expectations of greater prominence for Canadian programming,
- mandate requirements to provide balanced opportunity for expression of differing views on matters of public concern,
- responsibilities arising from the special role of public broadcasting for balance and fairness,
- traditional objectives of providing public service programming,

- a tradition of providing for provincial and national free-time political telecasts,
- mandate requirements to contribute to national unity,
- a tradition of providing actuality coverage of national events,
- an expectation of increased provision of shared viewing experiences,
- a need to promote understanding between French and English Canada,
- mandate requirements to contribute to regional flow and exchange,
- a Corporate commitment to decentralization of production,
- an operational requirement to balance network production between Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Halifax, and St. John's and, subject to production capacity availability, from other centres,
- an expectation both outside and inside the CBC of greater decentralization of production,
- mandate requirements to contribute to the expression of Canadian identity,
- demands for recognition of regional identities,
- an expectation of talent and program development equalized on a regional basis,
- an expectation of increased intra-regional program services,
- demands for decentralization of schedule decision making,
- demands for increased opportunities for the provision of local service programming,
- an operational requirement to balance between network, regional, and local programming,
- an operational requirement to achieve commercial revenue quotas at CBC owned stations,
- an operating requirement to provide for French Television production at ESD locations,
- an operating requirement to provide for limited Northern Service production,
- an expectation of recognition of and contribution to a renaissance in the arts in Canada,
- an expectation of contributions to the development of the private Canadian film industry,
- an expectation of balance between CBC and independently produced Canadian programs,
- mandate requirements to cover the full range of programming in fair proportion,
- responsibilities arising from the special role of public broadcasting for optimizing program service balance and range,
- an operational requirement to balance between programming from News; Current Affairs; Agriculture and Resources; Arts, Science and Religious; Schools and Youth; Drama; Music and Variety; Sports; and Features and Special Events programming departments,
- demands for recognition of regional identities,
- demands for recognition of the role of women,
- demands for recognition of multicultural groups,
- demands for recognition of so-called "minorities,"
- a mandate requirement to balance for people of different ages,
- a mandate requirement to balance for people of different interests,
- a mandate requirement to balance for people of different tastes,
- an operational requirement to achieve commercial revenue quotas at the network level,
- a tradition of balancing between commercial and "sustaning" or noncommercial programs,
- an operational requirement to provide a popular programming service to help sustain the private affiliated stations,
- an operational requirement to balance between "reserved" programming to be carried by all stations and "available" programming to be carried by CBC stations during periods when affiliates were released to carry either the available programming or their own commercial reveune generating programming,
- some evidence and some further assumptions regarding audience viewing patterns,
- competitive scheduling considerations,
- agreements with the provinces for the provision of instructional television service to schools,
- national commitments to the provision of "host broadcaster" coverage of international events taking place in Canada,
- an operational requirement to provide live and delayed program services at appropriate local times to 7 time zones,

- finite total hours of service,
- finite production facility resources,
- finiate financial resources,
- finite human resources, and
- an expectation of imagination, excellence, and distinction in program services.

Considering the balancing process itself we find:

- continuing attempts to balance all factors together within the framework of the block program schedule "matrix,"
- the allocation of financial resources entering as a major consideration throughout the balancing process,
- extremely few programs intended to serve one objective in isolation,
- incremental increases in Canadian content,
- incremental increases in production decentralization,
- deliberate shifts in the content balance of the overall service,
- a "specialized audience" orientation associated most directly with public service broadcasting "traditions," mandate requirements and demands arising from mandate interpretation,
- a "mass audience" orientation associated most directly with the operational requirements to earn commercial revenue and sustain the private affiliated stations,
- apparent limits to the number of objectives and priorities which could be similtaneously balanced, the balancing process, and
- an apparent preoccupation with scheduling and resource constraints.

e) COSTS AND FINANCING

Level of Resources

At the public hearing one member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Broadcasting League (CBL) voiced a concern that he shared with many. Mr. Marwicke said: "I think it is too easy simply to say, 'With more money we get more programming.'" (CRTC 1974a, p 360)

This comment contrasted sharply with the thrust of both the League's intervention submission and its verbal presentation at the hearing. But it was representative of a common perception. That same perception surfaced, for instance, in a letter to the editor of THE GLOBE AND MAIL: "After all, the CBC has always had relatively large resources behind it...." (Globe 1974c)

The 1974 licence renewal process did, however, begin to deal with the level of funding in a manner quite different from past patterns.

In introducing the CBL presentation, Chairman Juneau paid homage to the League, and to Dr. Frederick Rainsberry, its new Chairman, "as one of the very important artisans and artists and administrators in a very important field, namely children's programming in Canada." He continued, saying that "the Commission is, of course, very pleased that the Broadcasting League, which [has] such an important history in this country, has you as its new Chairman. (CRTC 1974a, pp 337-8)

Appearing with Dr. Rainsberry was Dr. Graham Spry, who had been instrumental in the formation of the League some 34 years earlier. Juneau expressed the Commission's "enormous admiration" and "esteem" for the founder of the League, who had prepared its 1974 submission. "I think that the country owes him and his original colleagues an enormous debt ... which we remain conscious of." "[H]is work and his determination, his lucidity, his vigour, remains an inspiration for all of us" (CRTC 1974a, p 338).

One CBL concern was protection of the CBC from undue interference. That provoked the exchange about conditional licences discussed under "US Programming" in section 11(a).

But the League's major concern was the CBC's level of funding. Its submission dealt at length with the origins of the Corporation's financial problems. The presentation at the hearing contained the following observations and prompted the following exchanges:

> MR. SPRY: .... [I]f a text for what we are discussing today were necessary, you sir [Chairman Juneau], provided it in that remarkable Toronto address last autumn. The Commission, you stated, "will continue to recognize the importance of the CBC as a national service that helps to maintain some independence from the commercial environment for the Canadian broadcasting system."
>
> I had then thought of presenting a series of arguments [leading] to the conclusion that you also came to yesterday morning in your opening remarks, that the existence of the CBC is a paramount necessity of the national life of this people.... (CRTC 1974a, pp 339-40)
>
> Well you spoke, sir, of illness, of an emerging technological cancer [cable]. Do we blame somebody else for this? When I first heard of [problems in broadcasting services in] the north, could I help but ask: Who is responsible for this? When I hear complaints about the lack of Canadian programming in prime time, I think of the position of affiliates who would be deprived of advertising, I would think of the CBC and its struggle to do enormous things with such limited revenue.
>
> Forty years ago the principles of Canadian broadcasting and a national strategy about communications were legislated by a unanimous House of Commons. Every parliament since then has endorsed them. They were endorsed by parliament and defined by law, but government after government after government has failed to provide the means, and for forty or forty-two years or more we have devoted too many of our efforts to weakening those principles and compromising that national strategy. (pp 342-3)
>
> .... I recall you quoting George Ferguson, that all Canadian policies of great moment were bound to be difficult, to be risky, and to be costly.... But this brings us, as all these things bring us, to money, and programming is indeed the result, and the first consideration; but the funds have been persistently inadequate, and owing to inflation will provide less than more future program production by the CBC at present levels of income. (pp 347-8)
>
> [W]ithout any apology or whatever, our submission suggests ... that the programming of the national service be more generously and adequately financed, ... that we proceed by stages as a people through the government to set aside one one- hundred-and-twentieth of the gross national product ... by 1980 in 1980 dollars [and] that this be related to CBC programming. This five-sixth of one percent of the G.N.P. would provide of the order of one billion dollars. That is my punch line, sir, thank you.
>
> THE CHAIRMAN: It does have some impact. (pp 348-9)
>
> DR. FRYE: I was just wondering about the tenor of so many of the briefs that have been submitted to us in connection with this hearing, that so many of them appear to be concerned, particularly in regard to CBC television, with a certain ossifying of the creative and imaginative processes ... and I was wondering whether you felt that regarding the deficiencies of the CBC as primarily a matter of government policy and financing would be adequate in the light of some of the very clearly articulated and concrete representations that have been made to us. (p 350)

> MR. RAINSBERRY: .... The difficulty it seems to me has been that the CBC has not had sufficient funds and opportunity to deepen its awareness of the social processes and contemporary attitudes amoung Canadians. There have been attempts in the past to do this, and I believe the conviction is there and the sincerety is there, but owing to the many pressures that are upon them to meet the filling of a schedule with the limited resources available to them, they have not been able to do so.... (p 358)
>
> I think in that connection if there were more time and money for the planning of the programs that come on the air, they would be better. If you take a series like Images of Canada, for example, which had a very long period of planning and great care and thought was put into it, it emerges as the kind of quality programming that we are speaking of. Now what I would like to see is relief of the pressures so that the schedule can be met on the one hand, while there is time and opportunity for creative people to grow and develop within the Corporation. I see that opportunity, the lead time for growth and development, declining as the pressures of competition and the limitation [of] resources increases. (pp 370-1)

The Commission did not challenge the thrust of the CBL presentation. In fact, the Vice Chairman and Chairman introduced comparative figures to underline the League's point.

> MR. BOYLE: .... There is one other question I would like to ask Dr. Spry. When you ended with your resounding figure of one billion dollars, how much money will we spend in Canada on education in 1980?
>
> DR. SPRY: It is ten to twelve billion now .... and by 1980 it would be 25 billion, 26 billion dollars in taxation revenue from all levels of government....
>
> THE CHAIRMAN: The amount of money in 1972 as supplied by the federal government to the provincial governments for educational purposes was $667,000,000; that is three times, in 1972-73 at least, three times what the government provides to the CBC now.
>
> DR. SPRY: .... By 1980 we are going to have all sorts of expansions of channels over which programs could flow. Are we going to spend money to see that some of those programs are our own? And therefore I say a billion. (pp 364-5)

Throughout this chapter and section 10(f), sharp differences between the CBC and the CRTC emerged. The differences were not over the fundamental objectives of public broadcasting in Canada: they were matters of strategy, tactics, approach, and technique. And there was substantial agreement that the CBC's resources were not adequate to meet the coverage and programming demands made of the Corporation. Included in the decision were these comments:

> Broadcasting in Canada is particularly difficult and costly. The country is vast. The broadcasting system must operate in English and in French. Mountains and coastlines present formidable transmission problems. Many regions, the North particularly, are enormously large and sparsely populated.
>
> Most of all, Canada adjoins the most prosperous, prolific and powerful nation in the world in terms of popular entertainment and information. (CRTC 1974b, p 71)
>
> Insofar as the CBC is concerned, the Commission, as the agency established by Parliament to supervise and regulate the Canadian broadcasting system, has no hesitation in saying that in its considered opinion the CBC must, as a priority matter, be enabled to increase the quantity and improve the quality of its Canadian programming capability immediately, and to reduce significantly the disproportionate influence of merchandising on its program policies. (p 74)
>
> It is unfair to demand of the Board of Directors, and of the executive and staff of the Corporation that they continue to concentrate their efforts on administrative and managerial efficiency -- as they have been forced to do for some

> years -- in the absence of the tangible public support they need to improve the program services of the Corporation, to demonstrate that they can fulfil the mandate entrusted to them and to achieve the level of creativity and inspiration that is expected of them by the public. (p 75)

In section 10(c), pages 120-123, the highly critical nature of the Committee on Television intervention and of articles published in SATURDAY NIGHT prior to the hearing was noted. In December 1975 Morris Wolfe, a principal COT member and author of some of the original critical articles, wrote an update, "A Progress Report on the CBC," for SATURDAY NIGHT. Part of that article dealt with financing:

> What most of these things come down to is money -- lots of money. That's where those of us who were members of the Committee on Television were dead wrong two years ago. We assumed the CBC could be doing much more than it was with the budget it had.
>
> It can't. The more I've talked to producers and directors, the more I've seen of programmes being made, the more convinced I've become that the CBC needs a massive increase in its budget. You can only do so much on a shoestring. Graham Spry of the Canadian Broadcasting League suggested at the CBC's licence renewal hearings that the Corporation should have an annual budget of about one billion dollars. That may be too high, but it's certainly in the right direction. If CBC television is to get out of commercials entirely and to do the other things the CRTC has directed it to do (to say nothing of what I've directed it to do), I would say the corporation is going to need roughly double its present $242-million budget. If we get the kind of CBC I think it's possible to have, it'll be a bargain at the price. The trouble has been, as John Hirsch puts it, that Canadians "have kept expecting to get Tiffany wares from Woolworth's." (Wolfe 1975, p 83)

Despite the emergence of some consensus on the appropriateness of the level at which the CBC was funded, there were few clear calls for more funds.

Efficiency

The most common qualification attached to observations about the level of CBC funding was that one solution to the problem was to improve CBC efficiency. The CRTC decision, for instance, commented: "It goes without saying that the cost of operation, like that of any large organization, can be reduced. Everyone has 'horror' stories about real or imagined CBC extravagances" (CRTC 1974b, p 74). After the hearing, THE HALIFAX MAIL STAR editorialized that "before more funds are provided the CBC should do better with what it has" (Hfx MS). An editorial in THE REGINA LEADER POST suggested much the same: "One answer, of course, would be for CBC to do some energetic streamlining to eliminate bureaucratic waste where it occurs, and run a tighter ship" (Reg LP).

The question of efficiency was dealt with at great length under "Canadian Content" in section 11(a). In particular, it seems important to recall here the contentions of Val Clery and Morris Wolfe that a CBC preoccupation with efficiency was, in fact, taking its toll in substandard programs.

One review of the draft of the "CBC efficiency" portion of section 11(a) termed it an "apology" for the CBC. It was and is not intended as such. Nor was that analysis intended to argue that the CBC was perfectly efficient. Quotation of an exchange between Juneau and Picard at the hearing may help put the question in perspective:

> THE CHAIRMAN: .... [Y]ou hear and I hear all the time, people saying, you know, I went into a CBC building and there were so many people doing nothing, or I was interviewed by the CBC and there were seventeen people around, and that sort of thing. I suppose that you don't mean that there are no more reductions in cost

that can take place.

> MR. PICARD: Two things on that. There have been a lot of horror stories told about the CBC in respect to that. What people sometimes don't think is that we are giving a different kind of service than the private system....
>
> [L]arge organizations have not found yet what I would call "fine tuning" in management. You know, you go somewhat brutally, like the government treats us brutally by saying 16 million less, find it somewhere....
>
> CBC is like an orchestra, and maybe the private system is like a band, or maybe if I wanted to be nicer I would say it's like chamber music; it's a very different thing. And you don't ask the sixth violin in an orchestra to disappear because you think that five is large enough; or the triangle guy to increase his productivity because he's been playing only three minutes during the symphony. (Laughter)
>
> [T]he myth of "feather-bedding" in the negative sense ... has been described so often... [B]ring our union in and they will tell you, no, it's wrong.
>
> The fact is that the Corporation is geared for drama, large drama; it's geared for symphony orchestra; it's geared for ballet, for large productions, for the Olympics, for the Commonwealth Games; and obviously when you come to interview one person some of that's true.
>
> THE CHAIRMAN: Well you should perhaps take your example from other government departments where there is no excessive staff.
>
> MR. PICARD: I didn't want to frighten anybody here. (Laughter) (CRTC 1974a, pp 1463-6)

Nevertheless, despite agreement on the impossibility of total efficiency, and endorsation by the Commission of CBC efforts to increase cost effectiveness, and agreement on the need for additional funds, the final paragraphs of the CRTC decision section on financing looked forward to further CBC cost reductions:

> The CBC needs significant, enthusiastic and tangible public support to increase production, to improve the quality of programs and to extend and improve the facilities required to provide a better service to all Canadians....
>
> Indeed the Commission is convinced that with such public support and enthusiasm, the CBC will be better able to achieve administrative improvements and cost reductions while at the same time attaining new levels of creative productivity.... (CRTC 1974b, p 75)

It seems at least possible that the continuing preoccupation with potential cost reductions within the existing CBC budget distracted considerable attention from the basic financial problem: given the prevailing interpretations of its mandate, the CBC was cleary and severely underfinanced relative to the requirements and expectations of it. Wolfe suggested doubling the budget, and Spry argued for an increase by a factor of four. Maintaining and improving efficiency, though important, seemed to hold little promise of closing such a gap between expectations and resources.

Case Study Observations

My own background for examining the level of CBC finances and its influence on the management and operation of English Television includes the opportunities to study the financing of public television in the United States which were outlined in section 8(c), pages 95-96. Both the work with Stanford University, the Aspen Institute Program on

Communications and Society, and the Ford Foundation on the 1972 study, "The Financing of Public Television," and the reexamination required for my Aspen work in 1975 provided extensive opportunities to review the budgets of CPB, of PBS, of the national production centres, and of individual stations.

Opportunities to assess the level of funding of the CBC during the case study period were confined to English Television but, as outlined in sections 8(c) and (d), pages 95-103 and 95-103, within those boundaries I did have a chance to investigate spending in a wide range of areas at a variety of levels within ESD.

My period as an Associate Producer in Vancouver provided first hand exposure to the financial condition and needs of local Current Affairs program units. Informal assistance to producer friends in Toronto widened that exposure to include network programs and other types of local programming.

During the 1972-74 period of work with the Planning Group, I had continuing access to the English Television approved operating budget and to the regional Planning Books. Budget reviews were an integral part of virtually every Program Evaluation System deliberation at which I was present. While providing assistance with planning for the 1974/75 program year, I had an opportunity to review -- for my own interest -- both the requested and approved budgets of network programs approved for production. A lack of available funds to meet our system cost projection terminated the work of the Program Content Supervision Task Force with which I was associated. Financial concerns prompted my assignment to study the potential impact of Global Television Network operations. Helping prepare the briefing book for the 1974 hearing involved both extensive analysis of available data and the gathering of additional financial information. The study of technical manpower in Winnipeg, Halifax, and Vancouver was an efficiency study. Assistance in planning for an English Television CBC station in Windsor consisted primarily of budgeting for local Current Affairs programs.

But, more than anything else, my review of resources in nine so-called "HOURGLASS" program units across the country brought me into detailed consideration of English Television finances. This was my final work for the Planning Group, and by then I was in a position to view the problems from the perspectives both of the producers in the regional units and of the Planning Group itself. This proved to be useful because I had been asked to make any general or specific resource reallocation recommendations that I felt were appropriate.

Resource Allocation Strategy

Drawing on these various studies and exposures, it is possible to construct a general description of the overall resource allocation strategy of English Television, to provide an allocation strategy algorithm in narrative form. This description must, however, be taken as a construction: it is simplified, it infers rationales, and it does not attempt to describe the actual operation of the annual budgeting systems.

An easy way to break down the overall English Television budget is to begin with two main expenditure areas, which can be designated "operations" and "programs." Under "operations" we can group distribution and transmission costs, a substantial proportion of service department costs, and management costs. These non-program costs are principally fixed costs for essential activities, and they are not significantly affected by changing levels of program spending or production. The allocation strategy was to continually review these operation costs, to reduce them to the lowest possible levels, and then to allocate the remaining resources to programs. Allocation for operations costs "off the top" seemed inevitable, and efforts to minimize variable operations costs seemed to have been substantially effective. Organizational efficiency had been a preoccupation of both CBC President George Davidson and his successor, Laurent Picard; and the shortage of funds to meet programming demands exerted a natural pressure to minimize operations costs. In fact, case study observations suggest that the resources allocated to management, for instance, were insufficient and that, given its functional roles, the Planning Group was severely understaffed.

Allocation of resources to programs was a much more complex activity than dealing with operations costs. We can distinguish between local (or regional) and network programs and, within them, we can distinguish between procured foreign programs and Canadian programs. As explained in section 11(a), procurement of US programming was much less expensive than procuring or producing Canadian programs. And the popular imported programming was important for commercial reasons. The CBC's 70% Canadian content objective was the primary factor governing the allocation for procured foreign programs for the network.

The CBC did not publish individual program cost figures, but this excerpt from Morris Wolfe's December 1975 SATURDAY NIGHT article seems sufficiently accurate to indicate the cost attractiveness of US programming:

> We need less American programming, particularly during prime time. But those are the very times when the most money can be made from sponsors, and what better to attract a large audience than an American programme? ALL IN THE FAMILY cost the CBC $2,000 a week last year, from which it derived a weekly revenue of $24,000. (BEACHCOMBERS, on the other hand, cost $65,000 an episode to produce; it took in the same $24,000.) (Wolfe 1975, p 83)

Although actual 1973/74 production cost figures for the US programming are not available, in 1971 BROADCASTING estimated the production costs of ALL IN THE FAMILY at $95,000 per 30 minute episode (Broadcasting 1971, p 32). Assuming a cost of $100,000 each in 1973/74, the cost to the CBC indicated by Wolfe represented only 2% of production costs (Broadcasting 1974).

The per hour costs of this US programming were principally a function of conditions in the program series marketplace in which the CBC was bidding in competition with CTV, Global, and independent Canadian stations. The network procurement strategy was to purchase weekly US program series rather than individual programs or specials. This volume buying both kept the average per hour costs at the lowest possible level and minimized the time and effort required to screen and select this imported programming. Consequently, the allocation for imported network programming remained substantially fixed and, although it would be misleading to suggest that this allocation was also effectively made "off the top," the fact is that the costs of Canadian network and of local programming were the most elastic components of the English Television budget. And it is in examining the allocation of resources for these programs that we most clearly see the demand/resource imbalance in English Television.

In balancing the allocations for Canadian network programming, Canadian local programming, and procured local programming, a large number of factors had be considered simultaneously:

- The network operated under a CRTC 60% Canadian content requirement and a CBC 70% Canadian content objective.
- Local CBC stations operated under a CRTC 60% Canadian content requirement.
- By 1974, English Television was operating local and regional CBC program service operations of varying sizes in 15 cities. Although some of the smaller operations drew heavily on the regional programming of adjacent larger ones, the local and regional operations in Vancouver, Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, Halifax, and St. John's were substantially independent. These separate local and regional programming operations introduced a local program cost multiplier factor which we can take to have been roughly 10.
- Network program costs were not subject to such a multiplier.
- US program series originally telecast in prime time were available from distributors for rerun at very low prices. Figure 7-11 on page 82 showed the average cost of programs procured by local stations in 1973/74 to have been $187 per hour.
- As explained in the discussion of CBC efficiency in section 11(a), electronic

camera studio facilities were available for the production of low cost programming both for network and for local and regional distribution.

- Both the repeating of programs and regional program exchange, though normally requiring additional talent and rights payments, provided programming at costs significantly less than those of original production.
- And, as discussed throughout earlier sections of this chapter, English Television was operating under a mandate to provide "a balanced service" at both the network and regional levels.

The general outline of the resource allocation strategy can be derived from Figures 7-11 and 7-12, page 82:

- The total outlay in 1973/74 for network and local programs, both CBC produced and procured, was reported as $85,130.000.
- Procured programming accounted for 7.1% of the network program outlay, or 4.9% of the total 1973/74 program costs. (Note that this procured network program category lumps together both the relatively inexpensive US programs and the more costly Canadian program procurements.)
- The average cost per hour of CBC network production in 1973/74 was approximately $15,600. This contrasted with regular US prime time program series production costs of over $200,000 per hour. The average CBC per hour allocation for all network programs was thus less than 8% of the US commercial network prime time spending level.
- The average cost per hour of local production was $2,940 -- less than one fifth as much per hour as was allocated for network production. But, because of the number of stations multiplier, even at this cost level local production accounted for 28% of English Television's program spending.
- Inexpensive programming procured by local CBC stations totalled 14,142 hours in 1973/74. However, because the average cost was so low ($187 per hour, or about 1.2% as much per houras was allocated for network production), the total outlay for these local station procurements amounted to only $2,649,000 or about 3% of the English Television total.

The allocations for network production, local production, and local procurement were interdependent, and within each allocation grouping actual program costs ranged both significantly above and significantly below the average cost figures. Network production included some relatively expensive programs such as THE NATIONAL DREAM, IMAGES OF CANADA, THE BEACHCOMBERS, THE COLLABORATORS, and a limited number of specials such as THE NUTCRACKER. But it also included a great deal of inexpensive studio production, including such series as LUNCHEON DATE, JULIETTE AND FRIENDS, THIS IS THE LAW, FRONT PAGE CHALLENGE, SOME HONOURABLE MEMBERS, IT'S A MUSICAL WORLD, COUNTRYTIME, and SINGALONG JUBILEE. FAMILY COURT was an inexpensive electronic studio Canadian procurement. GILLIGAN'S ISLAND, scheduled on the network Monday through Friday at 5:30 pm in Winter 1973/74, was an inexpensive US rerun procurement. In Fall 1973/74, network program repeats averaged 1 hour and 40 minutes per day, or about 15% of the network service programming.

At the local service level, a priority was attached to the early evening News and Current Affairs programming and, just as the network allocated significantly more for some programs than others, the local allocations ranged significantly above and below the $2,940 per hour average. Imbedded in the Winter 1973/74 network program schedule (after the beginning of network service each day) was a total of 16.5 hours of local program periods. At most of the major centres the HOURGLASS News and Current Affairs service was provided for one hour per day, Monday through Friday, leaving 11.5 hours of local program periods within the network schedule. In addition to local program service imbedded within the network schedule, most locations provided local news service at approximately 11:30 pm, after the end of network service for the day. At most locations the requirements for local News and for HOURGLASS Current Affairs were such that very few resources were available for programming in the other local time periods. In fact, most centres found their resource allocations insufficient to meet the English Television guidelines which called for a uniform level of HOURGLASS service throughout the year, and they responded by curtailing Current Affairs service during the Summer seasons.

Under these circumstances, the volume of original programming produced by the local stations seems surprisingly high. Virtually all of these programs were electronic studio productions. Most of them were what could loosely be termed "talk shows." Many were "hosted" by CBC staff announcers who also carried other television and radio duties. And virtually all of these programs relied heavily on guests who were willing to appear without compensation. The volume of this type of programming which each location was able to produce depended primarily on the availability of studio facilities and existing technical manpower. Budgets for direct program expenditures as low as $100 per week for a half hour program Monday through Friday were not uncommon. Even so, programs such as Vancouver's BOB SWITZER SHOW, Winnipeg's FOUR CORNERS, and their equivalents at other locations provided what were widely considered to be valuable local services which attracted substantial numbers of viewers.

Some local periods were filled with regional exchange programing, but low cost procured programming predominated. These procured US series, such as PETTICOAT JUNCTION and its equivalents, were not only inexpensive but helped the individual stations meet their commercial revenue quotas. (In this connection it is interesting to note that although network policy prohibited commercials in virtually all News and Current Affairs programs, at the local level the HOURGLASS News and Current Affairs programs were a major source of advertising revenue.)

The hearing intervention filed by the regional producers' association described cutbacks in local production as follows:

> [I]n Winnipeg and Edmonton, for two examples, there is no longer a local agricultural show, no presentation of local sports events, and no local variety shows. At one time all these were in evidence. Local prime time slots have been removed when at one time both Winnipeg and Edmonton had prime time allocations for such things as variety shows which presented local professional talent that was in the process being discovered and developed. Here is where the Tommy Banks, the Karen Marklingers, the Guess Who, and many more Canadian artists were found and developed. The amount of money for local program directors to use is insufficient, especially in comparison with the network's similar projects. (L'Association, pp 23-4)

The intervention naturally enough viewed the allocation pattern from a perspective conditioned by exposure to the acute shortage of resources for local and regional programming. Resource stretching was a preoccupation not just of the Planning Group: the ingenuity and persistence of local and regional program producers emerged in the HOURGLASS study as one of the CBC's major sources of programming strength. The challenge was to produce programs of the same calibre as the best of those in the network service -- but on a resource base on the average only a fifth as large. The regional producers argued that the resource allocations for local and regional programs were inadequate to meet the CBC's existing local and regional program service commitments. My observations support that argument.

At the same time, however, there was an implication in the regional producers' intervention that network operations and programs were adequately funded. My observations and analysis suggest that the network allocation was also inadequate to support the levels of production undertaken. In the pattern of higher volumes of electronic studio production, low cost foreign procurements, more frequent repeats, and reduced network program resource allocations there would appear to be evidence of network program underfinancing. The fact that network production costs were only 8% as high as the US program production industry cost levels lends further support to the argument that network programming was also produced under demand/resource imbalance conditions. The 1973/74 English Television network program budget was $54,538,000. At the same rate of investment as in the US programs with which its programs competed, English Television would have been able to produce approximately 5.25 hours of prime time network programming per week -- or about 273 hours in total. In fact, 3,497 hours of network programming were derived from the available resources. The comparison is subject to the following qualifications:

- some US prime time programming consists of repeats rather than original production,
- the English Television output of 3,497 hours included some repeats, probably about 17 to 20% of the total, and
- the investment in daytime programming (included in the English Television network total) was substantially less on a per hour basis in both countries than the prime time rates.

In 1973/74, the CBC English Television schedule contained 8.5 hours per week of US programming in network time periods between 6 and 10 pm -- that period during which at least 30% of all Canadians were choosing to watch television at any given time. This amounted to over 43% of the network programming during that peak viewing period. But to "Canadianize" the service required removing US programs obtained for about $4,000 per hour and replacing them with Canadian programs capable of competing with the $200,000 per hour US offerings. Assuming no program development costs, Canadian production at half the US rate of investment, a 20% repeat rate, and no drop in audience size and therefore no drop in commercial revenue, it would have required an additional $4,000,000 per year to replace each of the imported hours.

The "Additional Statement" annexed by some members to the Association of Television Producers and Directors (Toronto) submission to the CRTC commented on network Current Affairs program funding:

> A comparison: The program "This Hour has Seven Days" to which the COT alludes so often -- had a budget both direct and indirect at least double in real value to that available to the program [WEEKEND] that occupied the same Sunday-night Public Affairs spot last year. It [SEVEN DAYS] also shot all film in black and white -- a saving of almost half, compared to color. (ATPDT 1974b, pnt 19)
>
> One result of the program money shortage is the great number of procurred series that now run in such great numbers on CBC under the banner of Public Affairs -- The World at War, America, True North, The World We Live In, etc. It's cheaper to buy an expensively-produced foreign program than it is to produce a cheap program of our own. (pnt 35)

The "Additional Statement" chose an interesting example. WEEKEND was commonly considered, both inside and outside the CBC, to be the English network's "flagship" Current Affairs program. It was the third attempt (following SUNDAY and THE WAY IT IS) to "replace" SEVEN DAYS as the major national weekly Current Affairs program in a program period which had been reserved for such a program since 1961. WEEKEND faced a perhaps impossible challenge, and its cancellation in 1973 marked the end of Sunday night "magazine" Current Affairs programming. Some argued that audience expectations were so high that they could not be satisfied and others suggested that the magazine format had become outdated (Kirby 1973a). And cable was providing an ever widening range of Sunday night viewing alternatives. But the fact reamins that the CBC's own expectations of WEEKEND, if not impossible to realize, were at least very high. In my work with the Program Evaluation System I found it was the most frequently and intensively evaluated program in the network schedule. But it apparently opperated on a budget less than half of that allocated to SEVEN DAYS.

The WEEKEND/SEVEN DAYS example illustrates the ultimate impossibility of arriving at firm conclusions about appropriate levels of funding on a program by program basis. It is possible to argue any of the following propositions: SEVEN DAYS had superfluous resources, WEEKEND had insufficient resources, or there is little relationship between resources and either program quality or audience appreciation. SEVEN DAYS had more "bench strength" than was available to WEEKEND: it was much easier to investigate and produce program items over and above the minimum required to fill a weekly program hour -- to select for telecast the best available material from a wider range of alternatives. I am not suggesting a direct relationship between program resources and either program quality or audience appreciation. Beyond a certain point, it would appear that a "diminishing returns" effect would significantly lessen the importance of additional resources. On the other hand, it would also seem that a certain "critical mass" of resources is required or else there will be a noticeable impact on programming. Whether WEEKEND was operating below that "critical mass" resource level is a matter of expectations and subjective opinion. What is clear is the following:

- program quality expectations and audience appreciation expectations of network programs were not falling,
- despite significantly greater absolute increases in network program funding than in local or regional allocations, the effective average cost per hour of network programming was reduced 12% in the 1969/70 - 1973/74 period, and
- in some notable instances program units were attempting to meet undiminished expectations with effective resource bases which had been reduced considerably in excess of the 12% "average."

Program Development

The regional producers pointed to the virtual absence of any funding for writer, performer, and producer development in local and regional programming. Talent and program development funding was equally as lacking at the network level. The Corporate Statement filed with the CRTC prior to the hearing, the President's presentation, and CBC responses to Commissioners' questions all stressed improvements in the quality of CBC programs. Of particular concern was the quality of drama programs on English Television. Included in the Corporate Statement were these comments:

> Improvement of the quality of our programs, national, regional and local, English and French, television and radio, is the CBC's number one goal, object and purpose....
>
> We have moved from adminsitrative concerns to the development of a creative programming system.
>
> It is the programs we have to think about, particularly the quality of our Canadian programs although we intend to be more selective in our acquisition of non-Canadian material as well.
>
> This is essential if the CBC is to fulfil its mandate in the period of TV saturation that is already upon us. (CBC 1973c, pp 2-3)
>
> In order to carry out its mandate and meet the needs of the population, the CBC believes that this strategy must be carried out by [a] distinct improvement in the quality of network programming of the English and French Services Divisions. The English division has been called upon to give priority, within a balanced schedule, to improve the quality of its drama programming, and to rejuvenate and upgrade the TV music and variety department....
>
> A five-year Television Drama Plan has been developed and approved. We have been fortunate in being able to get an internationally-known Canadian director to accept appointment as Head of Television Drama for the English Division....
>
> For both divisions this will mean the introduction of new programs and series; a greater emphasis on the discovery and development of Canadian writers and performers and directors, on program research, script development and the production of pilots. Funds will have to be provided to support these program development activities in order to encourage new talent and free exploration of new ideas and concepts. (pp 6-7)

The CRTC decision supported increased allocations for program development:

> Of all the sources from which quality broadcasting programming springs -- from ideas, scripts, designs, technical and artistic talent, production facilities and knowhow, even picture and transmission quality -- authors and writers have been the least effectively supported. In total broadcasting budgets, money allocated for this purpose is, in the opinion of the Commission, largely insufficient. Yet very many program failures are blamed on the lack of good writing.
>
> The Commission is of the view that much larger investments must be made by the Corporation in this crucial aspect of creative production. (CRTC 1974b, p 60)

But all this talk about program quality and drama development in 1974 was not consistent with the budgetary reality. Prior to the hearing, in November 1973, the CBC announced the appointment of "one of Canada's top men of the theatre," John Hirsch, as Head of Television Drama in ESD. The appointment was announced as part of a program "designed to improve the quality and increase the volume of television drama," involving the investment of "far more money" in scripts, writer development, recruiting, training, and liason with theatre undertakings across the country. Drama was the second program area (following News) to receive this "priority" revitalization. Hirsch's appointment was widely welcomed and little was said about serious drama at the public hearing. But shortly after taking on his responsibilities as head of TV Drama, John Hirsch began to speak publicly about the shortage of resources for the "priority" drama development undertaking. The following excerpts are from a July 1974 Toronto STAR story by Jack Miller, "Truth About CBC Drama -- No Money For Miracles":

> [I]n four months as head of drama for CBC English-language television, Hirsch has absorbed the one great thundering fundamental truth that dawns on all CBC executives in time -- there isn't enough money in the corporation to make miracles....
>
> "I had a feeling the CBC was richer than it is, and was not doing what it should in drama because the people here were a bunch of ornery bastards," he says. "Now I understand."
>
> "My budget for the entire 1975-76 season -- for producing 110 hours of drama of national network quality -- is only half of what Hollywood spends on a single run-of-the-mill movie any more," he claims.
>
> And with a little prodding he'll admit that even that budget has been cut since he arrived.... He wants bench strength, as they say in the sports world....
>
> "People forget that for every successful series in the U.S., like a Maude, there are 30 shows made that never get on the air."
>
> "Most of their production gets thrown in the garbage. We have to broadcast the garbage, along with the good ones, because our budget will produce only enough hours to fill the schedule. And then people wonder why we aren't always wonderful."
>
> He finds the money shortage popping up everywhere. Even the TV cameras, in many cases, are antiquated. "Mickey Mouse equipment," he calls it.
>
> "In 1976, for the Olympics at Montreal, we'll get all kinds of new cameras, and afterward, they'll be spread around the network, so we'll be better off. But that's because the Olympic coverage will be going to other countries. We can't use old run-down cameras for other countries. Canadian viewers aren't good enough to buy new equipment for, but foreigners are.
>
> "That's so typically Canadian. It's sinful." (Miller 1974e)

A year after the public hearing, in February 1975, Hirsch was again speaking out about program development. In an interview with CP writer James Nelson, he said that "the CBC needs to devote money to developing human resources -- writers, directors and producers for TV." Hirsch added:

> "This has been neglected for almost a decade," he said. "It's a kind of left-over colonial attitude where we say, 'Well, let England train our artists and we'll just get them over here and they'll do all the work.'
>
> "That's not the way to develop native drama, theatre or broadcasting....
>
> "It seems to me a most wasteful way of operating, because we are constantly either importing people who can do a job quickly, or we are doing the work with people who have not been trained properly and it costs three times as much as it should."
>
> "We are dealing in most cases with antiquated equipment, studios that leak, and money that is not enough to do a good series of Mickey Mouse cartoons. Out of this we are supposed to create a national drama? It's ridiculous." ....
>
> There was an attitude when I came here that the CBC brings in Hirsch and it has a man who'll create miracles. But no miracles are possible. If you don't have the tools, you can't perform the simplest bit of magic, and this corporation doesn't have the tools.
>
> Hirsch summed up his position: "I'm asking, Give me the money, give me the ability to plan, give me the commitment to training and development. If I don't have the money and the commitment, then I can depart in good conscience without any rancor and say I've tried, but this thing is too big or impossible for anyone." (Nelson 1975)

With Hirsch in place and undertaking -- with expressed reservations -- his new duties, English Television turned its attention to its problems in creating popular variety and light entertainment programming. Those problems were noted at the 1974 hearing; Picard commented:

> News has gone a long way in the English network under the direction of Denis Harvey; [in] drama, the English network has taken the first step with the hiring of John Hirsch. I think to have a key man there is the first step, and we are very hopeful about what is going to come out of that.
>
> Light variety and entertainment is a weak part of the English network, and they will have to concentrate on that. (CRTC 1974a, p 103)

At the hearing the English Division reported that "the next step, which will start almost immediately, will be to further improve our variety, music and current affairs department[s]. They will be given the same careful study, given targets and objectives and supported with adequate resources" (CRTC 1974a, p 153).

The study of Variety department requirements, originally intended to result in a revitalization similar to that in News and Drama, was terminated in late 1974. In a public statement the CBC explained that the development had been suspended because of a lack of money to implement the study recommendations (Tor Star 1974b).

In dealing with efficiency and the allocation of resources for network and regional programming, there is always the question of the standard against which measurement is made. But in examining the allocation of resources for program development a relatively clear pattern emerges.

- The "revitalization" of News had been publicly noted by the President before the CRTC. Although the new Area Head ("Chief News Editor") had taken up his duties in February 1973, at the end of the case study period News had still not been allocated the human and financial resources called for by the development plan.

- In Drama, the development plan was substantially altered before implementation began, principally in response to arguments that, given the resources, it was impossible to produce the increased volumes of quality programs envisioned in the original plan.
- In Variety, the President admitted the need for program development before the CRTC, and ESD said the project would start "almost immediately" and be given "adequate resources," but the Corporation later announced its decision to terminate planning for a Variety department revitalization.
- In Current Affairs, the appointment of a new Area Head had been coupled with an announcement of "a major revitalization of CBC Current Affairs TV programming" involving increased emphasis on current affairs programming in general, documentaries, and investigative reporting. But shortly after taking on his duties, the new Area Head considered his greatest problem to be securing permission to reduce program output while keeping the same budget allocation so that resources could be devoted to talent and program development.

Public expectations aside, the CBC was not allocating sufficient resources to program development to accomplish even its own priority objectives in the time frames it had set for itself.

The overall level of funding, including efficiency, resource allocation, and program development considerations, will be taken up in combination with observations about the CBC's commercial activities and the Government's annual system of funding at the end of this section.

Commercial Activities

Concern with the CBC's commercial activities ran throughout the 1974 hearing. And it was the subject of special attention in the decision:

> There is a growing concern in our society that broadcasting in general and television in particular has become excessively influenced by the North American merchandising system. On a number of occasions the Commission has stressed the importance of the CBC as the major instrument for enabling the Canadian broadcasting system to establish a new relationship with the commercial environment.
>
> The traditional role established for the Corporation as the publicly funded national broadcasting service is especially threatened if the criteria of the marketplace are permitted to predominate. (CRTC 1974b, p 35)

As explained in section 11(f), the decision also proposed a licence condition limiting the number of commercial minutes per hour to 8 in 1975/76, dropping one minute annually to 5 in 1978/79:

> Thus, in five years' time, the duration of the CBC's television network licences, the total amount of time allowed for such advertising material will have been reduced by fifty percent from the present level, which generally is a maximum of ten minutes on a CBC station. (CRTC 1974b, p 44)

This move by the CRTC constituted a rejection of the CBC position on commercial activities which was both surprising and concrete. Although commercials were the subject of much talk at the hearing, there was little meaningful discussion on the matter between the Commission and the Corporation. Each perceived the other as having made up its mind.

The CBC position was that its resource shortage was so acute and the need to improve the quality of programming was so great that it felt it unwise to relinquish the commercial revenue which constituted about 20% of its income. The argument was that to remove commercials from CBC television would require additional funds from Parliament, and that any additional funding which Parliament was willing to grant should be spent on improving programs rather than on reducing or eliminating commercials.

The CRTC position was that the CBC's involvement in commercial activities was having an inordinant and inappropriate influence on the programming and scheduling of the national broadcasting service. It argued that Canadian broadcasting as a whole was overwhelmingly influenced by merchandizing strategies and that there was growing intolerance in society of the unquestioned consumption of material goods. The decision expressed concern that amidst all the CBC's responsibilities and obligations, it should not be impeded in carrying out the objectives for which it was established, and it concluded that the disentanglement of the Corporation from the commercial context was an urgent priority (CRTC 1974b, pp 35-44).

At the hearing the CBC outlined plans to eliminate commercials from certain classes of programs and to regularly program a commercial-free evening. In this, the two basic objectives were to reduce or eliminate negative effects of commercial or service messages in television programs and to open up portions of the schedule to program innovation. Two general constraints were noted: maintenance of a balanced schedule to ensure that CBC and affiliated stations remained competitive, and protection of the current revenue position (CBC 1974c, pp 57, 57A). The CBC presentation included public opinion poll results to support its continuation of commercial activity (pp 33-5). But the Corporation and the Commission were talking past each other.

The CBC approach dealt with the on-air "look" of the national broadcasting service. The CRTC concern was with the effect of commercial involvement on the management of the Corporation, on its pattern of program development, and on the overall content, character, and balance of the service.

The whole matter was exceedingly complex at the detailed level but exceedingly simple in general terms. From the public there were detailed complaints about the volume of commercials in CBC programs, about program interruptions for commercials, and about the content of the commercials themselves. The portrayal of women in commercials was specifically criticized. The CRTC criticized in detail the extensive scheduling of popular US commercial programs in peak viewing periods. And the CBC pointed to an estimated cost for dropping commercials of $80,000,000 for the 1975/76 year. Included in the estimate were lost CBC revenues, payments to compensate its commercial affiliates, costs of replacing programs available only on a commercial basis, and the costs of producing longer CBC programs and material to insert into and around procured programs produced in a commercial format (CBC 1974c, p 50).

At the general level, the CBC seemed to view its commercial activity as being not so much desirable as inevitable. The Corporate Statement contained this observation: "All the indications are that the CBC will continue to have commercials in its TV schedules" (CBC 1973c, p 23). Although this must be speculation, its seems likely that "all the indications" included indications from the Government about probable CBC funding levels and about the Government's attitudes towards CBC commercial activity. It would seem that the CBC position had developed essentially as a strategy for coping with its resource problems. At the hearing, Picard commented on the five year outlook:

> [I]f God would give us 80 million dollars to get out of that -- I think it would be a greater miracle if the Treasury Board gave it to us -- .... my inclination would be to say: why don't we put the 80 million dollars in the programming? And when we will have done the job that we think we should have ... with the programming, and have given our producers the kind of resources that they often lack, and there would be some money left, let's move in the direction of getting out of commercials. But this is going to be a long time....
>
> It is a constraint, it is sometimes annoying, it's all that, but the kind of money we need to do the job in programming, to [provide] for our producers the support that they need in terms of research, in terms of help, in terms of Canadian

> programming, this is a paramount thing and I think it's going to occupy the Corporation in terms of the money we can get for a long time. (CRTC 1974a, pp 1456-7)

The CRTC position emerged on the last morning of the hearing. In his closing remarks, the Chairman challenged the inevitability of the CBC constraints:

> [T]here are terribly important things in the mandate of the CBC, extremely ambitious goals established in the Act; perhaps it is our responsibility, both in CBC and CRTC, to underline the importance of these objectives, to recall their existence, to insist on the fact that they are not only platitudes, and to recall to the country the fact that they are there and we are expected to fulfill them.
>
> I think we may be blamed in a certain number of years after we've disappeared to other things perhaps, for having insisted too much on the constraints instead of facing the country with the objectives that it has given itself, as people like Dr. Spry have said, which it has repeatedly asserted over 45 years. And it would be ironic if some of us were blamed for having been too good managers of constraints. (CTRC 1974a, pp 1469-70)

In the end, the disagreement about commercial activity was referred to the Government, and the proposed limits on commercials were dropped. But the discussion does serve to introduce an important observation: the operation of English Television during the case study period was, in fact, primarily a matter of the management of constraints.

The Corporation remained heavily involved in commercial activity as a means of dealing with its overall financial constraints. But the commercial involvement itself added other constraints, some obvious, some not. There was, for instance, a clear impact on English Television program scheduling, and on procured program selection. Less obvious, but perhaps of greater importance, were the internal effects.

Operating a commercially successful network took time and attention that might have otherwise been devoted to Canadian program development. Broadcasting in commercial format tended to focus attention on ABC, CBS, NBC, and CTV approaches rather than on the development of a distinctive CBC service. Perhaps most significantly, the existence of both public service and commercial revenue objectives introduced an organization schizophrenia that was particularly apparent at the program unit and Planning Group levels. Frequently the service and revenue objectives were in conflict; commercial considerations entered as an important factor into the making of a wide range of decisions. The commercial activities can be seen as a major source of distraction for management. A great deal of time and energy was devoted to attempting to keep commercial activity in its proper place.

The CRTC decision reported on Juneau's careful questioning of Picard on the first day of the hearing:

> [T]he Chairman asked the President of the CBC what model he would propose for a public broadcasting system for Canada if the CBC did not exist and if there were already two or three commercial networks in existence.
>
> The President replied: "I would be inclined to say that it should be ... a total public system .... if there were the money and the resources ... it would make the job of making it different, more simple." (CRTC 1974b, pp 41-2)

The commercial activity issue, then, was really one of resources and strategy. There was basic agreement about the demand/resource imbalance. Where the CBC (or, perhaps more accurately, the Government, the CBC Board, and Corporate management) differed from the CRTC was in the perception of the consequences of commercial activity within English Television.

The CRTC decision contains a series of passages to support its conclusion that the consequences were so severe that the CBC had to immediately begin to change its pattern of commercial activity. Taken against case study observations, the decision seems to overstate the extent to which English Television was preoccupied with commercial considerations. Nevertheless, observations also suggest that there was reason for concern. For this study, commenting on the accuracy of the CRTC decision is not so important as establishing a significant point about the management of English Television. It should be recognized that "the management of constraints" described earlier both included and was made more complicated by commercial activity. The problems of the demand/resource imbalance and of having to control the influence of commercial activity on the service compounded each other.

Section 11(e) on audience orientation suggested that the program decision making processes in English Television were operating under an overload of dimensions along which service was to be balanced. Commercial activity introduced another dimension into the overall service balancing process, and it was not one which was ignored. Commercial considerations, as well as the resource shortage and the 12 month planning cycle, contributed to the operational focus of English Television management decision making. Under the circumstances, this operational focus seems to have been virtually inevitable. And it seems equally inevitable that there must have been some tendency for commercial activity to reinforce the thinking about audiences in commercial mass media mass audience terms.

Long Range Planning

Annual Funding

Throughout the case study period the CBC continued to be funded by annual grants from Parliament. As noted in section 6(d), pages 66-67, the 1957 Fowler inquiry recommended a system of long term financing. The Royal Commission noted:

> If the history of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, between 1932 and 1936 is examined, especially in the evidence and reports of several Parliamentary committees in the period, there is much to suggest that the provision of finances to the Commission by annual votes was regarded as one of the weaknesses in the system which led to the extensive changes of 1936 when the Canadian Broadcasting Act was passed. (Fowler 1957, p 276)

The 1958 Broadcasting Act did not contain any long range funding provisions. In 1965, the Fowler Committee again considered the matter:

> A new basis for the financing of the public sector is vital to the future of the whole structure of broadcasting in Canada.... The CBC ... has expressed great concern about the present one-year-at-a-time approach to its financial requirements, and the stultifying effect which this has on its ability to plan programming policy on any firm base. We have reported that all who commented on finances in briefs to the Committee supported a greater measure of financial security for the CBC.
>
> Our discussions with those responsible for broadcasting systems in other countries strongly support the concept of forward planning. Fully commercial systems such as the United States networks regard three years as a proper planning period. The BBC attaches utmost importance to the guaranteed licence fee, and builds its plans for several years ahead, for both operating and capital requirements, on this predictable level of revenue. We conclude that the present basis of financing for the CBC must be changed if the management of the Corporation is to be put in a position to meet the challenges that lie ahead. (Fowler 1965, p 304)

Although both the 1966 White Paper and the 1967 Broadcasting Committee review of the White Paper supported long term financing arrangements (Stanbury, p 14), no such provisions were made in the 1968 Act. And the CBC's Corporate Statement for the 1974 hearing took up the issue once again:

> We have been seeking a breakthrough in this area for many years. Almost everyone, both inside and outside the CBC, agrees that the uncertainty inherent in the present system of annual allocation and review is inimicable to best management of a corporation as sizable and complex as the CBC....
>
> Too often now, in our year-to-year uncertainty, it's a case of hurry up, get it in the can, for tomorrow there may be no money. That means there is not enough time for research, review and preparation. No chance for trying new, unproved writers and producers because there's no room for experiment, no freedom to err in the search for new programming modes, not enough working capital. There's no time for innovation in that sort of arrangement; you settle for what's worked before. (CBC 1973c, p 18)

In discussing drama program development, John Hirsch identified annual financing as a major problem:

> "Instead of being able to plan for two or three years ahead -- which is absolutely necessary in any kind of artistic organization, as it is in business or anywhere else -- it's impossible to do it here.
>
> "One's ability to create things properly is practically nil. All the great hopes I had at the beginning are somewhat shattered...."
>
> Hirsch says every other radio-television network in the world, in the same way as every major industrial corporation, has to plan its work years in advance. But because the CBC is financed by annual grants from Parliament, it can only work season-by-season.
>
> "We are engaged in a squirrel cage, running and running and never having the ability to consider what we are going to do next year." (Nelson 1975)

Planning Approach

In addition to making long range program development difficult, the system of annual financing contributed to the entrenchment of the annual Planning System described in section 9(f). That system was used to allocate resources to existing program commitments. As noted earlier in this section, the demand/resource imbalance did not permit any appreciable amount of talent or program development. The effect of annual financing was to lock English Television into an annual planning timetable designed to fit the government's annual budgeting system rather than the needs of a broadcasting organization. The intervention of the regional producers criticized the inflexibility of the Planning System, and the CRTC decision expressed concern over "the rigidity of administrative procedures" (L'Association, pp 34-7; CRTC 1974b, p 60).

These concerns were also present within the Planning Group itself. At the end of the fieldwork period one program director described himself as "a vociferous and emotional opponent of the inflexibility that is beginning to strangle our existing planning system." During the case study period, I was twice involved in major reviews of the system. In each case system inflexibilities were a major concern, but the reviews indicated little likelihood of appreciable short term improvement. Both case study observations and a rereading of report on the 1974 review of the Planning System suggest that the inflexibilities resulted in large part from the overall demand/resource imbalance and the amount of attention devoted to that imbalance, but that the problems were severly compounded by planning almost exclusively on an annual timetable made necessary by the system of financing the Corporation on an annual appropriations basis.

Comments: Costs and Financing

It is important to establish at the outset that the main focus of this study is on programming and that extension of coverage is considered only to the degree that coverage requirements affected the overall financial position of the CBC. There is, therefore, no attempt here to assess the level of coverage extension funding, to examine the Corporation's capital allocation strategy, its efficiency in extending coverage, or to consider the development of public policy in that area. It is also important to establish that this study deals only with the English Television component of the national broadcasting service. There is no attempt here to assess the operating positions of the other English and French CBC radio and television services or to examine the Corporate operating resource allocation strategy. To the extent that the terms English Television and CBC are interchanged here, the assumption is that conditions were roughly equivalent in the other services.

LEVEL OF FUNDING: It is not possible to say that there was substantial agreement on the related level of funding and commercial activity issues. At the public hearing, two representatives of the Canadian Broadcasting League took substantially different positions on resource adequacy within minutes of each other. And use of the term "underfinanced," when applied to the CBC, had come to frequently evoke emotional responses -- both in agreement and not. The somewhat awkward term "demand/resource imbalance" has been used here not so much to avoid emotional responses as to underline the fact that any resource base assessment must be in terms of adequacy to accomplish a specific set of objectives, to provide a particular level of service.

The adequacy of CBC resources was considered against several different levels of expectation. The CRTC analysis was in terms of the Commission's interpretation of the Broadcasting Act. Public expectations, though not systematically documented, were more directly oriented to the quality of program service. The approach here is to consider resources against each of several different levels of expectation and in combination with annual funding and commercial activity considerations.

EFFICIENCY: Comments regarding efficiency in this study apply to English Television program production and service operations. Within that context, it appeared that there was substantial basis for the CBC claims of significantly improved efficiency. In fact, observation of production unit operations and discussions with producers and Production Managers tend to support the contention that the level of efficiency had been pushed past the optimum point, to the point where the efforts to economize were requiring more time and effort than the "savings" justified. As the effective overall resource base in English Television grew smaller, program units were thrown into contention with each other for financial and physical resources, and producers were forced to devote increasing amounts of their time to securing, preserving, and juggling program production resources. At the public hearing, the President estimated that over the four year period of the case study, 1969/70 through 1973/74, the combined effect of budget reductions and provision of additional services without an increase in budget was an efficiency "saving" of $136 million. This estimated saving had been accomplished by "redirection" or "reallocation" -- which, in the final analysis, consists of taking money out of one pocket and putting it into another. Where there are excesses, redirection allows recovery of funds for other purposes, but, once all the excesses have been reallocated, further redirection leads to development of one aspect of service at the expense of one or more others.

The CBC did not enter the case study period with any significant excess resources. The Government imposed a three year freeze on the CBC budget which, during the presidency of George Davidson, had led to a freeze on all programming budgets and reductions in staff, particularly program production personnel. The decision to increase Canadian content was taken by the CBC without assurances of increased funding. The CBC found itself without that funding but nevertheless committed both to maintain existing services and to provide new services and higher Canadian content levels. Given the relative inelasticity of "operations" costs for distribution, transmission, and so on, a high proportion of the $136 million "saving" had of necessity come from programming budget redirection. Picard termed the period up to 1974 a "consolidation period" and suggested that there had been a need for some reallocation of budgets. But he also argued that the extent of redirection had "over-extended" the Corporation and that opportunities to turn up funds for developmental and innovative purposes had been fully identified and exploited. He commented: "I think this looks great from an administrative point of view; it is bad from a programming point of view. We had to do it (CRTC 1974a, p 92).

The CRTC decision, though suggesting that some further efficiency improvements might be possible, nevertheless took the position that continuing concentration on administrative and managerial efficiency could not result in the program service improvements which the Commission argued were necessary for the Corporation to fulfill its mandate (CRTC 1974b, p 75).

RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRATEGY: Examination of the English Television resource allocation strategy reveals a trend towards relatively smaller allocations for local and regional services than for network programs at a time when demands for regional services and decentralization of CBC activity, and feelings of regional identity, were rising. Preservation of the network program resource base was an understandable operating strategy: in the absence of a "number of stations" cost multiplier for production for the same program periods at each regional centre, it was an economical means of providing increased hours of service and increased Canadian ccontent levels to the nation as a whole. At all production centres network programming took priority over local and regional production, and per hour network program resource allocations exceeded those for local and regional programming by a factor of about 5. In effect, the regional Program Directors were being given a resource allocation and a group of local time periods and were being asked to stretch the resources as far as possible. Beyond that, the remaining time periods were simply "filled" with very low cost procured programming. Although the Corporation undertook to increase local and regional programming at the 1974 heraing, it was difficult to see where, within the existing programming budget, adequate funds could be found for redirection to serving the special needs of geographic regions without substantial cutbacks in network program allocations.

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT: The CBC's over-extension problem is most easily seen in consideration of resource allocation for program development. Various of the hearing interventions argued the need for revitalization of the Drama, Variety, and Current Affairs programming services. The failure to allocate the levels of resources required for implementation of the revitalization plans developed internally within ESD would seem to indicate that only limited possibilities of redirection remained. Given that the CBC had already overextended itself in the provision of existing levels of service, it was difficult to see where adequate funds could be found for intensive program quality improvement without substantial cutbacks in existing local, regional, and/or network program allocations. Even more difficult to see was how such development could be undertaken within each region to support increased contributions to the flow and exchange of regional and cultural information and entertainment.

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES: Although the Corporation announced new plans to eliminate commercials from certain special programs and program periods, these changes were to take place similtaneously with "protection of the current revenue position." In essence, the plans called for moving commercials around within the schedule so that they wouldn't be quite so visible. The position on the overall level of commercial activity was firm, and the inevitability of continuing that activity was not questioned by the

CBC. The development of that position will be considered in Chapter 12; for purposes of this discussion it is sufficient to note that:

- commercial considerations played a major role in entrenching popular US entertainment programming in peak viewing periods,
- management of commercial activities added to the workload of program decision makers and required the balancing of conflicting objectives and priorities, and
- despite an earlier recognition of an "over-commercialization" and "*over-Americanization*" of the English Television prime time schedule, the Corporation took the position that its level of resources was so low that substantially unaltered continuation of commercial activity was essential.

LONG RANGE PLANNING: The annual basis of funding enters consideration of costs and financing primarily as a factor complicating and shaping resurce allocation strategy. The most obvious consequence was to make long range program development planning difficult. The more subtle consequence was to limit programming flexibility. The Planning System was used to allocate a very high proportion of total programming resources, both financial and physical, at a point up to 18 months prior to telecast. That advance planning was at a very detailed level: many documentaries were proposed and approved on an individual basis. Although the prior allocation of a high proportion of available dollars and production facilities made possible higher levels of efficiency and more predictable expenditure and revenue levels, it made response to events, developments, and opportunities not anticipated in advance considerably more difficult. There was a tendency for those portions of the network program output planned on a program by program basis to appear "dated"; reflection of "current" concerns took place primarily within those ongoing series which operated under "Umbrella" Program Proposals which did not specify program content on an episode by episode basis.

The level of funding and the annual basis of financing worked in combination to entrench both the Planning System and certain of its inflexibilities. The annual funding system, with its year to year fluctuations in the proportion of the CBC operating "request" actually allocated by the Government, had been the primary factor in establishing successive 12 month periods as the term of advance service planning. And the perceived demand/resource imbalance led to extremely careful or "tight" planning designed to derive maximum levels of program production and programming services from available resources. Management had the option of using the Planning System for the prior allocation of some portion of total available resources and retaining a portion of both financial and facilities resources for allocation at some point closer to telecast dates. In practice, the proportion planned in detail many months in advance remained very high. From an efficiency standpoint this permitted "load levelling" or adjustment of production schedules so as to "smooth out" the total demand for production facilities over a 12 to 15 month period. It also permitted development of a detailed financial operating plan against which expenditure and revenue performance could be monitored on an ongoing basis. As with the total amount of redirection, the efficiency benefits arising from tight planning looked great from an administrative point of view; the resulting inflexibilities were, hovever, not so great from a programming point of view.

Taking these various factors into consideration together we find:

- differing assessment of the adequacy of total resources,
- the regulatory agency taking the position that the CBC was not overfinanced and that additional funds were required for program quality improvement,
- the national broadcasting service arguing that it was underfinanced and required all available funds, including those derived from advertising activity, for program quality improvement,
- some intervenors suggesting that it was too easy to say, "With more oney we get more programming," at the same time as others were arguing for a budgetary increase by a factor of 4 to $1 billion in 1980, and
- these differences in assessment appearing to arise from both differing perceptions of existing levels of efficiency and differing levels of expectation.

Taking continuing provision of existing services as the minimum demand level we find:

- an overall 22% reduction in the effective average program allocation per hour in the 1969/70 - 1973/74 period,
- an effective decrease of 6% in total program budget purchasing power,
- a high proportion of network producer effort being devoted to resource management,
- certain program periods within the existing network service schedule being "filled" with low cost US rerun programming,
- no evidence of significant funds available for redirection to other objectives,
- a suggestion that, even in terms of maintaining existing services, English Television was over-extended -- that it was committed to a level of service greater than its level of resources could adequately support, and
- an absence of agreed level of service standards (including program quality standards) required to form firm conclusions about the existing demand/resource balance.

Taking provisions of the CBC's mandate in the Broadcasting Act into account we find:

- expectations of increased local and regional services to serve the special needs of geographic regions,
- expectations of increased regional participation in network program production,
- CBC commitments to both increased local and regional services and to increased regional participation in network program production,
- an effective decrease of 24% in total local program budget purchasing power,
- a reduction of 34% in the effective average production resource allocation per hour for local programming in the 1969/70 - 1973/74 period,
- program periods within the existing local service schedules being filled with low cost US rerun programming,
- a very high proportion of regional producer effort being devoted to resource management,
- limited allocations for regional talent and program development,
- no evidence of significant funds available for redirection to increase or improve local and regional program services or to support talent and program development for network program production, and
- an indication of a demand/resource imbalance sufficiently great to raise questions about English Television's ability to meet either its own objectives or the regional service and regional flow and exchange requirements of the Broadcasting Act.

Taking prevailing interpretations of the mandate into account we find:

- expectations that, as a matter of priority, the CBC increase the quantity and improve the quality of its Canadian programming capability,
- CBC commitments to a further increase of 5% in Canadian content and to program quality improvement, notably in News, Drama, Variety, and Current Affairs,
- English Television arguing that rising demands on production capacity, among them demands for increased flow of regional programming, "raise questions about the capacity of the network to increase Canadian content above 70%, while retaining quality standards and competitive effectiveness, without a major increase in total production capacity."
- the CBC's Head Office qualifying the "increase in total production capacity" argument of English Television with the phrase, "or the development of new approaches, or both."
- incomplete implementation of the News development plan,
- cutbacks in the Drama development plan,
- uncertainty as to the level of resources available for Current Affairs development,
- cancellation of the Variety development initiative,
- limited allocations for regional program development,
- no evidence of adequate funds available for redirection to program development, and
- evidence of a severe imbalance between program development and quality improvement expectations and available resources.

Taking the CRTC's proposed licence conditions requiring progressive reductions in commercial activity into account we find:

- no evidence of adequate funds available for redirection to significantly reduce dependency on commercial revenue, and
- an imbalance between expectations of less commercial involvement and available resources.

This study finds that a some point on the range of expectations stretching from maintenance of existing service levels to intensive development of higher volumes of distinctive Canadian programming of imagination and excellence the English Television resource base was not adequate to meet demands. No attempt is made here to establish the precise point along that expectation continuum where demands first exceeded resource adequacy. Assessment at the minimum demand level would seem inevitably to be highly subjective. Assessment against expectations of increased contributions to special regional services and to regional flow and exchange and against expectations of major increases in Canadian production and improvements in program quality is progressively less difficult. Chapter 12 will argue that, within the overall Canadian broadcasting system context during the case study period, the greater expectations of the CBC were not inappropriate. Taking those expectations as a basis for assessment, this study finds a severe demand/programming resource imbalance within English Television during the case study period.

Chapter 12 is devoted in large part to an examination of the origins of this demand/resource imbalance, of its consequences for the Canadian broadcasting system and the country. This section's observations about the imbalance between public expectations and English Television programming resources are also of considerable importance in the examination of English Television management decision making in Chapter 13: to a great extent that chapter is a study of the management of constraints, of the internal consequences of operating under demand/resource imbalance conditions.

Analysis

Chapter 12

Public Television in Canada

a) INTRODUCTION

In the guidelines for this study outlined in section 1(f), the examination of issues and conditions in public television in Canada was set out as "a third objective" -- following two primary objectives: the mapping of the management decision making environment, structures, and processes in English Television, and the examination of the impact of communication research on such decision making. However, in moving from the detailed examinations of specific issues and conditions to the development of sets of characteristics and limited generalizations, it is the third objective which is addressed first.

The general conditions under which public television broadcasting was carried out in Canada during the study period are a fundamentally important part of the English Television decision making environment. It is easier to focus on structures, processes, and organizational decision making characteristics at that management level if the national environment has already been considered. That would be the case in any institutional case study, whether set in Canada or elsewhere. In this study, however, there is an additional reason for considering the overall Canadian situation before attempting to analyze decision making within the broadcasting organization. The fact is that the national environment had a profound effect on both the structure and operation of CBC English Television.

Because this is not a comparative or cross-national study, there is no basis here for concluding that the national environment was a far more significant factor in shaping organizational decision making in CBC English Television than in other public broadcasting institutions. On the other hand, however, those cross-national studies which have been completed typically have identified Canadian cultural, linguistic, political, geographic, and economic factors as being of special significance in explaining "how and why the broadcasting system in Canada has developed as it has, and operates as it does" (Emery, p 45).

This chapter attempts to identify significant characteristics of the Canadian situation. It is important to note that the general nature of the relationship between the public broadcasting organization and the public at the national level has turned out to have been a much more significant factor in shaping organizational decision making within English Television than was anticipated. Significant environment and (to use the language of section 5(b)) "interface" characteristics have emerged. They have been relatively easy to identify. Isolation of "internal" characteristics has not been as simple. The institutional characteristics developed in the next chapter are limited in number and basic in nature. Virtually all of them are environment-related. Apart from the inherent complexities of the internal structures and processes, there has been the additional problem that the internal characteristics tend to be "swamped" by external considerations. Consequently, there are probably a number of important institutional characteristics, perhaps most of them common to most public broadcasting organizations, which have not emerged in this study.

To the extent that characteristics peculiar to the Canadian situation are highly significant in explaining organizational decision making within English Television, the ability to generalize the findings of this study to other situations is limited. On the other hand, however, the setting was perhaps ideal for examining the relationship between broadcasting organizations and their environments.

The Canadian Situation

The 1968 Broadcasting Act, with its explicitly nationalistic objectives, can be viewed either as a positive expression of post 1967 cultural nationalism or as a reaction to the immediate problems posed by increasing cable penetration. Or it can be viewed as some combination of the two. The thrust of the Act, in any event, was to shape a Canadian broadcasting system responsive to Canadian needs -- cultural, political, social, and economic. Implicit in the thrust of the Act was the assumption that, if the overall system were meeting those needs, Canadians would be viewing television programs produced in Canada by, for, and about Canadians.

Under any circumstances, effective implementation of the nationalistic objectives of the 1968 Act would have been difficilt. The Act had been framed with a view to protecting Canadian broadcasting from being engulfed by US broadcasting, but cable television had already set that process in motion by the day the first CRTC Commissioners were sworn in. The Chairman of the Commission termed cable a "technological cancer." The President of the CBC called it a "brutal" technology. Early in the case study period, Brian Stewart summarized the problem as follows:

> The core of the problem can be simply stated. The number of stations traditionally licensed to a given community depended on that community's ability to support them commercially. Many of these stations are now suddenly faced by one or more additional stations, usually American but sometimes distant Canadian. The new stations take a large share of the audience. The existing stations become less attractive to advertisers; their ability to produce Canadian programs is lessened; their commercial viability is threatened. Probably no other country in the world faces the dilemma of its own programming being outnumbered by foreign signals in the same language. (Stewart, pp 45-6)

The dilemma was not just that the US signals were available. As cable penetration increased, Canadians as a whole began to watch significantly more US programming, but total viewing time remained essentially constant, and the amount of time Canadians spent viewing programs produced in Canada by, for, and about themselves began to drop. Although the most obvious and immediate consequences were economic, there were disturbing long range cultural and political implications in the trend.

In effect, the 1968 Act gave both the CRTC and the CBC roles in ensuring that the Canadian broadcasting service offered Canadian services which Canadians would choose to watch.

For its part, the CBC undertook to increase its offering of Canadian programming -- to deal with the "over-Americanization" of its own English Television service. Its submission to the CRTC prior to the 1970 licensing hearing summarized the situation:

> During a typical week this winter [15-21 February 1970] the English television network presented a total of 69 1/4 hours of programs. Out of this .... 39:45 hours (57.4%) was purely Canadian. This has been the approximate level of Canadian content in the English network schedule for some years. However, the situation is less satisfactory than this figure would indicate. The Canadian content is not distributed evenly through the schedule, dropping during the prime time hours (7:30 to 11:00 p.m.) to 49%.

> The reason for this is well-known: the CBC's need for commercial revenue to meet the cost of operations combines with the understandable desire of sponsors to be associated with programs of wide audience appeal at times of maximum audience availability to place a high priority on imported entertainment programs, for the most part from the United States. The result has been twofold: the over-commercialization and the over-Americanization of the prime time schedule. To say this is to be neither anti-commercial nor anti-American; it is merely to recognize that economic pressures have resulted in a situation which is not entirely compatible with the CBC's mandate. (CBC 1970d, pp]7-8)

That same 1970 submission reported on the CBC's decision to increase Canadian content in prime time by 1.5 hours weekly in 1970/71, and to build further increments of Canadian programming into the prime time schedule in successive years. But it noted a "fundamentally economic" problem:

> A change of this kind is much more difficult than it sounds. The difficulty is fundamentally economic: the network's operating budget has to adjust not only to the cost of the new Canadian production (which may or may not gain sponsors) but to the loss of commercial revenue from the American programs which are being displaced.... (CBC 1970d, p 18)

While the CBC undertook to increase Canadian production for its prime time English Television schedule, the CRTC moved to address the problems of the Canadian broadcasting system on other fronts. Canadian content regulations for music on AM radio stations were introduced. Required levels of Canadian content for television stations and networks, both private and public, were raised. And the Commission began to evolve policies and regulations to control the distribution of US signals in Canada via cable.

The AM music regulations were successful in promoting the development of a native popular music industry. But the various television regulations seemed to have limited success in checking the Americanization of Canadian television. New cable policies and regulations were devised. Additional Canadian stations and networks were licensed in an attempt to establish a greater Canadian presence in Canadian broadcasting. But throughout the case study period cable penetration continued to increase, and the only apparent explanation was that Canadians wanted cable to bring them more US programming (Weiss, p 8).

In attempting to deal with the Americanization of Canadian television, the Commission adopted two types of approaches. One was regulation in what may be termed the "negative" sense: the short lived prohibition on the use of microwave facilities by cable television operators to import distant US stations was one regulatory attempt to block further penetration of Canada by US stations. The cable substitution policy and, indeed, even the minimum Canadian content (or maximum foreign content) regulations can be viewed as means of limiting the US presence in Canadian broadcasting. The problem with such approaches, as quickly became apparent with the microwave issue, was that they were acceptable to the public only if a satisfactory range of Canadian alternatives or substitutes was available.

The other type of approach, obviously, was to encourage the growth of the Canadian program production industry and encourage the development of attractive, distinctively Canadian program services. Both the minimum Canadian content regulations and the licensing of the Global Television Network were intended to contribute to the development of Canadian production capability. Some observers have argued that the content quotas "achieved what they set out to do: that is, to develop a programming base in the broadcasting industry whose products would reflect Canadian themes and aspirations, and in so doing, would replace the industry's heavy dependence upon imported materials which reflect other nation's cultures" (Romanow, p 6). Certainly, the content quotas had some effect, but assessment of the extent of their impact would seem to be highly subjective. As Romanow noted, "to meet a content quota is one thing, but to produce and schedule content which will attract audiences is quite another" (p 7). Although it was certainly not the only problem contributing to Global's financial difficulties, it was clear that the Canadian programs which the new network procured from the independent production industry in 1974 were not capable of attracting audiences in the fashion which it (and the CRTC) had anticipated.

In the midst of all these attempts to Canadianize broadcasting in Canada, it was understandable for the Commission to cast critical glances at what the national broadcasting service was doing. In 1972 it rejected the Radio One/Radio Two plan to popularize CBC radio services because it perceived in that plan a tendency towards the same radio formats already common to both US and Canadian private stations. In television, although the Canadian content level was increasing, US programming continued to occupy a substantial proportion of the English Television schedule during peak viewing periods. The Corporation's budget had not been adjusted for the cost of the new Canadian production, and it was generally scheduling its popular US programming so as to derive the maximum possible commercial revenue from it. With its increases in Canadian content the CBC was moving in the direction it had indicated in 1970, but the continuing prominence of US programming in the English Television schedule made it difficult to detect much of a transformation in the overall character of the service.

By 1974 the CRTC was expressing the same "over-commercialization" and "over-Americanization" concerns that the Corporation itself had voiced in 1970. The Commission found the extent of the CBC's "entanglement" in the "North American merchandizing environment" to be alarming. It was looking to the CBC for leadership in the development of innovative and distinctively Canadian program services -- in a creative renewal of the Canadian broadcasting system. It didn't find exactly what it was looking for, and it began to comment in public about the need to free the CBC from the influences of "the North American marketing system." The CBC also began to speak in public. It argued that, given its existing funding levels, it simply couldn't afford to abandon its commercial activities.

In the best of all possible worlds, the Corporation and the Commission would have begun to work together to clarify the CBC's role and, if that role was to be more distinctively Canadian, to develop the case for higher funding levels for the CBC -- both to improve program quality and lessen the Corporation's dependence on commercial revenue.

No matter how one looked at it, it was a money problem. And it was a problem that involved not just the CBC and the CRTC. In November 1973 Pierre Juneau commented:

> Without getting into Laurent Picard's estimate of $80 million or $90 million as a total cost, just the loss of $45 million in advertising revenue is pretty big in itself. I don't think he would get very far with the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board if he asked for $45 million more next year.
>
> Nevertheless, our view has been reinforced that there should be a very conscious, systematic and vigorous review of advertising policy in the CBC....
>
> But at the management level the CBC and the CRTC are certainly not at loggerheads on the question....
>
> If it turned out the CBC required so much money to improve its service and it was quite clear that money was not available, then fine -- nothing changes yet. At least everybody will have a clear understanding of the situation and can stop talking about it for another year. (Wilson, pp 18ff)

While the CBC and the CRTC may not have been "at loggerheads" on the question of commercials, there were at least distinct differences between them over priorities. The CBC argued its need for funding for program quality improvement, and attached a low priority to the reduction of commercial activity. The CRTC saw that commercial activity as the source of serious problems in the services the CBC was providing -- as inhibiting the Corporation's ability to meet its mandate.

The Broadcasting Act provided a mechanism for the CRTC to conduct a public review of the Corporation's positions in the form of licence renewal hearings. The 1974 hearing addressed the issues but it did not produce agreement. In an apparent attempt to break the deadlock, the CRTC issued a decision proposing licence conditions which constituted a rejection of the Corporation's policy on commercials. The CBC invoked the "right to consultation" provisions of the Broadcasting Act and, when those consultations with the CRTC still produced no agreement, the proposed conditions were submitted to the Government for consideration. The situation had called, at the least, either for an accommodation between the CBC and the CRTC or for a clarification of public policy on CBC commercial activity. I will argue later that a comprehensive review of public broadcasting policy was actually in order, and that there were needs both to clarify the role of the Corporation and to reassess the adeqacy of the resources provided in terms of that role.

There was no clarification of the CBC's role. There was no comprehensive review of Canadian public broadcasting policy. And there was no reassessment of resources. The CRTC remained dissatisfied with the Corporation's performance and policies. The CBC remained convinced that its biggest problem was underfinancing, not commercials. And there was little prospect of change.

Why? Why did the deadlock develop? Why was it not resolved during private consultations or public deliberations? Why, when the need was alleged to be so great, was there so little evidence of any public commitment to strengthen the national broadcasting service? These are the questions which this chapter attempts to answer. The approach is to develop, in turn, sets of environmental, structural, institutional, and process characteristics and then to consider them in combination.

b) ENVIRONMENTAL DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS

This section looks at the demands made on the organization by its environment, at the demands made on the national broadcasting service in Canada. Earlier, the CBC's mandate in the Broadcasting Act was reviewed in section 6(d); excepts from the Act appear as the Appendix; demands and expectations are considered in various sections of Chapter 11. The intention here is to summarize and develop a set of demand characteristics to contribute to the analyses in later sections.

Requirements

At the beginning of the case study period the Davey Committee commented that "we are faced with the fact that if the CBC did not exist, we would have to invent it." But it had been invented and the Corporation's mandate in the Broadcasting Act reflected a recognized need for a strong national broadcasting service in Canada. Section 3 of the Act translated the national needs into a set of demands made by the nation on its public broadcasting service. The mandate was uncommonly specific and notably ambitious. Its specific requirements were noted in various earlier sections but, in order to develop an understanding of the scope of the requirements made of the CBC, it is useful to summarize certain of the mandate requirements and their service implications:

- The thrust of the Broadcasting Act was that no Canadian should be deprived of the national broadcasting service on account of geography. The physical topology of the country and the pattern of population distribution was such that the demand on available resources for signal distribution and transmission "to all parts of Canada" was heavy.
- The recognition of equal rights for Canada's two official language groups required the provision of the national broadcasting service "in English and French." This

necessitated not only duplicate signal distribution and transmission facilities, but also dual programming and production operations.

- The nation is not only bilingual but also bicultural. As part of its obligation to "contribute to the development of national unity," the national broadcasting service had a special responsibility to foster understanding between the English and French cultural communities -- within each language service, and not simply through the provision of separate services.
- The political structure of the nation, a federal/provincial system, suggests the existence of significant regional and cultural differences as early as 1867. The national broadcasting service was assigned, by law, a special role in contributing to regional understanding through "the flow and exchange" of regional information and entertainment.
- Recognition of the multicultural nature of the country established Canada as a cultural "mosaic." Although multiculturalism was not specifically mentioned in the Broadcasting Act, the cultural flow and exchange provisions of the Act were commonly interpreted as requiring the CBC to contribute to understanding between all possible cultural groupings.
- International geography and North American history added special responsibilities for the national broadcasting service to contribute to the expression of a Canadian "identity" distinct from that of the United States. The perceived threat of American cultural domination of Canada had been a major factor leading to the creation of a public broadcasting system in Canada. This same concern had led to the specification of explicitly nationalistic objectives for the Canadian broadcasting system in the 1968 Act. And continued concern in the 1970-1974 period was the springboard for a series of requirements such as minimum Canadian content levels.

Section 3(f), pages 35-39, outlined a series of requirements which follow from "the special role of public broadcasting" and which apply to any public broadcasting undertaking. These "special role" requirements for maintaining fairness and political independence in programming and for ensuring balance and range in services provided can be taken as an additional set of environmental requirements. In the case of the CBC, they arise directly from provisions in the Broadcasting Act and, although they too were not unique to the CBC, they too must be kept in mind.

The levels of service specifically required of the national broadcasting service by the Broadcasting Act were high and implied requirements for major undertakings both in signal distribution and in program production.

Expectations

There was little disagreement that the expectations of the CBC were high. The Corporation's mandate itself established a high level of expectation. At the public hearing, Pierre Juneau noted that "there are terribly important things in the mandate of the CBC, extremely ambitious goals established in the Act" (CRTC 1974a, p 1469). The legislative requirements in Section 3 of the Broadcasting Act seem capable of speaking for themselves as to the expectations of the CBC. But a full understanding of what was expected of the Corporation must also take into account the fashion in which the Act was interpreted and also those expectations only indirectly related to the mandate.

The 1974 CRTC licence renewal decision expected the CBC to "play a vital role in creating excitement, enthusiasm and confidence in the future of the Canadian people, with their diverse aspirations and concerns" (CRTC 1974b, p 18). It expected "imagination and excellence" (p 19). At the detailed level:

- Section II of the decision expected additional regional, bicultural, and multicultural programs; programs to exploit satellite technology; "more regular and attractive programming of events and developments in the fields of Canadian literature, art, film, and the theatre"; provision of CBC programs to schools, educational organizations, and possibly cable television; and special efforts to foster the development of the Canadian film industry (pp 32-3).

- Section III required the reduction of commercial activity but also expected the CBC to "assist advertisers and advertising agencies who have expressed a desire to improve advertising practices in order to make them more responsive to the values and concerns of a changing society" (pp 43-4).
- Section IV expected far greater attention to standards of professional journalism, a new approach to public affairs programming, and increased actuality coverage of the proceedings of legislatures and other important meetings, conferences, seminars, and public forums (pp 51-2).
- Section V expected a higher turnover in and the gradual reduction of staff, additional training and re-training programs, the procurement of more programming from independent producers, much larger investments in scripts, and that the CBC become "more receptive to all ideas and proposals" (pp 59-60).
- Section VI expected coverage, service, and facilities extension or improvements or one sort or another in virtually every area of the country, "bold and imaginative plans to satisfy the programming needs of the people in the North," and improvements "in the use of the transmission capability of Anik" (pp 65-9).
- Section VII's expectations were of both the CBC and government. It expected that the CBC "be enabled to increase the quantity and quality of its Canadian programming capability immediately, and to reduce significantly the disproportionate influence of merchandizing on its programs" (p 74).

The expectation that the CBC succeed in reducing regional tension was noted in section 11(b), page 170. That concern was representative of a range of national political expectations of the CBC. But there was another set of expectations of the CBC, not so directly connected with changing national social or political conditions.

I think it fair to say that the expectations of Canadians as individual viewers related primarily to program quality. Those expectations, though not expressed in formal documents, were certainly no less demanding than any others. In information programming, the CBC had its own past successes to live up to: viewers remembered, for instance, that THIS HOUR HAS SEVEN DAYS had been both informing and entertaining, and they looked for that combination to surface again. In entertainment programming, viewer expectations were based on standards set externally: they expected light CBC programs to be as entertaining as those of ABC, CBS, and NBC, and they expected comedy programs from Vancouver, Toronto, or Montreal to be as humourous as any from New York or Los Angeles.

The first topic in the hearing submission of the Association of Canadian Television and Radio Artists was what ACTRA termed "our increasingly unreasonable expectations." ACTRA commented:

> Canada makes extraordinary demands on its CBC.
>
> We apparently do want it to be all things to all men, though it is questionable whether we are prepared to pay the real cost involved.
>
> The CBC is required to provide the programs and delivery systems for four national broadcasting services .... to be distributed, instantly and without any direct charge to the listener or viewer, to every citizen in this enormous country.
>
> We want the CBC to be Canadian, but also, in practice, to compete commercially with the Americans -- and with other Canadian services....
>
> [The] reasonable requirements of the Broadcasting Act have recently begun to be interpreted by some in vary narrow parochial terms, terms that insist that every minority has the right to demand a share of broadcast time in a particular language other than English or French, or that every region has the right of

> access to the national audience, or that this or that special interest group has a right of access to its immediate audience and a national audience.
>
> It is remarkable how many speak of rights, and how few of obligations. To those of us who earn our way by interesting and attracting audiences, obligations have always been important....
>
> We insist and demand that the CBC be impartial, fully informed and informing, fair, balanced, unbiased, but when the Corporation tries to do this we brand it 'bland'....
>
> The question we now ask ourselves is, have we gone too far? Can we reasonably expect the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to really be all things to all men (and Indians and Liberal cabinet ministers and big labour lobbies and women and even persons) or should we begin to reassess our public broadcasting facility, and either assign to it responsibilities it can reasonably hope to filfill, or provide it with the necessary resources to effectively meet these expanded expectations? (ACTRA, pp 5-7)

Whether viewed from the perspective of Parliament, the regulatory agency, groupings of citizens, or individual viewers, the expectations of the CBC were high.

The level of expectation of CBC contributions to the cultural, political, social, and economic life of Canada significantly exceeded the requirements explicitly specified by the Broadcasting Act.

c) ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT CHARACTERISTICS

Support Traditions

Behind the specific responsibilities assigned to public broadcasting in Canada were a series of traditions and assumptions which should be emphasized here for the benefit of those not especialy familiar with the Canadian situation.

Governmental Support of Cultural Activity

By the beginning of the case study period there was a well established tradition of federal government participation in the cultural life of the nation.

Both the CBC and the National Film Board of Canada had been established in the 1930s. The Canada Council, established in 1957 as recommended earlier by the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, continued to provide support for the visual and performing arts, for literary endeavours, and for studies in the humanities and social sciences. The Government's own 1967 Centennial project, one of many such projects with a cultural focus, had been the construction of the National Arts Centre in Ottawa. The creation of the Canadian Film Development Corporation and the subsidization of Canadian book publishers continued and expanded the pattern (SC 1973d, pp 54-62). Much of this more recent government participation in cultural affairs can be seen as part of the resurgence of Canadian cultural nationalism discussed in section 11(a), pages 135-137.

The Canadian Public Broadcasting Tradition

The public broadcasting tradition in Canada predates these more recent developments but also had its origins in a surge of cultural nationalism. The detailed history was reviewed in section 6(d), pages 59-64; the following summary, by George Ferguson, at the time editor of the Montreal STAR, was published in 1955:

> There was, from the beginning, an element of monopoly in radio which was lacking in the printed word, and this justified state intervention.... There was, added to this, another consideration. In the economic circumstances of the time in Canada, it was believed not only possible, but highly probable, that, without state intervention, Canadian radio would become the branch plant of an aggressive and expanding American industry.... It was known that one of the prime objectives of private licensees of radio wave lengths was to get affiliation with a United States chain, thereby securing permanent access to the highly paid, popular entertainment programmes with mass audience appeal. It was considered undesirable that this should happen -- that this new and important medium of communication should fall so completely under American direction. It was believed that such a development would retard the growth of native Canadian nationalism and thinking, and that it was essential for the national well-being and development that this new instrument should be protected from such consequences. These ideas, presented by a Royal Commission headed by a distinguished Canadian banker (who could hardly be accused of harbouring socialist tendencies) seized the mind of a prime minister whose United Empire Loyalist heritage made him watchful and suspicious of American influences on Canadian life. The result was the creation of a mixed radio system in which privately-owned stations are permitted to develop local audiences while network facilities become the responsibility of a Crown corporation.
>
> The system has worked well, but it would be idle to deny that it represents a striking departure from the orthodox liberal tradition. (Ferguson 1955, pp 5-6)

Throughout the case study period the CBC was repeatedly referred to as "the cornerstone" of the Canadian broadcasting system, and that combined system was described as "the central nervous system of Canadian nationhood."

Support for the concept of public broadcasting in Canada dated from the late 1920s and remained strong throughout the case study period.

Governmental Participation in Commercial Activity

To these comments on the origin of the public broadcasting tradition in Canada must be added some observations about another tradition which has influenced the form of Canadian public broadcasting from the outset. The 1974 debate about the commercial advertising activities of the public broadcasting service may seem unusual to those most familiar with the noncommercial public broadcasting systems in Britain and the US. But it should be recognized that the tradition of direct government participation in the economic life of the nation was both long and well established.

As Margaret Prang observed in tracing the origins of public broadcasting in Canada, state initiative has played a larger part in the nation's economic growth than is the case in most countries in the Americas and western Europe (page 57). The Canadian broadcasting system, consisting of a combination of public and private enterprise elements, was not the only "mixed" system operating in Canada during the case study period. Transportation and communication services were provided by an extensive series of mixed systems which "made sense" to Canadians but may seem unusual to others. Canadian Pacific Railways was a private enterprise operation. Canadian National (CN) was a public or Crown corporation. In some ways their services were complementary, but in others they were competitive. Each operated coast to coast passenger and freight rail services, shipping services, and chains of hotels. Over some routes CP Air competed with Air Canada, a CN subsidiary. In the communications area, the two operated a consortium, Canadian National/Canadian Pacific Telecommunications, consisting of independent operating organizations offering combined services to the public through a common sales organization (DOC, p 71).

Given such other situations in which the government was in competition with private enterprise, it is perhaps easier to understand that Canadians did not regard the CBC's circumstances as particularly unusual. The Canadian broadcasting system was a mixed one in which the public and private components competed for advertising revenue. The CBC was itself a mixed system of private affiliated and CBC owned stations. And the network services were mixed -- at times commercial, at times noncommercial or "sustaining." Regardless of the consequences for the CBC or for the public, there was at least nothing in the tradition of government participation in commercial activities that was inconsistent with its arrangements for the CBC.

National broadcasting service commercial advertising activity was not inconsistent with the established tradition of Canadian government participation in commercial activities, notably in the transportation and communication areas.

Public Support

Assessment of Services Provided

Opinion poll results presented at the hearing showed that 85% of English speaking Canadians felt the CBC was "doing a good job" (CBC 1974c, p 22). The hearing interventions, however, were described as "a deluge of more than 300 briefs, most of them highly critical of CBC programs" (Kirby 1974b). In 1974 Pierre Juneau declared that the licence renewal hearing "was not an investigation of the CBC." He added, "Let us hope that Canadians have had enough of this peculiar sport" (CRTC 1974a, p 3). At the beginning of the case study period, the 1970 Senate Committee report had observed that "sniping at the CBC has become a national pastime" (Davey 1974a, p 5).

Much criticism of the CBC was valid, much was not, and some was irrelevant. But the volume and intensity of criticism was remarkable and, in 1974, its tone did not suggest to those within the CBC that 85% of the people thought the Corporation was "doing a good job." It is understandable but nevertheless true that the messages the CBC received about itself were overwhelmingly negative. The CBC, as a taxpayer supported institution, was expected to do a good job. Citizens had at least a right if not a responsibility to point out where they felt there could be improvements. It is an inherent characteristic in this relationship that the Corporation heard from the public primarily about its faults.

It is useful at this point begin to to analyze the CBC's organizational environment in terms of the simple structural models presented in Figures 5-2 and 5-4, pages 46 and 47, and to consider the volume and nature of input from the Canadian public to its public broadcasting organization.

There was a certain amount of input from individual citizens.
But it was not a condition peculiar to the CBC that it was much less extensive than was generally assumed by the public. "Fan mail" and constructive suggestions were especially welcome at the program unit level but, as in broadcasting generally, such input was limited in volume and not always constructive. Input directed by telephone to CBC switchboards was similarly limited and mixed.

Input from interest groups, from those active in the fine and popular arts, and from the commercial broadcasting industry tended to have a very specific focus, in most cases related directly to the interests of the input sources. Interest groups typically sought increased or more sympathetic coverage of their activities or concerns. Those active in the arts frequently sought greater opportunities to participate in the provision of the national broadcasting service. The commercial broadcasting industry interests were especially concerned with the impact of CBC commercial activity on their own revenue potentials.

The CBC's affiliates, though obviously having financial interests and problems of their own, seemed remarkably understanding of the Corporation's need to balance its public service commitments against their own interests in competitive commercial broadcasting. But their input was regarded, at least within English Television, as virtually internal, though in many cases they did serve to channel to the network viewer comments originally directed to an affiliate.

It is difficult to assess the impact of the media writers, either on the CBC or on the public. Within the CBC, excerpts from their columns were included in the "Daily News Summary" and other digests which provided some managers and some producers with a condensation of comment in the daily press about the CBC and its programs. Within the Planning Group and the program units, more attention was paid to the writings of some columnists than others, and some were perceived as having predictable reactions -- both negative and positive.

Whereas most of the criticism of the media writers was accepted even if not appreciated, the criticism contained in the interventions filed for the 1974 hearing caused the CBC special concern. The interventions filed by the Canadian Broadcasting League and by the Committee on Television are representative of the extremes in range of comment. The League's submission and presentation -- supporting the CBC, calling for increased funding, and advocating condition-free licences -- were not widely reported. The COT intervention -- describing the English Television as "a grossly inadequate programme service resulting from a paralyzed bureaucracy" -- received considerable attention. Although one writer suggested that the rating of programs was "a subjective thing" and that "the elite group [COT] has in it some professional broadcasters and film-makers who may or may not have axes to grind" (Braithwaite 1974b),most of the coverage was favourable to the Committee's propositions.

It should be noted, however, that even the most severe criticisms of the CBC voiced during the period implied strong support for the concept of public broadcasting in Canada. The Committee on Television intervention, for instance, though critical of English Television program performance, reaffirmed support for a strong CBC, and distinguished between support in principle and criticism of execution:

> Supporters of public broadcasting in this country have reason to be proud of the battle that has been fought and won over four decades to create and sustain the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (COT 1974, p 2)
>
> At issue are not the general goals or mandate of the CBC, but their execution.... (p 8)
>
> At its best, the CBC English-language television network fulfills admirably the commonly accepted goal of public broadcasting -- to make good things popular and popular things good. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of what might be called popular education.... We congratulate the CBC on these achievements. What we regret ... is that such programmes have become exceptions to the rule. (p 18; emphasis added)

Public support for the concept of public broadcasting and for the mandate and general goals of the CBC was implicit in the relatively widespread criticism of the quality of program service actually being provided during the case study period.

Demands for Extension of Service.

Many of the interventions filed by individual citizens with the CRTC prior to the 1974 hearing pleaded for rapid extension of full CBC service to specific geographical areas. The thrust of the hearing presentations by the Ministers Responsible for Communications in the Maritime Provinces, the Council of the Northwest Territories, and the Town of Shaunavon was that people in those areas wanted more CBC service. Section 11(b), pages 174-175, reviewed the pressures on the Corporation to complete extension of CBC service to areas not yet so served.

Implicit in criticism of delays in completing the extension of the national broadcasting service to cover all parts of Canada was a desire to be provided with the full range of CBC services.

Political Support

Conceptual Support

At the 1974 hearing Graham Spry noted that not only had the principles of Canadian broadcasting and a national strategy about communications been legislated by a unanimous House of Commons some forty years earlier, but also that every Parliament since then had reaffirmed those principles (CRTC 1974a, p 343). Calls by politicians to dispense with the CBC were not at all common.

Support from individual politicians for the concept of public broadcasting in Canada and for the principles set out in the Broadcasting Act was virtually unanimous.

Assessment of Services Provided

While individual politicians seldom questioned the general need for a national broadcasting service, as the public's elected representatives they did play a special role in monitoring the Corporation's performance and in commenting on the appropriateness of the services provided to the country in general and to their own constituents in particular.

The Canadian parliamentary setting, in particular the daily Question Period in the House of Commons, provided Members of Parliament with an opportunity to criticize the CBC on a program by program basis. In many cases MPs were clearly reflecting the concerns of at least some of their constituents about the content of CBC programs. But it is difficult to review the range of their comments and not allow for the possibility that there was at least a temptation for some MPs to use criticism of the Corporation as a means of gaining personal publicity. Their comments were widely reported as "news," though occasionally some writers and columnists questioned the appropriateness of some of the criticism.

It is difficult to generalize about the role of individual MPs in conditioning the CBC support environment. Some Members were especially sensitive to the CBC's need for operational independence. Others were genuinely alarmed at -- to use the CRTC's term -- "real and imagined" CBC excesses and shortcomings. But, as a group, Members of Parliament constituted a uniquely important element in the overall Canadian public television environment, and it is important to consider the nature of their independent and collective relationship with the Corporation. The following press excerpts have been selected to illustrate the range (but not the balance) of their comments and to suggest the nature of at least some reactions to them:

Editorial in the Montreal GAZETTE, 1 June 1973:

The narrow majority of MPs on the Commons Broadcasting Committee who voted to cut the CBC budget by $1,000 with the main aim of criticising the amount of separatism on Radio-Canada are making fools of themselves. Anyone who has been an occasional viewer of the French network over the past decade knows that the peddling of under-the-counter separatism peaked in the late sixties and has gone away down since then. At the same time, the French network has set some very high standards.... But the CBC budget cut voted by the committee amounts to a formal act of censure and an attempt at parliamentary direction of programming. When discussion of the CBC comes before the whole House the committee's action should be repudiated. (Gazette 1973)

Ottawa JOURNAL, 13 September 1973:

A news story reported that Social Credit leader Raoul Caouette had protested that the CBC remained what he called "a box of socialism and separatism" and wanted to know when the Prime Minister was going to use the "key" of government power to turn it off. (Journal 1973b)

HALIFAX CHRONICLE-HERALD, 12 December 1973:

A news story from Ottawa reported criticism directed at the CBC over the Cape Breton radio program, ISLAND ECHOES. ".... MPs from three parties supported a motion charging the Corporation with an affront to Parliament and the committee for reducing the length of the broadcast and moving it to a new time slot...." (Hfx CH)

Ottawa JOURNAL, 16 March 1974:

A CP story reported that Prime Minister Trudeau had said he would look into the possibility of asking the CBC to stop telecasts of National Football League games on Sunday afternoons when Canadian Football League teams are playing. (Journal 1974c)

THE TORONTO STAR, 18 March 1974:

Dennis Braithwaite commented on the Prime Minister's statement: "That's like the late Louis St. Laurent, when he was Prime Minister back in 1956, writing a letter to the editor of an Ottawa newspaper in which 'as a private citizen', he took the CBC to task for its coverage of the Suez crisis. There is no way that a prime minister can make public statements on controversial issues as a private citizen.... Prime Minister Trudeau cannot 'ask' the CBC not to telecast NFL games; such a request, coming from that source, imediately becomes a directive...." (Braithwaite 1974a)

Ottawa JOURNAL, 4 February 1975:

A news item reported that Conservative MP Wiliiam Scott had asked Secretary of State Hugh Faulkner to investigate complaints that a Sunday night CBC television program contained indecent material. Mr. Scott had complained in the Commons that PERFORMANCE was too crude for television. (Journal 1975)

GLOBE AND MAIL, 12 February 1975:

Blaik Kirby commented about criticism of PERFORMANCE: ".... The trouble is, people who love a show don't generally bother to say anything about it. It's those who are angry who phone or write.... Good drama is meant to be disturbing. The shows that say something important to society are the ones that get people's backs up.... There is a large silent majority -- my letters show -- that want and appreciate quality. The drama department's job is not to cater to the lowest common denominator of taste, but to put on a broad range of works at the highest possible level. I'm sure John Hirsch intends to do just that. I'm not at all sure about the politicians who control the purse strings." (Kirby 1975a)

Ottawa CITIZEN, 14 February 1975:

A CP item reported opposition complaints had continued in the Commons about TEN LOST YEARS, which MP Stanley Korchinski said showed Canadian culture along "permissive lines." MP James McGrath had suggsted that the government meet with the CRTC to establish a code "to prevent the exploitation of sex and violence." Communications Minister Gerard Pelletier had said that he would examine the suggestion, but that the government did not intend to interfere with CBC program content. (Citizen 1975b)

Ottawa CITIZEN, 19 February 1975:

A CP item reported that Kootenay West MP Bob Brisco had said that a CBC television program was "obscene and profane" in its portrayal of the town of Trail, B.C. as "an industrial-polluted sinkhole." He was referring to a program in the PACIFICANADA series produced for the CBC by the NFB. Secretary of State Hugh Faulkner assured him that the complaint would be investigated. Mr. Brisco said he intended to continue pressing Mr. Faulkner to clean up what he termed increasing profanity on the CBC as a whole. (Citizen 1975c)

GLOBE AND MAIL, 15 March 1975:

A CP story reported that the CBC had been accused of handing the public obscenity, profanity, and "gift wrapped garbage" in its television programs. Members of the Commons broadcasting committee had told CBC President Laurent Picard that the CBC spent too much time dramatizing the tribulations of the foul-mouthed, the violent, the unhappily married and the sexually preoccupied members of society. (Globe 1975b)

Montreal GAZETTE, 20 March 1975:

Dave Billington commented: ".... These white tornadoes in the service of TV cleanliness know full well that every one of their tripe, vapid complaints will be fully noted and splashed across the nation's newspapers. Why? Because a nation like Canada needs unifying elements and MPs in need of a little publicity to prove to their constituents that they are still alive, know that nothing short of a Grey Cup will unite the country -- and give them headlines -- like a lot of generalized claptrap about a CBC plot to destroy Canada...." (Billington)

GLOBE AND MAIL, 16 May 1975:

A CP story reported that a special showing of two CBC-TV dramas already seen on television had been scheduled at the request of the Commons Broadcasting Committee. CBC President Laurent Picard had agreed to arrange the showings of TEN LOST YEARS and BAPTIZING which had been criticized earlier by a group of MPs. (Globe 1975c)

Reporting of election campaigns always received special attention from politicians. The 1974 federal election was no exception:

> Conservative campaign director Malcolm Wickson charged Friday [June 21] that from June 6 to 20, Prime Minister Trudeau received almost twice as much coverage as Robert Stanfield on CBC's THE NATIONAL, which has a nightly audience of 1.5 million viewers.
>
> The Tories also complained that during a successful three-day swing of the West and Ontario last week, Stanfield did not appear on the air at all, receiving a total of only 24 seconds "announcer copy." Over the same three-day period, the Tories said, Trudeau was on the air for more than five minutes. (MacDonald 1974e)

The content logging system study described as activity 5 in section 8(d) had involved us in a detailed consideration of the special need to ensure balance in election campaign reporting. CBC News had established a policy in this area some years earlier to ensure balanced coverage by the end of any given campaign. This had been considered necessary because different parties were more active than others during different portions of a campaign, and balanced coverage on a daily basis would have required the airing of a great deal of material which, measured against professional journalism standards, clearly was not "news." Following the 1974 election, Bob Blackburn commented on the charges of bias:

> One party or another, or maybe all of them at once, is always beefing that the CBC's national news is biased, either quantitatively or qualitatively or both. Such charges are inevitable every time around, and maybe some of them are justified. Unless there is a flagrant offence, they're really impossible to prove.
>
> In mid-campaign this time, the Conservatives were complaining that the CBC's national news had been shortchanging them. It may or may not be true. I don't know, and you don't know. It would take a considerable staff of monitors and analysts even to cook up a reasonable argument one way or the other.
>
> Partly because I'm so tired of hearing the same charges and arguments in every election, I'm inclined to suggest a drastic solution: Let the CBC national news service simply ignore election campaigns....
>
> Personally, I would be exactly as willing to trust the CBC to present campaign news on the basis of professional news judgment as I am to trust any other news medium.
>
> But the politicians -- and other concerned parties -- will not let it happen that way.
>
> So, if we can't have honestly selected news reports on the politicians, let's get the politicians off the news altogether and put them somewhere [where] they can make their own rules.
>
> Somehow, though, I don't think that would please them, either. (Blackburn 1974d)

"A considerable staff of monitors and analysts" had, as in previous elections, been logging announcer copy and filmed reports throughout the campaign. The CBC policy of balancing coverage over the whole campaign rather than on a daily basis had been explained to the political parties. Still, the charges of bias not only continued but continued to receive considerable press publicity.

Members of Parliament tended to concentrate on two aspects of CBC program content: balance in reporting their own political activities (as in elections), and matters of taste. Although it would be unfair to characterize all complaints about matters of taste as appealing to "motherhood" concerns, MP complaints about the broadcast of language heard in the street and references to sexual matters almost invariably received press attention. Perhaps not surprisingly, satire involving national institutions also provoked extensive complaints from politicians.

An April 1974 edition of the French Television network program, LES BEAUX DIMANCHES, contained satirical segments involving the Queen, the wife of the Governor General, and federal politicians. There was an immediate uproar, and by 29 November of that year the CBC had been called before a committee of the Senate to account for the content of the broadcast. News stories reported on the Corporation's appearance:

> Senators lit into the CBC today over a French-network satirical program that portrayed the Queen and the wife of the Governor-General.
>
> But when CBC President Laurent Picard invited them to watch a British Broadcasting Corp. (BBC) program that he said went much further in spoofing the Queen, the senators didn't want to know about it.... (Lon FP 1974)

Picard's appearance did not mark the end of the investigation. The Senate Transportation and Communications Committee called the Chairman of the CRTC to testify and eventually, on 25 June 1975, issued a special report which was critical of the program's content and of both CBC and CRTC performance in supervising program quality (Lon FP 1975).

Despite implicit support for the concept of public broadcasting, public comments by individual politicians, especially those comments receiving widespread public attention, focused primarily on critical assessment of CBC program performance.

Political Pressure

Although individual politicians frequently criticized CBC performance, including the reporting of political issues and activities, their comments and actions did not constitute real political "interference" with the programming operation of the national broadcasting service.

During the early 1970's public broadcasting in the US was subjected to a political assault launched directly from the White House. One objective in that campaign was to eliminate or at least reduce the public affairs programming service provided by that system. It was the sort of blatant political interference which US public broadcasters had feared for years and which to a somewhat lesser extent they still fear. It is in order to gain some protection against such interference that the US system has placed such a premium on obtaining effectively insultated long range funding (McKay 1976, pp 148-50).

Public broadcasting in Canada has never been subjected to that sort of political assault. The CBC's independence in political reporting was, like the BBC's, traditional. The Corporation did not have the financial independence which operating from receiving set licence fees gave the BBC, but there was a general public understanding that direct interference in political programming was inappropriate. This traditional independence for the CBC was not untested. In June 1959 senior CBC management, apparently under at least indirect pressure from the government of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, made a move to cancel a short daily program of freelance political comment. Peter Newman reported on the apparent origin of the initiative:

> As part of his morning routine, Diefenbaker always made it a point to tune in the CBC's eight o'clock news -- either on his car radio while being driven to work, or on the desk clock-radio in his office. On weekdays, the news was followed by a three-minute talk called "Preview Commentary," featuring members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery analysing current events in the capital. In the spring and early summer of 1959, when the Conservative government was facing its initial wave of troubles, the "Preview Commentary" speakers grew increasingly critical, and rumours began circulating in Ottawa that the Prime Minister was displeased. (Newman 1963, pp 234-5)

In the end, 35 of the Corporation's public affairs producers and supervisors tendered their resignations in protest, the CBC's management and Board of Directors reversed their stand, the program continued, and the Commons Committee on Broadcasting called a special session to investigate the controversy (Newman, pp 235-6). The investigations were less than conclusive, but the incident did serve notice to Parliament, CBC management, and the Canadian people that attempts to interfere with CBC programming of a political nature were, at the least, quite likely to backfire. The program's name was changed to COMMENTARY in the fall of 1969 when the overall PREVIEW package was replaced. But, as I discovered while working as a service producer on COMMENTARY in the summer of 1970, that weekday talk was remembered as having special significance. Both the members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery and listeners who wrote to the program almost invariably referred to it as "PREVIEW" COMMENTARY.

Such incidents must be seen as the exceptions that prove the rule. Covert attempts to influence the CBC politically were rare. Comments on the CBC's handling of political issues, though often highly critical, were made in public. It is possible to regard some of those observations noted earlier as constituting political "pressure," but they should not be considered as "interference."

Demands for Extension of Service

Apart from reflecting the concerns of their constituents about the content of CBC program services, MPs had a responsibility to represent to the national broadcasting service and to the Government the desires of their areas for access to the full range of CBC services. In this regard, it is impossible to view their comments and activities as at all unusual. The concerns that CBC services be extended to areas not yet served were noted in several earlier sections and need not be repeated here. The Government's 1974 decision to fund the CBC's Accelerated Coverage Plan for service extension would seem to indicate a sensitivity to those demands on the part of both the CBC and the Government.

# Individual MPs served as appropriate and effective channels in communicating to the national broadcasting service and to the Government the demands of their constituents for extension of full CBC services to their particular areas.

Governmental Support

Conceptual Support

The 1973 Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada asserted: "The Government remains fully committed to the principles and objectives of the 'Broadcasting Policy for Canada' set forth in the Broadcasting Act (Green Paper, p 18).

As in the case of both the public in general and individual MPs, Government support of the concept of public broadcasting was traditional and, in the 1970-1974 period, without publicly expressed reservations.

Financial Support

On the final day of the 1974 hearing, CRTC Commissioner Gordon Hughes reflected on what he termed the CBC's "practical" problem:

> Now the last thing that sort of concerns me is [this.] Hopefully everyone here is very keen and anxious for you [Mr. Picard] and the CBC to be very successful in the future; there's no question about this. But from a practical point of view, if you want to do more it does cost more money, and there's all sorts of problems; and one group that still has to be convinced is Parliament and politicians.... We have heard a few discouraging things about what they think on Parliament Hill during the week.... They do get quite a cross section of people complaining for various reasons, and some of them are probably reasonably justified. Nobody's fault in particular, just a little bit on everyone. And I think it's important that .... we try and work it out so that we have parliamentarians [and] the people on our side completely. (CRTC 1974a, pp 1429-30)

Earlier in the week, Graham Spry had offered these observations about the levels at which successive national governments had funded the CBC:

> Forty years ago the principles of Canadian broadcasting and a national strategy about communications were legislated by a unanimous House of Commons. Every parliament since then has endorsed them. They were endorsed by parliament

> and defined by law, but government after government after government has failed to provide the means, and for forty or forty-two years or more we have devoted too many of our efforts to weakening those principles and compromising that national strategy. (CRTC 1974a, p 343)

There was certainly no evidence of a Governmental intention to weaken the principles of public broadcasting in Canada or to compromise the national communications strategy. On the contrary, the domestic satellite program, the decision to proceed with ACP, and comments by Cabinet Ministers indicated considerable support. But there was no indication that there was to be any significant increase in the operational funding of the Corporation. Throughout the case study period the level of funding remained below the levels requested by the CBC. The shortfall in the 1969/70 through 1973/74 period amounted to some $57 million (CBC 1974c, p 47). Moreover, it should be noted that the CBC "requests" were prepared according to general guidelines set by the Government.

Throughout the case study period the level of funding provided by the Government for the national broadcasting service remained below the levels requested by the CBC. At the end of the period there was no indication of any significant change in either the immediate or long term future.

The operational consequences of the imbalance between the requirements and expectations of the CBC and its level of resources were examined in detail in section 11(e), pages 201-223. It is difficult to argue that the Government was unaware of the imbalance between the demands placed on the CBC and the level of resources provided, and the continuing failure of successive governments to match means with demands is one of the central puzzles in Canadian public broadcasting. We will return to this puzzle later in this chapter.

Regulatory Support

Conceptual Support

The role of the CRTC in Canadian broadcasting in the case study period was reviewed in detail in section 7(c), pages 84-92. The Commission's role in the 1974 licence renewal process was detailed in sections 10(b) through 10(f), pages 118-134. And its position on specific issues was considered in virtually every section in Chapter 11. The concern here is not so much with its detailed positions as with the general thrust of its regulatory activity.

The notion of the CRTC and the CBC sharing the overall problems of the Canadian broadcasting system was developed in section 12(a). It is important to note that the CRTC's support of the concept of public broadcasting in Canada was never in question. It had some deep reservations about certain aspects of CBC operations, but it must not be forgotten that the CRTC hearing on CBC licence renewals was opened by Commission Chairman Juneau with this observation: "A strong CBC is vital to the health of Canadian broadcasting.... It is clear that any weakening of the national service, as it is called, would pose a threat to the entire Canadian broadcasting system."

Throughout the case study period, regulatory agency support for the concept of public broadcasting in Canada was articulate and unconditional.

Assessment of Services, Policies, and Plans

The CRTC conditioned the CBC environment in three main ways: by providing a forum for public comment, by offering its own assessment of CBC performance as guidance, and by regulatory activity.

The 1974 licence renewal hearing served as a focus for public assessment of CBC performance and it funnelled to the Corporation a wide range of comment -- some of it positive, much of it negative -- from a wide range of groups and individuals. The Commission's licence renewal decision document was, in many ways, a digest of public comments which reflected both the public's expectations of the CBC and relatively widespread dissatisfaction that those expectations were not being met.

To the public input the Commission added its own comments. That assessment reflected considerable dissatisfaction both with the immediate past performance of the CBC and with its future plans. Its expectations were noted in detail in section 12(b); excerpts from the Commission's decision and a digest of reaction to it appeared in section 10(f), pages 131-134.

Despite support in principle, the regulatory agency's 1974 licence renewal decision was highly critical of CBC performance, and was widely interpreted as constituting a rejection of the Corporation's policies and plans for the future.

d) STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

Relationship with the Public

This study is concerned with the relationship between the CBC and the public. But the public is a general term and not a simple element in a structural model. Important characteristics will be noted in the later parts of this section about the relationship between the CBC and the three national structural elements -- Parliament, the Government, and the CRTC -- which acted on behalf of the public. But there is one informal aspect of the general relationship between the CBC and the public which -- though included here more or less arbitrarily -- should be noted before considering the characteristics of the formal structural arrangements.

The operation of the national broadcasting service was an undertaking highly visible to the public.

In a very real sense the CBC was the main daily federal presence in the lives of Canadians. They paid for the CBC and they spent an average of just over an hour a day each watching it -- as viewers and as shareholders. They intervened in their networks' licensing procedures to an extent unequalled elsewhere in the world. They read about their public broadcasting corporation in the daily columns of radio and television critics and in news stories about comments made in Parliament. They wrote letters about the CBC to editors, and editors published them.

The visibility of the CBC was noted in section 11(b), page 170, and -- because the point is relatively obvious -- it is really not necessary to argue it at length here. Robert Lewis commented on the visibility of the CBC's President:

> At the February hearings Picard may have won the battle for headlines, but he lost the war. The next month, the CRTC weighed in with its decision, attaching several conditions to new CBC licences and rebutting Picard on virtually every one of his major points....
>
> No one in the communications industry, of course, could feel anything but sympathy for Picard. Certainly no newspaper publisher or commercial television executive or magazine editor or newspaper reporter is open to so much public second guessing and abuse as in an employee of the CBC. (Lewis, p 16)

Decisions in a public broadcasting organization are not made in an isolation chamber installed in a boardroom. It would be more apt to describe them as being made in a goldfish bowl. And, while this is not at all necessarily a bad thing, the public nature of the Corporation's business did have a strong impact on decision making.

Relationship with Parliament

The structural arrangements for public broadcasting in Canada were established by Parliament in the Broadcasting Act. That Act, together with a strong Canadian tradition, establishes public broadcasting independence in programming, including controversial and political programming. Even so, the Act and the Canadian system of government established important dependency relationships between the CBC and Parliament, the Government, and the regulatory agency.

The annual basis for funding of the national broadcasting service established a dependency relationship between the CBC and Parliament.

The arguments and support for long range funding offered by Fowler in 1957, by Fowler in 1965, by the White Paper on Broadcasting in 1966, by the Broadcasting Committee in 1967, by the CBC in 1974, and by John Hirsch in 1975 were reviewed in section 11(e), pages 217-219. Those familiar with issues in public broadcasting in the United States in the period between passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 and the Public Broadcasting Financing Act of 1975 will be familiar with the basic arguments. They are the subject of an extensive volume of literature on US public broadcasting (eg-Owen; Schramm & Nelson), and of these observations by Rowland:

> By reducing CPB to the annual authorization and appropriation treadmill, the lawmakers virtually guaranteed that the kind of political pressure exercized by the Nixon administration would manifest itself. Given a funding process that is part of the general procedure for financing all federal agencies, CPB has come to be treated just like a government office. Under such conditions it is likely that Presidential interference in CPB affairs would have developed, regardless of who the White House occupant happened to be. (Rowland, p 11)
>
> Given that any broadcasting system requires a certain degree of governmental regulation, and given that politicians have certain basic needs for and fears of broadcasting, it is clear that any form of broadcasting is more vulnerable to political manipulation than almost any other social institution. As the recipient of governmental funds, a public broadcasting system is even more subject to attacks on its autonomy. In the American environment issues of accountability and control assume major importance in the strategies of Congressmen and Presidents as they jockey with one another over decisions about how to apportion the public purse. Therefore with a limited duration, limited insulation general treasury authorization as their sole major funding source, public broadcasters are going to have to be so careful in their self-control that a restrictive pattern of programming is virtually insured. (p 16)

Observers of the Canadian scene also have identified annual funding, or the lack of funding "insulation," as a problem. Writing in MACLEAN'S in June 1974, Val Clery commented on the consequences:

> In retrospect, the practice of annual government financing appears to have assured the CBC's victimization. Every year, CBC executives are obliged to trudge up Parliament Hill, cap in hand; if they never get as much money as they need, they can be certain, as one former CBC executive, Gunnar Rugheimer, has put it, to be offered moral guidance.
>
> "These annual requests for money also meant, by definition, a discussion in Parliament; and with MPs from rural districts who objected to everything from

a production of MACBETH to any show of the female form, a tradition was created which continues to hamper the CBC from doing its rightful job." (Clery, p 54)

In the same issue of MACLEAN'S, editor Peter Newman also commented on the annual funding problem:

> Under Laurent Picard's vigorous leadership many of the CBC's shortcomings are being rectified. But what the CBC needs most of all is a pledge from the federal treasury that it will make up the funds lost through the withdrawal of commercials, and a budget based on three to five years, instead of the fiscal hastle that the corporation now has to face every year. What we, as listeners and viewers, can demand in return is that the CBC become what it was always supposed to be. (Newman 1974)

The internal operational consequences of funding on an annual basis and the implications for long range planning were considered in section 11(e), pages 217-219 and 221. Those implications are important, but the point to note here deals with the general nature of the relationship between the national broadcasting service and Parliament. The annual scrutiny of CBC performance arising out of the annual basis for funding was not the only Parliamentary scrutiny of the Corporation: the tradition of "scrutinizing" the CBC was noted in section 1(a), and the ongoing monitoring by individual politicians and the activities of the Senate and Commons committees on broadcasting and on public accounts were noted in sections 13(c) and 9(a). On the surface, the structural relationship between the CBC and Parliament would seem to be a general policy relationship. In practice, however, the relationship had an operational focus which, though not directly implied by the Broadcasting Act, was at least reinforced by the annual funding system. There was not much effective "distance" between the national broadcasting service and Parliament: the CBC was at no time more than 12 months away from a detailed Parliamentary review of its operational performance.

Despite an established tradition of political independence for public broadcasting in Canada, structural arrangements -- in particular, the annual basis for funding the national broadcasting service -- established a dependency relationship between the CBC and Parliament in which the Corporation's operational performance was regularly the subject of close Parliamentary scrutiny.

Relationship with the Government

The annual basis for funding of the national broadcasting service established an operational dependency relationship between the CBC and the Government.

At the outset it is important to repeat that the traditional independence of the Canadian public broadcasting system effectively protected it from direct attempts at the political control of programming by the Government. But, as in the case of Parliament, there was not much effective "distance" between the national broadcasting service and the Government. The closeness of the relationship between the two arose, again, in large part from the annual funding system:

- The working relationships between the CBC and the various elements of the Government -- in particular, the Department of the Secretary of State, the Department of Finance, and the Treasury Board -- were outlined in section 9(a), pages 104-105.
- The impact of the Government's annual budgeting timetable and procedures on internal CBC operations -- notably in determining the timetable of and reinforcing the importance of English Television's annual Planning System -- was examined in section 9(f), pages 114-117.
- The role of the Government in setting guidelines for the preparation of the CBC's annual funding "requests" was noted in section 12(c).

Simply because it operated from public funds, the CBC could have been expected to have had a relatively "close" working relationship with the Government. But, as with other public broadcasting institutions which are financed from general revenue funds on an annual appropriations basis, the CBC was drawn into an especially close working relationship with the Government. The broadcasting organization was not financially independent. It could not plan its financial future on its own. Although it "reported" to Parliament, the financial arrangement made the CBC effectively dependent on the Government -- because it was the Government that each year prepared the operating budget recommendations to be presented to Parliament. The public broadcasting organization needed the cooperation of the Government on an ongoing basis and, in the case of the CBC, this led to relatively extensive consultation between the Corporation and various components of the Government on both policy and operational matters.

The financial control provisions of the Broadcasting Act contributed to the CBC's operational dependence on the Government.

Section 41 of the Broadcasting Act (included in the Appendix) empowered the CBC to enter into property agreements and conduct transactions but, except in the case of program materials and rights, the Corporation was required to obtain prior Cabinet approval of any expenditure over $250,000. In effect, this provision of the Act gave the Government control of the CBC's capital financing, and made it at least possible for the Government to set the Corporation's capital spending priorities. Simply in terms of matters raised in Chapter 11 concerning English Television in the 1970-1974 period, the Act gave the Government control over:

- the establishment of new stations in Saskatoon, Charlottetown, Sydney, Goose Bay, Labrador City, Windsor, and Calgary (page 174),
- the CRTC's recommended acquisition of the existing private station in Saint John (page 174),
- the Accelerated Coverage Plan (pages 124-125),
- the Northern Broadcasting Plan (page 173),
- contracting for utilization of the domestic satellite system (page 76),
- acquisition of equipment for the Olympics Radio and Television Organization (page 180),
- replacement of existing capital necessitated by the "obsolescence gap" estimated by the CBC at $32 million (page 174),
- the facilities consolidations in Montreal and Vancouver and those contemplated in Regina and Toronto (pages 174-183).

The financial control provisions of the Act made it possible for the Government both to establish the level of capital spending and to determine, for instance, the expenditure balance between extension of coverage and the upgrading of production facilities. Like the annual system of funding, Section 41 established an operational dependency relationship between the CBC and the Government.

Relationship with the Regulatory Agency

The licensing of stations and networks and other provisions of the Broadcasting Act tended to make the CBC operationally dependent on the CRTC.

The Broadcasting Act established the powers of the CRTC to regulate both private and public broadcasting. And, although interpretations of the legal and sensible extent of the CRTC's powers to regulate the activities of the Corporation remained a matter of debate at the end of the period, the Commission did have an operational impact on the CBC during the case study period:

Figure 12-1. CBC TELEVISION'S FIRST "LIFE CYCLE"



Source: "President's Presentation: Visuals, CRTC Hearings, February 18-22, 1974" (CBC 1974c, p 1)

- The Commission forced a revision of CBC radio policy through denial of the station licence applications required by the Radio One / Radio Two plan (pages 90-92).
- The Commission established the 60% Canadian content requirement (pages 85-86).
- The regulatory agency rejected the CBC's station and signal distribution plans for service to Vancouver Island (page 92).
- The proposed network licence conditions, unless challenged, would have significantly altered the Corporation's scheduling and commercial operations (pages 131-134, 153-154).

In addition, as noted in section 13(b), the CRTC offered the CBC a significant amount of operational guidance with respect to both the program content of its services and its spending on programs, talent, personnel, extension of coverage, and production facilities.

The 1968 Broadcasting Act, in establishing CRT[illegible]rol over both the private and public components of the Canadian broadcasting [illegible]m, attempted to eliminate the earlier confusion over BBG and CBC jurisdiction noted in section 6(d), pages 66-67. But, as noted in section 11(a), pages 153-154, in the final analysis the Act recognized that the Commission and the Corporation might well differ on major issues, specifically those involving conditional licences, and in Section 17 it simply provided for the ad hoc resolution of such differences by the Government.

As the 1974 hearing approached, there was speculation about the extent of the CRTC's powers over the CBC but -- at least within the CBC -- no consensus on the jurisdictional boundaries implied by the Act.

The "right to consultation" and "right to referral" provisions of Section 17 of the Broadcasting Act left the legal and practical extent of the regulatory agency's powers over the national broadcasting service uncertain.

e) ANALYSIS

This chapter began with a review of the apparent need for, at the least, a clarification of public policy on CBC commercial activity. Commercial policy had been the subject of regulatory agency concern at least as early as 1970 but, at the end of 1974, the agency and the CBC remained in disagreement on the matter, and there was little prospect of a full public review. The policy development and interpretation process was deadlocked. To some extent the origins of the policy deadlock can be seen to stem from environmental and structural characteristics of the Canadian situation. But policy development process characteristics and institutional characteristics of the national broadcasting service were also factors. In oder to isolate them it is necessary to consider policy alternatives and the way they were considered.

The CBC Options

In his presentation to the CRTC, Laurent Picard included a figure depicting the first "life cycle" of an organization (reproduced here as Figure 12-1). Television was compared with radio, and the argument was that, with the coming of television, radio had changed so as to provide a differentiated set of services. In the case of CBC English Radio, there was relatively widespread public support for the types of public broadcasting services being provided. Its audiences, though substantial, were not enormous, but they were appreciative of the unique CBC offerings. At the public hearing ESD argued that English Radio had entered a vigorous second life cycle and that in its exploitation of the flexibility and cost advantages of radio for new programming formats

-- in public affairs, arts, and music, for instance -- it had evolved a new role for itself differentiated from both television and commercial radio, and of vital importance as a distinctively "public" broadcasting service. The argument went unchallenged. The assessment was that English Radio was providing a unique and appropriate contribution to the Canadian broadcasting system. It is interesting to note in passing a much closer working relationship between English Radio and its US counterpart, National Public Radio (NPR), than between the equivalent television institutions, and also striking similarities in the types of public broadcasting services and actual program formats of English Radio and NPR.

Picard's analysis suggested that in television by 1975 the CBC would have to begin to evolve a differentiated role within the Canadian television environment or else enter a period of institutional decline. The time frame of the life cycle was determined by technological developments and it was such a development, cable, that had propelled the CBC into a "differentiate or decline" situation. But the institutional surival problem was a distributed one, not exclusive to the national broadcasting service itself. A strong and vital CBC was considered vital to the overall health of the complete Canadian broadcasting system.

Discussion of the appropriate future role of television, and of English Television in particular, tended to use "pure models" as extreme cases to argue the suitability of a middle course. Consideration of the consequences of pursuing either pure model approach is an appropriate starting point for refining a definition of an appropriate middle course.

The Commercial Broadcasting Service Option

Not only cable but virtually all of the technological developments such as home video players that appear to be following in its wake imply a steadily increasing range of "programming" alternatives to an individual viewer. And the service differentiation process had already begun by 1974, with independent television stations in both the Canadian and US broadcasting systems evolving "local" programming and specialized audience service roles distinctive from those provided by the national commercial networks and their affiliated stations. In Canada, given the maturation of CTV, the continuing development of independent stations and third networks, a service based on a commercial broadcasting model would eventually have become redundant. Canadian commercial networks and stations and cable systems were rapidly becoming capable of delivering an adequate range of popular US entertainment programming to Canadian viewers. The CBC, though at one point providing the sole source of such programming for many Canadians, would no longer be required. Adoption of the "commercial" pure model approach was not an available option: justification of public funding for the provision of services equivalent to those provided at no direct charge by commercial broadcasters would have been, in the final analysis, impossible. ACTRA noted: "After all, we are really not interested in paying two hundred and fifty (or sixty or seventy) million dollars a year merely to perpetuate what are essentially American patterns of broadcasting" (ACTRA, p 16).

In an individual intervention filed with the CRTC, William Neville, who had been Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State during the period when the 1968 Broadcasting Act was being drafted and enacted, argued that the CBC's early role in television had, of necessity, been strikingly similar to what others described as the "commercial" pure model. Neville's submission eloquently argued the need, in 1974, for English Television to seek a new role, in part as follows:

> The current English-language television network of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation can best be described as an essentially publicly-owned hardware system delivering an essentially commercial programming service....

> That the CBC has evolved into this rather strange hybrid is not surprising given the needs and policies of Canadian broadcasting during the past 20 years. During much of that period, the number one priority was to get service, any service, to as many Canadians as quickly and as efficiently as possible....
>
> CBC programming policy is also understandable in historical terms. If the CBC was to be, as it was, the sole service available to many Canadians, the need was for "balanced and comprehensive" programming -- a legislative euphemism for the basically mass-oriented programming schedules endemic to commercial networks....
>
> While the use of privately-owned affiliates was an efficient and quick method to extend services, this relationship to the CBC of a large number of private licensees so heavily dependent on commercial revenues has made it difficult -- even if the will was there -- for the Corporation to seriously revise either its commercial policy or its programming philosophy now so dominated by that commercial policy.
>
> Since the CBC was able -- indeed was asked -- for so long to provide programming virtually indistinguishable from that offered by the commercial networks, the Corporation has never developed a distinct programming philosophy of its own and has never been identified by viewers as offering anything distinctive in programming terms....
>
> Since the CBC's programming philosophy enabled it to raise large amounts of commercial revenue, the Corporation has, in fact, become dependent on such revenues and the raising of them has become a major priority, if not the priority, in making programming decisions....
>
> In my judgment, the question which should -- indeed must -- be asked at this juncture is as basic as whether we need the CBC and, if so, why....
>
> There is certainly no need for a CBC in 1974 simply to provide service. (Neville, pp 1-4)

Also gone by 1974 was potential justification for an essentially commercial CBC to contribute to the Canadian merchandizing system. The once unique role of the CBC as a national advertising medium was recalled within the CBC prior to the hearing, but only as an historical sidelight. The CBC's own 1970 and 1974 submissions, the policy analyses in the ACTRA and Neville interventions, and the CRTC decision were in agreement that an essentially commercial role was not appropriate for a CBC heading into the second half of the 1970s.

The Educational Broadcasting Service Option

At the other extreme from a wholly or essentially commercial service was what the CBC termed the "educational" option. Like the commercial option, the educational model was not a realistic alternative for Canadian public television, but it was raised by the Corporation as a means of arguing against an exclusively specialized audience and minority service role. Prior to the hearing the CBC was extremely concerned that the CRTC seemed to be advocating what was termed an "NET" role for the CBC. Although at times CBC executives, CRTC Commissioners, Neville, and others all spoke of an "NET" model, the facts were that they were referring to the US public broadcasting system model, that NET (National Educational Television) had been replaced as the major national program distribution agency by PBS in 1970, that both the role and structure of public television in the US had changed substantially at that point and were continuing to change, and that few of those involved in the Canadian debate seemed familiar with the real nature of the model they claimed to be considering.

What seemed to scare the CBC about the NET model was the prospect of drastic reductions in overall program service audience size and an eventual corresponding reduction in general public support, both conceptual and financial.

In 1974, 95% of all Canadians watched CBC television at least once a week, and 25% of the time Canadians spent viewing television was spent watching the CBC. In the US, *only about 20% of the population* (33% of those able to receive the service) tuned to public television once a week, and public television viewing accounted for 1.1% of all viewing, with public television programs only infrequently attracting audiences as large as 5% of the national total (CBC 1974c, pp 21, 36; Bower, p 52; CPB 1975, p iii). The contexts are so different that such simple comparisons are of value only in establishing that the CBC was concerned about sizes of audiences for "educational" television. But, despite the Corporation's concern, there was little suggestion that it should exclusively adopt an alternative or minority service role. Juneau commented that "Nobody, I am sure, would advocate that the CBC should go about systematically losing audience," and the CRTC decision noted that "the Commission agrees with the CBC that the national broadcasting service should endeavour to remain a popular service and that it should guard itself against becoming the preserve of esoteric minorities" (CRTC 1974a, p 241; CRTC 1974b, p 18).

Everyone seemed to agree that the appropriate future role of the CBC fell somewhere between mass audience commercial and specialized audience educational broadcasting. The problem was being more precise about just where that "somewhere" should be.

The Public Broadcasting Service Options

One of the CBC options was to continue with essentially the same type of service provided during the 1970-1974 period. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, it was the position of the regulatory agency that such an approach was not an acceptable response to the new Canadian broadcasting environment and that a more clearly differentiated national broadcasting service was essential to the health of the mixed Canadian broadcasting system. Quite apart from the consequences for other elements of the combined system, continuing the existing approach would not seem to have been in the Corporation's own best interests. Cable viewing patterns had already revealed that Canadians on the whole would not watch Canadian programs simply because they were Canadian. Given a choice between similar types of programs, they would choose "the best" or "the most interesting" regardless of point of origin. Attempting to provide low budget Canadian equivalents of essentially the same programming as Canadians seemed to be seeking in US commercial television services did not seem to be a realistic future option for the CBC. The US entertainment industry was operating with an available talent base, a potential audience, and production resources greater than the CBC's by factors ranging upwards from 10. And, even if the CBC were able to compete successfully for mass audiences, there was the problem of justifying public funding for such services unless they were uniquely Canadian.

What was required in 1974 was not an abrupt change in the CBC's role but the beginning of a gradual adjustment. That adjustment had to be part of a coherent new pattern, and that pattern had to be uniquely suited to the Canadian situation.

There was a requirement for a very delicate adjustment of the balance between mass and specialized audience orientation. Although in the future the CBC would not be required as a delivery system for "mass audience" commercial programming, abrupt abandonment of mass audiences was not appropriate either. For the CBC to remain an effective national cultural institution, for it to effectively contribute to the development of national unity and the expression of Canadian identity, and for it to survive as an organization, it had to command the viewing attention of substantial numbers of Canadians of different ages, interests, and tastes. In that respect, there was an appropriate place for mass audience programming -- but of a distinctively Canadian character related to what may be termed "mass Canadian culture" and clearly differentiated from mass American culture. And it was in this area that English Television had been experiencing problems and it was also in this area where future success seemed most crucial.

Although there was criticism of certain aspects of English Television's "information" programming, the debate about the future role of the service really revolved around entertainment programming considerations -- around the need to lessen the CBC's depenence on US entertainment programming and its need to develop Canadian programs of popular if not mass appeal. The Planning Group spoke informally of wishing to replace the US entertainment programming in prime time with Canadian programming of interest to a substantially undiminished share of the Canadian viewing public. But duplication of American formats was not a realistic approach: even within the realm of "popular" programming there was a requirement for distinction.

In its public statements the CBC recognized its need to evolve a differentiated role. The Introduction to the English Television submission spoke eloquently about the need for "distinction":

> The increase of cable services for Canadians, the advent of a third television network, and the licensing of new television stations in a number of communities, pose major questions for the network's future.... One thing is clear: the CBC English Television Network must play a distinctive role in Canadian television. Its hallmark must be Canadian programs of quality and diversity. As a mass media service with special challenges and duties, it must offer an effective range and choice of programs of information and entertainment. Such programs alone can give a network a distinctive character and make it clear to viewers that the television station carrying CBC English Television Network service offers a choice of programming largely different from the rest. (CBC 1973b, p i)

But, despite these statements and recognition in the Corporate submission of the need for "major innovations and changes in the character of network schedules" (CBC 1973c, p 8), there was little evidence of CBC initiatives to actually move towards a significantly more differentiated role. Internally, there was little discussion of any major transformation of the character of the service in either the immediate or distant future. There seemed to be an assumed inevitability that things would go on "pretty much the same" more or less indefinitely. At the public hearing, Picard presented a strong argument that the CBC was efficient, that it was making good use of available resources. But the argument about the level of funding seemed made with less force: no estimate of what the CBC's overall operating budget should be was presented, and there were no indications of the financial requirements for the program quality improvements that were set out as the Corporation's first priority. And, so far as commercial activity was concerned, the Corporation projected substantially unaltered continuation of the existing pattern, and there was no real indication of even a long range reduction in commercial involvement.

The CBC was in a financial box. Costs were rising with inflation, commercial competition was increasing, audience fragmentation was reducing commercial program audience shares, and demands for new services were piling up. If it planned to continue "coping" with these problems as it had in the 1970-1974 period, it seemed inevitable that its reliance on advertising revenue would be undiminished, that it would be unable to redirect sufficient funds for intensive Canadian program development, that US programming would remain in prominence during peak viewing periods, and that its ability to provide a service of excellence and distinction would be severely limited. Differentiation was not just an attractive alternative: it was the only route to survival -- both for the CBC and for the overall Canadian broadcasting system.

But effective differentiation was significantly more expensive than continuing the existing pattern. At the outset there was the problem of improving the quality of existing services -- of compensating for the years of frozen budgets and effectively shrinking resource bases so that existing CBC services would be of such a quality that Canadians would choose to watch them. Beyond that, there were major requirements for creative development to eventually reduce reliance on imported popular programming. There was the need to begin to reduce reliance on commercial revenue so as to provide greater peak viewing period scheduling flexibility. And there were questions about the ultimate fate of that portion of the coverage system provided by the private commercial affiliates.

If, as I have argued, and as so many of the interventions and the CRTC decision and the CBC presentation suggested, the time had come for the differentiation or decline of CBC television, why was there so little evidence of moves in that direction in 1974? The CBC needed creative development desperately, and such development required significantly higher levels of funding. Was it that the CBC didn't realize the magnitude of its requirements, or was it that it couldn't or wouldn't discuss them openly in public? I suggest that all three factors were involved.

Institutional Characteristics

Analysis of the public television environment and structure in Canada suggests two important and related characteristics of the CBC as an institution which make its reluctance to outline a bold, new, and expensive role for itself more understandable. But they are not characteristics peculiar to the CBC. Anthony Smith's book, THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE: THE BROADCASTER, HIS AUDIENCE, AND THE STATE, looks in detail at the broadcasting systems of France, Japan, Holland, Britain, and the US; short sections deal with Germany, Sweden, Israel, and Poland; but, because Smith based his analysis on personal experience and observations, there is but one sentence dealing with broadcasting in Canada. In personal correspondence, Smith commented: "As you can see from my book, I have no knowledge whatever of Canadian broadcasting, even though I have occasionally worked for CBC from the London end" (Smith 1975). I find it striking that the Canadian system provides as much if not more support for Smith's conclusions as those other systems which he did examine in detail.

In the introduction to THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE Smith examines reaction in the US and around the world to Spiro T. Agnew's 1969 attack on American broadcasters:

> Within days his key phrases were being repeated in newsrooms and broadcasting board rooms from Berlin to Santiago, in Dublin, London and Tokyo, in every place in which the instrument of broadcasting has added its special complications to an age-old argument between politicians and journalists. It was not by any means the beginning of the tension between broadcasters and politicians but it helped both sides to make their dispositions around the globe and prepare for a long war of curses and threats.... One station in the south-west was visited by four men who announced that they had come to beat up anti-Agnew newsmen. Other stations found it prudent to lock their doors after office hours. Broadcasting was under seige.
>
> In the years that followed broadcasting has developed a seige mentality in many places. Tensions between the broadcasters, the politicians and the vast audience which they jointly share have increased. (Smith 1973, pp 13-4)

Smith's book is devoted in large part to an examination of the origin of these tensions in the history of broadcasting around the world and, with his permission, some of his comments have been included here to supplement observations of the Canadian situation.

Defensiveness

Although broadcasters in Canada have never been subjected to a frontal assault such as that launched by Agnew or by Nixon and Whitehead, both the environment and the structural arrangements for broadcasting induced a characteristic in the public broadcasting institution which can be termed "defensiveness." Although it seems relatively easy to see how this characteristic develops within broadcasting organizations, it is seldom noted, and even when it is recognized its importance in explaining institutional behaviour seems underestimated.

In the Canadian situation, earlier sections of this chapter found:

- the levels of service required of the national broadcasting service were high,
- the levels of expectation were significantly higher than the explicit requirements,
- there was relatively widespread criticism of the quality of service being provided,
- public comments by individual politicians, especially those receiving widespread public attention, focused primarily on critical assessment of CBC performance, and
- throughout the case study period the levels of funding provided by the Government remained below the levels requested by the CBC.

The first section of the first chapter of the study provides a quotation which, with others, indicates that some Canadians were aware of the impact which "scrutinizing the CBC" had on the Corporation.

The Davey Committee, in 1970:

> Unfortunately, sniping at the CBC has become a national pastime that ranks with watching National Hockey League games and thinking deeply about reform of the Senate. (page 1)

Pierre Juneau, opening the 1974 licence renewal hearing:

> This hearing is not an investigation of the CBC. Let us hope that Canadians have had enough of this peculiar sport. (page 2)

Douglas Marshall, in TV GUIDE in November 1973:

> Knocking the CBC has long been a favorite but frustrating Canadian pastime. Answerable to the public only through Parliament, the Corporation has seldom felt the need to give its critics the satisfaction of a reply. (page 122)

Following release of the licence renewal decision, there were more comments in the same vein which were noted in section 10(f), pages 133-134.

Specific indications of this institutional defensiveness and of factors contributing to its development appear in various places earlier in this study:

- One columnist wrote: "Now's your chance, the CBC is on the mat. Well don't just sit there -- throw a brick!" (page 121)
- An interview with a program director, ostensibly to form the basis for a student essay, turned out to have been conducted for the Committee on Television intervention group. (page 126)
- A COT researcher was refused access to the CBC reference library in Toronto. (page 127)
- A CBC program director said that misinformed attacks on the CBC made him "damn angry and resentful" because "we need the needles put in the right places by critics whose credibility is not destroyed by gross inaccuracies." (page 127)
- There was significant internal concern over pre-hearing CRTC requests for statistics on US program purchasing and on local and regional talent spending. (pages 125-126)
- Columnist Blaik Kirby's motives for requesting Toronto production facility output

statistics were unnecessarily suspected. (page 127)

- The CRTC's motives in requesting an aircheck of a specific evening's programming were similarly unnecessarily suspected. (page 127)
- The CBC defended its contributions to regional flow and exchange, both in public statements that "there is in fact a very wide representation of production talents across the country on the nerwork, and there is an awareness that not all the talent in this country is in Toronto" (page 173) and in its hearing presentation and responses (pages 171-172).
- And there was a pre-hearing speech about "attacks" on the CBC: "The CBC is attacked for not giving adequate coverage to young people or old people or ethnic groups or women, or labor, or business, or left-handed paper-hangers. I suppose the CBC has been poked and probed, swabbed and needled by just about every presure group in existence." (page 188)

One of the more interesting "defensive" positions taken by the Corporation regarded its Sunday night public affairs programming. Current or public affairs programming had been a special concern of not only the CBC but of the public as well ever since the 1966 THIS HOUR HAS SEVEN DAYS "crisis." Average English Television audience ratings in the 10-11 pm Sunday slot in 1972/73 were less than a third of their 1965 SEVEN DAYS average. Audience fragmentaion by cable accounted for a significant proportion of this drop, but there were charges that public affairs programming on the network was "in decline." In the summer of 1973, senior management instituted a sweeping series of changes in the current affairs programming in the upcoming regular season schedule, bypassing the Planning System, and leaving a sharply reduced volume of Current Affairs programming on the network during Fall 1973/74 while the replacement programs were being developed. Picard made a point of defending the new Sunday 10-11 pm programs at the hearing. The Committee on Television had argued that "the decline of public affairs programming on English-language television .... results, apparently from CBC management's fear of controversy" (COT 1974, p 19). In fact, several factors had a bearing on Current Affairs program quality and audience attention. Certainly, SEVEN DAYS was a factor, but principally because of frustration at not being able to attract large audiences and generate public excitment as that program had. SEVEN DAYS had been designed by its producers to "become mandatory viewing for a large segment of the nation" (Leiterman, p 1), and it had been successful in that respect. (In passing, it is interesting to note that the SEVEN DAYS producers were the heaviest users of audience research the CBC had known, and that their relationship with CBC Research remained unequalled throughout the study period.)

But the Corporation's argument was that the magazine format was outdated, and Picard produced audience size figures at the hearing to defend replacement of WEEKEND with three more specialized programs, MARKETPLACE, OMBUDSMAN, and IN THE PRESENT TENSE. He noted average program ratings of 10.75 percent viewing for the new programs in January 1974 and contrasted them with averages of 10 for WEEKEND and 9 for CTV's W5 in 1972/73 (CBC 1973c, p 56). What the defence didn't note was that in January 1974 the US had moved to Daylight Saving Time to conserve energy and that the 1974 programs were competing for audience with US local station 11 pm news rather than with 10 pm US network programming as in 1972/73. The defence was not challenged, but it is interesting to note that beyond the end of the case study period new "magazine" format programs were introduced into the schedule.

The "Additional Statement" made by some of the Toronto producers addressed itself to the CBC's defensiveness and its origins:

> The environment in which we work is one of managerial anxiety -- a sensitivity to pressure of almost any kind. Should a documentary or a program cause a stir, a whole process is set in motion in which everything, after it, is checked and re-checked, screened and re-screened, worried over and re-worried over in an atmosphere of paranoia and fear. The management of the CBC can only be as strong as the institution itself. And that is weak. Management cannot, by itself, strengthen the institution because some of the major causes of the CBC's weakness are external. (ATPDT 1974b, pnts 39, 40)

Given the requirements, expectations, limited resources, and mixed but primarily negative public comment about CBC performance, the development of a "seige mentality" or defensiveness within the CBC seems to have been inevitable. Smith found this pattern in other national contexts:

> We have reached a point at which the various institutions and legal devices created around the world are ceasing to satisfy many of the parties involved in their creation. At the same time a new source of independent pressure has sprung up among the creative workers of broadcasting who have become much more conscious of themselves as a special interest within the debate than ever before. Furthermore, the politicians, the network officials, Government, and the new range of broadcasting pressure groups are all of them choosing to speak in the name of 'freedom', in one sense or another. The debate is thus complicated because all of the participants are employing the same shibboleths. (Smith 1973, p 15)

The nature of the relationship between public broadcasters and the public's elected representatives seems to be an especially important factor in this regard:

> The politician finds he can not treat the broadcasting organisation as a ministry, nor as a newspaper, nor as a public meeting. As an institution it lies outside the normal range of familiar arenas; as a set of skills it demands things of him which he may not be able to give. Yet the prominent politician increasingly depends on radio and television for his very existence. Politics within mass society is inextricable from the technology which provides contact between the few and the many. The periodic outburts of fury and vengeance between the broadcasting organisations of the world and their respective political communities follow inevitably from the very existence of broadcasting. (Smith 1973, p 114)

The attention paid to the personal observations of politicians affected the CBC in two main ways. At the practical level, each charge required at least an internal check of the validity of the comments. As such questions arose, they were routed down through the organization for investigation. In addition to those questions noted in the public press, there were also direct inquiries from MPs requesting statistics on the amount of broadcast time devoted to specific individuals, political parties, and issues. The volume of such inquiries and the effort required to assemble the information requested was such that by March 1973 the English Services Division was planning to establish what was anticipated would be a computer based content logging system for network News and Current Affairs programs. During my work with the task force established to study the feasibility of establishing such a system (activity 5 in section 8(d), pages 99-100), it became clear that although it had been realized that there could be creative uses of such a system, the original reason for its consideration was to provide a less time consuming means of preparing responses to questions raised by Members of Parliament.

The other effect of these comments and inquiries was to continualy remind the Corporation, at all levels from producers to the President, of the careful and ongoing scrutiny of its output by the same MPs who annually voted the CBC's capital and operating funding. The Committee on Television charged the Corporation's management with a "fear of controversy" and suggested that English Television had been "laundered politically" (COT 1974, pp 19, 21). Robert Lewis argued that the English division "was boring people to tears" (Lewis, p 16). Assessment of the actual effect of the pressures to avoid controversy is virtually impossible. Towards the end of the case study period, ESD became involved in a series of court actions defending its right to broadcast DYING OF LEAD, a radio program dealing with suspected lead poisoning in communities adjacent to certain industrial operations in the Toronto area. The Corporation was served with an injunction prohibiting broadcast of the program and at one point the ESD Vice President and General Manager faced a charge of contempt of court arising out of CBC television's reporting of the serving of the injunction. The incident neither proves nor disproves anything about the CBC's alleged fear of controversy. The important point to note here is that the Corporation appeared to be continually under pressure not to disturb vested interests.

The role of Parliament, once it had set out the Corporation's broad mandate in the Broadcasting Act, was to look at the Corporation's performance in relation to that mandate. Individual MPs did try publicly to influence the CBC with regard to certain matters, and they did freely criticize its programs. The CBC considered this to be "fair game." The point to note here is that the people's elected representatives did significantly condition the operating environment of the Corporation: they added slightly to the internal workload, and -- much more importantly -- the primarily negative nature of their comments was widely taken within the CBC to indicate a lack of confidence in the Corporation as a whole and in the calibre of its individual people.

The suggestion is not that politicians alone induced an institutional defensiveness in the CBC, but simply that their influence is more easily seen. Later sections of this chapter will consider the influence of the CRTC and the media writers in further contributing to the CBC's defensiveness.

The most obvious institutional characteristic of the national broadcasting service as a complete entity was a tendency to be "defensive." This characteristic, though seemingly induced in the CBC by environmental and structural characteristics of the Canadian public broadcasting setting, has been noted in many other national contexts and would seem to stem from the general nature of the relationship between mass media institutions and the publics they strive to serve.

Before leaving this discussion of CBC defensiveness, it is important to note Smith's argument that the relationship between broadcasting institutions and their publics is such that the forces which induce institutional defensiveness are unlikely to diminish in the immediate future:

> Television sets are purchased by individuals to entertain themselves in their non-working time, usually in surroundings of domestic privacy. They become members of a 'mass' as a result of the kinds of messages they receive, not as a result of the kind of people they are. When a man acquires a television set, even more acutely than when he buys a mass circulation daily paper, or votes as a member of a mass franchise, he enters into a set of cultural, political and social transactions of kinds more far-reaching than those of which he is aware. During the last two decades an instrument which entered our homes as a means of entertainment has become the means by which an enormous range of other forces enter our lives; we did not invite them there, but they came. Because of that network of forces the question of controlling the messages is becoming a more contentious and bitterly fought issue than almost any other. (Smith 1973, pp 15-6)

Conservatism

A distinction is made here between defensiveness (as the tendency to justify past and current performance) and "conservatism" (as the tendency to operate and plan cautiously). To a great extent the defensiveness arose as a response to the volume and nature of criticism in the CBC's environment. Its conservatism, though augmented by that defensiveness, seemed to stem principally from structural factors.

Earlier sections of this chapter found:

- the operation of the national broadcasting service was an undertaking highly visible to the public,
- the annual basis of funding established a depenency relationship between the CBC and Parliament,
- the same funding arrangement established a dependency relationship between the CBC and the Government,
- the financial control provisions of the Broadcasting Act contributed to the CBC's

operational dependency on the Government, and

- the licensing of stations and networks and other provisions of the Broadcasting Act tended to make the CBC operationally dependent on the CRTC.

The visible nature of the Corporation's operations tended to make it operationally conservative. There was a great deal of pressure not to make mistakes and not to offend. The Corporation needed to have the confidence of the Canadian people and, in turn, of their elected representatives. And, just as the 1966 ghost of SEVEN DAYS seemed to hang over the the CBC's public affairs programmers, the charges of "rotten" management made at about the same time still hung over the whole Corporation. The visibility of the CBC's activities seemed to complicate the process of building greater public confidence in the Corporation. The CBC made mistakes. Most organizations do. The difference was that the CBC's mistakes seldom went unnoticed. Frequently they received considerable public attention. The inevitable effect was to introduce at least a temptation to make "safe" decisions. In BROADCASTING THE CANADIAN WAY, Albert Shea commented:

> It is possible that the CBC is no more executive-ridden and no more lacking in nerve than any private corporation of the same size. But the CBC does live in a glass house. It is exposed to the strong light of criticism from every side. Private corporations are perhaps better able to conceal their mistakes and to treat the lack of an adventuresome spirit as prudent conservatism. (Shea, p 38)

An institutional characteristic of the CBC, related in part to its defensiveness and visibility, was a tendency to be operationally "conservative" and avoid high risk undertakings.

Perhaps more significantly, the CBC's varying degress of dependence on Parliament, the Government, and the CRTC would seem to have been a significant factor in explaining the CBC's apparent reluctance to propose a new, less commercial future role for itself and to argue more vigorously its case for additional funding.

The "Additional Statement" by some members of the Toronto producers' and directors' association commented on the Corporation's approach:

> CBC management, we feel, has not in the recent past argued with sufficient force before the government and the people of this country the case of public broadcasting. They have not argued the vital importance of the CBC to the life of this country. Educators over the last 15 years have argued with staggering success for increased budgets for their efforts. But the CBC has actually managed to allow itself to be talked into producing more programs with less real money. (ATPDT 1974b, pnt 18)

A transcript of an interview with an unnamed "distinguished producer of twenty years' experience" included in the COT intervention included this observation:

> There are profound problems of priorities, and middle management or senior management is over-sensitive to political pressures to multiply service at the expense of improving its quality. (COT 1974, p 109)

Separately, I have argued that the financial problems of public broadcasting in the United States should be understood as indicative of a more basic problem in its relationship with its audience, with the public (McKay 1976, p 152). That argument must be applied to the Canadian situation as well, but there are significant differences.

Because it started long after the commercial networks were well established, public broadcasting in the United States had problems making the public aware of its existence. Canadians were acutely aware of the CBC's existence. For many years it had provided the only Canadian television service; for some it still did.

Canadians were certainly aware of the CBC throughout the case study period, but its financial problems may not have been generally or well understood. Morris Wolfe's change of opinion in late 1975, noted on page 204, may indicate that during 1974 the CBC had still not presented its case for increased support very effectively. The Corporate Statement submitted to the CRTC prior to the 1974 hearing seemed to be a new departure for the CBC. It spoke plainly and forcefully about financing:

> The plain fact is that the national broadcasting service is under-financed -- and this at a time when there is a greater public need for it than at almost any other time in its history. (CBC 1973c, p 19)

At the public hearing, Laurent Picard dealt at length with efficiency and with financing. But, prior to that, the CBC did not seem to have made especially strenuous efforts to explain its financial plight to the Canadian people.

It may be that the Corporation felt it should accept the allocations provided by government and not protest publicly. It may be that it thought that the situation was improving at an acceptable rate, or as fast as could be expected. Whatever the reason, for most of the case study period the Corporation was strangely silent about its resource problems, particularly in view of their severity and the toll they were taking on its own people and the services they were providing.

While the CBC's reluctance to deal with its existing problems in public can be understood in terms of its institutional defensiveness, its failure to argue more forcefully about its future requirements extended beyond defensiveness.

Within the Planning Group, continuation of operation under demand/resource imbalance conditions seemed taken as an inevitable fact of life -- past, present, and future. While members of the group frequently defended English Television performance, even they seldom spoke of the real financial requirements to meet public demands for service.

This conservatism was also evident at the Corporate level. The ESD Planning System was described earlier as contributing to operational efficiency and to predictable levels of expenditures and revenues, but also as introducing programming inflexibilities. There was pressure on the French Services Division to adopt a similar system, though the less decentralized nature of French Television production would seem to have reduced to need for such a planning mechanism. Perhaps the most striking indications of conservatism in making its requirements known were the changes made in the draft of the English Television submission to the CRTC. As noted in section 10(d), page 123, the submission draft argued that rising demands for further production output increases raised questions about the ability of the network to maintain program quality "without a major increase in total production capacity." At the Corporate level, this argument was qualified by the phrase "or the development of new approaches, or both," but despite intensive inquiry no indication of what such "new approaches" might be were ever given. To English Television, the change seemed primarily designed to weaken the force of the resource shortage argument.

There remains one important indicator regarding the sources of of this institutional conservatism: it will be taken up under "Jurisdiction and Coordination" later in this chapter.

An institutional characteristic of the national broadcasting service, related in part to its defensiveness, was a tendency to be "conservative" in discussing its future aspirations and existing CBC demand/resource problems.

Policy Development Process Characteristics

While the CBC's institutional defensiveness and conservatism were factors contributing to the deadlock in policy development and interpretation, they were not the only factors. And, although they are of importance in understanding the CBC approach to policy questions, they seem somewhat inevitable. Less inevitable, at least in the long run, were characteristics of the policy development and interpretation processes arising from structural factors.

Participation

Although the structure of broadcasting in Canada provided for a high degree of participation in public policy development and interpretation on the part of Parliament, the Government, the regulatory agency, and the national broadcasting service, in practice public discussion of policy during the case study period involved only the CRTC and the CBC.

William Neville attached a "Postscript" to the policy analysis intervention he filed in connection with the CBC licence renewal applications. He noted:

> On re-reading the above, I am struck by the fact that almost all of this submission is, in fact, "ultra vires" of the Commission. That is, the issues raised and the proposals made should not be, under the terms of the Broadcasting Act, the subject of discussion before the CRTC, but rather are matters which rightfully should be for resolution by the Government and Parliament of Canada.
>
> I make no apology for placing them before the Commission, for in recent years it can fairly be said that the CRTC has become not just the regulator of broadcasting, but its de facto "Parliament." It has been before this Commission and not in the House of Commons where virtually all the important debates have taken place. Indeed I think it fair to say that there has not been a single general debate on broadcasting policy or on the CBC, in particular, in Parliament since discussion of the current Broadcasting Act. Nor has there been a single speech or policy statement by the Ministers responsible, especially the Secretary of State, on the future of the Corporation. (Neville, pp 7-8)

The lack of attention in public to national broadcasting system policy on the part of the Government contrasted sharply with the vigorous development of the cultural democratization and decentralization policies noted in section 11(b), page 162, and the increasing support of cultural activity noted in section 12(c). Despite specific attention, for instance, to the Canadian magazine and book publishing industries, the Government's basic public broadcasting policy remained unchanged and was not the subject of public review between 1968 and 1974. Specific issues, such as children's program advertising were considered by Parliamentary committees, but there were no coordinated reviews similtaneously involving the CBC and the various representatives of the public -- Parliament, the Government, and the CRTC.

There was, in the Canadian situation, the extra "player" in the policy development and interpretation process, the CRTC. Throughout the case study period, regardless of whatever issue it had under consideration, whether relating to cable or commercial or public broadcasting, the CRTC took the position that its role was simply to discharge its responsibilities -- to implement the provisions of the 1968 Broadcasting Act. Inevitably, the discharge of those responsibilities required careful but extensive interpretation of the Act and the formulation of regulations to translate the general objectives of the Act into a broadcasting reality.

The CRTC was breaking new ground, both in Canada and in the world. In the US context, for instance, the FCC had always been notably indifferent to public broadcasting policy development (Smith 1973, p 229). What was unique in the Canadian situation was that the 1968 Broadcasting Act had deliberately interposed an "activist" regulatory agency between government and broadcasters. The idea, as Smith noted, had at least been considered elsewhere:

> Since pressure or advice cannot be channelled through government to broadcasters without endangering the sensitive relationship which exists between the two, various plans have been considered and urged in a number of countries for institutions which would interpose themselves between government and broadcasting institution, and which, with varying degrees of advisory or statutory authority, can act as a buffer, representing a 'public interest' without acting as an agency of official pressure. The aim of these proposals is to pre-empt or evade direct government intervention in the editorial process. (Smith 1973, p 148)

But blocking direct government intervention in the editorial process had not been the reason for the creation of the CRTC: the aim had been to sort out jurisdictional uncertainties and to provide for the coordinated development of the overall Canadian broadcasting system. In practice, however, the new structure still left some unresolved jurisdictional and coordination problems in the hands of two agencies which, on their own, could not resolve policy matters which were appropriately the concerns of Parliament and the Government.

The Broadcasting Act's formal structural arrangements did not provide for regular, coordinated reviews or evaluations of public broadcasting policy; in practice, such coordinated reviews -- simultaneously involving Parliament, the Government, the CRTC, and the CBC -- did not take place.

Jurisdiction and Coordination

The formal structural arrangements did not clearly establish boundaries of jurisdiction and responsibility for the Government, the regulatory agency, and the national broadcasting service; in practice, the policy development and interpretation process was uncoordinated.

As noted in section 12(d), the "right to consultation" and "right of referral to the Government" provisions of Section 17 of the Boadcasting Act left the legal and practical extent of the regulatory agency's jurisdiction over the national broadcasting service uncertain. The licence conditions proposed by the CRTC in 1974 were, in a sense, a test case. Although the ultimate power in developing and interpreting public broadcasting policy rested with Parliament, at the operational level three main parties were involved -- the CRTC, the Government, and the CBC. In general terms, all three were moving in the same direction, but at distinctly different rates. The CRTC sought an immediate start on the transformation of the CBC into a less commercial, more distinctively Canadian service. The CBC indicated a williingness to alter commercial practices somewhat, and to increase Canadian content to the extent that available resources permitted. There was no comment from the Government.

Although the proposed licence conditions were to be attached to CBC licences, the implications were for changes in the policies of the Government, specifically the provision of additional funds to reduce dependency on commercial revenue and to finance intensive program development.

The three-way policy development process didn't work -- at least not so as to move the overall Canadian broadcasting system in the direction considered essential by the agency established by Parliament to supervise and control broadcasting in Canada. Of particular importance in understanding the deadlock is the fact that the Corporation was having two different roles set by two different bodies. The requirements and expectations were being established by the CRTC; the resources were being provided by the Government. The requirements and expectations were being discussed in a public forum; the resources weren't.

To the extent that the Corporation was proposing a less ambitious role than the CRTC, its inherent defensiveness and conservatism made that not especially surprising. But, I suggest, the ultimate financial dependency of the CBC on the Government was a much more important factor.

About four months prior to the public hearing, during preparation of the written submissions to the CRTC, the Corporation made a deliberate attempt to ensure consistency between the Corporate Statement and the various divisional service documents. At that point it was confirmed that the policy on commercial activity and statements regarding levels of funding would be reserved for the Corporate submission and the presentation at the hearing. How best to deal with these issues remained a matter of some uncertainty. There seemed to be a concern that, since the Corporation's policy on commercial activity was -- in the final analysis -- the Government's policy, the CBC would have to be careful in its statements unless, prior to the hearing, there was an indication of a change in the policy of the Government. Similarly, there was a concern that outlining especially ambitious plans for the future might put the Government in a difficult position unless there was an indication of an intention to provide higher levels of funding over the anticipated five year period of the new licences.

The point that the CBC policy on commercials was not its own must be stressed. Section 6(d) noted that the 1958 Broadcasting Act, in rejecting the financing recommendations of the 1957 Fowler Commission, gave implicit support to the Commission's recommendation that the Corporation adopt more aggressive measures to earn much of its own revenues (page 66). The 1965 Fowler Committee took up the commercial question again:

> At a meeting in January 1965, senior officers of the CBC argued from current statistics that Canadian television schedules contain too many programs produced in the United States and too high a proportion of commercially sponsored programs, and that by reducing the proportion of both, more Canadian programs would be produced and the general quality of programming greatly improved. We questioned this line of reasoning, for these bare statistics of program sources and sponsorship reveal nothing at all about the quality of programming unless it could be shown that all programs originating in the United States are poorer than Canadian programs, and that all unsponsored programs are better than sponsored. As this obviously cannot be established, the percentages prove nothing about the quality of programming. (Fowler 1965, p 219)
>
> For the prime evening hours alone, the CBC estimated an annual extra cost of $12 million for programming improvement, coupled with an estimated loss of $8 million in commercial revenue. Both these figures appear unnecessarily high; in particular, we do not understand why there should be any considerable reduction in the present levels of CBC audiences or any appreciable loss of sales revenue if programs are substantially diversified and improved. (p 220)

The Davey Committee reviewed the matter again in 1970:

> Dr. Davidson said his personal preferance would be for a more limited participation in the commercial field, and he made a comment we found most significant: "My personal belief is that we are excessively dependent on commercial advertising now. It shows signs of affecting the quality and nature of our programming in prime time."
>
> Possibly no more ominous words could have been spoken about a public broadcasting agency. They were spoken by its chief, who can hardly have been pleased about having to voice them....

At the time of the 1966 White Paper on Broadcasting, the government instructed the CBC to undertake no increase in commercial programming. Further, it instructed the CBC to seek to maintain its 25 per cent share of Canada's television advertising revenue, and its four per cent share of the country's radio advertising revenue. (Davey 1970a, pp 197-8)

By 1974, a new CBC President, appointed by the Government in 1972, was arguing the case for maintaining commercial activity. And Picard's successor, A.W. Johnson, appointed by the Government in 1975, was continuing the argument in 1976. BROADCASTER reported:

> CBC President A.W. Johnson has said that the corporation's first priority is in continuing improvement of the quality of CBC programming. Since tv advertising revenues are an important factor in reaching that objective it would not be consistent with that priority to consider seriously the abandonment or even a significant reduction in CBC television sales effort, a spokesman added....
>
> "We have not been instructed by the cabinet to cut back on the number of commercial minutes per hour allowed under CBC policy and the Corporation itself has no plans to change the present allowance," the CBC spokesman said. (Broadcaster 1976a)

The formal structural arrangements did not clearly establish boundaries of jurisdiction and responsibility for the Government, the regulatory agency, and the national broadcasting service; in practice, the policy development and interpretation process was uncoordinated.

Structural Implications

Somewhere between 1970 and 1974 the CBC handed its "over-commercialization" and "over-Americanization" script over to the CRTC and picked up a new one which argued that "not everybody 'hates' commercials" and that "most people believe the CBC should stay in advertising" (CBC 1974c, pp 34-5).

One reason for the apparent switch in position may have been the Corporation's reading of public opinion. An organization with induced tendencies towards defensiveness and conservatism could be expected to pay close attention to such findings. But the statistics presented really did not seem to justify maintaining the existing pattern. Public attitudes towards commercials among English speaking Canadians were reported as follows: "very faourable" -- 12%, "moderately unfavourable to neutral" -- 77%, "favourable" -- 11%. Note the absence of a "moderately favourable" option. Attitudes among French speaking Canadians were slightly less favourable to commercials (p 34). And, although 63% of English speaking and 56% of French speaking Canadians supported a combination of advertising revenue and government funding for the CBC (p 35), there was no detail on how many felt the existing balance was "about right" as there was, for example, in the case of the volume of imported programming (p 26A).

Picard indicated at the hearing that, in a hypothetical situation, given two or three existing Canadian commercial networks, and the option of building a CBC from scratch, that he would recommend a totally public system -- "if there were the money and the resources" (page 216). But the situation wasn't hypothetical, and he was advocating maintaining the existing level of commercial activity.

The CBC was reflecting the position of the Government, which -- unlike the CRTC -- was paying its bills. In the final analysis the structural arrangement for broadcasting in Canada seemed to give creative control of the Canadian broadasting system to the CRTC and financial control of the national broadcasting service to the Government. And, despite the language of the Act, the implication was that the Commission would remain a highly concerned, highly frustrated observer, and that public broadcasting policy would be determined by the Government. If the structure really had been intended to give the CRTC a hand in shaping the national broadcasting service, it hadn't worked. If a more clearly differentiated and distinctively Canadian CBC really was important to Canadian nationhood, the Government didn't seem convinced, and the Corporation seemed reluctant to argue the point in public. Before plunging into any further analysis of the policy development deadlock and the need for an improved public broadcasting policy review mechanism, it seems useful to back away slightly and consider the impasse in a wider context.

f) OVERVIEW

> *Broadcasting can no longer be ignored by political science. Its problems are encoded versions of the political issues which confront societies. The second part of* [THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE] *therefore is an attempt to unravel these 'codes' in a number of countries and show how the broadcasting systems of the world conceal layer upon layer of suppressed conflict; many of the unresolved neuroses from which nations suffer can be found reflected in the ways they choose to organise radio and television.... (Smith 1973, pp 14-5, emphasis added)*

In section 3(e), pages 33-34, I argued that a great deal of care must be exercised in the use of the term "reflection" and the application of the "mirror" analogy. With those precautions in mind, let me suggest that Smith's observation can be paraphrased as follows: The shape, conditions, and problems of a national broadcasting system are a strikingly accurate reflection of the shape, conditions, and problems of the nation it was created to serve.

Certainly the shape of the CBC supported that contention. The Corporation, like the nation, was divided into English and French language and cultural components. As Ramsay Cook observed (page 57), "Much of the country's history can be viewed as a continuing search for accommodation between the two major cultural communities." The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, appointed in 1963, the Official Languages Act of 1969, the Bilingualism Development Program begun in 1970, and Official Languages Development Program launched in 1973 stand as official indicators that the search for accommodation was far from over. Similarly, the regional management structure of the CBC reflected the federal/provincial structure of government, a structure developed as a political accommodation for regional differences in "the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada." And the Corporation's mandate in the Broadcasting Act specicially assigning it a role as an instrument of cultural nationalism reflects a national concern for maintaining a distinctive Canadian identity within the North American context.

Chapter 13 will argue that within English Television there were no misgivings about the intent of the CBC's mandate and no evidence of reluctance to confront the nation's problems. It will note that the demand/resource imbalance, commercial activity, and certain institutional characteristics distracted attention from audience and program concerns, but not to an extent sufficient to explain the widespread dissatisfaction with the service provided. A review of the "issues" examined in Chapter 11 reveals that the most severe criticisms of English Television program performance related to its reflection of the bicultural nature of the country, its handling of the roles and concerns of the various regions, its contributions to national unity and the development of a distinctive Canadian identity, and its support of Canadian cultural development. In short, the CBC was perceived as having failed or fallen short in those areas which were of greatest importance to the nation -- in those areas where the country as a whole was having problems. The CBC's problems were, in fact, encoded versions of the political issues which confronted Canadian society. The point was actually noted at one point in the 1974 CRTC hearing: Vice Chairman Boyle commented that "it would appear that the CBC is as complex as federalism" (CRTC 1974a, p 1041).

The close relationship between the problems of the nation and those of its national broadcasting institution presents some immediate practical problems to the broadcasting organization. In the case of the CBC, recognition of feelings of regional particularism would seem, for instance, to explain government willingness to invest $50 to $70 million in the Accelerated Coverage Plan while allowing the Corporation's programming allocation to effectively shrink. And it is difficult to discount the possibility that these same feelings may have played a role in delaying the start of CBC facilities consolidation in Toronto. The Aird commissioners had been aware that, if their 1929 report was to be accepted at all, they had to make some concessions to the strong provincial feelings of the time, and the role of Toronto in a decentralized broadcasting system became a matter of debate immediately thereafter.

Another problem arising out of the relationship between the nation's and its broadcasting service's problems is that the organization tends to be held responsible for the national conditions it reflects. Broadcasting mandates are written in the expectation that the electronic media will solve or at least help solve national cultural, political, social, and economic problems. Because the broadcasting institution's efforts to discharge its mandate are highly visible, and because many long standing national problems are not easily solved, there is a natural temptation to consider beheading the messenger. One consequence of holding an organization such as the CBC "at least partly accountable" for problems such as tension between English and French Canada and between Alberta and the East is to contribute to the institution's defensiveness and, in turn, to its conservatism. Another consequence is that such criticism makes maintenance or building of the organization's internal morale especially difficult.

It is also interesting to consider the CBC's demand/resource problem and the need for a review of national public broadcasting policy in light of Smith's suggestion of a relationship between "the unresolved neuroses from which nation's suffer" and "the ways they choose to organise radio and television."

It may be that Parliament felt that the generally negative tone of public comment about the Corporation would have been perceived by the public as inconsistent with any significant increase in CBC support. It may be that the need for a comprehensive review of public broadcasting policy and of the role of the CBC was not well understood.

It may be that failure to review the Corporation's overall role or, at the practical level, to balance its resources with the demands made of it, was an indication of a lack of confidence -- in the CBC, in the successful development of a distinctive Canadian cultural tradition, or both. In any event, statements that the Canadian broadcasting system was "the central nervous system of Canadian nationhood" and that the CBC was the "cornerstone" of that system seemed inconsistent with the level of moral and "tangible" public support provided to the Corporation.

In the December 1973 issue of SATURDAY NIGHT, editor Robert Fulford offered a sobering scenario describing how the CBC became what he termed "a collection of made-in-California thrillers and comedies with a sprinking of seldom-very-good Canadian content":

> When presented with the best that the CBC had to offer, the people of Canada, on the whole, yawned. They yawned and then they switched their dials to Bellingham if they lived in Vancouver or to Buffalo if they lived in Toronto or to whatever border town was available....
>
> The newspapers helped, of course. For a while there in the 1950s, the newspapers thought the CBC was, ho ho, the biggest joke in the country.... "Screw off," the newspapers told the CBC, and the people went along.

> So in the end the CBC did what the people told it to do. If it was American television the people wanted, then the CBC would deliver American television. In the 1960s the CBC brought in more and more American shows, until finally the CBC looked like nothing so much as a fourth American network....
>
> My theory is only partly an examination of history; the rest is guesswork. But if you want to know why the CBC is so bad, I think I have the answer: it is run by people who once offered the best of themselves to Canada and who were turned down. Flat. (Fulford 1973b)

Whether or to what extent Fulford's scenario is an accurate portrayal of what happened in the 1950s and 1960s may not be that important now. The early 1970s brought not only the new broadcasting environment produced by cable but also the rise of cultural nationalism described by Fulford himself (page 136). The coincidence of these two developments provided an opportunity for new departures in the development of a distinctive national broadcasting service for Canada. The dream remained in tact, but there were problems which Val Clery described in MACLEAN'S in June 1974:

> As far as I'm concerned, the CBC remains an ideal in broadcasting, our 20th-century national dream. But the effects of commercial pressures, government interference and political demands on management and ultimately on producers have made it in a creative sense a national nightmare, almost always falling disgracefully short of the quality of broadcasting Canadians have a right to expect. (Maclean's)

Chapter 13 will focus on internal conditions necessary for the provision of "the quality of broadcasting Canadians have a right to expect," but it should be noted that the CBC had two major needs which its environment had to provide if the Corporation was to make stimulating, positive contributions to cultural growth in Canada.

The primary need was for at least some public agreement about what it was supposed to be. There was no lack of suggestions, but there was little consensus on priorities. Virtually all requirements and expectations of the CBC were considered to be of equally vital importance. There was a need for clarification of public policy on the general nature of the program services to be provided: the CBC could be used as a delivery vehicle for popular US and inexpensive Canadian programming, or it could be developed into a differentiated and distinctively Canadian service. There was a need for clarification of public policy on commercial activity: the CBC was not in a position to decide on its own how commercial its television services would be.

Earlier, I suggested that "the continuing failure of successive governments to match means with demands" is one of the central puzzles in Canadian public broadcasting. But it is not a puzzle which defies solution. In the mix of environmental, structural, process, and institutional characteristics of the Canadian public broadcasting situation it is possible to see factors working in combination to contribute to a general reluctance to invest more heavily in the future of the CBC.

- Because the absolute requirements to meet Canadian needs are so great, the basic level of expenditure has always been relatively high -- at least compared on a per capita basis with other countries (Schramm & Nelson, p 26).
- The combined expectations of the CBC are so high that it is understandable that there has been a reluctance even to contemplate the prospect of funding the national broadcasting service at a level sufficient even to meet those expectations half way.
- Despite strong support for the "concept" of public broadcasting, the fact that the CBC is a public institution whose day to day operations are highly visible has led to a situation where, not surprisingly, most public comment about the national broadcasting service has consisted of critical assessment of performance at a very detailed level. Such comment, though for the most part well intentioned, seems to have created a less than inspiring public "image" of the CBC.
- The CBC's own tendencies towards defensiveness and conservatism would seem to have

inhibited more reflective public consideration of its appropriate role. The Corporation seems to have gotten caught up in defending the public broadcasting policies of the government of the day, and it has been relatively reluctant to advance in public any plans which would indicate CBC aspirations for the national broadcasting service more ambitious than those of the Government.

- Despite successive revisions of broadcasting legislation, the problems of establishing jurisdictional boundaries and ensuring coordinated policy development have defied solution over the years. And, because agreement on role and structure must come before determination of the level of resources required for role fulfillment, there has been an absence of any agreed standard for appropriate resource level determination.

And, beyond the specific characteristics of the Canadian situation, there have been the universal problems arising from inherent characteristics of the relationships between the broadcaster, his audience, and the state. Those problems, though inevitably far from resolution, are beginning to be identified and considered. In Britain, the Government has launched the Annan Committee investigation into the overall future of broadcasting in the UK. In the US, there are now increasingly frequent calls from within the public broadcasting establishment itself for a reappraisal of the role of public television in serving the public and of its appropriate relationship with government. In Canada, well, there has at least been recognition by media writers, a former CBC President, and a former Prime Minister that the relationship between public broadcasting and the public's representatives is inherently unique and deserving of further attention.

Jack Miller, in THE TORONTO STAR, 30 August 1973:

> Davidson Dunton, one-time CBC President who now heads the Ontario Press Council, was saying the other day that the Canadian government has been pinching pennies for a generation on the CBC-TV budget. He added that Lester Pearson told him a year and a half ago that, in retrospect, one of his main regrets from his days as prime minister was that the government had 'kept the CBC budget too tight'. We agree. The CBC should have at least twice the federal subsidy it now gets and should be relieved of all commercial sales. Otherwise, it will always be partly compromised in its priorities. (Miller 1973)

Bob Blackburn, in the Toronto SUN, 13 March 1974 :

> The reason we don't have a Utopian broadcasting system is that you, you, and you are too damn cheap to pay for it. That's what your elected representatives think, anyway. Your collective MPs are terrified by the idea of leaning on you to the extent of one cent a day, which would provide enough revenue to wipe all commercials off the CBC.
>
> If you think you can afford a cent a day, write them and tell them, because the main hangup in everything that's wrong with the CBC is that the politicians are afraid of you. That doesn't only have to do with getting rid of commercials, but with the whole CBC operation, which in 1974 is less strangled in its own bureaucracy (considerable improvements have been made under the new president, Laurent Picard) than by underfinancing....
>
> It's really time the viewers woke up to the fact that they can have just about anything they want out of that expensive box in the corner if only they demand it. (Blackburn 1974e)

These observations by Dunton, Pearson, Miller, and Blackburn are not reproduced here in an attempt to argue for an immediate doubling of the CBC budget. Nor are they intended to suggest the existence of a neurosis in the Canadian psyche so severe that no progress can be made in sorting out the appropriate future role, structure, and resource requirements of public broadcasting in Canada. The point is that the relationship between the CBC, the public, and the Government is an inevitably complex one which demands periodic reappraisal. Smith commented:

> I believe that any useful development of broadcasting must be based upon a return to an examination of the idea of freedom: *we have to find ways to steer the various systems of broadcasting in ways which actually relate to the newly identified needs and demands of society*. (Smith 1973, p 18: emphasis added)

g) COMMENTS

I have already argued that there has been, over the years, considerable scrutiny of the CBC, that the continuing public examination of the Corporation's operational performance has been a major factor contributing to its defensiveness and conservatism, and that -- despite all the attention to its faults -- many of the major problems have remained unsolved. The relationship between scrutiny and defensiveness has been noted by others. A.F. Toogood's doctoral dissertation, "Canadian Broadcasting: A Problem of Control," completed in 1969, argued as follows:

> Broadcasting in Canada will continue to be stifled if it is subjected to incessant investigation. Continuing inquiry puts the broadcaster on the defensive, and works against his creative activities. It also breeds dissention and distrust. (Toogood, pp 317-8)

Because I am about to suggest a need for a further review of Canadian public broadcasting policy, it is important at the outset to make a distinction between such a review and the type of investigation which has concerned observers and analysts such as Toogood.

At the 1974 public hearing, Laurent Picard noted that the years of frozen budgets and redirection of funds had at least had some beneficial effects. One of those side effects was to produce a level of operational efficiency within the CBC which Picard could point to with a certain amount of administrative pride. Taken one step further, that development would seem to have gone a long way towards eliminating the need for the type of detailed operational investigation included in the Fowler Commission, the Glassco Commission, the Fowler Committee, and the Davey Committee studies. And even if a review of public broadcasting policy should move in the direction of yet another operational investigation of the CBC, it seems unlikely that it would make any further contribution to the development of a seige mentality within the CBC. The defensiveness is already there. It was my impression that the risks posed by further investigation were less at the end of the case study period than at any other point in the Corporation's history, and that investigation would find that the basic problems were, at least in the current context, external.

In that connection it is interesting to note that two of the interventions filed with the CRTC in 1974 from "inside" the CBC actually invited further public investigation of the role, structure, and resources of the Corporation.

From the Association of Canadian Television and Radio Artists submission:

> We suggest that a study be now undertaken by the CBC, by the CRTC, and by other bodies to determine whether the real demands being made by Canadians on the CBC are in fact realistic, and whether it is now necessary either to once again revise the Broadcasting Act, or to provide increased resources to the CBC, or both, to make certain that whatever expectations we do have can be reasonably fulfilled.
>
> We recommend that Parliament grant funds to the CBC in two parts, one part devoted to programming, the other to other services, and that all grants be on a long-tern basis to ensure the Corporation is able to properly plan its operations. We also recommend that these grants enable the Corporation to eliminate commercials from its schedules. (ACTRA, pp 20-1)

These recommendations imply support of the position that the Corporation's resources were not equal to demands made on it. But they also suggest a means of determining an appropriate support level which deserves comment. The recommendations raise the prospect of yet another "investigation of the CBC." The first parapgraphs of this study dealt with "Scrutinizing the CBC," and the matter has been the subject of considerable study.

From the "Additional Statement" by some members of the Association of Television Producers and Directors (Toronto):

> What we, the undesigned, recommend is that in renewing the CBC's English-language television network license, this Commission undertake:
>
> a) to re-affirm the premise that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is an institution inextricably linked to the life of this country and an instrument of great importance in the fostering of national consciousness and strengthening national unity;
> b) to review the powers and resources given to the CBC by parliament and assess their sufficiency;
> c) to encourage the public of Canada and their elected representatives to grant the needed extra financial resources, financial security, and financial independence required to carry out its purpose;
> d) to spell out in broad guidelines the real meaning of the mandate and then
> e) to enforce it. (ATPDT 1974b, pt 41)

The implication seems to be that the performers and producers were confident that there wasn't much to hide -- that there was little likelihood of public policy review leading only to a further set of suggestions about how best to edit video tape and make efficient use of studios.

What was required at the end of 1974 was a major and independent review of the structural arrangements for public broadcasting policy development in Canada, of the appropriate future role of the national broadcasting service, of the structural arrangements for that service, and -- then -- of the support requirements.

This is a case study, a map of existing conditions, not a prescription for Canadian public television. If it makes a contribution, it is as a sourcebook of detail for policy analysis and potential policy development. In that connection, it is -- without apology -- long on questions and short on answers.

So far as public broadcasting policy development is concerned, it is difficult to construct a set of recommendations. What seems required, because the ranges of alternatives are so extensive, and because positions on basic issues limit or extend options on others, is a policy development process.

The "crunch" question in 1974 was whether or not the CBC should begin to reduce its commercial advertising activity. The "bottom line" question was how much the Government thought the Canadian public was willing to pay for what the Broadcasting Act said the Canadian broadcasting system ought to be. Connecting those two questions were extensive sets of other related and interrelated questions. To the extent that I have been able to follow the developments since 1974 from a distance, both the fundamental questions and the need for clarification if not comprehensive review of public policy seem to remain essentially unchanged.

QUESTIONS ABOUT "BROADCASTING POLICY FOR CANADA": Does the public want a disctictively Canadian broadcasting system? Do Parliament and the Government want one? If so, what sort of system ought it to be? Distinctive in what ways and to what extent? How should the system be structured? If a "mixed" system of public and private elements is inevitable at least for the foreseeable future, how can the two sets of elements most effectively complement each other? Should the public system be "fitted around" the private one so as to provide complementary, supplementary, or alternative service? Or should first consideration be given to developing the public system so as to most effectively accomplish national broadasting service objectives such as those set out in the current Braodcasting Act? Is there really any serious conflict between the appropriate objectives of the public and private components?

The existing Act would seem to provide answers to the basic questions -- at least in terms of 1968 conditions and objectives. There was a clear determination on the part of Parliament and the Government that there should be a predominantly Canadian "single system" composed of public and private elements. As for the relative roles of the two components, the Act assigned provision of a service "predominantly Canadian in content and character" to the national broadcasting service rather than to the combined system, and it further provided that "where any conflict arises between the objectives of the national broadcasting service and the interests of the private element of the Canadian broadcasting system, it shall be resolved in the public interest but paramount consideration shall be given to the objecives of the national broadcasting service" (Act, s 3.h)." In short, the CBC seemed clearly intended to be the "cornerstone" of the combined system, and it is interesting that only in the area of commercial activity was there any substantial conflict between the objectives of the public and private elements during the case study period.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF "THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICE: Is the provision of "a balanced service of information, enlightenment and entertainment for people of different ages, interests and tastes covering the whole range of programming in fair proportion" an appropriate programming role for a single institution within the combined system? Or should attention focus on the balance and range of service provided by the combined system? If so, should the programming role of the public system differ significantly from that of the private component? How? To what extent? Why? Would the provision of "alternative" services be consistent with the objectives of contributing to regional flow and exchange, to the dewvelopment of national unity, and to the expression of Canadian identity? Or do these objectives imply a requirement for relatively "popular" services, viewed simultaneously at least part of the time by substantial numbers of Canadians?

These questions are, for the most part, matters of mandate interpretation. They are essentially questions of audience orientation, of the appropriate balance between mass and specialized audience service, of how best to confront "the horns of the broadcasting dilemma" in the Canadian context. Neither a preoccupation with mass programming concepts nor abandonment of a "mass medium" for a supplementary "public service" role seems appropriate.

The mandate also leaves open the appropriate balance between two potentially conflicting objectives -- "serving the special needs of geographic regions" and provision of a "national" broadcasting service. Is there a role for "local" service? If so, what is the appropriate balance between national, regional, and local service? These questions, though central to the ongoing debate about the structure of US public television, have largely been ignored in the Canadian context. Although it has itself been somewhat nervous about it, the CBC's interpretation of appropriate balance between national network, regional, and what it terms "community" service has only occasionally been seriously challenged. Even so, because the structural and resource implications are so great, a clarificaton of policy on these questions seems required.

QUESTIONS ABOUT CONTROL AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE: Is the system established by the 1968 Act working? Can the CBC be simultaneously and equally responsible to Parliament, the Government, the CRTC, and the public? Is it sufficiently independent of the Government, or has it come to be treated just like a government office? Can the CRTC have creative influence if Parliament and the Government have direct financial control? How serious are the consequences of financing on the basis of annual appropriations from general revenue funds? What alternatives are available? If receiving set licence fees are impractical, are there any other means of establishing a funding system insulated from annual political processes? Is a single source of funds appropriate? What possibilities exist for funding from diversified sources? Would voluntary subscription support for a portion of the Corporation's activities interfere with the discharge of its mandate? As much as engaging in commercial advertising activity? What, realistically, would be the revenue potential? Would the independence advantages outweigh the operational complications? Since the making of a profit is not an objective, and evaluation of cultural services provided free of direct charge is inevitably subjective, are there any practical means of introducing financial incentives for the national broadcasting service? Are there any natural incentives for Parliament and the Government to relinquish any part of their existing financial and operational control? If not, can any be created? By whom?

The 1974 process of CRTC renewal of CBC licences stands as clear evidence that serious control and support problems remain. There is a need for further clarification for jurisdiction and responsibility, and a need to establish more operational "distance" between the CBC and the Government. Although the possibilities for diversified financial support seem limited in the Canadian context, and although some support diversification schemes introduce negative side effects of their own, some change in the support arrangement does seem required. In early 1975, the CBC was attempting to figure out how to absorb a $15 million budget cut -- because the Corporation's budget, like that of the departments of the Government, had been reduced as an inflation fighting measure. The requirement for funding insulation from annual political processes is clear.

The problem of "control" has plagued Canadian public broadcasting since before its inception. The 1968 Act was the nation's fifth attempt to establish a better system of regulation and control. In 1969 Toogood argued that political involvement had always been excessive, but that the 1968 Act could provide a solution -- if the politicians removed themselves from broadcasting considerations better left to independent agencies of operation and control (Toogood, p 315). I submit that political involvement remained essentially undiminished through 1974, and that there were really no natural incentives for that to change. Given that situation, any spontaneous changes in the control and support arrangements would seem highly unlikely. Consequently, there is a need to create one or more incentives for Parliament and the Government to at least change their control and support arrangements if not their behaviour. In that respect, there is a need for the CBC, the CRTC, groups and organizations concerned with public broadcasting in Canada, and concerned media writers and citizens to recognize the inevitable consequences of retaining the current control and support structure, and to consider how they might -- individually and collectively -- find ways to steer the Canadian broadcasting system in ways which relate to the newly identified needs of Canadian society (as opposed to the needs and expectations of its political institutions and individuals). In "Financing: Problem or Symptom?" I have argued that a major part of the responsibility for bringing about such a useful development in the United States rests with the US public broadcasting system itself (McKay 1976, p 152). The argument applies equally in Canada. Despite the fact that its environment makes its defensiveness and conservatism understandable, the implication for the CBC is the same: although public broadcasting must ultimately secure insulated funding, in the meantime it must begin to develop a meaningful relationship with its public and, thereby, establish the basis for that independence.

QUESTIONS ABOUT INTERNAL STRUCTURE: I have argued that the basic questions about the CBC relate to its goals and objectives and the control and support arrangements for the national broadcasting service, and that changes or at least clarifications are required. Both questions about internal structure and answers to them become secondary because they are so directly related to the basic questions and the answers to them. In addition, I suggest that the questions posed as "structural" issues in 1974 were really problems of resource allocation, of expenditure reporting, and of recognition and portrayal.

Should the CBC be separated into two or more components? The Committee on Television proposed a "Programme Corporation" to be devoted entirely to programming and a "Service Establishment" which would own the physical plant and facilities, all the cameras and studios, all the individual television stations, and all the buildings. Another proposal, long advocated by the founder of BROADCASTER, the late Dick Lewis, was to split the production and distribution functions and to turn the CBC into a television equivalent of the National Film Board. Behind these proposals would seem to be concerns with attention to facilities at the expense of attention to programming, with the ratio of procured to internally produced Canadian programs, with the balance between spending on production and distribution, and with the fact that the CBC was competing for advertising revenue with private broadcasters. So far as programming and distribution are concerned, it seemed that the two functions were already effectively though not totally separated. Coverage planning was done at the Corporate level, program planning at the divisional level. But there was linkage between the program scheduling and distribtion systems within the services, and those arrangements seemed to provide flexibility essential for timely response to needs for public service broadcasts under special circumstances. Perhaps much of the concern over the integration of these two functions within one organization would have been alleviated if the Corporation had distinguished between coverage and programing in the reporting of both its capital and operating expenditures. Annual reports gave distributions of capital spending by province (presumably to demonstrate attempts to equalize spending on a regional basis), but it is impossible to tell precisely how much of that capital was devoted to the creation or upgrading of coverage or production facilities. I'm not suggesting that transmission and production be opposed, but rather that public consideration of the various outstanding requirements could benefit from disclosure of the historical and existing balance.

The proposal to segregate programming from facilities was almost instantly attacked by both the CBC and the CRTC. The arguments against such a structural division were efficiency and flexibility, and I do not dispute them. But the COT concern was not totally inappropriate: during the early 1970s it seemed that facilities were determining programming options and that an extremely high proportion of Canadian programming was being produced internally. However, it seemed that separating the two functions would have severely compounded the existing problems. To the extent that more Canadian programming got into CBC schedules, it was because of the high degree of integration of programming and production facilities utilization planning. In a slack resource environment, such a high degree of integration may well represent an inappropriate influence of means over ends; under severe demand/resource imbalance conditions, it is a means of achieving efficiency.

Questions about regionalization versus centralization were also, I suggest, basically resource allocation questions rather than structural ones. The regional structure was in place, though there were relatively limited allocations for local and regional programming. If there is a public determination that there should be higher volumes of quality programming to serve the special needs of geographic regions, the requirements would seem to be for funding. The existing structure seems easily adaptable to a more prominent role for local and regional services if the resources can be provided.

The one structural question which is more complex concerns the effective isolation of the English and French operating divisions. Whether creation of an additional structural element to sit between the two would help facilitate bicultural understanding seems problematical. In the existing system, the "Ottawa Area" is a combined English and French operating unit providing radio and television services, separately, in both languages. Though technical facilities and technical staff are integrated, the separation of program units was striking. The problem lies within programming, it was an outstanding one during the case study period, and experimentation with a special program unit may be in order. But the greater hope would seem to lie in sensitizing both language divisions at all levels to their special responsibilities in this regard.

QUESTIONS ABOUT RESOURCES: Without a more precise set of agreed goals and objectives for public television in Canada, any discussion of how much money should be spent is really a meaningless exercise. My own feelings are no doubt by now clearly evident. The Canadian broadcasting environment changed significantly during the case study period. The implications of those "brutal" technological and audience fragmentation changes were, I suggest, such as to dictate to the CBC a new role within the overall Canadian broadcasting system -- a role based on innovation, excellence, and distinctiveness. All this implied a requirement for a major creative revitalization of the CBC -- for major investments in talent development, program experimentation and development, in research, and in training. The CBC needed to be able to attract and to keep the best available talent. Beyond that, the inevitable prominence of American programming in peak periods brought on by requirements to achieve revenue targets seems inconsistent with the provision of a service so distictiively Canadian in content and character. But the price is high, and it can only be effectively considered against an agreed set of objectives.

QUESTIONS ABOUT POLICY INTERPRETATION AND DEVELOPMENT: Why do the preceding pages contain so many questions? Why are the prospects for clarification so dim? Why did the CBC and the CRTC talk "past" each other at the February 1974 hearing? Why was the CRTC decision so highly critical of CBC performance?

I've suggested that a major independent review is required to sort out the basic and detailed questions about roles, structures, and resources. Let me suggest that one additional task might be assigned to such a review -- the design of a policy review mechanism in which all the participants are actually in effective public and informal communication with each other.

As this study is being completed, a new regulatory agency is inheriting the work, and the problems, of the CRTC which I observed. Despite the fact that current Canadian economic conditions seem less than conducive to an early ungrading of the national broadcasting service, there are serious problems which remain unresolved, just deferred. It may be an opportune time for the CBC, with a new President, and the CRTC, with a new Chairman, to ask for an outside review of public policy.

What happened in 1974 was that there was a communication breakdown of spectacular proportions. If one reviews the public comments on the hearing and the decision in sections 10(e) and 10(f), pages 125-134, it is not difficult to assemble an argument that, in the end, the licence renewal process did little to advance the cause of public broadcasting in Canada. There is no indication that either the CRTC or the CBC wanted the hearing to be an adversary confrontation. But it is difficult to see how either the public, Parliament, or the Government could have perceived it as anything but just that.

It is not clear whether, in the quite limited private discussions between the CRTC and the CBC prior to the 1974 hearing, there was any attempt to develop a common approach to the interrelated commercial and financial problems. What followed at the public hearing and in the renewal decision suggests that, if such an attempt was made, there was little if any progress. Nor is there any indication that, in the end, the licence renewal process itself did anything either to resolve the differences between the Commission and the Corporation or to strengthen the Canadian broadcasting system.

Phrases from press reports cited in section 10(e) reflect the atmosphere of confrontation: "the opening round of his most important fight," "the prospect of a battle for control," "the potential controntation," "the publicity that accrued from the hearings," and so on. Even so, many observers felt that the hearing ended on a positive note. Jack Miller, one of the country's senior media columnists, wrote that "the CBC and CRTC came to terms with each other's problems and wound up at peace." Virtually the only hint at the nature of the decision which was to follow was Juneau's closing observation that "it would be ironic if some of us were blamed for having been too good managers of restraints."

Excerpts from the decision document appear in section 10(f) and they permeate Chapter 11. For the most part they appeared without comment because, as indicated by the mixed press reaction to the decision, assessment is inevitably subjective. In addition, it is especially difficult for me to be objective because I was inside the CBC when the decision was issued. This study actually supports the Commission's analysis, but I still find the tone and approach inconsistent with the CRTC's claim of attempting to help the CBC. The tone of the document did little to bolster public or governmental confidence in the Corporation, but the Commission's decision recognized the CBC's pressing need for "tanglible public support." It is my understanding from informal discussions that the CRTC was surprised at both the CBC and the public reaction to the document. That being the case, one can only observe that the decision was a tactical error. Joan Irwin's assessment was shared by many. She wrote: "If the CRTC hopes to inspire the CBC to a more open, philosophical view of broadcasting in Canada, a challenge to the Corporation's integrity and intelligence at every level is hardly the way to go about it" (Irwin 1974e).

Let me suggest that the CRTC simply became supremely frustrated -- at the CBC, at the Government, at Parliament, at its various critics, and at the impossibility of its own position. In that respect, its frustration was as understandable as the Corporation's defensiveness and conservatism.

The 1974 exercise is now history. And the important questions concern the future. This is no more the place to sort out the shape of an effective and ongoing public policy review mechanism than it is the place to sort out the various issues to which Chapter 11 and much of this chapter are devoted in such detail. But the requirements are clear.

The linkage between the CBC and the public -- through Parliament, the Government, and the CRTC -- didn't work. Conditions had changed, but the policy interpretation and development process wasn't adaptable. A single review now may help, but conditions will change again. What seems required therefore is a coordinated mechanism for public broadcasting policy development which operates openly in public and clearly in the public interest. Otherwise, confrontations, deadlocks, uncertainties, and unmet expectations will continue to characterize broadcasting in Canada. If many of the unresolved neuroses from which nations suffer really can be found in the ways they choose to organize radio and television, then, indeed, the medium will be the message.

What the message will be in the future rests, in the final analysis, not so much with the CBC as with the public.

Chapter 13

Management Decision Making in CBC English Television

a) THE CASE STUDY PERSPECTIVE

Observation over a two year period can lead to an attempt to map decision making structures and processes in minute detail. A great deal of such detail is, in fact, imbedded in Chapter 11. The attempt here is to pull together those various observations and to develop general decision making characteristics. Familiarity with the open system models discussed in Chapter 5 and, especially, with the outline of CBC management structures in Chapter 9 is assumed. The focus in early parts of this chapter is on the work of the English Television "Planning Group," principally the Managing Director of Television, the Director of Information Programs, the Director of Entertainment Programs, the Director of TV Network Scheduling, the National Resources Manager, and the Chief Financial Analyst.

Most of the Canadian public's armchair quarterbacking of English Television during the case study period consisted of second guessing decisions of the Planning Group. That was the group to which I was attached and, within the context of institutional studies of mass media organizations, such an opportunity to observe the management of a national television service is exceptional. Therefore, despite the danger of simply adding to the volumes of gratuitous advice on how the CBC ought to be run, there is a responsibility here to attempt to explain the most significant characteristics of decision making -- to explain how the CBC was run.

One factor reduces the chances of merely contributing to second guessing but may also reduce the value of these observations to those primarily concerned with the general internal characteristics of broadcasting institutions. Both management options and patterns of decision making within the Planning Group were highly environmentally determined.

The importance of decision making environments in understanding organizational behaviour was not widely recognized until relatively recently, when the "open system" approach derived from general systems theory began to be applied to organizational research. But within the last few years, it has suddenly become clear not only that the potential of systems theory is far from being realized in organizational research, but also that inadequate attention had previously been paid to consideration of an organization's environment (Rogers & Rogers, pp 58-9). The approach here is to view the observed characteristics as understandable in the existing environment, and that is why I suggested that the importance of environmental factors "may" limit the general value of these observations. As other broadcasting institutions are studied we may well find the decision making of other management groups to be highly influenced by environmental factors as well.

Over the two year Toronto fieldwork period the nature of my assignments and of my relationship with the group changed substantially. During the first six months I worked largely in isolation from the group as a whole, reporting to the Director of TV Network Scheduling, and focusing my attention on the network Program Evaluation System. By the end of the fieldwork period, there had been a shift towards project work for the group as a whole, and the nature of my work had become less specialized and more related to the central concerns of the group. Although I had worked within English Television on two previous occasions at the program unit level, prior to the fieldwork period I had little "feel" for the nature of the group's responsibilities, problems, or approaches.

That remained the case for some months, so I am not suggesting that external analysis is sufficient to arrive at an understanding of the actual decision making processes; environmental factors are seen here to explain decision making characteristics, but without direct exposure it would seem difficult to identify the significant characteristics of the relevant environments.

I was fortunate that the physical working arrangements located me on the ESD "fourth floor," in the midst of the Planning Group. I was, in fact, located between the offices of the Managing Director of Television (MDTV) and the Director of TV Network Scheduling. My access to individual members of the group, though not unrestricted was relatively free. Much of my contact with the group was informal and on an individual basis. Although a high proportion of it took place in the office setting, much of it occurred outside of "normal" office hours, principally at the end of working days. Despite the fact that the working relationship grew closer, I was critical of numerous aspects of English Television operations and of Planning Group decision making throughout the period. My critical outbursts were at first at least tolerated and later welcomed as the observations of someone familiar with television production and the group's concerns, but detached from the daily discharge of line responsibility. For purposes of participant observation, I think the relationship was close enough but not too close.

Throughout the fieldwork period I attached increasing importance to my prior industrial experience. In addition to providing exposure to the management practices of that particular corporation, my work with IBM had brought me into contact with a large number of customer organizations, and approaches to management had often been the subject of informal discussions with customer executives. In that respect, my background was different from that of many members of the Planning Group. The point is noted here because that background influences some of the personal observations in later parts of this chapter.

b) ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

The discussion in Chapter 12 considered the CBC as an organization within the national environment. Although no distinction was made there that environment was essentially a political one, or a power environment. At the Planning Group level, however, in addition to that political environment there were also relevant "creative" and "service" environments. It was at the Planning Group level where the political environment of the national broadcasting service in general and of the CBC Head Office in particular intersected the creative environment of producers and program units. And it was also at that point where the organization devised its responses to its service environment, the viewing public, and where it confronted both the special role of public broadcasting discussed in Chapter 3 and certain basic dilemmas inherent in the mass media.

The Political Environment

Both Chapters 11 and 12 focus on what I have termed English Television's "political" environment. Although that environment was common to English Radio and the French and Northern Services, particular attention was paid to English Television in both chapters.

- Requirements and expectations related to contributions to national unity, the provision of shared program experiences, increases in Canadian content levels, the use of US programming, and support of the developing Canadian film industry were summarized in the "Comments" on "Nationalism Issues" in section 11(a), pages 159-161.

- Requirements and expectations related to providing for the expression of Canadian identity, decentralization of production, and the flow and exchange of regional information and entertainment were summarized in the "Comments" on "Regionalism Issues" in section 11(b), pages 183-185.
- Requirements and expectations related to the reflection of the bicultural and multicultural nature of Canada and to the handling of "minority" interests and concerns were summarized in the "Comments" on "Recognition and Portrayal Issues" in section 11(c), pages 219-223.
- Resource provision and utilization considerations, including the level of funding, production efficiency, resource allocation strategy, provision for program development, commercial activities, and the annual basis for funding were summarized in the "Comments" on "Costs and Financing" in section 11(e), pages 219-223.

With respect to the relationship between the environment external to the Corporation as a whole and English Television, Chapter 12 found the following environmental demand, support, structural, and process characteristics:

- The levels of service specifically required were high and implied requirements for major undertakings in program production (page 229).
- The levels of expectation significantly exceeded the explicitly specified requirements (page 231).
- There was widespread public criticism of the quality of program service actually being provided during the case study period (page 234).
- Public comments by individual politicians, especially those receiving widespread public attention, focused primarily on critical assessment of CBC program performance (page 239).
- Throughout the case study period the levels of funding provided by Parliament on the basis of recommendations by the Government remained below the levels requested by the CBC (page 241).
- The operation of the national broadcasting service was an undertaking highly visible to the public (page 242).
- The annual basis for funding and the financial control provisions of the Broadcasting Act established dependency relationships between the CBC and both Parliament and the Government (pages 243-245).
- The formal structural arrangements did not clearly establish boundaries of jurisdiction and responsibility and, in practice, the policy development and interpretation process was uncoordinated (page 262).

The Service Environment

The distinction made here between what have been termed the "political" and "service" environments is intended to underline the fact that certain important aspects of the requirements and expectations of English Television were not prominently reflected in the "official" input to the Corporation from Parliament, the Government, the regulatory agency, and the intervenors at the licence renewal hearing -- from the "active" public. The "Comments" on "Audience Orientation" in section 11(d), pages 199-201, reflect a number of these "understood" service requirements and expectations.

Taking the political and service environments into consideration in combination we find:

- a very high number of specific requirements and expectations, most of them argued to be essential demands on English Television, and most of them in turn recognized and accepted by the CBC and translated into specific service objectives (pages 199-200),
- inherent conflicts between certain of these objectives (or pluralistic goals)

requiring resolution in a service balancing process (page 198),
- a finite service schedule and a suggested practical limit to the number of objectives (or balancing "dimensions") which could be accommodated (page 201),
- a suggested "balancing overload" (pages 197-199),
- finite production facility, financial, and human resources (page 201), and
- a demand/resource imbalance at some point on the range of expectations stretching from maintenance of existing service levels to intensive development of high volumes of distinctively Canadian programming of imagination and excellence (page 223).

The Creative Environment

Virtually all of the attention thus far in this study has focused on the "external" environment, and I have argued that, in terms of understanding the policies and operations of "the CBC as a whole," the external environment is of significant importance. However, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Planning Group operated -- much more than Corporate or divisional management -- within the CBC's "creative" environment.

An organization's environment is normally defined as lying outside of the system's boundary, but there are physical and social factors somewhat akin to an environment which are located within the boundary of the organization. These are normally referred to as aspects of the "climate" of the organization, in order to avoid semantic confusion with the concept of environment, and climate has been defined as the state of an organization's internal nature, as perceived by its members (Rogers & Rogers, p 73). The attention in this subsection deals with the climate of English Television program areas and production units, with those portions of the organization "below" the Planning Group on the formal organization charts of Figures 9-4, 9-5, and 9-7, pages 109, 110, and 112. Because this chapter deals with the Planning Group rather than the program units, the discussion here amounts to a consideration of the creative climate of those units and the creative environment of the Planning Group. The considerations are important in both senses: the importance of environments has already been noted; similarly, we know from a number of studies that an organization's climate exerts a strong influence on its members' behaviour, principally through interpersonal communication within the group (p 74).

Preceding sections have sought to identify the origins of a wide range of problems faced by the Planning Group. Many of those problems were reflected back to the group from its program units because they were shared at that level.

Public broadcasting organizations seem to attract people whose interests extend beyond personal financial gain from employment. Those interests may relate in part to desires to serve the public interest, or to make the world a better or happier place in which to live. And they may relate in part to personal satisfaction derived from acts (or the process) of artistic creation. Producers, production personnel, and a high proportion of technical and support personnel within public broadcasting organizations thus have much more in common with those engaged in print journalism than with stars in the international feature film industry. Personal fulfillment ranks high in their overall job satisfaction schemes, and seems to compensate for the fact that -- across the broadcasting production industry as a whole -- rates of remuneration are low relative to other equally demanding occupational areas. Both in the United States and Canada, public broadcasting program production is not a "get rich quick" vocation. Those who enter it are normally fully aware of that fact.

There is a practical benefit in this for broadcasting organizations: talented personnel are willing to work at salary levels below those which they might command in other business or professional areas. But there is a complication: in return they expect some appreciable measure of personal satisfaction to arise from their efforts.

Under any circumstances these expectations of making creative contributions could be expected to be the source of some amount of frustration on a personal basis, and of some problems for the organization as a whole. Within English Television during the case study period they were severely compounded by a series of factors, most of them noted in earlier chapters.

Measured against contemporary standards in business, government, and private broadcasting, physical working conditions for program units were, with some exceptions, significantly substandard. Under "Production Facilities," section 11(b) noted:

- the 45 mile separation of production offices from studio facilities in the Regina/Moose Jaw operation (pages 174-175),
- description of the Vancouver facilities in use through 1974 by a writer for BROADCASTER as "six inadequate morale-busting locations" including "an armpit of an ancient building" (page 176),
- further descriptions of those facilities including the terms "dungeon" and "unreal" (page 176),
- the comment in 1975 that "It's almost magical what the new [Vancouver] building has done for our people" (page 176),
- Norman Campbell's description of working in the scattered Toronto facilities (pages 179-180), and
- Laurent Picard's description of the Toronto plant as "a slum" (page 179).

Working conditions for program units were not uniform across the system but, of those to which I was exposed, they were the source of problems throughout the case study period in Vancouver, Regina, and Toronto and -- to a lesser extent -- in Winnipeg, Ottawa, and Halifax. Such substandard working conditions contrasted sharply with conditions in the new Maison de Radio-Canada in Montreal.

A second set of problems related to the "tools" provided for production. Various sections of Chapter 11 noted:

- some network program production (eg- TAKE 30) in black and white throughout much of the case study period (page 145),
- the use of mobile units to accomplish studio production in colour in Vancouver, Toronto, and Halifax (page 145),
- shortages in video tape editing resources (page 145),
- advance block production of full series preventing possible comment on current happenings and changes based on viewer reaction to previous programs in series (page 145),
- continuing use of black and white film in Regina/Moose Jaw (pages 174-175),
- the argument of the Toronto producers' association that "because of the antiquated equipment in Toronto, the quality of programming we produce is jeopardized" (page 179),
- the "Additional Statement" comments on "the critical equipment crisis" and "a 'bandaid' operation" (page 179),
- the use of noisy mobile unit cameras intended for outdoor service in Toronto studios (pages 179-180), and
- an estimated $32 million "obsolescence gap" in the replacement of capital equipment (page 174).

Also limiting the opportunities of producers were the effectively declining resource base noted in section 7(b), pages 83-84, and the resulting stretching of program budgets considered at length in section 11(e), pages 201-214. Producers and units were in contention for scarce production facility and financial resources.

Throughout the case study period relatively small amounts were allocated to production training and personnel development. Salary levels, though generally low within the industry, were especially low in some cases. In the absence of a major producer training and development program, a career path had developed in which a large number of producers had originally been recruited as program researchers, many of them by the regional HOURGLASS program units. Up until a few months prior to my HOURGLASS resources study, the stretching of regional programming resources has been such that some of these potential producers, employed on contracts supported directly by program budgets, were being paid as low as $180 per week.

In addition to their own activities within the Corporation, production units constituted an appreciable proportion of the "interface" between the CBC and the public. In this respect their role as "boundary-spanners" was not unusual; Rogers and Rogers have commented:

> At the top, executives travel widely and enjoy other types of contact with other organizations in the environment; they are in a position to obtain new ideas from sources external to their own organization. But most of their contact with the environment is at a relatively high level; they gather information about the "big picture" of changes in the environment without usually knowing the fine details.
>
> In contrast, those individuals near the bottom of the organizational hierarchy also have a certain degree of "cosmopoliteness." For instance, in a product or service organization, lower-level workers deal most directly with customers and clients, with incoming materials and energy, and with other operational-level information. (Rogers & Rogers, pp 67-8)

The interface role of production units was the source of some further frustration for them. There was a tendency for the CBC to be regarded by the public as a monolithic bureaucracy, and -- consequently -- for any person identified with the Corporation to be held at least partly responsible for its activities as a whole. It was, therefore, those producers, interviewers, and technicians who came into contact with individual members of the public, as much if not more than any other people in the organization, who heard directly from the public about the CBC's shortcomings. And there was a tendency for them to attempt to defend the CBC as a whole, and to accept relatively quietly their own personal frustrations. Writing in MACLEAN'S, Val Clery noted:

> On the third day [of the 1974 hearing], a delegation from the Toronto-based Association of Television Producers and Directors came forward to present their brief. For anyone who has worked in the CBC, as I had, there was something very moving about the group: they were all good producers, some distinguished; almost all of them were survivors of several uninspiring, submissive presidencies; a few I knew to have been victims of specific acts of managerial incompetence.
>
> And yet, despite a rumor that some of their more headstrong colleagues had wanted them to blast away at management, venting the simmering frustration that is endemic at the program level, their brief was quiet and reasonable. Harry Boyle, vice-chairman of the CRTC, and a survivor of the CBC himself, leaned forward to his microphone and asked gently: "I'd like you each to tell us, why do you go on working for the CBC?"
>
> Norman Campbell explained it this way: "Although I often go down to work in the States, I love working with Canadians and I use them whenever I can. CBC is a grand ideal, that we all have to run alongside to keep it going. CBC is marvellous, a holy grail, a fantastic unique organization. I love Canada and think it would be very deprived without the CBC."
>
> The convention room was quiet as the producers left the table and dispersed.
>
> Most of the CBC producers I know and have talked to, not only in Toronto but in Vancouver and Edmonton and Montreal and Halifax, would have responded to Harry Boyle's question in much the same way....
>
> The true realities that shape the programs you and I see on our screens, for

better or for worse, are the realities facing those creative people in the production line, "running alongside" the CBC, "trying to keep it going." (Clery, p 61)

The creative climate of production units was generally characterized by relatively ambitious personal creative goals, scarce program production resources, relatively obsolescent production facilities, low rates of compensation, and limited training and personnel development activity; in some instances working conditions were substandard; frequently, public criticism of the performance of the Corporation as a whole was directed to individual members of production units.

c) STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

Structural Setting

Within the structural organization of the CBC, the English Television Planning Group was located at the intersection of three relevant environments which may be termed the "political," "service," and "creative" environments.

The basis for the above observation was established in sections 13(a) and 13(b); it is explicitly re-stated here to emphasize the importance of this concentration of responsibility. Section 9(d) argued that in any broadcasting organization in which there is a budget, it is inevitable that at some point creative and financial matters come under joint control (pages 108-109). In addition, reference back to Figure 9-3 on page 108, which depicted the "media management" separation of radio and television within ESD, indicates that responsibility for service planning inevitably came to rest at that common control point, the Planning Group.

Within the "media management" structural organization of the English Services Division there was a concentration of decision making responsibility -- for planning program service to the public, for the internal creative development of the organization, and for the allocation of resources -- at the level of the English Television Planning Group.

Taking into account the requirements and expectations of the political and service environments and the nature of the creative environment, the concentration of responsibility to make decisions implied a requirement for dealing with the suggested service "balancing overload," the demand/resource imbalance, and the internal creative needs of the organization. Expressed more simply:

The concentration of decision making responsibility implied a requirement for the Planning Group to make a high volume of decisions.

The concentration of responsibility to make service, creative, and resource decisions noted above is, I suggest, inevitable to some extent in any broadcasting organization, and it it implies an inevitable complexity in decision making. In the case of English Television, that complexity was further increased by the structure of responsibility for those decisions. Figure 9-2 on page 106 indicated a line of responsibility for decisions from the English Services Division to, in turn, the Executive Vice President of the Corporation, the President, and the Board of Directors. Figure 9-3 indicated a line of responsibility for decisions from the English Television MDTV to the ESD Assistant General Manager and the ESD Vice President and General Manager. Although the lines of responsibility for decisions stretching from the Planning Group to the Board, though long, would appear to be direct, the interlocking media and regional structure, depicted in Figure 9-4 on page 109, complicated the structural arrangement.

Studies of other formal institutions have revealed something which most people familiar with the daily functioning of organizations could have predicted: the formal structure never completely explains or predicts the behaviour of the members of the system, even in the most rigidly structured systems (Rogers & Rogers, p 80).

Observation over the case study period confirmed both the above point and something that would appear probable simply on the basis of an analysis of Figure 9-4. Although responsibility to make decisions was highly concentrated at the Planning Group level, responsibility for those decisions was somewhat distributed. Normally in organizations downward communication flows are more frequent than upward flows (p 96). In that respect it is not surprising that the environmental demands made on the CBC were communicated relatively directly down through the organization to the Planning Group. Objectives and priorities relating to English Television were set at the Corporate level: the Corporate submission to the CRTC, for instance, commented, "The English division has been called upon to give priority, within a balanced schedule, to improve the quality of its drama programming, and to rejuvenate and upgrade the TV music and variety department" (CBC 1973c, p 6). Canadian content and commercial revenue objectives passed down the line to the Planning Group relatively directly. Similarly, objectives and priorities were set at the divisional level for English Television: such requirements (like their Corporate equivalents) tended to be global in scope, but typically included priorities for network program development, regional program development, and local program service. In addition, specific commitments made by the Corporation as a whole were "inherited" by the Planning Group. The CBC's "host broadcaster" undertaking for the 1976 Summer Olympics affected English Television in several ways: the capital equipment acquisition plans of the Corporation as a whole became geared primarily to Olympics requirements early in the case study period; the transfer of a large proportion of technical staff to Montreal for the duration of the Games required extensive pre-Olympics program "inventory" production for telecast during the period when regular production capacity would be significantly reduced; and special advance arrangements were required regarding employees' annual leaves.

The first factor complicating the actual operation of the "responsibility for" structure was the tension between network and local service which Chapter 12 argued was a reflection of essentially the same tension in the national context. And, as Figure 9-4 suggests, the formal structure which connected the media management and regional structures did not provide for authoritarian resolution of those tensions by the Planning Group.

The second factor complicating the actual operation of the "responsibility for" structure was in part related to communication patterns common to most organizations, and in part related to personnel promotion practices typical to date of public broadcasting institutions in North America. In most organizations, direct communication with one's boss's boss is discouraged; this is one means by which formal organization structure restricts communication flows to prevent information overload (Rogers & Rogers, p 92). But note that this discouragement of vertical bypassing applies primarily to upward flow; prohibitions on downward bypassing, though present, are not as strong: communication in an organization, like water, tends to run downhill (p 96). In selecting managers, public broadcasting organizations place a high premium on broadcasting production experience. At the 1974 hearing, ESD reported as follows: "The English Services Division has now completed the process of re-organization and management renewal. Of our regional Directors of Television, five have been promoted from recent production experience either in our regions or outside CBC. Six of our main national program department heads left active production only recently" (CRTC 1974a, pp 149-50). In fact, at that time production backgrounds extended up to the level of the Executive Vice President of the Corporation. The advantage was familiarity with the operational problems of management at lower levels. The disadvantage was that several different management levels each tended to engage in program management, with the result that operational decision making by the Planning Group tended to be subject to intervention from above. The reorganization of Current Affairs programming services in the summer of 1973, noted in section 12(e) on page 254, was such an intervention.

Although responsibility to make decisions was highly concentrated at the Planning Group level, the group was responsible for such decisions to a complex and somewhat distributed management control structure, and decision making was subject to intervention from above.

The discussion of the creative environment in section 13(b) identified certain sources of frustration for producers and production units. Somewhat complicating the work of the Planning Group was the fact that many of those problems stemmed either from decisions outside the group's jurisdiction or from factors over which it had little control. The buildings and facilities problems followed directly from the capital and operational funding problems of the Corporation as a whole; these seemed compounded to some extent by the degree of capital control vested with the Government, to some extent by an apparent Corporate reluctance to be perceived as concentrating on "building programs in major centres" (CRTC 1974b, p 68), and to some extent by attempts to economize on non-program expenditures. The stretching of program budgets and the resulting contract salary levels followed directly from the programming demand/resource imbalance. The allocations for training and personnel development were made at the divisional level and appeared intended to direct as high a proportion of resources as possible to programming.

The overriding concern with efficiency and the decision to allocate as high a proportion of total resources as possible to programming led to "economy" measures in areas outside of the group's jurisdiction which, though each somewhat understandable in isolation for a corporation spending public funds, contributed indirectly to frustration in the "creative" environment. As Figure 9-3 on page 108 indicated, "Administration" was separated from program management. Intensive efforts had been made to cut administrative costs: there was the long-standing perception in some quarters outside the Corporation, reflected in the Davey Committee comments about overhead costs (pages 143-144), that the Corporation was administratively inefficient; and there was the practical need to preserve resources for programming. This led to a number of "least direct cost" approaches -- in contrast to what systems engineering would term "least effective cost." The distinction is that the systems approach includes consideration of personnel time, effort, and convenience in the overall effective cost. Procurement of office equipment, for instance, tended to follow the "least direct cost" approach.

Included in PETER GZOWSKI'S BOOK ABOUT [the CBC English Radio program] THIS COUNTRY IN THE MORNING is a reproduction of a short note from Gordon Sinclair, veteran newspaperman and radio commentator, and regular panelist on the network television program FRONT PAGE CHALLENGE. Sinclair has capitalized on the Scottish heritage of which he is proud to develop a comic's reputation within Canada for a concern with money, the closest US equivalent of which would probably be that of the late Jack Benney. He wrote: "About a month ago I did a short stint on the program and signed a cost sheet but my records show no cheque. Could you look into this? I think it would be a small amount but every bit counts. Salaam; [signed] Gordon Sinclair (Gzowski, p 143). To those outside THIS COUNTRY and the CBC, the joke was on Sinclair. In fact, 6 to 12 week delays in paying performers were not uncommon. Several factors appeared to contribute to these delays. The CBC annually contracted with over 30,000 individuals for personal services, and its books and accounting procedures were audited (under provisions of Section 46 of the Broadcasting Act) by the Auditor General of Canada; there were both practical and formal needs to apply effective disbursement controls. In addition, there was an apparent reluctance to invest heavily in a more responsive payroll system. But producers tended to be held responsible by those whose services they had requested for ensuring that payment was made. The problem was not confined to performers: one location manager reported that a university student, employed as a summer relief technical operator, had completed his 3 month period of employment before his first regular payroll cheque arrived; two month delays in raising new employee's first regular cheques were not uncommon. Producers and department managers often arranged for "advances" in the interim period, but the approach contrasted sharply with that in most private industries where considerable efforts are made to ensure that new employees' first cheques are delivered at the end of the first payroll period worked as an indication of interest in the welfare of the new employee. All of this is raised here because, although these were matters outside Planning Group jurisdiction or control, these small aggravations contributed to frustrations within the group's relevant creative environment.

The structural arrangements placed certain areas outside of Planning Group jurisdiction; in practice, problems in these areas contributed to frustration in the creative environment for which the group was, in other respects, responsible.

Structural Form

The formal structure of the Planning Group was outlined in section 9(d), pages 108-111. This subsection adds a few observations about that organizational structure which have an importance in contributing to the "Analysis" section which follows.

- The Planning Group functioned primarily as a "group." Group meetings were frequent, many decisions were taken by the group as a whole, and consensus seemed to play an important role in decision making.
- Within the group, financial control was distributed. The MDTV, the Directors of Information and Entertainment Programs, and the Chief Financial Analyst each had direct program finance decision making or control responsibilities; the National Resources Manager and the Director of TV Network Scheduling also had financial responsibilities related to program finances, in some cases very directly.
- Creative responsibilities, though primarily resting with the Directors of Information and Entertainment Programs, were also somewhat distributed. Final decisions on major creative undertakings were normally made by the group as a whole.
- There was no single "Program Director." The "Information" and "Entertainment" program areas were separated, and the MDTV carried physical and financial resource, commercial sales, and scheduling in addition to program responsibilities.
- Although the group had responsibilities for both network and local operations, these functions were not separated. US commercial network structures typically establish separate network and owned and operated station divisions with separate managements. Within English Television, the essential participation of regional centres in network production was apparently considered inconsistent with such a division.
- The total size of the group and its support staff was small. This may have been because the existing size was considered optimum for decision making efficiency, because of a desire not to be seen to be establishing large management groups, and/or because of the relative scarcity of financial resources. (After the close of the case study period, the size of the group was enlarged with the addition of an Assistant Managing Director of Television.)
- The group, though located in the same building as ESD divisional management, was physically separated by several blocks from the nearest production units.

d) ANALYSIS

Communication Overload

The picture of the structural form of the Planning Group outlined in section 9(d) and extended above is, in general terms, that of a relatively small, highly integrated, physically concentrated and somewhat isolated decision making unit. Communication within the group was frequent and open. This is not surprising: horizontal flows in an organization are more frequent than vertical flows; individuals communicate more openly and effectively with their equals than with superiors; peers share a common frame of reference; the content of messages carried by horizontal flows is mainly of a coordinating nature; horizontal flows are more likely to be informal, and informal channels are generally more rapid and facile (Rogers & Rogers, p 96).

The attention in most of the rest of this section is on communication between the group and its relevant environments, and the following observations are of particular relevance:

> There is a common misconception about communication problems in organizations: it is that the main problem is restricted flows, and that the solution is to unclog blocked communication channels. The discovery of the crucial role of communication led to an enthusiastic advocacy of increased information as the solution to many organizational problems. But the problem, and hence the solution, is often just the opposite: the major communication problem is often information overload, to which the solution is obviously less, not more, communication. (Based on Rogers & Rogers, p 70)

The Planning Group operated under communication or information overload conditions.

The members of the Planning Group, sometimes collectively and sometimes individually, were in communication regarding their decision making activities with groups and individuals including:

- Head Office management, committees, and special study groups,
- divisional management, committees, advisors, task forces, and special study groups,
- divisional departments -- Planning, Finance, Administration, Marketing, Engineering, and Public Relations,
- Regional directors, regional Directors of Television, regional Program Directors, regional Production Managers, and Location Managers,
- the TV Sales department,
- the Program Purchasing department,
- foreign television networks and program producers,
- independent film and television program producers in Canada,
- the Head Office Station Relations department, the English Television Station Relations department, the TV affiliates' committee, and individual affiliated stations,
- the French Services Division,
- the CBC Northern Service,
- network operations departments and committees,
- the Program Evaluation System,
- broadcasting and film industry associations,
- the press,
- individual members of the public, elected public representatives, and officials of government agencies,
- internal unions and associations -- ACTRA, AFM, NABET, CUPE, regional producers, and Toronto producers,
- CBC Research,
- the network program Area Heads,
- individual producers and program units, and
- the Planning Group support staff.

Observation tended to confirm the existence of communication and information overloads. My access to members of the group, though greater than for most people external to it, was principally outside normal working hours. On the one occasion when a member of the group borrowed a communication research book, it was returned with the note: "I really see no prospect of reading anything for a week, so return this for safekeeping."

Operational Focus for Decision Making

The decision making activities of the Planning Group had a distinctly operational focus.

A number of factors, some peculiar to CBC conditions, some not, appeared to contribute to this operational focus:

- Policies were established at levels above the Planning Group; objectives and priorities were communicated to the group from Head Office and divisional management.
- The group had been established as an operational management unit; the ranking officer's title was "Managing" Director of Television.
- The concentration of responsibility to make decisions implied a requirement for the Planning Group to make a high volume of decisions.
- The group was responsible for the decisions it made to a complex and somewhat distributed management control structure, and individual decisions were subject to intervention from above. In practice, both the exercise of control and interventions had an operational focus. On one occasion the Planning Group and a regional Director of Television anxiously waited for divisional approval of a program project while a member of divisional management read the shooting script for the proposed program.
- The group was responsible for resource allocation in a resource poor environment -- in which regional programming, network program areas, and individual program units were in contention for resources at a detailed level.
- Many of the demands made on the group were of an operational nature. Expectations of greater network production decentralization, and of greater use of Canadian feature films and of independently produced Canadian television programs, for instance, implied requirements for operational decision making -- for resource re-allocation.
- The conflicts between established objectives were such that the formulation of general policies was difficult. Balancing public service objectives against commercial revenue considerations, for instance, was a complex process which sweeping general policies could not guide on a case by case basis.
- The attention to operational matters was not exclusive to the Planning Group or the CBC. The operational focus of assessment by the public, individual politicians, Parliamentary committees, and the regulatory agency was noted in section 12(c).
- The CBC's mandate, though considerably more specific than that of most public broadcasting organizations, was nevertheless relatively global in scope. Public interpretations of the mandate varied widely, and for the Planning Group, recourse to the Broadcasting Act was not a practical means of deriving middle range operational policy guidelines.
- The Planning Group, the CBC, and broadcasters everywhere faced (and still face) a series of classic dilemmas which earlier sections have argued arise from the nature of contemporary society and the fact that broadcasting exists. They are difficult problems to face, and the approach of broadcasting institutions has typically been to resolve them through balancing processes at the operational level.

The tendency for the English Television management group to concentrate on operational matters was, I suggest, greatly accentuated by the operational focus of virtually all of the input to the group -- from other parts of the CBC, from individuals, elements, and representatives of the public, and from the regulatory agency which had expressed considerable concern that more attention be devoted to goals, objectives, and policies. It seemed easier for many people to concentrate attention on changes in tangible, operational activities that to attempt to consider objectives and policies.

The Management of Constraints

> *The weekly schedule in its basic summer and winter forms is the matrix in which the aspirations and constraints of the television network are reconciled.*
> *- English Television submission to the CRTC (CBC 1973b, p 3)*

> *I think that we may be blamed in a number of years after we've disappeared to other things perhaps, for having insisted too much on the constraints instead of facing the country with the objectives that it has given itself, and as people like Dr. Spry have said, which it has repeatedly asserted over 45 years. And it would be ironic if some of us were blamed for having been too good managers of constraints.*
> *- Pierre Juneau at the 1974 hearing (CRTC 1974a, p 1470)*

Chapter 12 argued that there was a CBC reluctance, related to its institutional defensiveness and conservatism, to challenge the inevitability of its constraints. But under the circumstances prevailing during the case study period, I think that at the Planning Group level constraints were virtually inevitable. Given its position in the Corporate framework, there seemed little effective opportunity for the group to change its basic circumstances. It is difficult to assess either the extent to which the group perceived its situation as under its power to control or the extent of efforts to challenge either its existing circumstances or demands for additional services. The questions here are not about whether those circumstances were appropriate: that is what Chapter 12 was supposed to be about. The focus here is on how the Planning Group dealt with them.

Various earlier sections reproduced excerpts from the English Television submission to the CRTC and detailed specific decision making approaches:

- The submission's comments on the approach to establishing balance and range were included under "Balance, Range, and Optimization" in section 3(f), page 38.
- The scheduling of news specials was considered under "Shared Program Experiences" in section 11(a), page 139.
- Excerpts from the submission's "General Program Statement" describing the network's approach to schedule construction were included under "US Programming" in section 11(a), pages 149-150.
- The role of the block program schedule as the basis for decision making was described under "Content Balance" in section 11(d), pages 193-194.
- The English Television resource allocation strategy was examined in detail under "Level of Resources" in section 11(e), pages 206-211.

The submission comment that the block schedule was the "matrix" in which aspirations and constraints were reconciled was a strikingly accurate portrayal of the decision making processes observed. That matrix was the means by which the Planning Group handled the problem of simultaneously establishing balance and range in content, establishing balance and range in audience orientation, decentralizing production, and allocating resources -- of reconciling conflicting objectives and priorities, and dealing with the demand/resource imbalance.

Resource Orientation

The point that the decision making activities of the Planning Group were highly oriented towards resources is relatively obvious. Resource allocation was one of the group's primary official functional roles. The overall CBC concern for efficiency and the demand/resource imbalance amplified the importance of this resource allocation role. While resource considerations did not enter into every decision made by the group, they were a factor in a very high proportion of all decisions. Resource decision making within the context of the block schedule "matrix" consumed a high proportion of the group's time and energy.

Systems Solutions

One of the means by which the group dealt with requirements for high volumes of decisions and with its communication or information overload was the use of decision making "systems." Section 11(c) on "Recognition and Portrayal" argued both that there were appropriate places for such systems and that there were limits to the ability of systems to shape program content at the detailed level. One management systems approach, common throughout the Corporation, was the "management by objectives" technique described in section 9(f), pages 114-115; another was the "re-direction" or "re-allocation" approach noted in section 11(e), page 219. Both approaches, though having some potential pitfalls and requiring care in application, were in widespread use in both government and business and were not the object of much internal or public criticism during the case study period.

The Planning System described in section 9(f) was, however, quite another matter. The discussion of management decision making in section 11(b) on "Regional Flow and Exchange" noted some critical comments in the intervention filed by the regional producers' association (page 172). Other observations in that intervention included:

> [A] producer possesses memos saying that certain people would contact him to further develop [his] idea. No contact was made. There are many examples of program proposals by regional producers that simply do not get serious treatment by network personnel. (L'Association, p 15)
>
> A Winnipeg producer submitted [two] program proposals ... but received not even a one line acknowledgement from the network officers involved. The time and energy that producers go through to prepare proposals, with the many, complicated and elaborate forms and procedures the CBC systems people have created, is of concern to this Association because so much of that time and energy is not even rewarded with serious consideration. (pp 17-8)

The "Additional Statement" by some members of the Toronto association was also critical of the Planning System:

> Planning is a joke. Producers spend hours in meetings trying to answer impossible questions about facility requirements months, even a year in advance. If a producer answers honestly that he doesn't know what he'll need that far off, he runs the risk of getting nothing, as other players in the game blanket everything. This vicious spiral makes it impossible to seriously set up facilities for real program requirements.
>
> The new program proposal system is so inefficient that it prevents quick production of public affairs programs. Two years ago, the time from proposal to air date could be as little as a week; now proposals are delayed indefinitely in management. Some disappear, others return in altered form, still others are lost.

> Producers seldom are consulted during the decision-making process and it is sometimes difficult to find out who actually makes decisions. (ATPDT 1974b, pnts 29, 30)

It seemed to me that the Planning System was the origin of three distinct sets of problems. The more obvious ones were the demands made on producers for detailed facilities requirement information many months prior to production. The "Comments" on long range planning in section 11(e) suggested that a more subtle problem was the limiting of programming flexibility (page 221); the excerpts from the "Additional Statement" above noted essentially the same effect. But perhaps the most significant problem was that there was heavy reliance on the paperwork flows of the Planning System to handle high volumes of producer/management communication dealing with complex matters, both technical and creative. From a communication flow standpoint, the system had, in fact, been designed to routinize the transmission of certain detailed information throughout English Television, and to mimimize requirements for interpersonal communication in the gathering of routine advance planning information. In practice, the system was relied on to handle more than "routine" communication. Two factors seemed responsible for that. One was that the Planning System collected Program Proposals over a period of months, held them for batch decision making when the size of the English Television planning allocation for the next annual funding period became known, and then released for feasibility study at the same time all Proposals for programs to be funded in the next 12 month period. This annual cycle worked well for the efficient planning of facilities utilization, but the annual planning timetable and the resulting delays in decision making were the source of frustration in the creative environment. The system for handling "routine" matters once each year transmitted a batch of messages to producers which were much less than routine: management's decisions on which proposed programs were to be produced and, for those accepted, the proportions of the budget and facilities requests which would be honoured.

The second factor which seemed to contribute to the use of the Planning System for more than routine communication was the fact that the Planning Group was, as argued earlier, working under communication overload conditions. There was a tendency for any communication which could be handled by the system to be handled that way. The notes accompanying the Program Proposal forms stressed that documents were not intended to take the place of full and free discussion of program ideas, and that such discussion was essential (pages 113-114). The volume of discussion implied was high: 210 accepted Program Proposals, each with program purpose and target audience objectives, a program outline, and detailed production requirement specifications were released for feasibility study in September 1973. Some proposals (eg- for coverage of the opening of Parliament) would have required much less discussion than others (eg- ACCESS, HOUSE OF PRIDE, CANADIAN FILMMAKERS, and CHEZ CHARLEBOIS), but in practice there was relatively little discussion.

As noted in the Introduction, my work with English Television had begun with a project to improve the Program Evaluation System, but that experience did not yield suitable dissertation material. Several factors complicated the operation of that particular system. One was the uncertain role of audience research. Another was the heavy reliance on subjective assessment. But the major problem was that the reports which the system generated did not get discussed. Again, the Planning Group's communication overload seemed to be the major causal factor. And, again, the conseqence was to delegate consideration of the creative aspects of program service to a system which came to substitute for producer/management communication.

Ironically, the solutions to the problem of information overload in an organization which restrict communication flows tend to cause problems in distortion and omission (Rogers & Rogers, p 93). The problems with the English Television management "systems," I suggest, were not so much related to the nature of the individual systems themselves as to the fact that they caused communication distortions and omissions.

- Responsiveness

Did the Planning System respond to demands, or simply ensure the efficient use of facilities? I suggest that the system was responsive, though slow. The Planning Group did seem to identify demands and respond to them, but the interval between demand and actual response implementation was typically quite long. There was a perception in some quarters that the 1974 network licence renewal process quickly moved English Television on to positive new endeavours. There was some impact, but it was not as great as that suggested by Robert Lewis:

> The indirect benefits of the CRTC's protective but critical regard for the CBC was evident, even before the Commission hearings began in Ottawa last winter. Perhaps it was coincidental, but as the hearings approached, and it became evident that critics were taking aim at the corporation, an outsider was struck by the amount of CBC material churned out to proclaim an impressive series of new departures: a fresh senior management team for the English service in Toronto; .... a new head of drama in John Hirsch; plans for a first concerted effort to mount Canadian drama and film. At times it seemed to an outsider almost as if a member of the CBC Kremlin had actually toted up the various complaints on a balance sheet, then produced a response for each. Admittedly, many of the plans for the new season had been in the works for some time. But the smell of fresh breezes was invigorating.
>
> No women annoucers, came the volley at the CRTC hearings. There's Jan Tennant reading the national news. Low grade variety programmes and a lack of vibrations from Quebec? Here's Robert Charlebois opening a new season with a one-hour special. No prestige offerings and little use of outside, independent talent? Up pop several "theme evenings," the first a smashing look at life in the Arctic with Patrick Watson. (Lewis, p 16)

Lewis' article appeared in the August 1974 issue of SATURDAY NIGHT. The search which led to the appointment of John Hirsch had been launched on 7 March 1973. The drama development plan had been completed by 29 June 1973. Jan Tennant had become the CBC's first woman staff announcer in 1970, more women were being taken on as news reporters and announcers, and Ms. Tennant had been working the weekly network program, NEWS PROFILE, prior to the hearing. The Robert Charlebois special, first proposed to the CBC in November 1972, had gone into special production feasibility study on 7 September 1973. The themed evenings had been proposed on 14 August 1973 and incorporated into the planned 1974/75 schedule during the fall of 1973.

It would be an overstatement to say that English Television couldn't have responded to the hearing input that fast if it had wanted to, but perhaps by not too much. The Planning System's responsiveness was slowed by two factors: delays in processing input (eg- holding Program Proposals for annual decision making), and the standard implementation interval of 6 to 18 months from the start of feasibility study to telecast (page 117).

The operational decision making activities of the Planning Group were organized around block program scheduling and were highly oriented towards resource constraints. One consequence of the attention to the demand/resource imbalance was the limiting of opportunities for dialogue with program area and production personnel; formal paperwork systems designed to facilitate or promote discussion replaced interpersonal communication between the Planning Group and program personnel; the Planning System responded to demands, but very slowly, and thus contributed to creative environment frustration. The extent to which the group felt able to or attempted to challenge its operational constraints was not clear.

The Management of Public Service

Service Orientation

Sections 11(a), 11(c), and 11(d) noted that the provision of shared program experiences, the recognition and portrayal of cultural groupings, and audience orientation seemed seldom dealt with in isolation or in abstract terms. Those observations can, in fact, be extended to cover the Planning Group's overall approach to service planning. The group was not unaware of the more abstract questions; it discussed those raised in the CRTC licence renewal decision with ease and confidence. But in terms of service planning, public service traditions, the native understanding of the public service role, and demands for special public broadcasting services were considered in combination with other factors within the framework of the block schedule matrix, often on a program by program basis. Requirements to introduce new program services were handled on a demand by demand basis, frequently by displacement of existing programs from the schedule.

Section 11(d) commented on the absence of middle range objectives to connect individual program objectives to the quite general goals established at the Corporate and divisional levels (page 196). It appeared, in fact, that there was relatively little attention to any such "middle level" concerns. Chapter 14 will note the absence of research on the reach of segments of the schedule such as Current Affairs service or Canadian produced drama. A Program Evaluation System had been established to measure individual program performance against objectives but there was no schedule evaluation system, and scrutiny of the output stream seemed highly informal. (In that respect, the approaches of the Planning Group and of some of the regional program managements were similar.)

The CRTC licence renewal decision raised the possibility of a more predictive approach to service planning and recommended serious consideration of policies designed to "search out and explain the long range trends in various fields that affect the future of society" (CRTC 1974b, p 51). In essence, the Commission was recommending service planning on the basis of some form of social analysis and forecasting. I am not aware of an actual model which the CBC might have considered. The suggestion would seem to have some value, but such an approach was not consistent with the existing pattern of Planning Group service planning. Identification of new concerns seemed accomplished in part by monitoring demand input, in part by consideration of program ideas advanced by producers, and in part by intuition.

Public broadcasting service planning decisions tended to be made on a program by program basis, and to be balanced against other objectives and priorities within the framework of the block program schedule "matrix."

Audience Orientation

The argument that audience orientation was considered on an operational rather than abstract basis was made in section 11(d), pages 190-201. Both mass and specialized audience considerations entered into the matrix balancing process. The argument that commercial involvement tended to shift audience orientation towards mass audiences was made in section 11(e), pages 214-217. The low level of audience research utilization was noted in section 11(d) and will be further considered in Chapter 14. It seems at least possible that the regular audience research report in use through to the end of the case study period may have contributed to the natural tendency for English Television to "imprint" on the network's major commercial competitor, CTV. The weekly panel report provided percent viewing and "Index of Enjoyment" figures for both CBC and

CTV network programs, and a comparison table of CBC and CTV prime time program audience sizes. (As indicated in Figure 14-1 in the next chapter, competitive program performance was measured both in common areas served by CTV and CBC (owned or affiliated) stations, and in common areas served by CTV and CBC owned stations.)

The Planning Group's audience orientation was to both mass and specialized audiences; CBC and affiliated station commercial revenue considerations, and possibly research reporting techniques, seemed to accentuate tendencies to focus on the "mass" audience orientation.

The Management of Creativity

The discussion of "Systems Solutions" earlier in this section noted limited exchanges between management and producers about program ideas and objectives. Section 9(e), pages 112-114, provided an outline of the theoretical and actual patterns of program development. That process was the object of curiosity on the part of the CRTC at the 1974 hearing:

> MR. BOYLE: .... [H]ow does a program get on the CBC television network?
>
> MR. PICARD: I sometimes ask myself that question. (CRTC 1974a, p 226)

Summing up his response to the question, Executive Vice President Lister Sinclair commented:

> The short answer, it is a short answer, and it is a rather hazy one, but nonetheless, the short answer is fundamentally the ideas originate at the production level and I fail to doubt at higher levels. (p 229)

The "Systems Solutions" discussion argued that frustrations in the creative environment were in part caused, and in part accentuated by, the lack of dialogue between management and production units on program ideas and creative matters. English Television's "internal" communication problems became public problems in the 1974 licence renewal process. The COT intervention reported the comments of one veteran producer:

> [The divisional Vice President] is never seen on a studio floor. If he would even, from time to time, wander through Studio 7 [in Toronto] and murmur sagely, "Mmm, colour camera, eh?" people would be enormously impressed and touched.
>
> All CBC producers get more information through the gossip columns of the Toronto papers than from superiors. That is where they get the news. (COT 1974, p 110)

The point was raised at the hearing:

> MRS. PEARCE: .... Is this a priority, that there is this sort of "in-house" communication between the creative people and the administration, so at least an idea doesn't just languish, that somebody says something about it?
>
> MR. PICARD: Yes, we say in French, and I suppose it's the same thing in English, cordonnier mal chausse, how do you say that -- a man who makes shoes usually wears very poor shoes?
>
> MR. SINCLAIR: A doctor's children are always sick.
>
> MR. PICARD: Yes, we have been very bad in internal communication.

> Let me try to look at one aspect of that which is important though. There is a kind of structural conflict in a creative organization [and] by "structural" I don't mean it's due to people, it's due to structure -- between administration and creativity. (CRTC 1974a, p 1404)

The discussion turned immediately to "public" communication, and the "structural conflict" was not considered further. Some amount of "we/they" administrative/creative tension was argued earlier to have been inevitable. But it seemed that such tension was increased by the tendency to concentrate more on the solution of problems posed by the external environment than on internal ones, and by the physical separation of the production and management groups. There was also, I think, a tendency for the Planning Group to take defensive stances towards program areas and producers regarding levels of resources allocated.

Although appreciable attention was devoted to resource problems, and although public service and audience orientation considerations were handled in combination with other objectives and priorities in operational decision making processes, deliberate attention to creative matters and to administrative/creative tension and factors accentuating that tension was limited.

e) OVERVIEW

Why was there the apparent Planning Group preoccupation with operational detail? Why the "distraction" from service planning and internal creative matters? Was it something peculiar to the environment, or structures, or process of the CBC or of the Planning Group? Certainly there were unique aspects to the group's situation, but the fundamental "policy" questions which the group seemed to confront so infrequently would seem to be classic dilemmas facing all broadcasters. This section, like its equivalent in Chapter 12, draws from Anthony Smith's THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE. Smith writes:

> One simple and perhaps obvious problem bedevils all broadcasting. The broadcaster reaches a vast and incoherent audience, the entire audience which the geography of the wavelength permits. When he has reached it he has created a source of power for himself which no society can possibly allow him to wield without supervision or control. If the instrument is used for means of clear personal expression, the position of the broadcaster is socially unacceptable. If it is used merely to create the maximum audience the product becomes culturally and ultimately politically unacceptable. Under the weight of this problem the structure of the ethics which is believed to be skeletal to twentieth-century culture -- that of individual and artistic freedom -- simply disintegrates. Broadcasting therefore either takes place on a territory of enforced neutrality which becomes intellectually meaningless or it becomes a tyranny. When it finds a level of taste at which it can successfully aggregate its audience it becomes culturally valueless; when it occupies a higher ground in a spirit of dedicated intellectual exclusiveness it fails in its purpose of serving the entire society. Those are the horns of the broadcasting dilemma. (Smith 1973, pp 15-6)

The riddle of the masses, the question of taking a lead, and the problems of ensuring freedom of expression are all, I suggest, matters of balance. The use of balancing mechanisms such as the block schedule matrix may not, therefore, be inappropriate. But there would seem to be requirements to use such mechanisms very carefully, and not to assume that they will automatically react to changing conditions in society.

There would seem also to be a requirement for studied consideration of program service content, if only to compensate for the fact, noted by Philip Elliott, that "although the professional communicator has gradually emerged as a new-style intellectual in society, the tendency is for him to be preoccupied with the form rather than the content of communication." Elliott added: "On the other hand, those who are preoccupied with content are not likely to achieve access to the form" (page 22).

At the 1974 hearing Dr. Fred Rainsberry suggested that the problems of keeping the broadcasting organization "in touch" with its society had been compounded in the case of the CBC:

> .... The difficulty, it seems to me, has been that the CBC has not had sufficient funds and opportunity to deepen its awareness of the social process and contemporary attitudes among Canadians. There have been attempts in the past to do this, and I believe the conviction is there, but owing to the many pressures that are upon them to meet the filling of a schedule with the limited resources available to them, they have not been able to do so. (CRTC 1974a, p 358)

The "requirement" to be in touch is, in fact, a responsibility. The content of the media constitutes a media definition of reality. Harold Innis suggested that the fundamental form of social power is the power to define what reality is (page 31). The only responsible approach for a public broadcasting organization is to make its media definition of reality as true a reflection of current social conditions and trends as possible.

f) COMMENTS

Structural Implications

The specific "dilemma" facing the English Television Planning Group would seem to have been as follows: the group was concentrating on the making of operational decisions; the demand/resource imbalance made that attention to "constraints" understandable, but there was a resulting distraction from service and -- especially -- creative matters; there was a special responsibility to pay close attention to and carefully shape service content; there was a practical requirement to tend to creative matters; but the Planning Group was already working under communication or information overload conditions.

There have been changes in both the size and membership of the Planning Group since 1974 so, at first glance, there would appear to be little purpose in considering specific structural solutions. But I suggest that structural solutions alone would not have solved the basic problems anyway.

- It may be that the existing arrangement was optimum; any other appropriate structural form would have required additional people at some level and would have been more costly.
- The communication overload might have been eased through a partial separation of network and local station matters, possibly through adding to the size of the Planning Group or its support staff.
- Some further delegation of operational decision making and/or resource allocation responsibility may have been possible. That would seem to imply increasing the size of the overall management structure, though not necessarily at the Plannning Group level. Note that complete delegation of service, creative, or resource decision making was not consistent with the group's balancing role.
- The structural arrangement with audience research might have changed to give Research a greater role in service decision making, though the limited Planning Group/Research communication seemed to result more from the group's own communication overload than from organizational separation.

- The Planning Group might have been enlarged (had its information processing capacity increased) so as to permit increased attention to service and creative matters.
- Since the problem was compounded by the demand/resource imbalance, beginning to deal with that imbalance was one long term solution which I will argue below deserved serious consideration.
- The other solution which I will argue held promise was tackling the communication overload problem itself -- to try to free some "think time" for service and creative matters.

Structural changes might have eased the communication overload, but I suggest that changes in public and internal communication were also required, at the Planning Group level and above.

Public Orientation

From the transcript of the final day of the 1974 hearing:

MRS. PEARCE: .... Have you, in all these priorities and objectives and strategy and tactics -- I've never, you know, been a general -- for instance, have you put in there anywhere, in resources or environment, the problem of communication? And I don't mean communication via programming, I mean communication to Canada about the CBC. (CRTC 1974a, p 1403)

MR. PICARD: There is a problem of communication. One of the things that struck me in the past, and it was almost a philosophy in the Corporation that you don't communicate .... you don't communicate externally about what the CBC is.

MRS. PEARCE: This is really what I was leading up to, which is from my point of view, as a member of the public, in some ways much more important than what you do in-house.

Can we go to that external thing then, because it seemed to me a lot of the thrust that we've been talking about this week had to do with the fact that a great many people, for one reason or another, really didn't know what the CBC was doing. (p 1405)

.... I am talking about the business of the CBC letting people know what it was about, and we've heard that. We have heard another brief presented here, by saying, why not level with us, give us a chance, give the country a chance to help. (p 1406)

MR. PICARD: .... We have recognized this problem, both internally and externally.... It's not only a problem in this communication, it has almost been a desire not to communicate very often. And we are trying to work on that, both internally and externally. I think we had the proof yesterday by listening to some of the producers, that our internal communications are not very good. They are not very good externally either, and I am going to say something which will look like a Harvard Business School graduate syndrome: we have hired a vice-president of public relations. You know, I just walk close to the wall when I am near producers and they know that we have hired a vice-president of public relations.

But there was a feeling that if the program was on the air, that's our job, and we've done a poor job of communication, internally, externally, in every direction.

MRS. PEARCE: This is interesting, because it's not only public relations, I think it's just straight delivery, of being honest with the people who own the thing. Tell them, these are the facts. You know, we are not making excuses, but this is just what happens. (pp 1407-8)

Perhaps a revitalized Public Relations department was required. The Corporation had, for instance, as economy measures, discontinued publication of first CBC TIMES, a combined program guide and magazine about the CBC, and then SELECT, which replaced CBC TIMES but provided program notes only. There was thus no possible regular direct print communication between the CBC and interested members of the public. Advertising space purchased in magazines was used to promote individual programs. This was in contrast to the US situation where both CPB and PBS produced an inexpensive but professional weekly newsletter outlining developments in their sectors of public broadcasting, and where individual stations produced combined program guides and station magazines to encourage subscription contributions. It seems possible that those members of the Canadian public who so missed CBC TIMES might have been especially important to the long range financial welfare of the Corporation. Clearly, it is not appropriate for a public institution to spend vast amounts of money trying to convince the public that the institution needs more money, but the CBC was far from approaching that point. In discussing the public relations of the CBC in 1951, the Massey Commission had observed that "the inadequate information service of the CBC is also at fault, and equally the indifference of listeners who enjoy or resent their fare in silence. The reticence of the CBC matches the passivity of its audience and results in widespread ignorance of an essential national service" (Massey, p 41).

During the early years of CBC television, the Corporation occasionally programmed about itself. Typically, these programs were connected with further extension of service; I recall, for instance, the special program in which CBC President Alphonse Ouimet inaugurated the last link of the trans-Canada CBC microwave facilities. In 1973, the Prime Minister officially opened Maison de Radio-Canada in Montreal. The ceremony was carried live on the French network, but not on English Television; it was, in fact, not even reported in the network's news that day. That example illustrates the extent to which the Corporation's activities, its senior officers, and -- notably -- its Board of Directors, the public's representatives, had become invisible to the public. For all practical purposes, Laurent Picard became a "public" figure during the 1974 licence renewal hearing; he had become President of the CBC in 1972. (His successor broke a "self imposed vow of silence" about ten months after taking office.)

[The following personal comments refer to the CBC as a whole; it seemed to me that the English Television Planning Group was not in a position to initiate a change in the general character of the relationship between the CBC and the public on its own, though the character of the existing relationship contributed very directly to the group's basic problems.]

I have argued that the Corporation as a whole was defensive and conservative; I have tried to show that such characteristics were understandable and not unique to Canadian public broadcasting. I have argued that day to day operations were inevitably highly visible to the public. And I think that Pat Pearce was right, and that one of the main things revealed by the 1974 hearing was that "a great many people, for one reason or another, really didn't know what the CBC was doing." (The Corporation at least realized that week that the CRTC wasn't particularly well informed.)

I personally don't believe that it is reasonable to expect Public Relations departments to solve the CBC's basic problems. They can help, but it seems to me that first a basic management reorientation to the public is required. If the "demand/resource imbalance" problem or the problem of commercial "constraints" is ever going to be resolved, it seems to me that the CBC as a Corporate entity has little choice but to become much more open with the Canadian people. As Pat Pearce said, "I think it's just straight delivery, being honest with the people who own the thing. Tell them, these are the facts." Keeping the door open would seem to be the safest way to live in a glass house.

What seemed required was not a minor adjustment but a fundamental reorientation. The invisibility of the CBC Board, both to the public and to the Corporation's own employees was striking. Commissioner Shanski noted that Board members were not in attendance at the public hearing (CRTC 1974a, pp 1457-8). The contrast to the US situation is striking: meetings of the Board of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting are now open to the general public, a Presidential nomination to the CPB Board was turned down in 1975 as a result of public opposition, and citizens' groups are increasingly demanding and getting general public representation on the boards of individual public television stations. Both CPB and individual station now have citizens' advisory committees similar to that proposed by NABET for the CBC (CRTC 1974b, prt 2, p 30).

Figure 13-1.

CBC SYMBOL, 1974



The thrust of these US developments has been to counter what has been termed the "transmitter fixation" of broadcasting organizations. The physical broadcasting of programs is a one way process, but I suggest there is a pressing need for feedback to public broadcasting institutions. In 1974 the CBC adopted a new logosign: "The new symbol evolves from the initial letter 'C' for Canada, expanding in every direction. The 'C' represents the core of the broadcasting source, emphasizing that our national service, owned by the people of Canada, represents the primary element in the Canadian broadcasting system. The symbol is visually weighted to the center and lightens as it radiates to the perimeter. In its full color version the symbol is red (at the center) and moves outward in radiations of dark orange, light orange, and yellow" (CBC 1974e, p 5; emphasis added). The new CBC symbol, reproduced in Figure 13-1, has already been criticized quite enough, but it does seem appropriate to observe that public broadcasting should involve more than the outward radiation of programming from a central source. I don't think the symbol need be changed, but its conceptual limitations should be recognized.

The openness which I am advocating involves the CBC, first of all, in telling Canadians much more about itself -- in telling the truth and telling it early, and in trusting the intelligence of the people of the country. A periodic "report to the shareholders" program, for instance, would not seem totally inappropriate. In addition, the Corporation must both become perceived to be and actually be open to feedback. In that connection, I think that informing the public is both the CBC's only means of escape from its own defensiveness and conservatism and one of the most promising means of strengthening its own morale. And, like Smith, I believe that such openness is a responsibility:

> Broadcasting will inevitably remain in the hands of large and powerful bodies who will continue to act as giant impressarios and considerable employers in the future as in the past. Broadcasting, in all its main streams, will stay in the hands of the tiny unelected elite of professionals whose knowledge and understanding of their mass clientele will be the mesh through which most of the messages have to pass. There is no way of avoiding this. The real question of 'access' therefore resolves itself into one of access to the interest and good judgement of the professionals who mediate the entire process. It is the broadcasters' minds that have to be opened up, their working practices, their own personal outlooks on life.
>
> The chains of responsibility within broadcasting are the conveyor belts on which the programmes and messages for mass dissemination are prepared. The open society is one which is able freely to feed its communication spare parts into that

> assembly system. Broadcasters and producers need to become a breed who cease to look inwards to their institutions and its codes, but take their own honest sounding of their own social environments as a path towards repersonalizing the mass audience whose features they have never truly examined. New rules and regulations, new rights and privileges will only go a short distance along the route to a free broadcasting system; the general consciousness and self-awareness of those who occupy positions of responsibility within broadcasting is the real area of contact between society and mass communicator. (Smith 1973, pp 284-5)

Internal Orientation

Internal Communication

In 1974 the CBC still occupied some facilities taken over in 1936 from the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, which had taken them over in 1932 from the Canadian National Railways radio department. The CN radio department had been established in 1923 on the orders of the new company President, Sir Henry Thornton. "Sir Henry didn't see radio primarily as a commercial medium. He had just taken over an agglomeration of bankrupt railways and he hoped strongly that the thousands of railway employees ... now working for a new company called Canadian National ... could be given a sense of common purpose through union and inspiration by means of radio" (CBC 1969). The 1974 public discussion of the CBC's internal communication and morale problems seemed, to me at least, a bit ironic.

Very early in my Toronto fieldwork period I made an attempt to focus the attention of the Planning Group on what I termed "internal communication" problems. They were problems which had struck me as significant during my two periods of work in program units -- periods when I felt I knew alarmingly little about the CBC and how I was supposed to fit in. I found the pattern of internal communication striking, not so much because I was a communication research student, but rather because it contrasted so sharply with the patterns I had observed within IBM and its customer companies. While at IBM Canada headquarters, one of my primary responsibilities had been to help maintain effective routine internal communication. We were involved in producing films and video tapes and booklets and newsletters and in leasing lines so that senior management could speak simultaneously to all employees in all company offices across Canada. Some of this internal communication was profesional; most of it was "fast and dirty." There was a company magazine, an employee's handbook, and a series of progressively more specialized newsletters -- some technical, some reporting on personnel changes, some on innovative solutions to problems developed by branch employees. Special materials were sometimes prepared for use in the regular branch office meetings. There were two basic objectives: to ensure that employees had the routine information they needed to do their jobs (so that they were aware of new developments and potential problems and so that they didn't have to spend excessive amounts of time "tracking down" basic information), and to give them some sense of what the company they worked for was all about. A "speak up" program for general complaints, a funded suggestion program, and an "open door" management policy were part of the larger pattern. The approach was essentially that of the "human relations" or "human resources" schools of management (Goldhaber, pp 49-90).

Within the CBC there was one general "house organ" for management, production, technical, office, and support personnel, an engineering journal, and occasional notices of senior management appointments. There was, for instance, no newsletter for producers, either regular or irregular; general meetings of all employees in a given area were exceptional; and -- perhaps most striking -- no use of the Corporation's extensive film, video tape, or live transmission facilities for internal communication. (During 1975 the Corporation produced a film about itself for new employees.) Most information came to producers from memos transmitted down through the formal line management structure, from "the grapevine," or from the newspapers.

I drafted some proposals for improving internal communication and passed them to a friend for comment. They were returned with a note: "Bombs should be explosive, so O.K. But not paragraph 4. Experience elsewhere is unpopular." Much later I came to recognize the perceptiveness and truth of the comment. At the time I simply accepted the advice, deleted the "paragraph 4" references to IBM, and submitted my proposals without reference to "experience elsewhere." They were referred to the division's Public Relations department. I dropped my personal crusade.

The press release announcing the intention of the Committee on Television to file an intervention for the 1974 licence renewal hearing contained the charge that "the role of the producer as a creative individual has been seriously undermined within the CBC" (COT 1973, p 1). Investigation of this particular charge was "farmed out" to an Assistant Area Head, who concluded that "there is insufficient and faulty communication between producers and all levels of management." The hearing discussion of the point raised in the COT intervention was reviewed earlier.

Both the decentralization of production and the scattering of facilities in Toronto, in particular the physical separation of management from producers, created special internal communications problems for English Television. But why was there apparently no deliberate focus on internal communication?

- It may be that the problem was not recognized.
- If it was recognized, the perception of the CBC as a unique organization may have ruled approaches known to be in use elsewhere as inappropriate.
- There may have been some concern for unfairly raising the expectations of employees.
- The possibility of adding to the communication overload may have been recognized.
- More likely, the communication overload itself may have prevented spending much time on the problem.
- Also likely, some direct cost expenditures were no doubt recognized as required.
- Most likely, the fact that solving the problem would take time, both initially and on a continuing basis, was recognized.

Earlier I suggested several possibilities for dealing with the Planning Group communication overload which I observed, and commented that some combination, rather than a single change, seemed required. It seemed to me that the group's overload was caused in part by requirements to provide over and over on an individual basis essentially the same information, and that, if that information could be systematically distributed on a routine basis, the effort required would be less than that required under the existing circumstances, and thus justified. It seemed to me that the danger of adding to the communication load was remote. But it also seemed that the establishment of at least one regular channel of information flow from management to producers would have begun to ease the "we/they" estrangement of creative personnel from management. Cost justifying such benefits is difficult, but I think they were important.

Personnel Development

At the public hearing Commissioner Gordon Hughes asked about the development of the CBC's human resources, and about creative renewal. Laurent Picard's response, in part, was as follows:

> We have to look at turnover, we have to look at the retiring perspective of people, we have to look at the schedule of jobs or skills.... But there isn't an infinite number of possibilities there. Basically, we have to retrain. (CRTC 1974a, p 182)

> The excitement about the first group of [French Services Division] producers who went on sabbaticals is incredible. People have changed their careers, they are seeing their jobs in a new light.... It is not necessarily financial at the start, but in fact, finance of the Corporation was so pressed .... that a large amount of money will have to be spent which has always been cut every year.... In that, I am talking about a real large thing, four or five million dollars, just to renew people to give them a chance to think.... (pp 183-4)
>
> You don't solve the problem of human resources in a year or two. It's a long, very tough process.... You know, creativity is a hell of a complex thing.... (p 185)
>
> The human resource situation is one of the weaker points of the Corporation. (p 188)

Picard had stressed the same theme in an address to the European Broadcasting Union in Brussels in 1972:

> If television is going to survive during its fourth phase ... the power and leadership structure must also change for the third time. Since what matters now is the quality of the product and since differentiation will be based on the product, leadership must be organized around the creative workers. It is therefore essential ... to develop an internal strategy to enable producers, creative artists and program originators to play an increasingly important part in shaping the destinies of the Corporation. In other words, we must develop new channels of of communication and decision-making which will give a larger place to the role of creators and producers and foster the development of producers so that they may participate in decision-making within the new structure.
>
> In the past, we have not gone far enough in this direction. We must redefine the role and career of producers.... The CBC will clearly have to develop new procedures for training producers which have little reference to conventional management structures. (CBC 1972b, p 15)

About a year later, the Corporation's Executive Vice President, also in a public address, noted "the problem of promoting people in the artistic line, people in the production line like myself." He continued:

> I fortunately had been doing a lot of work in administration. But very often, people who are good producers are promoted to administrators and not given one shred of training. So, there is no sense of expectation of what is called for from them. And so, we have the famous curious sense of tension. There is within our organization, as within similar organizations, a morale problem. The administrators feel they don't understand producers. The producers feel they don't understand the adminstrators, and these feelings are reciprocated in all directions as far as the eye can see. My first perception is that everybody is right. (CBC 1973f, p 7)

Why play these 1972 and 1973 addresses back to the CBC? Because the analyses seemed correct but, at least at the end of the case study period in 1974, the problems weren't being solved, and conditions seemed more like those the Senate Committee had found in the media in Canada in general in 1970, when it noted "the industry's astoundingly offhand approach to recruitment and personnel development," and commented: "The news business is above all a 'people' business. But if IBM had been as unconcerned about the kind of people it attracts and the conditions under which they work, it would still be making adding machines" (Davey 1970a, p 10).

In many ways the CBC is a unique organization. The demands made on the organization are uniquely Canadian and unique within Canada. But it is an organization, and, like all other organizations, it must derive support from its environment and strength from within, from its people. It needs both, and in that respect it is far from unique. In 1974 its President agreed, but noted an essential distinction between creative and other organizations:

> I have heard many time since I have been in the Corporation that broadcasting is different from anything else; but it substantially follows the pattern of any kind of undertaking or organization.... (CTRC 1974a, pp 11-2)
>
> .... A good teacher in mathematics can be a good teacher in first year mathematics for the rest of his life. He might not be a very good teacher in a seminar in mathematics, but he might be a good teacher for the rest of his life in first year of mathematics.
>
> In broadcasting, it is very different and creativity is a much more elusive thing than a high skill in electronics and knowledge in electronics or a good teaching ability at the level of first year of college or second year of college. It is much more elusive. (p 181)

Because the CBC is an organization, it shares certain characteristics with other organizations. One is dependence on its people. Another is a need to maintain appropriate internal communication flows. In those respects it would seem that experience elsewhere may well be relevant and helpful. Public broadcasting in the United States, for instance, has had some experience with training programs to improve management skills in dealing with both common practical problems and with people (NAEB 1975b). There seemed to be outstanding requirements for such training at virtually all levels of the CBC. Other organizations have found means to ease communication overload problems, and such problems were clearly present within the CBC.

Because the CBC is a creative organization, its people are of much greater importance to it than in any industrial organization. This seemed to be recognized occasionally, but just that.

I think that constraints are fully capable of following Parkinson's law and consuming all available time and energy, and thus leading, in a vicious circle, to further constraints. In a sense, Chapter 12 argued that this had happened to the CBC at the Corporate level, and when the political environment asked the CBC to stretch, it did. Above I argued that the only real means of escape from that vicious circle was for the Corporation to become very open with the Canadian people, and that in the long run the effort required would be justified. Changes in internal orientation also seemed required at that level, and at successive levels below. Unlike a change in external orientation, however, it seemed to me that an internal reorientation could be initiated at any level -- at the divisional level, at the Planning Group level, or at the program area level. The relevant skills could be acquired, the resources could be provided by cutting back service slightly if necessary, and the time could be freed by some combination of delegation, structural change, and saying "no" to additional demands. I suspect that the lack of apparent concern for the internal wellbeing of the CBC derived in part from external defensiveness and conservatism -- from attempting to satisfy more demands that were practical under the circumstances, and in part from a transfer of defensiveness to internal relationships and of conservatism to internal management.

The internal requirement was for a commitment to the CBC's most stretched resources, its people, and to the consolidation of the minds and attitudes and feelings of which Norman Campbell spoke so eloquently.

Chapter 14

Communication Research Utilization

As explained at the beginning of Chapter 2, it is convenient if not essential to distinguish between research conducted within the mass media and about them. This look at research utilization is similarly divided: section 14(a) deals in general terms with the overall role of communication research, other than technological research, in Canada; section 14(b) deals with the utilization of communication research, principally audience research, within CBC English Television. Both sections contribute to the development of the roles for research suggested in section 14(c).

a) COMMUNICATION RESEARCH IN CANADA

Environmental Characteristics

Needs, Requirements, and Expectations

Chapter 12 argued that by the end of the case study period there existed a need for a comprehensive review of public broadcasting policy in Canada. Conditions in the Canadian broadcasting environment had changed (and were continuing to change) to such an extent as to dictate a new role for the CBC. The government's 1973 Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada noted the impact of cable: "The traditional framework of control of Canadian broadcasting has been distorted in recent years by the phenomenal growth of the cable-television industry, and Canada is one of the most heavily cabled countries per capita in the world" (Green Paper, p 19). The CBC's scheduling practices and policy on commercials were the subjects of debate in 1974, but the basic issue was the appropriate future role of the national broadcasting service.

There appeared to be a clear need for a wide range of communication research to guide policy development and interpretation in the rapidly changing Canadian broadcasting environment.

There appeared to be a need for organizational research: structural changes such as dividing the CBC into two components were suggested, and the regulatory agency proposed some structural mechanisms such as special development funds for CBC consideration. Beyond that, as argued in Chapter 12, there was a need for communication analysis of the broadcasting support and control system itself -- to consider why the policy interpretation and development system had become deadlocked. There also appeared to be a need for a wide range of related audience, program content, and further viewing pattern studies to determine the best strategy for strengthening the overall Canadian broadcasting system and to guide interpretation of the CBC's programming role within that system.

The articulated requirements for communication research were minimal, and the level of expectation of significant research contributions in broadcasting policy development and interpretation was not high.

At the beginning of the case study period, a study prepared for the Davey Committee had noted the need for more than ratings research, and it described existing conditions:

> Large sums are expended each year to find out what Canadians are watching and listening to by such organizations as the Bureau of Broadcast Measurement, Nielsen Ratings, the CBC Research Department, trade associations, and ad hoc audience studies sponsored by advertising agencies and individual stations.
>
> Quantitative measurement of broadcast audiences has thus been well-served, but Canadian research into the qualitative aspect of programming has been minimal. It appears that very little money is being spent to determine why Canadians tune in to a particular program or to study the sociological implications of programme content.
>
> The situation in the United States is sharply different. Most major American universities have ongoing research programs, many financed by grants from the national networks.
>
> Studies of this nature have had a significant effect on program content, particularly in the recent move to de-emphasize violence on television. The lead in the United States was taken by academics who initiated original research on an unsponsored basis. The networks subsequently saw the value of this work and in addition to providing funds for further research, applied many of the findings to their own programming. The greater emphasis on news and information programming is attributed in part to a wider appreciation of television's potential as revealed by sociological and communications research. (Davey 1970b, p 446)

The Davey Committee's own report called on the CRTC to "match your technical research with depth research into the social implications of broadcast programming," but the comments it directed to universities dealt only with the teaching of journalism and television arts (Davey 1970a, pp 258-9).

In 1971 the Department of Communications reported in INSTANT WORLD on suggestions which had been made at its "Telecommission" seminars:

> A recommendation that emerged from all the seminar discussions was that consideration should be given to the establishment of some kind of Institute for Communications Research; the Arts Seminar more specifically recommended a Creative Communications Centre. Participants were wary of what was called the "almost inevitable bureaucratization of any institute" and wanted it to be free from governmental control, perhaps in the form of a 'think-tank'. However formed or named, its function would be to conduct both pure and mission-oriented research into the the communications environment, and to criticize policies developed by government and industry, while perhaps performing an additional role as a source of trained manpower. (DOC, p 38)

But such calls for an expansion of Canadian communication research activity were relatively isolated, and the government's 1973 position paper on communication policy made no reference to research.

Support

Financial support of communication research, other than ratings and technological research, was minimal.

The 1970 study for the Davey Committee commented on the level of research activity, and contrasted it to the US situation:

> The relatively small number of research papers available and the absence of any industry sponsored activities would suggest that both industry and the academic community have been less than aggressive in their approach to the question of program content and its sociological implications....
>
> According to John E. Twomey, director of communications at Ryerson Polytechnical Institute in Toronto and a former CBC staff member, Canadian academicians have not displayed a similar interest in communications research and few universities have adequate facilities for such studies. He points out, however, that Canadian broadcasters do not seem to have made any strenuous effort to encourage the academic community to undertake research in the field. No formal system of research grants is maintained by either private or public broadcasting interests on an individual or a collective basis. (Davey 1970b, pp 446-7)

During the 1970-1974 period there were increases in research activity. The CRTC, empowered by the Broadcasting Act to "undertake, sponsor, promote or assist in research relating to any aspect of broadcasting" (Act, s 18.1), undertook and underwrote research dealing with the impact of mass communication on various sectors of the society (eg-children, ethnic groups, and consumers) and with the nature and functions of Canadian production and programming -- principally to support the policy making and planning activities of the Commission itself (CRTC 1974c, p 62). Only a small proportion of the results were published. Additional studies were conducted by and for the Department of Communications, and the number of provincial governments, universities, and public policy development institutes undertaking communication studies continued to grow throughout the period. The Canada Council expanded its list of regularly supported doctoral research areas to include communication studies, and the Institute for Research on Public Policy announced a project to examine existing communication policy "levers." Extensive technological research programs were undertaken by the federal government, by industry, and in universities; both the latter were assisted by government grants (DOC, p 104). However, in surveying communication research in Canada as a whole at the end of the case study period, there remained a notable absence of critical policy research on the mass media, and there was little indication of significantly greater support for such work in the future.

Structural and Utilization Process Characteristics

Communication research activity was highly decentralized and, to some extent, uncoordinated.

In 1971 DOC reported on the nature of communication research activity in Canadian universities:

> Government-sponsored university research projects are sometimes initiated by the department or agency making the grant. More often, however, the initiative comes from a particular scientist or group of scientists working on problems that may be special or general interest in relation to government policy. While grants for such projects undertaken by individual scientists seldom exceed $15,000, assistance is also provided for larger projects [including technological research] undertaken by groups of scientists, which may extend over many years and involve grants up to as much as $1 million in all.
>
> In Canadian universities, several factors have tended to militate against the establishment of research teams for important long-term projects and their economical operation. The relatively narrow interest of the academic researcher may shift to another subject when he has attained some personal objective in a research project, although its continuation might be extremely valuable in the public interest. Movement from one university to another, which is frequent among younger scientists, may also entail a change in the direction of research. These

> conditions do not apply to the same extent in research institutions or agencies that have no academic affiliation. But, although student participation in research is not always conducive to economy in time or expenditure, its educational value is so important as to justify consideration of means to improve the extent and continuity of government-aided communications research in Canadian universities. (DOC, pp 109-10)

The Department also noted an existing lack of coordination and of information sharing:

> An expressed majority view [in Telecommission seminars] was that some form of communications information service should be established. It is a cliche to say so, but those involved in communications are conspicuously poor communicators. Most of the 400 or so participants in the seminars were strangers to each other, and there was a consensus that an information service would link all those in the field into a larger collectivity, in addition to the obvious benefits of a centralized store of information and the elimination of duplication in research. (p 38)
>
> From all the evidence, it appears that there is no easy way for a communications researcher in one discipline to find out about related work going on in others, and it is surprising that no more than 13 [of 135] respondents [to a DOC research needs questionnaire] proposed an obviously needed clearing-house for information about current communications research, which might perhaps be responsible for publishing some kind of periodical or newsletter. (p 104)

After the close of the case study period, DOC's Communications Research Centre undertook to establish a timely information service to answer the obvious need for a Canadian Communication Research clearinghouse.

Utilization of communication research in broadcasting policy development and interpretation was minimal.

Case study observations permit comment on research utilization in two settings: within English Television, and in the 1974 CRTC licence renewal process. Section 14(b) will note that utilization of communication research other than audience research within English Television was extremely limited. Communication research input to the licence renewal process was similarly limited. Mary Van Stolk's submission, noted in Chapter 10, made the only specific references to communication research other than audience research observed during the case study period. The CBC presented some public opinion survey results at the hearing, but even audience research (eg- viewing patterns research) made little effective contribution to a better understanding of the positions taken by the CBC, the CRTC, or the intervenors. As noted in sections 11(a) and 11(d), there was disagreement about the importance of the "lead-in" effect in program scheduling, but no evidence was cited either to support or dispute its importance.

Analysis

Given the changed and still changing Canadian broadcasting environment, there was an opportunity to conduct a wide range of communications research investigations and an opportunity for such research to guide policy development and interpretation. But only a limited amount of research, mostly audience size measurement, was undertaken, and even that had a limited impact on the public deliberations on the future role of the national broadcasting service.

Section 15(c) will argue that if that situation is to change, it will have to be substantially on the basis of initiatives taken by researchers themselves.

b) COMMUNICATION RESEARCH IN CBC ENGLISH TELEVISION

The Case Study Situation

The research which forms the basis for this look at the CBC and the public was not originally undertaken as an institutional case study. Throughout the first six months of the fieldwork period, attempts to proceed with the originally proposed study of the network Program Evaluation System continued. Those attempts were eventually abandoned when it became clear that the prospects for changing that system -- for moving it from virtually total reliance on subjective opinion towards more effective use of audience research data and techniques -- were not encouraging.

The second study which was contemplated had its origins in the problems experienced in attempting to launch the Evaluation System research. The research design was extremely simple. We had found that producers of network programs were being asked each year to describe the target audiences for their programs in formal Program Proposals, that these producers received no audience composition (demographic) information about the audiences reached by their or other CBC programs, and that, although it was being distributed neither to production nor to management personnel, detailed audience composition information was being compiled on a weekly basis from data gathered by the Research department's Audience Panel system. We hypothesized that if we could arrange to have this audience research information distributed in a readily understandable form to producers, it would influence their thinking about their audiences and potential audiences as reflected in the target audiences specified in their Program Proposals. Towards this end, and with the cooperation of the Research department and the Planning Group, in April 1973 the "objectives" section of the Program Proposal document was revised to ask producers to provide more detailed descriptions of the composition of the target audiences for their programs. It was not possible to complete this second study for two reasons: only very limited attempts were made by management either to encourage or require more critical thinking about target audiences and, at the end of the fieldwork period in September 1974, the system for distributing audience composition data to producers still had not begun operation.

My own personal frustrations about the level of research utilization within the CBC were, however, somewhat offset by my earlier experiences in public broadcasting audience research in the United States, by continuing contact with a research colleague at PBS, and by the reporting of Halloran and his associates on similar research utilization problems in Britain and other countries.

As explained in the Introduction and in Chapter 2, especially in section 2(d), page 28, research diffusion and utilization are problems in a wide range of institutions and seem to be especially severe problems in public broadcasting organizations. The CBC situation, though far from satisfactory or encouraging from a communication researcher's point of view, was at least far from unique.

It should be pointed out that my perspective was that of an outsider. Although work on the Program Evaluation System, on the reviews of that system and of the Audience Panel system reporting format, on revising the target audience section of the Program Proposal, and my own interests brought me into contact with the Toronto component of the Research department, I was attached not to it but to the English Television Planning Group. The comments which follow are, therefore, based on much less than full time observation.

It should also be noted that my own role was not that of a neutral observer. As noted above (and in detail in section 8(d), pages 96-103), I was actively attempting to

Figure 11-4. CBC AUDIENCE PANEL ANALYSIS REPORT FORMAT

DAY DATE TIME	PROGRAM NAME PROGRAM CONTENT SUMMARY	NETWORK CONFIGURATION: -Full network, -"Available" program, or -CBC owned stations only

Audience Composition Categories	TOTAL SAMPLE				ADULTS	
	ENJ BASE	AUD SIZE	AUD COMP	.... etc. *(See below)*	ENJ BASE	.... etc.
TOTAL SAMPLE						
ADULT MEN ADULT WOMEN AGE 12-17 18-35 35-49 50 +						
STILL AT SCHOOL GRADE SCHOOL SOME HIGH SCHOOL COMPLETE HIGH SCHOOL UNIVERSITY						
EAST TOTAL WEST TOTAL EAST ADULT MEN WEST ADULT MEN ONTARIO ONTARIO (CTV) TORONTO AREA						
METRO OTHER URBAN RURAL						
ONE STATION RECEIVED 2+ STATIONS RECEIVED 2 STNS ONLY RECEIVED 3+ STATIONS RECEIVED						

*For each **Audience** Composition Category:*

-ENJ BASE (Enjoyment Base): "Index" sample size

-AUD SIZE (Audience Size): percent viewing or "rating"

-AUD COMP (Audience Composition): percent of program's total audience made up by that composition category

-(*"Index of Enjoymnet" components: percent of total for each of 5 possible responses*)

- -ENJOY VERY MUCH
- -ENJOY QUITE A BIT
- -ALL RIGHT, NOT BAD
- -DIDN'T ENJOY TOO MUCH
- -DIDN'T ENJOY AT ALL

-INDEX: weighted overall "Index of Enjoyment"

As explained for TOTAL SAMPLE at left:

-ENJ BASE

-PER CENT VIEW

-AUD COMP

-INDEX

Composition Categories for Special Coverage Area Analysis	SPECIAL COVERAGE AREA ANALYSIS					
	TOTAL			METRONET .... etc. *(See below)*		
	BASE	VIEWING	.... etc.	BASE	VIEWING	.... etc.
MALE 12-17 18-34 35-49 50 + ADULT TOTAL						
FEMALE 12-17 18-34 35-49 50 + ADULT TOTAL						
TOTAL 12-17 18-34 35-49 50 + ADULT TOTAL						
HAVE COLOUR TV NO COLOUR TV						

-BASE (Enjoyment Base)

-VIEWING (Percent Viewing)

-COMP (Audience Composition)

-INDEX ("Index of Enjoymnet")

BASE, VIEWING, COMP, & INDEX *for three Special Coverage Area Categories:*

-METRONET: areas served by CBC owned and operated stations

-CTV/CBC: common areas served by both CTV and CBC (owned or affiliated) stations

-CTV/METRONET: common areas served by CTV and by CBC owned stations

Notes: 1. This figure is a condensed and notated representation of two 15 inch wide pages of computer printed information. Each 2 page report consists of 719 individual (though somewhat overlapping) "line by column" entries.

2. See text for an explanation of the "Index of Enjoyment."

alter the research utilization patterns within the Program Evaluation System and within the Planning Group.

Research Activity

CBC Research operated two Audience Panel systems, one for English Television, one for French. English panel respondents, of whom some 2,500 provided information each week, were selected on a probability sampling basis to be representative of all persons in Canada with access to television, aged 12 and over, whose main language of communication at home was English. To minimize respondent conditioning, all contacts with respondents were made through an independent field company to avoid disclosing CBC involvement. The panel was systematically "rotated," with a proportion of the members being retired and a new probability sub-sample substituted each week. Panel members kept daily records of their CBC and CTV viewing and answered other questions about reactions to programs and program elements.

The main source of audience research information within English Television was the weekly summary report based on the Audience Panel system data. This report provided two commonly used indicators of program performance: the program's rating (percent viewing), and an "Index of Enjoyment." This index was calculated on the basis of responses to the question, "How did you feel about this particular broadcast today?" The possible responses, and their weighting factors, were: "I enjoyed it very much" (5); "I enjoyed it quite a bit" (3); "It was all right, not bad" (2); "I didn't enjoy it too much" (1); and "I didn't enjoy it at all" (0). It is important to note that the weekly reports did not regularly contain audience composition data or a breakdown of the Index of Enjoyment components.

Detailed audience composition information and the components of the Index were available in a computer generated "Panel Analysis" report but, as noted earlier, these detailed audience reports were not distributed either to producers or to managers. On occasion this information formed the basis for comments in the narrative portion of the weekly report, but it should be noted that the comments were prepared at Head Office and not by the researchers stationed at ESD headquarters in Toronto.

In their existing format, the detailed Panel Analysis reports would seem to have been too detailed for unassisted analysis by producers; the volume of detailed data (on a weekly, program by program basis) was undoubtedly excessive for effective anlaysis by management. Figure 14-1 provides an outline of the content of these reports and is intended to indicate the type and range of audience information yielded by the Audience Panel system.

The viewing diaries used in the Audience Panel system regularly provided pages for the inclusion of special sets of questions which might deal with reaction to various elements of a program, with the manner of presentation, with aspects of viewing patterns, or which might provide for viewers to enter their own comments. These pages were used to gather information specifically requested in advance; pages over and above those required to gather such information were used by Research to investigate its own concerns.

In addition to serving producers and network management, the Research department conducted a wide range of other studies -- from the cost efficiency of spot advertising on CBC owned English Television stations to a comprehensive analysis of patterns of television viewing in Canada (CBC 1973a). Public opinion studies were conducted for producers who wished to incorporate such information into their programs, and the department engaged in some more basic research including an investigation of "dimensions" of audience response to television programs (CBC 1973e). There was strict compliance with survey research technical standards and no evidence of interpretation beyond that warranted by the available data. The department's reputation for technical competence within the Corporation was high.

In addition to carrying out its own studies, the CBC participated in and had available the reports of the nonprofit BBM Bureau of Measurement organization which conducted both national and individual market audience measurements four times per year. (The sample size in the CBC system, though fully adequate for national measurement, was not sufficiently large to yield data on an individual station basis.)

In general, however, the focus was on research conducted internally. Research was in contact with its counterpart departments in some of the US commercial networks but not with US public broadcasting research.

Environmental Characteristics

Needs, Requirements, and Expectations

As noted in section 7(a), pages 71-74, the overall Canadian broadcasting environment was changing rapidly during the case study period. The audience fragmentation produced by increasing cable penetration and the licensing of additional Canadian stations and networks in effect dictated a change in the CBC's future role within the Canadian broadcasting system. That change, the subject of the "mass audience" debate reviewed in sections 11(a), 11(c), and Chapter 12, at least required very careful reconsideration of CBC English Television's audience orientation. As audience fragmentation increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to assess audience performance on the basis of traditional overall rating and share audience data, and it becomes more important to address specific questions.

There were major questions about what impact audience fragmentation might be having on "traditional" viewing or program selection patterns. Specifically, there was the question of whether the "lead-in" effect continued to operate effectively when a very wide range of viewing alternatives was available. What was most remarkable about the discussions of the lead-in effect, both within the CBC and with the CRTC, was that there was not an intensive effort to discover something about it -- whether it existed and, if so, under what conditions and to what extent it operated. Clearly, such an undertaking would have been a major effort requiring recourse to individual viewing records, the establishment of new audience and program classification schemes, and the development of new analysis techniques. Even so, the potential implication for the scheduling strategy of the network, particularly in the future, seemed important.

Although there was a great deal of concern that English Television should have been more differentiated and distinctively Canadian, the service was clearly moving in that direction -- though not fast enough to satisfy its critics. During the case study period the network was, for instance, increasingly moving away from one traditional scheduling practice, audience building through the sustained scheduling of the same program in the same weekly time period. "Alternating" series, in which programs such as OMBUDSMAN and IN THE PRESENT TENSE shared a scheduling position and each appeared every second week, became more common. So too did the scheduling of successive "mini-series," short series of programs followed in the same time period by other series also consisting of a limited number of episodes. And the frequency of the preemptive scheduling of "specials" increased. Each of these trends would seem to have warranted research investigation, if only to discover the most effective means of making potential viewers aware of these irregular offerings.

There appeared to be a clear need for a wide range of audience research to guide overall service planning, scheduling, individual program planning, and service and program evaluation in the rapidly changing Canadian broadcasting environment.

Requests for research results and research undertakings came to the department from a variety of sources including (but not limited to) ESD divisional management, regional managements, the English Television Planning Group, English Radio, the commercial Sales department, the Program Evaluation System, program units, and individual producers. The nature of these requests varied widely. Some requests were explicit, some were vague, and some were for data which might have been gathered if the requirements had been known earlier, but weren't. There was a tendency for research requests from producers to have a "diagnostic" as opposed to "evaluative" focus -- to seek ways to improve future programs in a series. In the case of entertainment programs featuring individual performers or distinct segments, such investigations, though not simple, could normally be conducted within the context of the existing Audience Panel system if sufficient advance notice were given. In other cases, producers asked for extensive investigation of all aspects of programs whose structures were more complex.

Research requests from network and local managements, on the other hand, tended to focus on performance measurement -- on audience size trends and competitive programming effects. Most of these requests could be handled through the direct extraction of data from the various Audience Panel system reports or from the national or local BBM reports. Research requests from Sales normally asked for relatively accessible information or secondary analysis of available data. Generally speaking, the most complex requests came from producers.

The expressed requirements for audience research ranged from simple requests for existing data to demands for extensive special studies requiring original design, special data collection, and complex analysis.

A distinction must be made between the expressed requirements and the general level of expectation of audience research contributions to programs and service planning. It seems reasonable to assume that those who made requests had a genuine expectation that research findings would be of value to them. But the proportion of producers making such requests was quite small. Some were aware that not all requests could be honoured. Many were not aware that such services were available at all. Some didn't want them. And some who did complained that researchers seemed incapable of writing or speaking in terms which they could understand.

Lack of knowledge about research techniques, about their limitations and potentials, is a universal utilization problem. Few producers or managers seemed comfortable dealing with research reports; almost none had any formal or informal research training. This can lead to the development of a research "mystique" -- of a feeling of helplessness in confronting something believed to be impossibly complex. There was some of that, too.

It is difficult to assess the impact of individual and group attitudes in determining the expectations of research within English Television. Hostility towards research was not common, but a limited number of producers and managers did place a very low premium on communication research findings. In some cases this was a reaction against "the numbers game," the result of a concern that ratings had taken on too much importance in program decision making. In some cases this resulted from a perception of research as a tool used by management to justify decisions potentially unpopular with producers. In other cases, however, the disinterest in research resulted from a belief that the findings of "number crunching" social science research had little if any relevance to the creative work of broadcasting. For the most part, however, the attitude towards research was neutral. The limited expectations seemed to result primarily from a lack of familiarity with the potential contributions of research and from pressure to devote attention to immediate, operational problems.

The expectations of audience research contributions to overall service planning, scheduling, individual program planning, and service and program evaluation varied widely. The general level of expectation of innovative contributions was not high.

Support

Despite the fact that only a very small proportion of producers and managers made demands on Research, requests exceeded the Toronto department's manpower and financial resources. Operation of the Audience Panel system, though efficient, took a large proportion of the total available Research resources. One economy measure was suspension of the operation of the Panel during the Summer season. But, as noted in section 9(f), page 117, Summer was the period when the network scheduled a large number of "on air pilots" of programs which might be incorporated into the following year's regular season schedule. Some indication of the department's resource level is provided by the fact that a special effort was required in the spring of 1973 to have the Research budget augmented by funds from English Television so that the Panel could be operated for two weeks during the Summer season that year. Total cost: $6,000.

The level of resources provided for Research was minimal, and provided for only a limited amount of research other than audience size and appreciation measurement.

Research requires more than just the gathering of data and statistical analysis. There must also be time for dialogue with the users of research -- for comparative analysis, for interpretation, and discussion of the implications of results. Because demands from producers and from network and regional managements for research investigations exceeded the Toronto department's manpower and financial resources, it was understandable that the primary efforts were directed to the "doing" of research rather than to the improvement of utilization.

Prior to the start of my fieldwork in Toronto, it had already been established that the absence of precise program objectives was a major problem in both Research and Evaluation. In short, how do you design research to discover whether a program has been successful if there is no statement of what is to be accomplished? As noted at the beginning of this section, the Program Proposal was revised in the spring of 1973 so as to request objectives sufficiently precise to form the basis for research planning. But many proposals with no program purpose or target audience specification were approved. One, bearing seven sets of signatures or initials, read as follows:

Statement of Purpose:		"To entertain and inform"
This program is intended to reach (choice):		(x) A general mass audience ( ) A more specialized audience
Age Composition Priorities -	Up to 12:	0
	12-17:	1
	18-34:	1
	35-49:	1
	50+ :	1
Is this program aimed at viewers with any specific level of education?:		"No"
CBC Research "Index of Enjoyment" target:		"Between 0 and 100."

Such Proposals were exceptional, but so too were ones with objectives sufficiently precise to be researchable. In many cases the Proposal was an official document simply confirming decisions made in conversation; the objectives, though generally agreed, simply were not documented. In obtaining documented and adequately precise statements of objectives, Research required a concentrated effort on the part of management to explain that objectives were required for study design (if for no other purpose).

Management efforts to ensure the provision of precise program objectives for research and evaluation were limited.

Structural and Utilization Process Characteristics

The Research department which served English Television was located in the same building in Toronto as the Planning Group but did not report to the television management group or to the English Services Division, but to Head Office. The CBC's Director of Research was based in Ottawa; the Toronto research operation was managed by a Supervisor who worked almost exclusively for ESD but did not report to the Division. This organizational arrangement was reviewed as a part of a study of Head Office organization which took place during the latter part of the fieldwork period, but it was decided to leave the arrangement unchanged. Although other considerations apparently entered into that decision, for purposes of improving research input to operational decision making, it would almost certainly have been preferable to have more closely integrated the audience research and management groups. The Supervisor of Research in Toronto and his staff were "outsiders" on the formal organization chart of English Television and it seemed to me unusual, given the opportunity, that no move was made to integrate a research component into the English division management group so as to establish closer daily working relationships. One can speculate that the arrangement was left unchanged so that Head Office could conduct more basic research in cooperation with the departments located in Toronto and Montreal. At the same time, however, divisional research departments would have been formally separated from a Head Office department no more than the existing ones were from the operating divisions they served.

In organizational terms, the Research department was structurally separated from the operating divisions.

A different type of structural separation existed between Research and producers. In the scattered Toronto facilities, Research was housed in the same building as the Planning Group, several blocks away from the nearest production offices. Members of either group were seldom in the other's building.

The Research department was physically separated from the producers.

Although they were located on adjacent floors of the same office building, the Research department and the Planning Group were in limited contact. The Research department provided quarterly briefings for the Planning Group on the network's audience performance and special briefings -- prior to the making of decisions on the procurement of US programming for the next year, and on request. But there was little routine participation by Research in the daily decision making processes of the management group.

Contact between Research and producers was generally limited, but varied from producer to producer. Some producers relied heavily on research findings: this was especially the case with those variety program producers who requested that specific questions about the appeal of elements within their programs be included in the Audience Panel surveys. Other than as recipients of the weekly Audience Panel reports, many producers did not come in contact with the Research department at all.

Routine communication between Research and management was limited, though on the average more common than between Research and producers.

One constant concern in the utilization of research findings is deliberate misuse. On occasion an individual would select the most favourable of the BBM or CBC Audience Panel audience size estimates to demonstrate the popularity of a given program, but this was not a frequent or severe problem. In addition, the "Index of Enjoyment" had been introduced as a means of deflecting attention from raw audience size figures, although it gave rise to some problems of its own. Under certain circumstances, the Index of

Enjoyment could be useful. Its principal value was as an indicator of the appreciation of a program relative to other similar programs: comparison of the "enjoyment" of news with, say, drama programming was not intended. In addition, because it reported only the reactions of actual viewers and thus interacted with audience size, the Index had to be used with considerable caution: the larger the audience (the less specialized or selective the audience), the more difficult it was to achieve high Index levels. Among both producers and managers there was considerable confusion about the Index. Extremely few were aware of its derivation, and even fewer were aware of the precautions to be exercised in its use. Consequently, the Index was frequently misused to "defend" programs which had attracted small audiences but (not surprisingly) had achieved moderately high Index ratings.

Deliberate misuse of research findings to "defend" programs was uncommon, though there was some uninformed use for such purposes.

Analysis

The overall level of audience research utilization in English Television during the case study period was low.

Contributing to that low level of utilization were:

- widely varying but generally not high expectations of research contributions,
- a lack of awareness of existing information such as audience composition data,
- isolated hostility and more widespread indifference to research,
- limited opportunities for Research to assist in interpretation and discussion of results,
- an organizational separation between Research and management,
- a physical separation between Research and producers, and
- an information or communication overload on the Planning Group.

A high proportion of the research conducted and a higher proportion of that used was of a highly conventional nature.

Contributing to the conventional nature of the research conducted and used were:

- general dissemination of only one weekly research report which concentrated on program audience size and appreciation measurements,
- the availability of only BBM audience size measurements for individual station areas,
- a lack of awareness of potential research contributions through secondary analysis and special studies,
- limited resources for conducting research other than audience size, composition, and appreciation measurement,
- limited management efforts to obtain precise program objectives, and
- the factors affecting utilization noted above.

Throughout the case study period the research reporting to management concentrated on overall audience size and enjoyment measurements -- on indicators invaluable to the operators of commercial mass audience broadcasting services but not, I suggest, sufficient to guide the delicate balancing of either the audience or content orientation of the national broadcasting service.

The pattern developed thus far in this section was actually evident very early in the fieldwork period. As months passed and more and more pieces were added, the "pattern" seemed to make less and less sense (or at least to be less satisfactory to a researcher). The effect of the combination of the low level of utilization with the conventional nature of the research which management was requesting or being offered was to maintain, by default, the existing approaches to service planning, scheduling, program planning, and evaluation. Both within the Planning Group and within Research these approaches were recognized as being substantially intuitive. And there was recognition on the part of some members of the Planning Group that the research reporting to them tended to be confirmatory -- to give the impression that "things were going along not too badly." During one interview held in connection with the review of the audience reporting system, the weekly Audience Panel report in use at that time was termed a "soporific," and it was noted that the most prominent and frequently used part of that report was a table ranking programs in order by audience size. For their part, the researchers recognized the dangers of relying on overall audience size measurements. One of them had commented that "you can drown in a pool of water that is an 'average' of six inches deep." And they spoke informally of wishing to see audience research generally regarded as a "diagnostic" tool. Much of the special work which they undertook for producers was of that nature, but it was directed towards individual programs in isolation.

Still, no research was being undertaken to guide future scheduling practices or to systematically investigate the "lead-in" effect. Some available techniques for assessing the range of audience already being reached were not in use. Notably absent were both "turnover" and "circulation" statistics. Turnover measurements, which indicate the extent to which a program's audience consists of the same individuals week after week or day after day, can be a useful indicators of audience "loyalty" or program series appreciation. Circulation measurements, which indicate how many different people are reached at one time or another by segments of the overall schedule, can be an important check on the range of audience served. Without such statistics, it is impossible to tell, for instance, whether a set of current affairs programs such as IN THE PRESENT TENSE, UP CANADA!, SOME HONOURABLE MEMBERS, and TAKE 60 were cumulatively serving a substantial proportion of the viewing public or whether such a set of programs each served substantially the same "hard core" of Current Affairs program viewers. And there was no regular input to management concerning audience composition, although that information was available in the form shown in Figure 14-1. It didn't seem to me that either the Planning Group or Research was actively "looking for" problems.

[Assessing research utilization in one's own field is difficult. There is perhaps a natural tendency for researchers in any field to regard their findings, their approaches, and/or themselves as deserving more then the amount of attention they actually command. In this case, I worked for some months deliberately trying to extend the range and influence of audience research in connection with an early attempt to base a dissertation on the effects of beginning to provide audience demographic data to producers on a regular basis. And I spent some time sifting through demographic data in search of evidence to support the contention of some producers and managers that English Television had an "aging" audience. Therefore, I'm much less than a neutral observer. Rather than phrase my feelings quite formally or reserve them entirely, with this caution of potential bais I pass them on below as personal opinion.]

I don't remember who first mentioned the phrase "aging audience" to me. There were a number of producers and managers who suspected that older viewers were accounting for higher and higher proportions of English Television's viewership. And the Research department had noted the trend in the BBM data and its own Panel Analysis reports. But I couldn't detect any particularly special concern or, at least, any attempt to further investigate the trend, to consider its appropriateness, or to do anything to deliberately alter the trend.

/ So, as explained in Chapter 8, towards the end of the fieldwork period, I did some analysis of BBM demographic data in the Toronto market area reports for March 1970 and March 1974. I wasn't surprised that there had been an increase in the average age of English Television's viewers, but I was surprised at the rate of increase. And, because

Figure 14-2. AUDIENCE AGE PROFILES, TORONTO, MARCH 1974



Notes:
1. In order to facilitate comparisons, the ratings and shares have been "normalized," with 1.0 equal to the average across all age groups.
    - CBLT's share of 25-34 yearold viewers was 11.0.
    - CBLT's overall share of viewers was 15.7.
    - CBLT's normalized 25-34 share = 11.0 ÷ 15.7 = 0.70.
2. The width of the vertical bars is proportional to the Toronto area population distribution.

Source: McKay 1974, p 8.

the shift in the 1970-1974 period had been produced by a drop in viewing by people in my own age group, I may have had a "cause" for distributing my analysis to the Planning Group. Figure 14-2, taken from that report, provides some indication of the age distribution of viewers of CBLT, the CBC English Television station in Toronto. The report included the following observations:

> One way to express the variation in the ratings basis CBLT audience age profile is to say that CBLT draws 3.4 times as many veiwers per capita population from the 65+ group as from the 18-24 group, and 2.2 times as many per capita from 50-64 as from 25-34....
>
> The approximate average age of the overall CBLT audience (2+) has increased 4.1 years in the 4-year period from March 1970 to March 1974. The approximate average age of CBLT's adult audience (18+) increased 5.3 years during the same 4-year period.
>
> There is a general upward drift in the average age of the population as a whole which, projections indicate, could account for an increase of between 0.3 and 0.8 years over the 4-year period....
>
> Although these notes are based on careful calculations, there are some data limitations and technical assumptions which have not been spelled out here since this is not intended as a technical research paper. If you have questions, let's talk....
>
> There is no casual analysis here either. And, in fact, whether we have an unusually old audience for our programs because of a CBC "image" in the minds of potential viewers or whether the image results from the fact that our programs attract unusually old audiences may not be that important.... (McKay 1974, pp 5-16)

It's impossible for me to comment objectively on the impact of the report. I was disappointed that no one responded to my "let's talk" invitation. And when the Planning Group did consider the age characteristics of its audience, as part of a general discussion of 1975/76 schedule planning, the group concluded: (1) that it should be aware of the aging audience problem, but that it should not change programs for that end alone, and (2) that there was a major image problem which raised questions about the effectiveness of network public relations.

I had attempted to anticipate the "image problem" explanation because it seemed to me that the network's image was more a function of its program offerings than of its promotion or public relations activities. I can only speculate on possible reasons for the limited impact of the report:

- the analysis may have been faulty, though existence of the condition was acknowledged and only the suggested implications were not accepted,
- the format of the report may not have been consistent with a strong statement of the central point,
- research resources for further investigation of the problem were limited,
- the research did not suggest alternative plans of action but merely raised the possibility of a problem leaving the recipients to consider the findings and, if necessary, devise their own approaches,
- the recipients of the research were already working under communication overload conditions,
- any attempt to deal with the suggested problem would have constituted an attempt to adjust the audience balance of a schedule which the recipients were already attempting to balance along many other often conflicting dimensions,
- the research was volunteered and was not in response to a request for assistance in dealing with a recognized problem,
- the source of the work was external to the group which considered it,
- general attitudes towards research in general within the group of recipients were mixed,

- the subject area may not have been considered to have been a particularly relevant concern of the research recipients, and
- wheras most research input to the group was either confirmatory or constituted advice on future program procurement, this study was unusual in that it suggested the existence of a general problem.

This study adds little to the descriptions and analyses of research activity and research utilization reviewed in Chapter 2. It does, however, extend those observations to cover one additional institutional context. The implications for researchers are taken up in section 15(c).

c) COMMENTS

This study's description of the pattern of communication research utilization both in the CBC and in Canada generally ought not to be the source of much joy for researchers, although perhaps some consolation is to be found in the fact that similar patterns have been noted elsewhere.

A Role for Research About Public Broadcasting

There seems little need here to restate the outstanding requirements for research about the mass media. How relatively little we know was outlined in Chapter 2. There remains the pressing need for basic research about the role of the media in people's lives, for firm foundations for audience and content and effects studies. We are just beginning to learn about the operation of media institutions. The CBC's cooperation in this work was a striking departure from the usual pattern, and I can but hope that the results will be seen as beneficial both internally and externally -- that this study will ease rather than aggravate the "access" problem. So far as "societal" studies are concerned, the list of questions reported by Halloran on page 26 stands as an indication of an outstanding agenda which should keep us busy for many years.

On the other hand, we have already gained some useful insights but few of them are getting through to policy makers and media operators. And much of what does get through does tend to get shut away in storage cabinets, "safe from the dangerous hustle-bustle of making a living."

This study doesn't presume to prescribe a definitive role for research about public media or to address settings other than the Canadian context. But, within those constraints there are some points to be made. Section 14(a) revealed an outstanding need for Canadian public broadcasting policy analysis -- for both societal and institutional studies. Section 14(b) revealed a need for other types of institutional studies, for a wide range of audience, content, and effects studies, and for research utilization studies.

Conditions may have changed, but not much of that work was getting done during the case study period. While working as an associate producer in Vancouver, the program unit to which I was assigned was the subject of a Master's level case study by one student at Simon Fraser University. Some of the preliminary work leading to the CBC Research report on "Dimensions of Audience Response to Television Programs" was carried out independently by a York University professor. And, from time to time, universities hosted seminar and conference discussions about general media roles. But, apart from those specific exceptions, I was aware of no interchange between the nation's universities and its national broadcasting service. This contrasted sharply with my own experience at Stanford which had included a significant amount of contact with and research work for US public broadcasting. It also contrasted sharply with the extensive cooperation I had observed between the faculty, staff, and students of other US universities and the various elements of the US public broadcasting system

Canadian universities and public policy development institutes are in a uniquely privileged position to undertake mass media research, and they have clearly carried out some interesting and important studies. Although the universities and institutes may well have established effective working relationships with some elements of the Canadian broadcasting system, I found the lack of interchange between them and the CBC during the case study period quite startling. I also found it particularly striking that amid the 305 in 1974 interventions filed with the CRTC in 1974 in connection with the CBC licence renewals, there was no communication research input -- either at the policy or audience research level -- from Canadian university communication departments.

I don't presume to suggest how the increased support and coordination which section 14(a) suggests were required can best be secured, but it does seem that if the Canadian broadcasting system really is "the central nervous system of Canadian nationhood" we need to know a great deal more about it that we did in 1974.

A Role for Research Within Public Broadcasting

The role for research within public broadcasting which is suggested here is a difficult one. It calls for a major change in the existing "client" relationship between researchers and broadcasters, and it places the burden for taking initiatives squarely on the shoulders of researchers. I hope it will be understood and accepted that I am attempting to speak as a colleague. I've done some "counting the house" myself, and I've spent enough time in and around the Canadian and US public broadcasting establishments to recognize an element of truth in George Hall's suggestion that public broadcasters tend to engage in research more to demonstrate a modern faith in science that to apply its results to their own undertakings. I've experienced the problems and I don't intend to forget them.

The first thing that is required by research within public broadcasting is some understanding of why support for research and research utilization are at such low levels. For most people involved in or with broadcasting, beginning to use research amounts to adopting an innovation. That adoption process is complex, and it faces many natural barriers. Space does not permit review of them here, but COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS (Rogers & Shoemaker) does provide valuable insights. Moreover, research utilization within public broadcasting takes place within institutional settings, and patterns of communication in organizations profoundly affect the actual and potential application of research findings. In that connection, a new book, COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS (Rogers & Rogers), should be helpful.

The detailed focus here is on audience research -- both because that is the area in which research contributions are most widely expected and because that area is the most convenient starting point for an expansion of communication research influence. Researchers working within and directly for public broadcasting also have a role to play in the expansion of research beyond audience research, but their greatest immediate opportunities would seem to lie within existing contexts.

There is obviously no escaping the fact that much of the work currently "required" of public broadcasting research is of importance and will continue to be so. "Counting the house" will and should have a place in mass media research, and the results of this "rather involved bookkeeping" do have a role as input to managements. Audience size measurement should continue, but it should not be allowed to consume all of the resources available to researchers -- or all energies.

Section 2(b) noted Halloran's observation that those who work within media institutions "are usually obliged to take the problem as given, and have little opportunity (and in many cases little inclination) to probe at depth or question the values of the institutions." There is a distinct danger that, in responding on a request by request basis, research will find itself providing information which, taken as a whole, does not meet the real or -- especially -- the changing information needs of the media (and societies) it seeks to serve. It may find itself contributing to the reinforcement of orders which no longer prevail.

There is a natural temptation for communication researchers, no more or no less than any other group, to perform just those functions required. However, if there is to be any substantial improvement in communication research utilization in mass media institutions, the temptation to answer only the questions asked must be resisted, and the role which research evolves for itself must include a recognition of responsibility for guiding the use made of its findings and for taking the initiative in proposing new undertakings.

Research will have to take on responsibilities for research utilization. Certain of those responsibilities relate to the actual output from research investigations which have been carried out. Findings must be expressed in a form that is intelligible to people whose primary interests and abilities are in creative or administrative areas rather than in research methodology. Where the implications of their findings are clear, interpretation must accompany the release of data; in such cases, and in instances where results are less conclusive, alternative interpretations must be noted. And research information and insights must be disseminated to producers and managers and those persons outside institutions who can make use of them.

Research will also have to take on responsibilities for utilization that extend beyond the dissemination of potentially useful results. It will have to take on the task of demystifying the nature of its work: there will have to be educational initiatives. There is no need to train producers or managers to actually conduct research, but there is a pressing need to educate them about research limitations and potentials -- to help them become confident, demanding, and critical consumers of research. And research will have to assume responsibilities in the consideration of the output from its investigations by others: it must be prepared to assist in the interpretation process and, over and above that, be prepared to take the lead in initiating discussions of findings.

Research will also have to take the initiative in using the data available to it in ways that reveal more than just average audience size. It must discover whether the averages it provides induce a false sense of security within organizations. In short, it must look for problems. It must look, for instance, at the cumulative reach of services as a whole and of components within those services, at the demographic composition of audiences for individual programs and groups of programs, and at audience loyalty or turnover. It must also analyze the viewing data available for patterns of audience flow so as to be able to provide assistance in the appropriate scheduling of programs. All this may lead to requirements for new research undertakings, and research must take the initiative in proposing and seeking funding for them, too.

Beyond audience research, the extent to which research within public broadcasting can introduce other research findings into the organizations it serves depends, I suspect, partly on the reputation it establishes for itself in audience research but largely on the extent to which it considers itself to have an activist role. The possibilities for participation in program development alone seem virtually unlimited though almost totally unexplored.

At the same time, there must be a willingness on the part of those producers and managers and policy makers to accept researchers as colleagues, and to work cooperatively towards the provision of better services. And there must be a willingness to provide research resources over and above the minimums required for the weekly generation of ratings reports.

I am not suggesting that all or any of this will be easy. In some cases, attitudes towards research will have to be changed over time. The undertakings will have to be cooperative: unsolicited research, in my experience, does not necessarily command a great deal of attention. Even so, if we believe that research has an important role to play in putting and keeping public broadcasting producers and managers and policy makers in touch with their publics, we must be prepared to make the first moves.

Chapter 15

Remarks

This case study attempts to map a great deal of territory in relatively fine detail. Although the detail itself may be of importance to some readers, it does seem appropriate here to summarize the main features of the map, and to examine the likely consequences of following some of the options which it suggests are available.

a) ABOUT THIS STUDY

It seems to me that the *basic* goals of public broadcasting are widely shared. I have tried to show that, given a particular set of environmental and structural circumstances, the operating characteristics of a public broadcasting institution are really quite understandable. The most important outstanding questions, therefore, are matters of public policy; and that, I suggest, is precisely what the public, through its elected representatives, has actually intended be the case.

If this study is to make any positive contributions, it is important for readers to remember its limitations and the precautions to be exercised in its use.

The first point to note concerns *bias*, and deals specifically with the use of "public domain" and "confidential" documentation. The procedure for CBC clearance of the use of internal materials, established in response to point 14 in this study's guidelines, did not lead to any requests or demands for deletions or changes. The procedure did provide for the correction of a few factual inaccuracies and it did yield some constructive suggestions; some of those suggestions were accepted; others were not. Though formalized in the "guidelines," the basis for clearance was essentially one of mutual trust: the CBC knew me well enough to know I would be critical; for my part, I have attempted to be fair. But the opinions expressed are mine, and I take full responsibility for them.

The use of public domain documentation provides only some protection against bias. I have attempted to provide controls by detailing my own background, and by indicating where excerpts have been used to illustrate ranges of opinion rather than consensus. But responsibility for the selection of excerpts rests with me.

The second point to note also concerns bias, and deals specifically with the extent to which I may have been entrapped in broadcasting institution and nationalistic *defensiveness*. No doubt there are biases here which result from alternatively viewing the CBC from inside its production and management units and from a thousand miles south of the forty-ninth parallel. My internal vantage point was virtually ideal for for participant observation of management decision making: to the extent that I was part of the organization, I may be overly "understanding" of the CBC's problems -- though I think not much. My external vantage point was out of range for all but the CBC's shortwave services: to the extent that for many months television really has been that which ABC, CBS, NBC, and PBS provided, I may see the overall Canadian broadcasting system as more important to Canadians than those who have never been "deprived" of its services -- perhaps as significantly more important.

Some control on defensiveness was provided by the academic members of my dissertation reading committee. They were able to point out portions in early drafts where I had become caught up in the institutional seige mentality whose origins and nature I was attempting to describe. Some additional control on defensiveness was provided by the fact that the 18 month writing period allowed me an opportunity to "stand back" from the operations I had observed at close range and to examine them in a wider context. Over the period my thinking on some matters changed significantly; emphasis shifted from a detailed examination of the activities of the English Television Planning Group to more extensive consideration of the decision making environment; and emphasis shifted away from consideration of communication research utilization to the point where it is almost a specialized footnote to the study.

The final point concerns the use which others make of this document. For the benefit of those who start reading at the back of any book, let me explain that my concerns have been to avoid further development of the "confrontation" approach to Canadian public broadcasting policy development and interpretation, of the "siege mentality" within broadcasting institutions, and of the "art versus science" debate about the relevance of communication research to the control and operation of broadcasting.

Some protection against contributing to witch hunting and polarization on specific issues is provided by the fact that much of what is described here has, while I have been writing, become historical. The principal players have all changed. There is a new Minister of Communications, a new Chairman and two new Vice Chairmen at a reorganized CRTC, and a new President and Executive Vice President at CBC Head Office. A new ESD Vice President was appointed in early 1974, and there are other new people at the divisional level. Within English Television, there is a new Director of Entertainment Programs, a new National Resources Manager, and an Assistant Managing Director of Television has been added. Since the beginning of 1974, 8 of the 10 program department Area Heads have changed, as have about half of the Regional Directors and regional Directors of Television and Program Directors. And there have been changes in Research. The issues have changed too, at least in their immediate sense. And many of the dilemmas which remain are not at all unique to the Canadian situation.

I have written at some length about atmospheres of confrontation and attitudes of defensiveness, and I have tried to suggest that such conditions, though understandable, are not productive and not inevitable. I realize, however, that the detail which this study assembles may be used selectively to "condemn," "justify," "attack," or "defend" any or all of the CBC, the CRTC, the Government, and the Parliament of Canada. If that happens, we will all be "losers." I have tried, as they say in broadcasting, to achieve "balance," but it seems important to stress again that the attempt here has been to contribute to understanding.

b) ABOUT PUBLIC BROADCASTING INSTITUTIONS

Section 1(d) of the Introduction, written many months ago, betrays a wish that this study would help clear up some detailed misunderstandings evident in the 1974 licence renewal process. The detailed analyses in Chapters 10-12 may, in fact, make some contribution in that connection. But, although my thinking about the handling of specific operational issues has not changed much since 1974, I have come to see the problems as more fundamental than I did while directly attached to the CBC.

Relatively little has been written about the "theory" of public broadcasting -- about its theoretical role or roles, or even about possible alternative structural forms. Though unfortunate, I think, this does not seem surprising. And I think that Chapter 3's short review of some of what has been written reveals the reason: the theoretical role of public broadcasting and the theoretically ideal relationships between it and the public, audience, and market components of its environment are exceedingly complex. Thus, theoretical analysis makes the emergence of certain specific issues such as "mass versus specialized audience" more understandable.

Organizational analysis also makes a contribution; the general systems theory model of "an organization in its environment" set out in Chapter 5, and its application in the early parts of Chapter 12, leads, I think quite easily, to the identification of defensiveness and conservatism as institutional characteristics of the organization under study.

The societal analyses provided in the Overviews in Chapters 12 and 13 make perhaps the most significant contribution: they provide a framework within which the theoretical, operational, and organizational analyses can be reconciled; and they suggest implications both for the public and for public broadcasting institutions.

The model of an organization in an environment seems to be of great importance in understanding the characteristics of broadcasting institutions. Organizational analysis here suggests that defensiveness and conservatism were induced in the CBC by its environment. Smith observed a "seige mentality" in other national broadcasting institutions and his analysis suggests its development is far from accidental. He noted that we have reached a point at which the various broadcasting institutions and legal devices created around the world are ceasing to satisfy the parties involved in their creation. The Davey Committee noted that contemporary social problems centred on the relationship between people and institutions, and that the media, precisely because they *are* institutions, are involved in the conflict as participants.

The organizational analysis of the CBC and Smith's societal analysis also converge in the finding that the shape, conditions, and problems of a national broadcasting system are a strikingly accurate relection of the shape, conditions, and problems of the nation it was created to serve. The CBC had been deliberately created as an instrument of cultural nationalism and as a means of providing for an expression of a Canadian identity. It shared with the country as a whole the problems of Canadian self-definition in relation to the outside world. The CBC had also been assigned a role in contributing to the flow and exchange of regional information and entertainment -- in the unstated belief that such flow and exchange would contribute to inter-regional understanding and an easement of regional tensions. And the CBC and the nation also faced together problems of bilingual, bicultural, and multicultural accommodation. Even the debate about "mass" and "specialized" audiences for the CBC, though having its origins in the nature of mass societies themselves, would seem to have been augmented by a specifically Canadian concern for a style of life differentiated from the "mass market" emphasis in contemporary American society, and -- in turn -- for a public broadcasting service oriented less towards "the market" and more in tune with "the public" and/or "the audience."

The various modes of analysis also converge in identifying institutional problems which arise from the nature of broadcasting itself. Organizational analysis found an ambivalent attitude towards the CBC on the part of elected representatives and elements of government: strong support in principle -- for the "concept" of public broadcasting; in practice, extensive criticism of operational performance, and limited attention to public broadcasting policy development and interpretation, and to the resource implications of those policies which had been established. Smith's societal analysis suggests that an ambivalent relationship between public broadcasting organizations and their respective political communities follows inevitably from the very existence of broadcasting. As an institution, the broadcasting organization lies outside the range of both the politician's direct control and his familiar arenas; but politics within mass society is inextricable from the technology which provides contact between the few and the many, and the politician is increasingly coming to depend on radio and television for his very existence. Public broadcasting institutions in turn rely on elected representatives for institutional support and, ultimately, survival. Smith suggests that the relationship between public broadcasting organizations and other elements of their active publics is also likely to be strained: a new source of independent pressure has sprung up among the creative workers of broadcasting who have become more conscious of themselves as a special interest within the debate than ever before. One of the striking aspects of the 1974 licence renewal process was the unprecedented degree of public intervention: both existing national organizations and specially organized groups of creative workers in broadcasting entered the debate. And there was the tendency, suggested by Smith, for the politicians, elements of government, and pressure groups, as well as the broadcasters, all to speak in the name of "freedom," in one sense or another.

The relationship between public broadcasting organizations and their audiences is also complicated by the nature of broadcasting itself, or -- perhaps more precisely -- by the fact that the development of broadcasting and the development of twentieth century mass societies have been inextricably interrelated and mutually dependent. General concern about the "mass" characteristics of contemporary society translate into specific concerns about the "mass" characteristics of the broadcast media. And the public broadcaster suddenly faces the problem of whether to give the public what it seems to want, to give it what he feels is good for it, to strive for balance between those two, or to attempt the high road -- "to make good things popular and popular things good."

One approach to these various institutional dilemmas is simply to decentralize responsibility for control. It is interesting to note, however, that despite regional tension, the public demands on the CBC were at least as much for decentralization of centrally coordinated production operations as for decentralization of actual programming control. This contrasts with the US situation where "local control" is of supreme importance. The contrast may simply reflect a relatively greater concern over centralized government and centralized institutions in the U.S. However, it seems to me that the two national contexts are different in ways which make the differences in degree of centralization understandable. Public broadcasting in the US originated as an alternative to the existing commercial services, and its role has thus far been defined primarily in relation to those services. The CBC's role has been defined in terms more directly related to national problems, notably cultural, political, and social problems. It seems to me that, at least in the Canadian context, contributing to the solution or easement of national unity and identity problems implies a requirement for effective national network operations. But this raises the "access" problem, and the problem of how to deal with the feeling of powerlessness of individuals in mass society -- the feeling that there no longer exists any part of the overpowering mechanism in which he can intervene. Smith suggests several possible approaches to "access" -- to the cause of pluralism in broadcasting. One is to split the audience into tiny groups. This, in essence, is the argument which is made for insisting that cable television system operators program a "community" channel. Another approach is for broadcasters to yield control over certain parts of their transmitting time. And it may well be possible to extend public accountability for broadcasting into an area in which groups and individuals with an interest in the overall policies of broadcasting as a whole may be able, in a practical way, to participate in broadcasting management. Each of these approches may ease the access problems inevitable in a mass society.

But Smith suggests, and I suspect that at least for the foreseeable future he is quite right, that broadcasting will inevitably remain in the hands of large and powerful bodies, in the hands of a tiny unelected elite of professionals whose knowledge and understanding will be the main mesh through which most messages have to pass. That inevitability is difficult to argue, but I sense that it is real. It may be connected with the economic logic of a relatively small number of broadcasting sources each, for the most part, serving substantial audiences. It may be connected with a natural individual attraction to experiences shared on a wide basis. It may be connected to other characteristics of mass societies. Or there may well be minimum "critical mass" sizes for vital creative institutions. But it does seem inevitable that, at least in the intermediate term in any given national context, there will be relatively few broadcasting institutions of national scope. And what is most important, and probably most difficult, is the question of access to the interest and good judgement of the professionals who mediate the entire message passing process.

It is at this point that it would seem that legal devices and structural changes and regulatory supervision will inevitably fail. If, as Smith suggests, and as I believe, broadcasters and producers must cease to look inwards to their institutions, but take their own honest sounding of their own social environments, such a change will come on the basis of broadcaster and producer initiative, and not as the result of legislation, regulation, or direct frontal attack.

For public broadcasters and public broadcasting institutions there are basically two alternative external orientations. One is a defensive stance. It would be understandable if such an external orientation continued to prevail. The tendency arises from inherent characteristics of the relationship between public broadcasting organizations and their environments. But remaining defensive could also be institutionally fatal. The alternative is to be open to the public, and if it is not, it may well lose touch and, in so doing, become inflexible. Societies and nations change. There is an argument that it is the role of the media to prepare societies for change. In any event, it is clear that a public broadcasting institution which becomes inflexible and not adaptable to changing conditions will experience problems maintaining the public support which its existence requires. Neville argued that if the CBC remained an undifferentiated, basically mass audience oriented, national broadcasting service, it would eventually become redundant. This study suggests that the need for differentiation was recognized, but that the CBC was not moving rapidly towards a more clearly differentiated service, largely because of the level and means of public support. Externally, the situation called for a review of public policy. But there were also implications for the CBC. It was engaged in a cooperative, national, creative endeavour: it required the confidence and support of the Canadian public; and the best approach to securing that support seemed to lie in taking the initiative in the establishment of a more open relationship with the Canadian public. Thus, an open relationship with the public can be argued as essential to long run institutional survival.

But the actual "good" of the entire culture must clearly come before matters of institutional survival. They need not be in conflict; in fact, broadcasters' responsibilities for the definitions of reality provided to their audiences constitute the valid argument for more "open" broadcasting institutions. The requirement is, however, for an openness "to" audience and general (as opposed to "active") public input. Such an approach would seem to hold the most promise for steering systems of broadcasting in ways which relate to the newly identified needs and demands of society.

c) ABOUT THE CBC

Just as the CBC was, in many ways, a strikingly accurate reflection of the nation it served, so this study accurately reflects a condition of the Corporation. This document concentrates overwhelmingly on the demands and expectations of the active public. I've suggested that the CBC tended to concentrate more on the public's demands than on audience concerns or on internal conditions. But in addition to the public and the audience, the CBC was also attempting to meet the demands and expectations of the market. And it seemed to me that simultaneously attempting to serve the public and the audience and compete in the market was the source of basic problems for the Corporation.

It seems to me that there was a role for CBC initiative in securing a clarification if not a reconsideration of public policy on Corporate commercial activity. I've suggested, however, that the Corporation was in a difficult position to take such initiatives in 1974. Its operational dependence on the Government was, I think, striking and not totally appropriate. In Chapter 13 I argued that an open relationship with the public was the CBC's only means of escape from its own defensiveness and conservatism and, on the practical level, from its demand/resource imbalance and its commercial constraints. Above, I argued than an open relationship with the public as audience was required for the provision of a responsible media definition of reality. In the Canadian situation there was an additional argument for an open relationship between the CBC and the public; it stemmed from the provisions of the Corporation's legislative mandate. If the CBC were to effectively discharge its national unity and

Canadian identity obligations, the Corporation and its management and its producers needed an opportunity to deepen their awareness of the social processes and contemporary attitudes among Canadians.

This study also mirrors the CBC in its attention to demands, expectations, structures, processes, programs, resources, and issues -- to just about everything but people. I have, if only in the selection of material for quotation, been severely critical of what is often termed management "style." But I've tried to balance my suggestion that more attention to people was required with an organizational communication analysis which suggests that under prevailing conditions the actual approach was almost inevitable. My criticism, therefore, is of the situation; responsibility for it extends, ultimately, to every Canadian. As I said earlier, I think that Smith is right and that for the foreseeable future the control and operation of the major elements of broadcasting systems will remain in relatively few hands -- regardless of structural or operational adjustments such as greater decentralization or higher proportions of independent production. These broadcasters, individually, are the people who will mediate the dominant message passing processes. It seems important, therefore, that the organization should want and be able to establish significant recruitment, training, and development programs, tailored to individual needs and aspirations, to best develop the abilities required of these relatively few hands, and to help put them in touch with the mass audience whose features are so seldomly examined.

It is also at least possible to suggest that more open internal relationships and greater attention to the individual may influence probabilities of success in creative endeavours. I believe that creative climates are important and that creativity is not accidental, but performing a cost/benefit analysis is impossible so, in the end, the choice of a management "style" or the determination of the importance attached to the individual in the organization must be left to the good judgement of the senior officers of the Corporation. In Chapter 13 I speculated that there may have been a transfer of defensiveness and conservatism from external to internal relationships; the observation is speculative, but worth considering. Also speculative is the suggestion that the Corporation's conservative external orientation may have translated into "conservative" programming.

As pointed out earlier, the conditions examined in this study are now historical. There may have been changes in the external orientation of the CBC since 1974, or such changes may be imminent. It seemed to me that in early 1974 the Corporation was becoming somewhat more open, but it also semed that the CRTC's licence renewal decision would contribute to increased defensiveness at least in the short run. There were, however, indications that the CBC Board would become more active and visible, and that there would be regular consultation between the Corporation and the CRTC.

The last part of this chapter examines public broadcasting policy options available to the Canadian people, and it suggests public responsibilities in that connection. Those responsibilities and the challenge to improve the CBC were, I suggest, shared by the CBC and the public. For its part, the Corporation had a choice between either remaining defensive and conservative or becoming more open with its audience public about its problems and aspirations. The seeds of a more open and positive external orientation were evident in early 1974. The transcript of the 1974 licence renewal hearing reflects the English Service Division Assistant General Manager's comments about challenges as follows:

> MR. MUNRO: .... The Corporation's mandate has often been stated as requiring its television service to link all Canadians, yet that requirement must be seen in the context of increasing television choice from more and more competing stations.
>
> To fulfill our mandate, we must program so that Canadians want to be linked. I must stress that we don't quarrel with the rights of a viewer to have the maximum choice available. What I am pointing out is that this situation provides us with a challenge just as radio faced its challenge in the 1950's and '60's.

> To meet that challenge, we must offer Canadians television program service which is different from that of the private stations, and of a quality and variety that Canadians will choose to watch.... (CRTC 1974a, pp 149-50)
>
> For the rest of this decade, CBC television must cope with a situation quite different from that which faced us four years ago. In the face of increasing viewer choice, we must remain relevant to Canadians of all ages, interests and tastes. We must do so by offering a service which is distinctive in its amount of Canadian and regional programming, distinctive in its balance, and distinctive in its quality. We recognize these as major challenges and we recognize that our success in meeting them is important -- not just to the CBC or to the Canadian broadcasting system, but to Canada.... We look forward confidently to the challenges and we welcome them. (pp 156-7)

Some 1,315 pages later the hearing transcript ends as follows:

> MR. JUNEAU: Well, Mr. Picard, you said that if you persist you will find that Canadians are capable of doing the job.
>
> That is one of the most hopeful phrases, not only because it expresses a strong sentiment, but because it appears to express determination, and I think determination is perhaps the thing, after hope and wisdom, that we need most.
>
> I would like, however, to terminate not on any of my ideas, my phrases, or any of your phrases, but from the brief of the regional producers. They say in their conclusions: "It is now the time to admit to all the failures and then forget them. It is now the time to look for new avenues to success. We will create the programs to do this, given the facilities and resources necessary. It is essential to have the co-operation of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission, the Canadian government, and the Canadian Parliament." I would add only this: that you can be assured of the co-operation of the CRTC, and I think also you need the co-operation of the people.
>
> MR. PICARD: That's what I was going to say. (Based on CRTC 1974a, pp 1470-2)

All that cooperation seemed like a good idea at the time. It still does. But effective cooperation seemed to require both a change in the external orientation of the CBC and changes in public policy.

d) ABOUT PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN CANADA

Television is a competitor. It competes for our time with working, sleeping, and other necessary and optional activities. When we watch it, we do so because we choose to -- because it has successfully competed for our time.

Television is competitive. Broadcasting organizations compete with each other for our viewing attention. When we watch one program rather than another, we do so because we choose to -- beacuse it has successfully competed for our attention.

Canadian television programs compete with American television programs. Except where alternatives are not yet available, when Canadians watch Canadian programs they do so because they choose to -- because they are more entertaining, more informative, more in tune with their own lives, and/or simply because they are Canadian.

Ultimately, regulation cannot force Canadians to watch Canadian programs. If they want to get cable TV and watch it every night and watch only US programs, they will do so. They have the power to elect a government which will permit them to do any or all of those things.

In practice, few Canadians are willing to watch programs which are less entertaining, less informative, and less in tune with their lives solely because they are Canadian. Ultimately, Canadians will only watch Canadian programs if those programs have a quality and appeal sufficient to compete successfully not only with US television programs but with all the other things which compete for their time.

. Television competes most successfully for the time of Canadians during the evening. At that time Canadian programs must compete with US programs in which the production investment in 1973/74 was approximately $200,000 per hour -- or $10,400,000 for one hour of original production each week for a year. The total 1973/74 CBC English Television budget was $54,538,000.

In the United States, television has a fully developed film industry as an established source of programming. In Canada, the CBC is expected to financially assist the development of such an industry.

The Broadcasting Act established the CBC on behalf of the Canadian people as an institution to contribute to national unity. It will make such a contribution only to the extent that it is watched. If only its US programs attract substantial numbers of viewers, then the medium is the message. If its Canadian programs attract substantial numbers of viewers, they will share what the national broadcasting service reflects of their country to them, and there will be a contribution to unity.

But Canadians share something else: they share the way the national broadcasting service reflects on them as a people. If they are proud of its Canadian services, if they think its Canadian programs are worthy, the institution itself will stand as a positive force contributing to unity. Even if they are not proud of it there will be some contribution to unity -- through having a common institution to talk about and react to and criticize and know as their own. But such a backwards approach to unity has disturbing implications for the cultural confidence which the nation has in itself.

It is interesting, in the light of a recent CBC budget cut and a more recent upwards adjustment, to speculate on the nature of the relationship between the cultural and economic confidence of a nation. The CBC budget cut had its origin in national economic problems brought on by the combination of similar problems in the United States and the fact that it has largely been Americans who have invested in the economic future of Canada. In much the same way that social and political unity are linked, I suggest there is a connection between a nation's cultural and economic confidence.

The problem for public broadcasting is that investments in cultural futures do not pay off very quickly. It takes time to develop talent and skills and ideas, and so it is perhaps understandable that successive Canadian governments, each with its own immediate problems and instincts for political survival, have not invested heavily in the development of a strong and vital and distinctively Canadian national broadcasting service. Unfortunately, the longer the hesitation the higher the entry price. In 1970, Professor Thomas McPhail of Loyola University's Department of Communication Arts, warned the Davey Committee that "Canada has one decade remaining in which its members have to make up their minds whether they want to remain a distinct political, cultural, and geographical national entity" (Davey 1970a, p 11). On the eve of the 1974 CBC licence renewal hearing, Pierre Juneau is quoted as having declared, "Look, we either have a country or we don't. Let's decide" (Lewis, p 12).

I'm not going to suggest that, if there isn't an immediate change in public policy, or a new external orientation in the Corporation, the CBC will wither and die and that the nation will disintegrate shortly thereafter. Changes will come and I think their natures and directions are almost inevitable; the uncertainty is as to their timing. It seems to me that the sooner the changes are begun, or at least seriously contemplated, the easier the necessary adjustments will be.

The first question facing the Canadian public, therefore, is whether a review of public broadcasting policy is now in order. I have tried in Chapter 12 to argue that it is. I think that the record of the 1974 licence renewal process stands as sufficient evidence of the fact that the structural arrangements for broadcasting in Canada require re-examination. If there is no appraisal, and if general national conditions do not change drastically, things will probably continue pretty much as they are in broadcasting and in the CBC until a crisis precipitates a crash investigation. McPhail and Juneau essentially argued that by the time such an obvious crisis developed, it would be too late to preserve a distinctively Canadian system of broadcasting. They may well be right. In any event, it is clear that if policy review begins now, it can be more thorough, more contemplative, more public, and no doubt more successful in steering broadcasting in ways which relate to the needs of the society, than if it is left until there is a crisis in the Canadian broadcasting system, in the CBC, or in both. The question of whether a review is in order prompts two others: how might it come about, and is it likely to? Earlier, I suggested it was in the CBC's interest to have a review, and that some initiative on its part would not have been inappropriate. At the least, it needs public clarification of the Government's policy on future CBC commercial activity. The CRTC clearly needed a clarification of its role. The basic questions are matters of public policy, so there would seem to be Parliamentary and Governmental responsibilities to attend to public broadcasting policy matters now. The other possibility for initiative, and the most interesting one, would seem to lie outside the realm of the "official" public. If the 305 intervenors in the 1974 licence renewal had one thing in common, it was an interest in an effective review of Canadian public broadcasting policy. Most of them regarded the CRTC hearing as such a review. In the end, it wasn't; moreover, it didn't lead to one, and it didn't result in policy clarification. In the interval, there have been some changes of opinion. There are new directions within the CBC. Some members of 1974 Committee on Television group now believe that the CBC has a resource problem. The Canadian Broadcasting League is presumably as committed as ever to the concepts of a distinctively Canadian system of broadcasting and an independent and innovative CBC. It seems likely that there could be widespread "active" public support for a comprehensive policy review. Whether there is likely to be such a review depends, quite simply, on whether any one of the CBC, the CRTC, Parliament, the Government, the creative workers of broadcasting, or any of the groups or individuals concerned with broadcasting in Canada who were so much in evidence in 1974 takes the initiative.

If there is to be a policy review, it must focus first on the Canadian broadcasting system as a whole. I think the concept of a combined system is valid, but there have been major changes in the conditions of that system since the 1968 Act was framed. In Chapter 12 I argued that a comprehensive review must begin with a reconsideration of "Broadcasting Policy for Canada." I suspect that the principles of that policy will be reaffirmed, but such reaffirmation should recognize and accept the fact that ambitious objectives cannot be accomplished without the expenditure of energy and other resources.

It seems important that, in all their phases, any future reviews recognize that broadcasting systems are a function of their national settings and that the institute may be as accurate, if not more so, in reflecting national conditions and problems as the program services they provide. In Chapter 12 I argued that tendencies to consider beheading the messenger are inevitable, given that broadcasting mandates are written in the expectation that the electronic media will solve, or at least help solve, national problems. Recognition that broadcasting's problems are encoded versions of the political issues which confront nations, and that institutional characteristics result from environmental influences, from policies, and from the nature of the structural arrangements for broadcasting, is important. But it importance is as background to a review: exhortations or impassioned pleas for understanding will not on their own change much.

So far as the CBC is concerned, the first questions must be about its role. Its mandate responsibilities must be reassessed in the light of their resource demand implications. Its audience orientation must be reassessed in light of conditions and trends both in the Canadian broadcasting environment and in the general Canadian social climate. Scattered throughout the hearing interventions and the 1974 licence renewal document are indications that some Canadians were having second thoughts about certain aspects of twentieth century mass societies. It would seem important to determine the exact nature and extent of those concerns. They may well constitute the most valid argument for a CBC "differentiated" from commercial services. There are no "two way choice" policy options here: the questions are about balance and timing. The differentiation process had already begun before the end of the case study period. The "block schedule" was becoming fragmented, and by 1974 it was a potentially misleading representation of actual English Television service. The audience data used most in this study is from the BBM measurement period closest to the public hearing, from 23 January through 3 February 1974; during that period, 21% of all English Television network service and 22% of all prime time service consisted of special programming not reflected on block schedules -- principally "public broadcasting" coverage of the Commonwealth Games and extended coverage of the National Energy Conference. It seems to me that further differentiation was required, but not through ceasing to be a "popular" service. Consideration of the degree and rate of differentiation appropriate for public broadcasting service in Canada must be extremely careful; the various balancing processes involved are complex and should be well understood by those advocating change; and there are resource implications, considered below, which should also be taken into account.

The second set of questions concerning the CBC deal with the structural arrangements for public broadcasting in Canada. It seemed to me that the CBC was tied much too directly, both in policy and in operations, to the Government. I've suggested that the Corporation's operational dependence on the Government led to institutional conservatism and to conservative programming. There are two possible approaches to establishing greater institutional independence: one is to change formal structural arrangements -- reporting lines, regulatory systems, funding mechanisms, and periods of funding; the other approach is for the broadcasting institution itself to develop a meaningful relationship with its audience public and, thereby, establish the basis for its independence. I suggest that effective change will require the application of these two approaches in combination, and that such change, if achieved, will be evolutionary. Structural change requires a policy review; institutional initiative does not, and, if taken in advance of policy reassessment, may establish a basis for earlier and more effective structural change.

The final set of questions concerning the CBC deal with resources. These questions must be taken up last because they must be considered against a defined role and specific objectives, not against vague or global expectations. If, for instance, quality regional program services are to be a prominent feature of Canadian public broadcasting service, then Canadians are going to have to get serious about the costs. And there are significant cost implications in opting for a more differentiated service. National unity and Canadian identity objectives can be used to argue the case for quality Canadian programming of popular appeal. If "making good things popular and popular things good" is an appropriate general goal for the CBC, then there are major outstanding requirements for program and talent and production and management development. And consideration of resources will have to face the question of commercial activity and the distribution system implications of any changes in that activity. The question of commercial activity is exceedingly complex. A multitude of arguments have been made both to support the elimination or reduction of commercial activity and to justify continuation of current policies and practices. The revenue which the CBC derives from selling advertising time comes at a cost both to the organization and the services it provides. The question is not whether commercial activity comes at a cost, but whether the costs to service are justified by the net gain in funding. Making such a determination will be difficult because "costs to service" are primarily intangibles. But the policy on commercial activity must be considered thoroughly because, although it is raised here within a third group of questions, it is a major policy question in its own right. In can, in fact, be seen as an encoded precis of the problems of public broadcasting in Canada.

At the practical level, the commercial activity question is bound up with the overall demand/resource imbalance. In the early days of CBC television, when the emphasis was on getting any service to as many Canadians as possible, deriving revenue from commercial advertising was one means of dealing with the CBC's mounting requirements for money. And the incorporation of private commercial stations into the system as affiliates was an economical means of extending coverage. But there have been significant changes since CBC television was monopoly television in Canada and, indeed, since 1968. Commercial activity, though at one point enabling Canada to extend CBC services across the land quickly and at reduced public cost, may now or soon be introducing more and greater problems than it solves. In particular, it would seem to seriously complicate the task of responding appropriately to the changes in the Canadian broadcasting environment already produced by the rapid growth of cable and by the licensing of additional Canadian commercial stations and networks. And technological trends towards the provision of an even greater range of "programming" choices in the future would seen to hold the promise of throwing the CBC's role and its commercial activities into even greater conflict.

By the end of the case study period the CBC was, on one hand, arguing the need to "differentiate" its services from those provided by commercial broadcasters. But, on the other hand, it was also arguing that the nature of its distribution system justified or demanded the scheduling of popular US entertainment programming in peak viewing periods -- to maintain the "commercial viability" of its affiliates and its own revenue position. In essence, the CBC was admitting that the distribution system was determining program service content. Moreover, despite its attempts to deliver large audiences to the affiliates, the Corporation found itself unable to maintain their commercial viability and faced the prospect of either subsidizing or taking over operations in financial trouble. If the pattern and the trends continue, as it seems they inevitably will, the CBC will increasingly be paying for its distribution system at both ends -- by shaping its service schedules to sustain its commercial affiliates and, to the extent that such approaches are insufficient to maintain their commercial viability in the changing Canadian broadcasting environment, by further subsidization of their operations. But it should be recognized that the alternative will be costly. This study argues that effective differentiation of program services required substantially increased resources for programming, notably for program development. Such a differentiation also has major implications for the distribution system, and a clear differentiation will come at the cost of either extending the public portion of the distribution system or substantially subsidizing the private portion of the system.

The commercial policy question thus raises major resource level questions, as well as some less tangible ones. In his 1974 submission to the CRTC, George Ferguson took up the relationship between goals and resources; he observed:

> What are we to make of governments which, on the one hand, declare their determination to keep radio and television Canadian and then do nothing about the product they are charged to supervise? And what do you make of a government which directs its instrument, the CBC, to do everything in its power to make ends meet -- an objective declared, it may be added, without any parliamentary sanction. No statute exists declaring that the CBC must pay its way. Everybody knows that, if the CBC was to do the job Parliament assigned it to, the CBC would cost money. It may not have been clear thirty-odd years ago, but it is clear today. Yet nobody, so far as I know, has ever raised this central point. Yet it is clear that if the existing directives are maintained, and if the CBC's first duty is to make more money, the programming policy must include prime time for commercially sponsored features, which, in turn, means that the only programs that fulfill the original purposes of the publicly owned system must be shown at other hours of the day or night when commercial interests are not at stake. This is putting the cart before the horse with a vengeance. (Ferguson 1974, pp 6-7)

Beyond the tangible resource problems, the commercial activity question also encodes a more general aspect of public broadcasting policy development and interpretation in Canada. As Ferguson noted, the commercial policy is an operational policy of the Government, not one established by Parliament, not one determined by the public. Thus, the commercial policy question raises major structural questions as well. I've argued that by 1974 the CBC had become alarmingly close to becoming just another department of the Government. And I've argued that it needed to become more open with the public as a means of securing and preserving independence. But a Corporation so heavily operationally dependent on the Government was in an awkward position to begin asserting its own independence. The CRTC attempted to intervene in this closed relationship between the CBC and the Government, and it failed. Just how closed that relationship actually has become is illustrated by the fact that the basis for the 1974 public discussion between the CBC and the CRTC about the future of the public broadcasting service remains a secret Cabinet document.

There is a suggestion of inevitability in Anthony Smith's contention that the unresolved neuroses from which nations suffer can be found encoded in the ways they choose to organize broadcasting, and I don't accept that inevitability. I think Canadians have enough faith in their collective future to justify an appropriate investment in their country's cultural future. Ferguson commented:

> The makers of Canada a century ago knew they were embarking on an experiment that would be difficult, risky and costly. On these scores they had no illusions. Within two years the financial terms of Confederation had to be changed so that the poor partners would have to be subsidized by those partners who could afford to put more into the common pot. Those subsidies have continued to this day, despite the protests of the richer members of the union that they cannot afford to pay a nickel more. In every field you can mention, this same story has been repeated again and again and again. We found we needed new canals and new and bigger locks, and we built them. We extended ourselves westward, and again millions and millions were needed for new railways, and we built them. New ports? We built them. Nationally speaking, we built ourselves on subsidies, each occasion being made the subject of new protests that we could not afford the price. We went on building just the same.
>
> .... Increasingly I have wondered why a crown corporation like the CBC has not spent its resources on the interpretation of the different areas of Canada, one to another. They do not know each other. They do not yet understand each other. There are misunderstandings and ignorance on every hand. Yet how miserable are the reasons given for failure. It turns out that the CBC has not the money to do the job, and that the given reason for that lack, is that the corporation must concentrate its energies and talents on making money, rather than concentrate on the repair of the national framework.
>
> This is a massive break with the past. In the old days, we gladly spent hundreds of millions of dollars on providing ourselves with the capital equipment our economic growth required. But we shrink back when it comes to the task of explaining to ourselves why such equipment is needed, indeed why Canada itself should exist and for what purposes. When Parliament turns to such a topic, it is to hear complaints that broadcasting in Gaelic is being reduced. Our problems are mountainous, and I wonder what headway we are making with them. (Ferguson 1974, pp 9-11)

It seemed to me that in 1974 not much headway was made. The future of the "national" broadcasting service seemed to lay in the hands of national institutions -- the CBC itself, the Government, and -- to a much lesser extent -- the CRTC and Parliament. The Broadcasting Act doesn't label the CBC as Canada's "public" broadcasting service. Perhaps it should, if only as a semantic reminder to national institutions that the most important relationship in public broadcasting in Canada must be between the CBC and the public.

It seems to me inevitable that the changes in the Canadian broadcasting environment in the early 1970s will eventually require a reassessment of the role of the CBC. I suggest that when that reassessment is made, a need for vastly increased levels of public support will be identified. But it seems unrealistic to expect a sudden and massive increase at some given point in the future. Because Canada's public resources are not unlimited, it seems to me that the sensible approach is to make an early determination of the "target" role for the CBC, to assess the structural and resource implications of that role, and to begin systematically to move towards it as soon as possible.

This study doesn't contain great long lists of specific recommendations. Most of the issues and questions considered are, ultimately, matters of public policy, and I don't presume here to suggest in detail what public policy should be. But I do presume to recommend that policy be reconsidered.

1. The national broadcasting service is, formally, a creature of Parliament. The CBC's mandate was established by Parliament, the structural arrangements for broadcasting were determined by Parliament, and it has ultimate control of public resources. Parliament has first responsibility for taking the initiative in bringing about a review of Canadian public broadcasting policy.

2. Effectively, the Government is in control of the CBC. But control implies responsibility as well, so Parliament's responsibility to ensure that its broadcasting policy for Canada is appropriate to current conditions and that resources are adequate for the discharge of the mandate it has given the Corporation are, in a very special sense, the responsibilities of the Government as well. Moreover, given what would seem to be inevitable requirements for increased levels of CBC resource support in the future, it would seem to be in the Government's own best interest to have a fully public reconsideration of broadcasting policy at an early date.

3. I have characterized the CRTC as a "frustrated" observer of the the current public broadcasting policy development and interpretation process -- a process which involves primarily the Government and the CBC. The 1974 licence renewal decision can be regarded as a disguised call for a review of public policy. Whether the 1974 disguise was appropriate does not seem important now. It does seem to me that the time has come when the CRTC can, and should, call directly for a public clarification of the broadcasting policies it has been charged to implement.

4. I have suggested that the sources of many of the CBC's problems were external, and that its effective independence was extremely limited. Even so, I suggest that the CBC has an appropriate role to play in the planning of its own future. Given its recent preoccupation with efficiency, its persisting problems, and the prospect of increasing resource requirements in the future, it would seem to be in the Corporation's own best interest that there be a full public review of Canadian public broadcasting policy.

5. Ultimately, the future of broadcasting in Canada rests with the public. Parliament, the Government, the CRTC, and the CBC are its instruments, but these institutions have not recently consulted the public about its public broadcasting wishes and convictions. It may well be that public pressure will have to be brought to bear before there is a comprehensive reassessment of the relationship between the CBC and the public it was created to serve. One of the most interesting aspects of the differentiation process set in motion by cable and audience fragmentation is that it provides an opportunity to convert the CBC into a more public broadcasting service. I've suggested that the CBC itself has responsibilities and an interest in such a development, but it seems to me that the Corporation will see those responsibilities and opportunities in a clearer light if there is evidence of public interest and concern. The national broadcasting service was established as a result of public initiative channeled through the Canadian Broadcasting League. Given the apparent inability of the CBC and the CRTC to alter the course of public broadcasting, and the apparent reluctance of Parliament and the Government to confront the issues, public initiative seems once again required. I sense that the necessary confidence in the future exists; what is required is a demonstration of that confidence to the public's representatives and its institutions. If leadership does not come from Parliament, the Government, the CRTC, or the CBC, it can and should come from the public. Whether it does or not may be a more telling indicator of the future of the nation as a whole than is widely recognized.

The CBC has been a unique institution and now offers unique opportunities for Canadians to develop a distinctive system of broadcasting suited to the needs and conditions of Canadian society. The cost is admittedly high. But if the CBC is not re-defined and differentiated, it will decline, and the opportunities will be lost. I think that the costs are justified, and that the time to begin to confront them is now.

POST SCRIPT 23 June 1976

In the interval between formal submission of this study to Stanford University and completion of preparations for this printing, there were two significant developments of direct relevance to this study.

Within English Television there was the announcement of significant changes in the composition and structure of the Planning Group, and it would appear that there will be further and related changes over the next few months. With respect to this study, these changes out-date the structural organization of the Planning Group presented in Chapter 9, but they would not appear to affect most of the analysis of management decision making in Chapter 13 -- which argued that structural changes might have eased the communication overload conditions under which the English Television Planning Group worked, but that changes were also required in the CBC's public and internal orientation, at the Planning Group level and above.

With respect to the CBC as a whole, there was a press report on planned changes in both the method and level of CBC funding. The Canadian Press reported:

> The government has agreed on a plan by which the CBC will be guaranteed -- short of a parliamentary upset -- an annual increase in its programming and equipment improvement budget for the next five years, authoritative sources say.
>
> While the formula has not been announced in detail, it has been under discussion between the corporation and the government's treasury board officers for about three years. The tip-off to its approval came in a speech in Winnipeg on May 12 by Secretary of State Hugh Faulkner on cultural development....
>
> What the Cabinet has agreed to, said sources in Mr. Faulkner's office, is an annual minimum increase in CBC subsidies from the treasury, plus a margin extra to recognize the annual rate of inflation. The treasury board has agreed that a recognized part of the annual subsidy increase should go to developing better programs on radio and TV....
>
> The CBC's annual grants will still be subject to approval by Parliament, but the corporation at least has the government's promise that it will propose stated amounts for the next five years.... (THE LONDON FREE PRESS, 28 May 1976, p 3)

The CP report also indicated that there would be incremental annual increases in the CBC budget for the next five years, but that "the exact amount has not been announced because they are dependent on annual appropriations passed by Parliament. There was no indication of any contemplated change in commercial policy. With respect to this study, the report appears to underline the seriousness of the level of resources and annual basis of funding problems identified in Chapter 11. Perhaps more importantly, it also illustrates the extent to which the CBC has become involved in a closed relationship with the Cabinet and the Treasury Board. The need for a comprehensive review of the CBC's role, structural arrangements, and resource requirements suggested in Chapter 12 remains undiminished, if not augmented. There remains the need for review of the Government/CBC policy on commercial activity. And the need for strengthening the relationship between the CBC and the Canadian public remains. Perhaps Parliamentary consideration of the new Government/CBC plan will provide an opportunity to demand a comprehensive public review of Canadian public broadcasting policy. This recent development, though helpful to the CBC, would seem to fall far short of meeting the Corporation's real requirements for operational independence and for resources adequate for the major program development undertakings which this study argues to be essential in the changed and changing Canadian broadcasting environment.

Appendix

Excerpts from the Broadcasting Act (1968)

Canada, Parliament, 1967-68, Chapter 25.
Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970.

Part I: General

Broadcasting Policy for Canada

3. It is hereby declared that
   a) broadcasting undertakings in Canada make use of radio frequencies that are public property and such undertakings constitute a single system, herein referred to as the Canadian broadcasting system, comprising public and private elements;
   b) the Canadian broadcasting system should be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians so as to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada;
   c) all persons licensed to carry on broadcasting undertakings have a responsibility for programs they broadcast but the right of freedom of expression and the right of persons to receive programs, subject only to generally applicable statutes and regulations, is unquestioned;
   d) the programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system should be varied and comprehensive and should provide reasonable, balanced opportunity for the expression of differing views on matters of public concern, and the programming provided should be of high standard, using predominantly Canadian creative and other resources;
   e) all Canadians are entitled to broadcasting service in English and French as public funds become available;
   f) there should be provided, through a corporation established by Parliament for the purpose, a national broadcasting service that is predominantly Canadian in content and character;
   g) the national broadcasting service should
      i) be a balanced service of information, enlightenment and entertainment for people of different ages, interests and tastes covering the whole range of programming in fair proportion,
      ii) be extended to all parts of Canada, as public funds become available,
      iii) be in English and French, serving the special needs of geographic regions, actively contributing to the flow and exchange of cultural and regional information and entertainment, and
      iv) contribute to the development of national unity and provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity;
   h) where any conflict arises between the objectives of the national broadcasting service and the interests of the private element of the Canadian broadcasting system, it shall be resolved in the public interest but paramount consideration shall be given to the objectives of the national broadcasting service;
   i) facilities should be provided within the Canadian broadcasting system for educational broadcasting; and
   j) the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system should be flexible and readily adaptable to scientific and technical advances;

   and that the objectives of the broadcasting policy for Canada enunciated in this section can best be achieved by providing for the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system by a single independent public authority.

Part II: Canadian Radio-Television Commission

Objects of the Commission

15. Subject to this Act and the Radio Act and any directions to the Commission issued from time to time by the Governor in Council under the authority of this Act, the Commission shall regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system with a view to implementing the broadcasting policy enunciated in section 3 of this Act.

Powers of the Commission

16. (1) In furtherance of its objects, the Commission, on the recommendation of the Executive Committee, may
  a) prescribe classes of broadcasting licences;
  b) make regulations applicable to all persons holding broadcasting licences, or to all persons holding broadcasting licences of one or more classes,
    i) respecting standards of programs and the allocation of broadcasting time for the purpose of giving effect to paragraph 3(d),
    ii) respecting the character of advertising and the amount of time that may be devoted to advertising,
    iii) respecting the proportion of time that may be devoted to the broadcasting of programs, advertisements, or announcements of a partisan political character and the assignment of such time on an equitable basis to political parties and candidates,
    iv) respecting the use of dramatization in programs, advertisements or announcements of a partisan political nature.
    v) respecting the broadcasting times to be reserved for network programs by any broadcasting station operated as part of a network,
    vi) prescribing the conditions for the operation of broadcasting stations as part of a network and the conditions for the broadcasting of network programs,
    vii) with the approval of the Treasury Board, fixing the schedules of fees to be paid by licensees and providing for the payment thereof,
    viii) requiring licensees to submit to the Commission such information regarding their programs and financial affairs or otherwise relating to the conduct and management of their affairs as the regulations may specify, and
    ix) respecting such other matters as it deems necessary for the furtherance of its objects; and
  c) subject to this Part, revoke any broadcasting licence other than a broadcasting licence issued to the Corporation.

17. (1) In furtherance of the objects of the Commission, the Executive Committee, after consultation with the part-time members in attendance at a meeting of the Commission, may
  a) issue broadcasting licences for such terms not exceeding five years and subject to such conditions related to the circumstances of the licensee
    i) as the Executive Committee deems appropriate for the implementation of the broadcasting policy enunciated in section 3, and
    ii) in the case of broadcasting licences issued to the Corporation, as the Executive Committee deems consistent with the provision, through the Corporation, of the national broadcasting service contemplated by section 3;
  b) upon application by a licensee, amend any conditions of a broadcasting licence issued to him;
  c) issue renewals of broadcasting licences for such terms not exceeding five years as the Executive Committee considers reasonable and subject to the conditions to which the renewed licences were previously subject or to such other conditions as comply with paragraph (a);

d) subject to this Part, suspend any broadcasting licence other than a broadcasting licence issued to the Corporation; ....

(2) The Executive Committee and the Corporation shall, at the request of the Corporation, consult with regard to any conditions that the Executive Committee proposes to attach to any licence issued or to be issued to the Corporation.

(3) If, notwithstanding the consultation provided for in subsection (2), the Executive Committee attaches any condition to a broadcasting licence described in subsection (2) that the Corporation is satisfied would unreasonably impede the provision, through the Corporation, of the national broadcasting service contemplated by section 3, the Corporation may refer the condition to the Minister for consideration and the Minister, after consultation with the Commission and the Corporation, may give to the Executive Committee a written directive with respect to the condition and the Executive Committee shall comply with such directive....

18. (1) The Executive Committee may undertake, sponsor, promote or assist in research relating to any aspect of broadcasting and in so doing it shall, wherever appropriate, utilize technical, economic and statistical information and advice from the Corporation or departments or agencies of the Government of Canada.

Hearings and Procedure

19. (1) A public hearing shall be held by the Commission
a) in connection with the issue of a broadcasting licence other than a licence to carry on a temporary network operation; or
b) where the Commission or the Executive Committee has under consideration the revocation or suspension of a broadcasting licence.

(2) A public hearing shall be held by the Commission, if the Executive Committee is satisfied that it would be in the public interest to hold such a hearing, in connection with
a) the amendment of a broadcasting licence;
b) the issue of a licence to carry on a temporary network operation; or
c) a complaint by a person with respect to any matter within the powers of the Commission.

(3) A public hearing shall be held by the Commission in connection with the renewal of a broadcasting licence unless the Commission is satisfied that such a hearing is not required and, notwithstanding subsection (2), a public hearing may be held by the Commission in connection with any other matter in respect of which the Commission deems such a public hearing to be desirable....

21. The Commission may make rules respecting the procedure for making applications, representations and complaints to the Commission and the conduct of hearings under section 19 and generally respecting the conduct of business of the Commission in relation thereto....

Part III: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

Objects and Powers

39. (1) The Corporation is established for the purpose of providing the national broadcasting service contemplated by section 3, in accordance with the conditions of any licence or licences issued to it by the Commission and subject to any applicable regulations of the Commission, and for that purpose the Corporation has the power to

a) establish, equip, maintain and operate broadcasting undertakings;
b) make operating agreements with licensees for the broadcasting of programs;
c) originate programs, and secure programs from within or outside Canada by purchase, exchange or otherwise, and make arrangements necessary for their transmission;
d) make contracts with any person, within or outside Canada, in connection with the production or presentation of programs originated or secured by the Corporation;
e) make contracts with any person, within or outside Canada, for performances in connection with the programs of the Corporation;
f) with the approval of the Minister, act as agent for or on behalf of any person in providing broadcasting service to any part of Canada not served by any other licensee;
g) publish, distribute and preserve, whether for a consideration or otherwise, such audio-visual material, papers, periodicals and other literary material as may seem conducive to the purposes of the Corporation;
h) collect news relating to current events in any part of the world and establish and subscribe to news agencies;
i) acquire copyrights and trade marks;
j) acquire and use any patent, or patent rights, licences or concessions that the Corporation considers useful for its purposes;
k) make arrangements or agreements with any organization for the use of any rights, privileges or concessions that the Corporation considers useful for its purposes;
l) acquire broadcasting undertakings either by lease or by purchase;
m) subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, acquire, hold and dispose of shares of the capital stock of any company or corporation authorized to carry on any business that is incidental or conducive to the attainment of the objects of the Corporation; and
n) do all such other things as the Corporation deems essential or conducive to the attainment of the purposes of the Corporation....

Agent of Her Majesty

40. (1) Except as provided in subsection 38(3), the Corporation is, for all purposes of this Act, an agent of Her Majesty, and its powers under this Act may be exercised only as an agent of Her Majesty....

41. The Corporation may purchase, lease or otherwise acquire any real or personal property that the Corporation deems necessary or convenient for carrying out its objects and may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of all or any part of any property acquired by it, except that the Corporation shall not, without approval of the Governor in Council, enter into any transaction for the acquisition of any real or personal property, other than program material or rights therein, for a consideration in excess of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, or enter into a lease of other agreement for the use or occupation of real property involving an expenditure in excess of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

42. (1) The Corporation may, with the approval of the Governor in Council, take or acquire lands without the consent of the owner for the purpose of carrying out its objects, and, except as otherwise provided in this section, the Expropriation Act, with such modifications as circumstances require, is applicable to and in respect of the exercise of the powers conferred by this section and the lands so taken or acquired....

Financial Provisions

46. The accounts and financial transactions of the Corporation shall be audited annually by the Auditor General of Canada and a report of the audit shall be made to the Corporation and to the Minister....

References

FORMAT NOTES

1. All references (to books, periodicals, newspaper articles, government and agency documents, and so on) appear here in one combined list.

2. Abbreviated forms of reference have been alphabetized here in the same condensed forms in which they appear in the text. Full forms are given in parentheses following the abbreviated forms or, in the case of multiple references to the same source, in an expanded entry in square parentheses immediately preceding the first reference to that source.

3. "CRTC Hearing" is an abbreviated form of reference to the Canadian Radio-Television Commission Hearing on Applications by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation for Renewal of Licences for AM, FM, and TV Networks and Owned and Operated Stations, Ottawa, 18-22 April 1974.

4. "CP Story" is an abbreviated form of reference to Canadian Press service stories.

5. "DNS" is an abbreviated form of reference to "CBC 'Daily News Summary,'" the secondary source of references to certain newspaper stories and articles.

REFERENCES

ACT (BROADCASTING ACT). Canada, Parliament, 1967-68, c.25. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970.

ACTRA (Association of Canadian Television and Radio Artists). CRTC Hearing Intervention. 31 January 1974.

Adilman, Sid. "Group Protests 'Automatic' CBC License," THE TORONTO STAR, 31 October 1973, p F14.

Affiliates (Private Affiliates' Committee of CBC Television Networks). CRTC Hearing Intervention. 31 January 1974.

Ashley & Smails (C.A. Ashley and R.G.N. Smails). CANADIAN CROWN CORPORATIONS. Toronto: MacMillan, 1965.

[ATPDT: Association of Television Producers and Directors (Toronto)]

ATPDT 1974a. "After 1975, What?" CRTC Hearing Intervention. 1974.

ATPDT 1974b ("Some Members of the Association"). "An Additional Statement." Submission to CRTC. 15 February 1974.

Arctic Inst (The Arctic Institute of North America). MAN IN THE NORTH TECHNICAL PAPER, PART II. Montreal: Arctic Institute, September 1971.

Barrett, Edward W. "Folksy TV News," COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, 12:4 (November/December 1973), 16-20.

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). BBC HANDBOOK 1975. London: BBC, 1974.

[BBM: BBM Bureau of Measurement, Toronto.]

BBM 1970. BBM TELEVISION MARKET REPORTS (#1 - Halifax, #7 - Toronto and Hamilton, #12 - Vancouver and Victoria). 12-25 January 1970.

BBM 1972. BBM RADIO AND TELEVISION DATA 1972. February 1972.

BBM 1973. BBM RADIO AND TELEVISION DATA 1973. April 1973.

BBM 1974a. BBM TELEVISION MARKET REPORTS (#1 - Halifax, #7 - Toronto and Hamilton, #12 - Vancouver and Victoria). 23 January - 3 February 1974.

BBM 1974b. BBM TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM REPORT. 23 January - 3 February 1974.

Beattie, Eleanor. A HANDBOOK OF CANADIAN FILM. Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1973.

Bercovici, Liza. "The Moving Needle Stops," TV GUIDE, 21 December 1974, 23-6.

Berton, Pierre. "The CBC and Separatism." CRTC Hearing Intervention. 30 January 1974.

Billington, Dave. THE [Montreal] GAZETTE, 20 March 1975, in DNS, 20 March 1975.

[Blackburn: Bob Blackburn. Except as noted: Regular bylined column. THE [Toronto] SUN.]

Blackburn 1970. "Satanic Look of CRTC Head Suits a Hot Job," THE [Toronto] TELEGRAM, 7 February 1970, p 43.

Blackburn 1973a. 7 December 1973, p 28.

Blackburn 1974a. 19 February 1974, in DNS, 20 February 1974.

Blackburn 1974b. 25 February 1974, in DNS, 26 February 1974.

Blackburn 1974c. 3 April 1974, p 23.

Blackburn 1974d. 9 July 1974, p 23.

Blackburn 1974e. 13 March 1974, p 23.

Bower, Robert T. TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC. Toronto/New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

Boyle, Harry J. MOSTLY IN CLOVER. Toronto: Clark Irwin, 1961.

[Braithwaite: Dennis Braithwaite. THE TORONTO STAR.]

Braithwaite 1974a. Regular bylined column, 18 March 1974, in DNS, 21 March 1974.

Braithwaite 1974b. "Now Elitists Want To Censor The CBC," 7 February 1974.

Breitrose, Henry S. "The Effects of Distraction in Attenuating Counterargument." Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Stanford University: Department of Communication, September 1965. [Main citations: Allyn, J. and Festinger, L. "The Effectiveness of Unanticipated Persuasive Communications," JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 62, 1961, 35-40; Festinger, L. and Maccoby, Nathan, "On Resistance to Persuasive Communications," JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 68, 1964, 359-66; Freedman, J.L., and

Sears, D.O., "Warning, Distraction and Resistance to Influence," JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2, 1965, 420-6.]

[Britannica: Toronto/Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1974.]

Britannica 1974a. "Canada," in MACROPAEDIA, vol 3, pp 713-23.

Britannica 1974b. "Populations and Areas," in 1974 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR, pp 555-9.

[Broadcaster: BROADCASTER, Toronto.]

Broadcaster 1974. "CBC to Get $50 Million for Service Extension," 34:3 (March 1974), 5.

Broadcaster 1976a. "CBC Maintains Commercial Television Position," 35:2 (February 1976), 8.

Broadcaster 1976b. "Completion Date of CBC's Accelerated Coverage Program to be Delayed," 35:2 (February 1976), 8.

[Broadcasting: BROADCASTING, New York.]

Broadcasting 1971. "The 1971-72 Schedule: What It Cost To Make, What It Will Cost To Buy," 5 April 197], 32-3.

Broadcasting 1974. "Cost Spiral Jeopardizing TV, Says Schwartz," 86:7 (18 February 1974), 40.

Brown, Les. TELEVI$ION: THE BUSINESS BEHIND THE BOX. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971.

Bruyn, S.T. THE HUMAN PERSPECTIVE IN SOCIOLOGY: THE METHODOLOGY OF PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION. Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966.

CANADIAN FILM DIGEST. "Group Formed to Challenge CBC Programming Policy," November 1973.

Carey, James W. "Canadian Communication Theory: Extensions and Interpretations of Harold Innis," in Gertrude Joch Robinson and Donald Theall, eds., STUDIES IN CANADIAN COMMUNICATIONS. Montreal: McGill University Programme in Communications, 1975.

Carnegie (Carnegie Commission on Educational Television). PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.

Cater & Strickland (Douglass Cater and Stephen Strickland). TV VIOLENCE AND THE CHILD: THE EVOLUTION AND FATE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1975.

[CBC: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Ottawa.]

CBC 1969. "CN Kept Early Radio on the Rails," CLOSED CIRCUIT, 27 February 1969, 2.

CBC 1970a. CBC - A BRIEF HISTORY AND BACKGROUND. September 1970.

CBC 1970b. CBC ANNUAL REPORT, 1969-1970.

CBC 1970c. "Press Reaction, CRTC Hearing, April 1970." [Citations: THE TORONTO STAR, 16 April; THE [Montreal] STAR, 16 April; THE TORONTO STAR, 17 April; THE TORONTO STAR, 16 April.]

CBC 1970d. SUBMISSION BY CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION TO CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION COMMISSION RE LICENSING OF NETWORKS, PUBLIC HEARING, OTTAWA, APRIL 14, 1970, vol 1, BRIEF AND APPENDICES.

CBC 1972a (Knowlton Nash). Address to the Chamber of Commerce, London, Ontario. 25 April 1972.

CBC 1972b (Laurent Picard). "Management Problems in Broadcasting." Address to the Symposium of Modern Management in Broadcasting, European Broadcasting Union, Brussels, 17-19 May 1972.

CBC 1973a (CBC Research). "Patterns of Television Viewing in Canada: A Project Conducted for the President's 'Study of Television in the Seventies.'" Report TV/73/28. July 1973.

CBC 1973b. MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF CBC APPLICATIONS FOR RENEWAL OF NETWORK LICENCES: ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TELEVISION. Submission to CRTC. November 1973.

CBC 1973c. MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF CBC APPLICATIONS FOR RENEWAL OF NETWORK LICENCES: CORPORATE STATEMENT. Submission to CRTC. November 1973.

CBC 1973d. CBC ANNUAL REPORT, 1972-1973.

CBC 1973e (CBC Research). "Dimensions of Audience Reaction to Television Programs." Report TV/73/24. June 1973.

CBC 1973f (Lister Sinclair). Address to the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Toronto, 18 January 1973.

CBC 1974a. CBC FACT SHEET. 15 November 1974.

CBC 1974b. CBC ANNUAL REPORT, 1973-1974.

CBC 1974c. "President's Presentation: Visuals, CRTC Hearings, February]8-22, 1974."

CBC 1974d (Knowlton Nash). "Responsibilities of Public Broadcasting." Address to Temple Emmanu-el Brotherhood, Willowdale, Ontario. 20 January 1974.

CBC 1974e. CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION VISUAL IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM. Undated.

CBC 1975a. CBC FACT SHEET. 31 July 1975.

CBC 1975b. CBC ANNUAL REPORT, 1974-1975.

CBC 1975c. "B.C. Centre: Staff Comments on New Facilities," CLOSED CIRCUIT, 11:19 (1 December 1975), 3-6.

[CBL: Canadian Broadcasting League, Ottawa.]

CBL 1973. "An Opportunity For You To Comment," TELENATION, 1:8 (August 1973), 4.

CBL 1974. CRTC Hearing Intervention. 30 January 1974.

CBS Inc., Office of Social Research. "A Review and Evaluation of Recent Studies on the Impact of Violence." Mimeo. New York: CBS, 24 June 1964.

CFE (Canadian Film Editors Guild, Canadian Society of Cinematographers, Directors Guild of Canada, and Association of Motion Picture Producers and Laboratories of Canada). CANADIAN PROFESSIONAL FILM DIRECTORY, 1973/74. Toronto: Filmcraft, 1974.

[Citizen: THE [Ottawa] CITIZEN]

Citizen 1974. CP story. 10 December 1974, in DNS, 11 December 1974.

Citizen 1975a. CP Story, 20 February 1975, in DNS, 21 February 197).

Citizen 1975b. 14 February 1975, in DNS, 17 February 1975.

Citizen 1975c. CP story. 19 February 1975, in DNS, 20 February 1975.

Clery, Val. "The CBC Under Seige: A Corporation Programmed for Failure," MACLEAN'S, 87:6 (June 1974), 43 ff.

Cohen, Joan. THE [Ottawa] CITIZEN, 8 April 1974, in DNS, 9 April 1974.

Cook, Ramsay. "The People and Their Heritage: History," in Statistics Canada, ed., CANADA 1974. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1974, pp 30-7.

[COT: Committee on Television, Toronto.]

COT 1973. Press release. October 1973.

COT 1974. "Saving The CBC." CRTC Hearing Intervention. February 1974.

[CPB: Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Washington.]

CPB 1975 (Jack Lyle). THE PEOPLE LOOK AT PUBLIC TELEVISION. March 1975.

CPB 1976. "A Fresh Look at the PTV Viewer," CPB FOCUS ON RESEARCH, #8, 2 February 1976.

CPC (Canadian Polish Congress, Ukranian Canadian Committee (Ontario Council), and Federation of Italian Canadian Associations and Clubs). Joint CRTC Hearing Intervention. 13 February 1974.

[CRTC: Canadian Radio-Television Commission, Ottawa.]

CRTC 1970a. "Hearing on Applications by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation for Licences for AM, FM, and TV Networks and for Renewal of Licences for Owned and Operated Stations, Ottawa, 14 April 1970." Transcript.

CRTC 1970b. CRTC ANNUAL REPORT, 1969-1970.

CRTC 1971a. CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION COMMISSION RULES OF PROCEDURE. Public Announcement. 29 October 1971.

CRTC 1971b. CANADIAN BROADCASTING: "A SINGLE SYSTEM" - POLICY STATEMENT ON CABLE TELEVISION. 16 July 1971.

CRTC 1971c. THE INTEGRATION OF CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM. Statement in preparation for public hearing. 26 February 1971.

CRTC 1971d. "Public Hearing on CBC Radio Policy Proposal." Public Notice. 24 November 1971.

CRTC 1971e. "Broadcasting Services to More Remote Areas." Public Announcement. 29 April 1971.

CRTC 1972a (Pierre Juneau). "The Right To See Everything ... Including Ourselves." Address to Empire Club, Toronto. 24 February 1972.

CRTC 1972b. "CBC Radio Policy." Decision 72-197. 29 June 1972.

CRTC 1973a. "CBC Radio Policy." Public Announcement. 18 October 1973.

CRTC 1973b. Public Notice 1973-61. 28 November 1973.

CRTC 1973c. "Notice of Public Hearing." Public Notice 1973-63. 14 December 1973.

CRTC 1973d. "Hearing on Applications by Chako Broadasting Limited, Great Pacific Industries Limited, West Coast Broadcasting Limited, and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Vancouver, 11-13 June 1973." Transcript.

CRTC 1973e. "Television Services in [illegible]ancouver and Victoria Areas." Decision 73-398. 10 August 1973.

CRTC 1974a. "Hearing on Applications by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation for Renewal of Licences for AM, FM, and TV Networks and Owned and Operated Stations, Ottawa, 18-22 April 1974." Transcript.

CRTC 1974b. RADIO FREQUENCIES ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY: PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AND DECISION OF THE COMMISSION ON THE APPLICATIONS FOR RENEWAL OF THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION'S TELEVISION AND RADIO LICENCES. Decision 74-70. 31 March 1974.

CRTC 1974c. CRTC ANNUAL REPORT, 1973-1974.

CRTC 1975a. POLICY ANNOUNCEMENT ON CABLE TELEVISION. Public Announcement. 17 February 1975.

CRTC 1975b. POLICIES RESPECTING BROADCASTING RECEIVING UNDERTAKINGS (CABLE TELEVISION). 16 December 1975.

CRTC 1975c. FM RADIO IN CANADA -- A POLICY TO ENSURE A VARIED AND COMPREHENSIVE RADIO SERVICE. 20 January 1975.

CRTC 1976. "Canadian Production of Commercials." Public Announcement. 12 January 1976.

Curran, Sir Charles. "Researcher/Broadcaster Co-operation: Problems and Possibilities," in J.D. Halloran and M. Gurevitch, eds., BROADCASTER/RESEARCHER CO-OPERATION IN MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH. Leicester: Centre for Mass Communication Research, 1971.

[Davey: (Hon.) Keith Davey and others (Canada, Parliament, Special Senate Committee on the Mass Media). Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970.]

Davey 1970a. REPORT, vol I, THE UNCERTAIN MIRROR.

Davey 1970b. REPORT, vol II, WORDS, MUSIC, AND DOLLARS: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLISHING AND BROADCASTING IN CANADA, BY HOPKINS, HEDLIN LIMITED.

Davey 1970c. REPORT, vol III, GOOD, BAD, OR SIMPLY INEVITABLE?: SELECTED RESEARCH STUDIES.

DOC (Canada, Department of Communications). INSTANT WORLD: A REPORT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN CANADA. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971.

Douglas, Robert. "CRTC Shatters CBC Two-stream Radio Policy," BROADCASTER, 31:8 (August 1972), 12-22.

Edwards, Alyn. "CBC Vancouver: No Innovation Has Been Overlooked," BROADCASTER, 34:12 (Deember 1975), 18-20.

Elliott, Philip. THE MAKING OF A TELEVISION SERIES: A CASE STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE. London: Constable, 1972.

Emery, Walter B. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS OF BROADCASTING: THEIR HISTORY, OPERATION, AND CONTROL. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1969.

Epstein, Edward Jay. NEWS FROM NOWHERE: TELEVISION AND THE NEWS. New York: Random House, 1973.

Fawcett, Margot J., ed. THE 1975 CORPUS ALMANAC OF CANADA. Toronto: Corpus Publishers Services Limited, 1975.

[Ferguson: George V. Ferguson]

Ferguson 1955. "Freedom of the Press," in G.V. Ferguson and F.H. Underhill, PRESS AND PARTY IN CANADA: ISSUES OF FREEDOM. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1955.

Ferguson 1974. "Public Broadcasting in Canada." CRTC Hearing Intervention. 16 January 1974.

Fitzrandolph, Katie. "More Emphasis Urged on TV Program Content," THE WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, 20 October 1973.

[Fowler: Robert M. Fowler. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.]

Fowler 1957 (with Edmond Turcotte and James Stewart (Canada, Parliament, Royal Commission on Broadcasting)). REPORT. 15 March 1957.

Fowler 1965 (with Marc Lalonde and G.G. Ernest Steele (Canada, Parliament, Committee on Broadcasting)). REPORT. 1 September 1965.

Fox, Paul W. "Regionalism and Confederation," in Mason Wade, ed., REGIONALISM IN THE CANADIAN COMMUNITY, 1867-1967. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969, pp 3-29.

Friendly, Fred W. DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL... Toronto/New York: Random House, 1967.

Frye, Northrop. THE BUSH GARDEN: ESSAYS ON THE CANADIAN IMAGINATION. Toronto: Anansi, 1971.

[Fulford: Robert Fulford. Except as noted: SATURDAY NIGHT.]

Fulford 1973a. "Notebook: Incredibly, the CBC Gets Worse and Worse," November 1973, 7.

Fulford 1973b. "Notebook: Again, the CBC," December 1973, 7.

Fulford 1974. "Canadian Cultural Nationalism," in 1974 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR. Toronto/Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1974, p 171.

Garvey, Daniel E., Jr. "Social Control in the Television Newsroom." Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Stanford University: Department of Communication, May 1971.

[Gazette: THE [Montreal] GAZETTE]

Gazette 1973. "CBC and Separatism," Editorial, 1 June 1973, in DNS, 1 June 1973.

Gazette 1974. Editorial, 21 February 1974, in DNS, 21 February 1974.

Gazette 1975. CP story. 5 March 1975, in DNS, 5 March 1975.

Glassco, J. Grant, and others (Canada, Royal Commission on Government Organization). REPORT 19: CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, in vol IV, SPECIAL AREAS OF ADMINISTRATION. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963, pp 15-51.

[Globe: THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Toronto.]

Globe 1974a. "Report on Business," 30 January 1974, in DNS, 30 January 1974.

Globe 1974b. 15 February 1974, in DNS, 15 February 1974.

Globe 1974c. "The Tyranny of the CRTC," Editorial, 2 April 1974, in DNS, 2 April 1974.

Globe 1974d. 16 July 1974, in DNS, 16 July 1974.

Globe 1974e. Letter to the editor from W.H.N. Hull, St. Catharines, Ontario, 14 June 1974, p 7.

Globe 1975a. 15 April 1975, in DNS, 15 April 1975.

Globe 1975b. CP story. 15 March 1975, in DNS, 17 March 1975.

Globe 1975c. CP story. 16 May 1975, in DNS, 16 May 1975.

Goldhaber, Gerald M. ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION. Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown, 1974.

GREEN PAPER (Canada, Department of Communications). PROPOSALS FOR A COMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR CANADA: A POSITION PAPER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, March 1973.

Guilfoyle, Norm. "La Maison, Montreal: Four Years Old and Still Suffering Growing Pains," BROADCASTER, 34:12 (December 1975), 16-7.

Gurevitch, Michael. "An Overview," in J.D. Halloran and M. Gurevitch, eds., BROADCASTER/RESEARCHER CO-OPERATION IN MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH. Leicester: Centre for Mass Communication Research, 1971, pp 159-69.

Gwyn, Richard. "Fight for CBC Survival Puts Picard, Juneau Nose-to-Nose," THE LONDON FREE PRESS, 31 October 1974, p 7.

Gzowski, Peter. PETER GZOWSKI'S BOOK ABOUT THIS COUNTRY IN THE MORNING. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1974.

Hall, George L. "Letter from Wingspread," PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVIEW, 3:2 (March/April 1975); 2-3, 43-4.

[Halloran: James D. Halloran]

Halloran 1971. "The Theme of the Seminar," in J.D. Halloran and M. Gurevitch, eds., BROADCASTER/RESEARCHER CO-OPERATION IN MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH. Leicester: Centre for Mass Communication Research, 1971, pp 9-27.

Halloran 1972. "Introduction," in P. Elliott, THE MAKING OF A TELEVISION SERIES: A CASE STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE. London: Constable, 1972, pp 1-3.

Halloran 1974. MASS MEDIA AND SOCIETY: THE CHALLENGE OF RESEARCH. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1974.

Herald (THE CALGARY HERALD). Editorial, 8 April 1974 (in DNS, 10 April 1974.

Hfx CH (THE HALIFAX CHRONICLE-HERALD). 12 December 1973, in DNS, 13 December 1973.

Hfx MS (THE HALIFAX MAIL-STAR). Editorial, 27 February 1974, in DNS, 28 February 1974.

[Hobbs: Lisa Hobbs. Regular bylined column. THE VANCOUVER SUN.]

Hobbs 1973a. 30 November 1973.

Hobbs 1973b. 19 November 1973.

Hobbs 1974a. 8 January 1974.

Hobbs 1974b. 9 January 1974.

Hobbs 1974c. 10 January 1974.

Hobbs 1974d. 11 January 1974.

Hobbs 1974e. 16 January 1974.

Hobbs 1974f. 16 February 1974.

Hudson, Heather E. "Community Communication and Development: A Canadian Case Study." Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Stanford University: Department of Communication, May 1974.

[Irwin: Joan Irwin. Except as noted: Regular bylined column. THE [Montreal] STAR.]

Irwin 1973. "CBC's English TV a Farcical Failure," 6 December 1973.

Irwin 1974a. "Channel 33 Plans Weekend Programs," 6 February 1974, p C18.

Irwin 1974b. 24 January 74, in DNS, 28 January 1974.

Irwin 1974c. 25 February 1974, in DNS, 26 February 1974.

Irwin 1974d. 1 April 1974, in DNS, 3 April 1974.

Irwin 1974e. 1 April 1974, in DNS, 4 April 1974.

Jacobs, Jane. THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES. Toronto/New York: Random House, 1961.

[Journal: THE [Ottawa] Journal]

Journal 1973a. CP story. 10 January 1973, in DNS, 11 January 1973.

Journal 1973b. 13 September 1973, in DNS, 14 September 1973.

Journal 1974a. Editorial, 15 February 1974, in DNS, 18 February 1974.

Journal 1974b. Editorial, 5 April 1974, in DNS, 8 April 1974.

Journal 1974c. CP story. 16 March 1974, in DNS, 18 March 1974.

Journal 1975. 4 February 1975, in DNS, 5 February 1975.

Kesterton, W.K. A HISTORY OF JOURNALISM IN CANADA. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967.

[Kirby: Blaik Kirby. Except as noted: Regular bylined column. THE [Toronto] GLOBE AND MAIL.]

Kirby 1973a. "Woes of Weekend: Poor Hosts, Drab Comic and a Death Knell," 10 March 1973, p 25.

Kirby 1974a. "Big Name Canadians Demand CBC Improve or Lose its Licence," 5 February 1974, p 12.

Kirby 1974b. 12 February 1974, in DNS, 12 February 1974.

Kirby 1974c. 16 February 1974, in DNS, 18 February 1974.

Kirby 1974d. Feature article, 19 February 1974, in DNS, 19 February 1974.

Kirby 1974e. 19 February 1974, in DNS, 19 February 1974.

Kirby 1974f. "Will CRTC Hearings Really Affect CBC Fare?" 23 February 1974, p 31.

Kirby 1974g. 9 August 1974, in DNS, 9 August 1974.

Kirby 1975a. 4 March 1975, in DNS, 4 March 1975.

Kirby 1975b. 12 February 1975, in DNS, 12 February 1975.

L'Association (L'Association des Realizateurs). CRTC Hearing Intervention. February 1974.

Leiterman, Douglas, and Patrick Watson and Wilson Southam. "We Propose." Program Proposal for THIS HOUR HAS SEVEN DAYS. Undated.

LaMarsh, (Hon.) Judy. MEMOIRS OF A BIRD IN A GILDED CAGE. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968.

Lewis, Robert. "Pierre Juneau's Spectacular Leap of Faith," SATURDAY NIGHT, August 1974, 11-6.

[Lon FP: THE LONDON FREE PRESS]

Lon FP 1974. "Senators Scandalized: CBC's French Network Criticized for Spoofing Queen, Mme. Leger," CP story, 29 November 1974, p 22.

Lon FP 1975. "Supervision of TV Quality Criticized," CP story, 26 June 1975, p 4.

Lynch, Charles. THE [Ottawa] CITIZEN, 23 February 1974, in DNS, 25 February 1974.

[MacDonald: Ian MacDonald. Except as noted: Regular bylined column. THE [Montreal] GAZETTE.]

MacDonald 1974a. 24 January 1974, in DNS, 24 January 1974.

MacDonald 1974b. 19 February 1974, in DNS, 19 February 1974.

MacDonald 1974c. 28 March 1974, in DNS, 28 March 1974.

MacDonald 1974d. 2 April 1974, in DNS, 2 April 1974.

MacDonald 1974e. "Election Notebook: Picard Pledges Personal Probe of Tory Claims," 25 June 1974, p 13.

MACLEAN'S. "Inside Maclean's," 87:6 (June 1974), 3.

Macy, John W., Jr., TO IRRIGATE A WASTELAND: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE A PUBLIC TELEVISION SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

Marshall, Douglas. "The Canadian Report: Committee to Protest Renewal of CBC's License," TV GUIDE (Western British Columbia Edition), 24-30 November 1973, 26-1.

Massey, (Rt. Hon.) Vincent, and others (Canada, Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences). REPORT. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1951.

McCall, G.J., and J.L. Simmons. ISSUES IN PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION. London: Addison Wesley, 1969.

[McKay: Bruce McKay. Stanford University: Institute for Communication Research.]

McKay 1971. "KQED and its Audience: A Survey of Television Viewing in the San Francisco Bay Area, November 1970." Mimeo. April 1971.

McKay 1972. "Program Objective Setting and Performance Evaluation in Public Television." Unpublished paper. September 1972.

McKay 1974. "Some Notes on CBC TV Audience Age Profiles." Unpublished paper. 10 May 1974.

McKay 1976. "Financing: Problem or Symptom?" in Michael J. Nyhan, ed., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING. New York: Praeger, 1976, pp 141-61. [Condensation: PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVIEW, 4:2 (March/April 1976), 29-35.]

McNaught, Kenneth. THE HISTORY OF CANADA. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Mendelsohn, Harold. "Behaviorism, Functionalism, and Mass Communication Policy," PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, 38:3 (Fall 1974), 379-89.

Mennie, Don. "TV on a Silver Platter," IEEE SPECTRUM, 12:8 (August 1975), 34-9.

Milgram, Stanley. VIOLENCE AND ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR. New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1974.

[Miller: Jack Miller. Except as noted: Regular bylined column. THE TORONTO STAR.]

Miller 1973. 29 August 1973, in DNS, 30 August 1973.

Miller 1974a. 15 February 1974, in DNS, 18 February 1974.

Miller 1974b. 25 January 1974, in DNS, 28 January 1974.

Miller 1974c. 19 February 1974, in DNS, 20 February 1974.

Miller 1974d. "CRTC A Friendly Judge At CBC Hearings," BROADCASTER, 34:3 (March 1974), 7-8.

Miller 1974e. "Truth About CBC Drama -- No Money For Miracles," 20 July 1974, p G1.

Miller 1975a. "The High Cost of Cable," BROADCASTER, 34:5 (May 1975), 16-8.

Miller 1975b. "A Sense of Form and Purpose," BROADCASTER, 34:2 (February 1975), 14-6.

Morrison, Neil. "CBC Audience Research Division," FOOD FOR THOUGHT, January 1958, 162-70.

Mtl Star (THE [Montreal] STAR). Editorial, 3 April 1974, in DNS, 4 April 1974.

Myrdal, Gunnar. ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS. New York: Pantheon, 1968.

[NAEB: National Association of Educational Broadcasters, Washington.]

NAEB 1975a. "Seminar on Research Needs in Public Telecommunications, February 1975: Report." October 1975.

NAEB 1975b. "Management," NAEB LETTER, 40:12 (15 December 1975), 19.

[Nelson: James Nelson (Canadian Press)]

Nelson 1974. "CRTC Swamped With Briefs For And Against CBC's Bid," in THE [Ottawa] CITIZEN, 8 February 1974.

Nelson 1975. "Hirsch Frustrated, May Quit CBC," CP Story, in THE LONDON FREE PRESS, 19 February 1975.

Neville, William H. CRTC Hearing Intervention. 4 February 1974.

[Newman: Peter C. Newman]

Newman 1963. RENEGADE IN POWER:THE DIEFENBAKER YEARS. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963.

Newman 1974. "The View From Here: A Mandate For The Canadian Reality," MACLEAN'S, 87:6 (June 1974), 6.

Nicholson, Connie. "Silver City Linings," THE TRAIL DAILY TIMES, 11 January 1974.

Owen (Bruce M. Owen, Jack H. Beebe, and Willard G. Manning, Jr.). TELEVISION ECONOMICS. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974.

Parker, Edwin B. "Technological Change and the Mass Media," in I. de Sola Pool, W. Schramm, and others, eds., HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973, pp 619-45.

Peers, Frank W. THE POLITICS OF CANADIAN BROADCASTING, 1920-1951. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969.

Pelletier, (Hon.) Gerard, Secretary of State. "Notes for a speech outlining the first phase of a federal film policy." Montreal. 4 July 1972.

[Penn: Frank Penn. Except as noted: Regular bylined column. THE [Ottawa] CITIZEN.]

Penn 1970. "Juneau: Making Waves His Business," 20 June 1970.

Penn 1974a. 19 February 1974, in DNS, 20 February 1974.

Penn 1974b. 4 April 1974, in DNS, 5 April 1974.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola. "Book Reviews," PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, 38:2 (Summer 1974), 311.

Porteous, John. "Some Thoughts of Chairman Juneau," BROADCASTER 31:5 (May 1972), 16-20.

Porter, John. THE VERTICAL MOSAIC: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CLASS AND POWER IN CANADA. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

Prang, Margaret. "The Origins of Public Broadcasting in Canada," CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, 46:1 (March 1965), 1-31.

Preshing, William A. "The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's Commercial Activities and their Inter-relationship to the Corporation's Objectives and Development." Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Illinois: Department of Economics, 1965.

Reg LP (THE REGINA LEADER POST). Editorial, 9 April 1974, in DNS, 11 April 1974.

Reith, (Lord) J.C.W. INTO THE WIND. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1949.

Rivers & Schramm (William L. Rivers and Wilbur Schramm). RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION. Rev. ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

Roberts, Donald F. "Communication and Children: A Developmental Approach," in I. de Sola Pool, W. Schramm, and others, eds., HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973, pp 174-215.

Rogers & Rogers (Everett M. Rogers and Rekha Agarwala-Rogers). COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS. Toronto: Collier MacMillan / New York: Free Press, 1976.

Rogers & Shoemaker (Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker). COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS. Toronto: Collier-Macmillan / New York: Free Press, 1971.

Romanow, Walter Ivan. "The Content Regulations for Canadian Broadcasting: Consequences for Canadian Society." Mimeo. University of Windsor: Department of Communication Studies, August 1975.

Rowland, Willard D., Jr. "'Public Involvement': The Anatomy of a Myth," PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVIEW, 3:3 (May/June 1975), 6-21.

[SC: Statistics Canada. Except as noted: 1971 CENSUS OF CANADA, vol 1, POPULATION. Ottawa: Information Canada.]

SC 1973a. "Mother Tongue." Bulletin 1.3-4. April 1973.

SC 1973b. "Age Groups." Bulletin 1.2-3. April 1973.

SC 1973c. "Cities, Towns, Villages, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations." Bulletin 1.1-8. January 1973.

SC 1973d (Yearbook Division). CANADA 1974: THE ANNUAL HANDBOOK OF PRESENT CONDITIONS AND RECENT PROGRESS.

Schramm & Alexander (Wilbur Schramm and Janet Alexander). "Broadcasting," in I. de Sola Pool, W. Schramm, and others, eds., HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973, pp 557-618.

Schramm & Nelson (Wilbur Schramm, Lyle M. Nelson, Trevor Brown, and Bruce McKay). "The Financing of Public Television." Mimeo. Palo Alto: Aspen Program on Communications and Society, 1972. [Condensation: COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, 12:1 (January/February 1973), 31-8.]

Selltiz, Claire, and others. RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS. 2d ed. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959.

Shea, Albert A. BROADCASTING THE CANADIAN WAY. Montreal: Harvest House, 1963.

Singer, Benjamin D. "Violence, Protest, and War in Television News: The U.S. and Canada Compared," in B.D. Singer, ed., COMMUNICATIONS IN CANADIAN SOCIETY. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972, pp 234-41.

[Smith: Anthony Smith]

Smith 1973. THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE: THE BROADCASTER, HIS AUDIENCE, AND THE STATE. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973.

Smith 1975. Personal correspondence. 18 August 1975.

Stanbury (Hon. Robert Stanbury and others (Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Broadcasting, Films, and Assistance to the Arts)). REPORT ON THE WHITE PAPER ON BROADCASTING, 1966. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 21 March 1967.

Stevens, Geoffrey. "Its Proper Function?" THE [Toronto] GLOBE AND MAIL, 3 April 1974, p 6.

Stewart, W. Brian. "The Canadian Social System and the Canadian Broadcasting Audience," in Benjamin D. Singer, ed., COMMUNICATIONS IN CANADIAN SOCIETY. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972, pp 39-66.

Sun (THE [Toronto] SUN). "CBC Smorgasbord To End," 22 January 1974, p 20.

Thomas, Alan M. "Audience, Market and Public -- An Evaluation of Canadian Broadcasting," CANADIAN COMMUNICATIONS, 1:1 (Summer 1960), 16-47.

Toogood, Alexander Featherston. "Canadian Braodcasting: A Problem of Control." Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Ohio State University: Department of Speech, 1969.

[Tor Star: THE TORONTO STAR]

Tor Star 1974a. "Prospect of Battle for CBC Emerges at License Hearing," 20 February 1974, p A18.

Tor Star 1974b. 11 December 1974, in DNS, 13 December 1974.

[US: United States of America. Washington: Government Printing Office.]

US 1969 (National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence). COMMISSION STATEMENT ON VIOLENCE IN TELEVISION ENTERTAINMENT PROGRAMS. 23 September 1969.

US 1971 (Report to the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service from the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior). TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE.

Van Stolk, Mary. CRTC Hearing Intervention. 18 February 1974.

Walsh, Michael. "Wanted: New TV Images," THE [Vancouver] PROVINCE, 30 November 1973.

Watson, Patrick. CONSPIRATORS IN SILENCE. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969.

Weick, Karl E. THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING. Don Mills/Menlo Park: Addison Wesley, 1969.

Weir, E. Austin. THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL BROADCASTING IN CANADA. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1965.

Weiss, Elaine F. U.S. TELEVISION & CANADIAN IDENTITY. Freedom of Information Center Report No. 324. Columbia: University of Missouri School of Journalism, July 1974.

White, David Manning. "The 'Gatekeeper': A Case Study in the Selection of News," in L.A. Dexter and D.M. White, eds., PEOPLE, SOCIETY, AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp 160-71.

Whyte, William Foote. STREET CORNER SOCIETY. 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, pp 279-358.

Wilson, Bob. "The Year TV Took More Than Half The Ad Dollar," MARKETING, 26 November 1973, 18 ff.

[Wolfe: Morris Wolfe. SATURDAY NIGHT.]

Wolfe 1973. "Something Has Gone Very Wrong With The CBC," December 1973, 46-8.

Wolfe 1974a. "One Problem With THE NATIONAL Is That It's Not," January 1974, 40-2.

Wolfe 1974b. "Making Plays On The Assembly Line," May 1974, 54-5.

Wolfe 1975. "Progress Report on the CBC: Better, and Still Improving," 90:7 (December 1975), 80-3.

WPA (Women for Political Action and Ontario Committee on the Status of Women). Joint CRTC Hearing Intervention. 1 February 1974.

Wpg FP (THE WINNIPEG FREE PRESS). Editorial, 5 April 1974, in DNS, 10 April 1974.

Young, Christopher. "Editor's Notebook," THE [Ottawa] CITIZEN, 6 April 1974, in DNS, 8 April 1974.

Index

A CRUDE COMPLAINT 165
A SECOND CAREER 167
Accelerated Coverage Plan 124-5, 184, 245, 264
ACCESS 288
Act see Broadcasting Act
ADIEU ALOUETTE 80, 173, 185
Adilman, Sid 122
Advertisers 23
Advertising see Commercial entries
Affiliates 69, 77, 100-1, 192, 200, 233-4, 249
Agarwala-Rogers, Rekha 274, 277, 281, 284, 288
Age of audience 102, 200, 313-5
Aird Commission 61-2
Alexander, Janet 16, 34
ALL AROUND THE CIRCLE 167
ALL IN THE FAMILY 80, 149, 164, 207
Annan Committee 27, 266
Arctic Institute of North America 183
ARTS '74 80, 166
Ashley, C.A. 104
Aspen Program on Communications and Society 95, 103, 205-6
Association of Canadian Radio and Television Artists 147-9, 230-1, 248, 267, 279
Association of Television Producers and Directors (Toronto) 179, 191, 193, 210, 254, 268, 287-8
Audience balance see Balance
Audience fragmentation see Cable
Audience research 13-7, 95, 301-19
AUDUBON WILDLIFE THEATRE 80, 173
Available programming 77, 79, 81, 200

BBM Bureau of Measurement 13, 70-1, 73, 308
Balance
  Audience 36-9, 190-201, 290-1
  Content 36-9, 193-5, 200, 285-6
  Political 35-6, 99-100, 170, 200, 235-40, 255-6
BAPTIZING 237
Barrett, Edward W. 14
Beattie, Eleanor 155
Bercovici, Lisa 14
Berton, Pierre 153, 185-6
Biculturalism 57-9, 200, 228-9, 263-4, 271, 275-7
Blackburn, Bob 84, 120-1, 130, 133, 238, 266
Block production 145
Board of Broadcast Governors 66-7, 140, 247
Bower, Robert T. 250
Boyle, Harry J. 93-4, 103, 134, 152, 203, 264, 279, 291
Braithwaite, Dennis 234, 236
Breitrose, Henry S. 139
Brisco, Bob 237
British Broadcasting Corporation 28-30, 35-6, 104, 146, 181, 239
BROADCASTER 90-1, 125, 175-6, 184, 262, 271
BROADCASTING 207
Broadcasting Act 1, 30, 35, 37-8, 84-5, 104, 120, 123-4, 134, 135-8, 140, 153, 154, 157, 161, 174, 186, 191, 199-200, 218, 225, 228, 243. 245, 247, 257, 259-63, 268-73, 282, 303, 326-32, 335-8
BROADCASTING THE CANADIAN WAY 257
Brown, Les 23-4
Bruyn, S.T. 40
BUGS BUNNY 80, 148

CTV Television Network 69-70, 126, 192, 307
Cable 38, 69-76, 84, 86-9, 192, 225-7, 248, 272
Cabinet documents 118-9, 330-1
CALGARY HERALD 154
Canada Council iii, 103, 231, 303
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
  CBC Times 295
  Corporate status 104-5
  Corporate submission 150, 211, 218, 258, 261
  Coverage 76-9, 83, 173-4, 228, 235, 240, 271, 275-6
  History 65-8
  Research department 16, 97-9, 305-15
  Services 76-9, 199-201
  Structure, 106-7
  Submission (English Television) 34, 38, 124, 138, 141, 149-50, 166-7, 171, 178, 182, 191, 193-5, 251, 286
  -- see also general topic entries
Canadian Broadcasting League 62, 122, 152, 154, 201-4, 219, 328
Canadian broadcasting system 51, 67, 69-92, 225-7, 268-70
Canadian content 67, 79, 81, 83, 85-6, 88-9, 126, 131-2, 140-2, 147-9, 159-60, 193-5, 199-201, 207, 225-8, 247, 268-73, 275-7, 281, 329

Canadian Film Development Corporation 155, 159, 231
CANADIAN FILM DIGEST 122
CANADIAN FILMMAKERS 80, 166, 288
Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission 63-5
Canadian Radio-Television Commission
  Creation 67, 84-5, 272-3
  Decision 123-4, 131-4, 137, 140-2, 147-9, 152, 158, 163-5, 176, 181, 186, 190-3, 203-5, 212, 214, 229-30, 272-3, 282, 290
  Hearing 1-2, 5, 100-1, 118-134, 270, 272-3
  Research 303
  -- see also general topic entries
CANNON 80, 149
Caouette, Raoul 236
Carey, James W. 31
Carnegie Commission on Educational Television 29
Case studies 13, 93, 224-5, 274-5
Cater, Douglass 16
CHEZ CHARLEBOIS 288
Chief Financial Analyst 110-11
Clery, Val 68, 141-3, 243-4, 265, 279-80
CLOSE-UP 126
Cohen, Joan 133
Commercial
  Activities 41-2, 214-7, 220-3
  Environment 89-92, 119-20, 191-3, 227
  Policy 61-8, 119-20, 125, 131-4, 230, 232-3, 247-9, 257-8, 261-2, 265-6, 269-71, 326-32
  Practices 147-53, 156, 192-3, 195-6, 199-201, 206-11
  Revenue 150
Committee on Television 121-2, 124, 126-7, 143, 153, 168, 185-6, 234, 254, 255, 257, 271, 291, 298
COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS see Rogers
Conservatism 252, 256-8, 261, 263-6, 270, 275-7
Consolidation
  Montreal 175, 177-8, 245
  Regina 174-5, 245
  Toronto 177-83, 245
  Vancouver 175-6, 245
Content research 16-9
Content selection 21-2, 33-4, 66, 194, 199-201
Cook, Ramsay 57-9
Cormier, Armand 129-30
Corporation for Public Broadcasting 14, 250, 296
Costs
  Distribution 79, 143
  Operations 79
  Program 81-4
  -- see also financing, program development
COUNTRY CANADA 80, 165
COUNTRYTIME 80, 145, 164, 208
Current Affairs 67-8, 214, 254
Curran, Charles 25

Davey Committee 1, 16, 18, 32, 34, 143-4, 147, 233, 253, 261-2, 267, 299, 302-3, 327
Davidson, George 68, 137-8, 206, 220
Decentralization 162, 163-6, 200-1, 275-7
Defensiveness 127, 129, 188, 252-6, 263-7, 270, 275-7, 292
Demographics 23-4, 102, 200, 313-5
Department of Communications 75, 105, 233, 302-4
Department of Health and Welfare 122
Diefenbaker, George G. 59, 239
Director of Entertainment Programs 109-12
Director of Information Programs 109-12
Director of TV Network Scheduling 110-1, 275
Douglas, Robert 90-1
Drama 143, 149, 211-4, 218, 222, 289
DROP IN 80, 165, 211-4
Dunton, Davidson 266
DYING OF LEAD 255

Edmonton 76, 87, 165-7, 209
Educational broadcasting 69, 249-50
Edwards, Alyn 175-6
Effects research 17
Efficiency 79-84, 140-7, 174, 199-201, 204-6, 219-20, 221-2, 258, 267, 271, 275-7, 282-3
Elliott, Philip 21-2, 40-1, 164, 292-3
Emery, Walter B. 224
English Television 108-11, see also CBC and general topic entries
English Services Division 107-8
Epstein, Edward Jay 3, 19-20, 33
Evaluation, program 96-8, 210

FM Radio 89-90
FAMILY COURT 80, 208
Faulkner, Hugh 124-5, 134, 236, 237
Feasibility study 115-7
Federal Communications Commission 15
Ferguson, George V. 232, 330-1
Film industry 153, 155-60, 199-201, 275-7
Financial control 181, 245, 256-7, 262-3
Financing
  Annual basis 67, 104, 114-7, 194, 217-9, 221-3, 243-5, 256, 269-70,

275-7, 326-32
  Level of resources 68, 132-4, 150, 170-3, 199-217, 219-23, 227, 240-1, 251-2, 256-8, 265-6, 270, 272, 275-7, 293, 326-32
FIRST PERSON SINGULAR 195
Fitzrandolf, Katie 122
FOUR CORNERS 209
Fourth Floor 111, 193-4
Fowler
  Commission (1957) 66, 177, 179, 182, 217, 243, 261, 267
  Committee (1965) 66-7, 87, 112, 144, 177-8, 179-82, 186, 217, 243, 261, 267
Fox, Paul W. 161-2
French Canada 57-64, 69, 136, 153, 155, 170, 185-6, 200, 228-9, 236, 263-4, 271, 275-7
Friendly, Fred W. 3, 23
FRONT PAGE CHALLENGE 80, 127, 140, 145, 208, 282
Frye, Northrop 137, 162, 202
Fulford, Robert 122, 136, 264-5

GALLERY 157-8
Garvey, Daniel E. 18, 25
Gauntlett, Hugh iii, 3
Geography 51-6
GILLIGAN'S ISLAND 80, 208
Global Television Network 69-70, 101, 226
GLOBE AND MAIL 97, 120, 127, 134, 170, 201, 236, 237, see also Kirby, Stevens
GOIN' DOWN THE ROAD 157
Goldhaber, Gerald M. 45, 47, 297
Gower, Rosalie 156
GREEN ACRES 24
Green Paper 50, 240, 301-2
Guilfoyle, Norm 175
Gurevitch, Michael 15
Gzowski, Peter 282

Halifax 73, 102, 164
HALIFAX CHRONICLE-HERALD 236
HALIFAX MAIL-STAR 204
Hall, George L. 17, 27
Hallman, Eugene 68, 125
Halloran, James D. 3-4, 15, 18, 24-5, 26
Harvey, Denis 125, 213
Himmelweit, Hilde 27
Hirsch, John 211-4, 218, 236, 289
History, Canadian
  General 57-9
  Broadcasting 30, 59-68
Hobbs, Lisa 121, 122, 126, 142-3, 170
HOCKEY NIGHT IN CANADA 80, 140
HOGAN'S HEROES 24
HORIZON 126
HOURGLASS programs 95, 101-2, 206, 208-9
HOUSE OF PRIDE 166, 173, 288
HOWIE MEEKER'S HOCKEY SCHOOL 80, 165
Hudson, Heather E. 43, 118
Hughes, Gordon 180, 240, 298-9
HYMN SING 80, 165

IBM 94-5, 275, 297
IMAGES OF CANADA 80, 167, 195, 208
IN THE PRESENT TENSE 80, 254, 308, 313
IN THE SOUTH SEAS 166
Independence
  Broadcaster 35-6, 239
  CBC 64-5, 104, 217-9, 221, 235-41
Index of Enjoyment 307
Inflation 82-4
Innis, Harold 31
INSTANT WORLD see Department of Communications
Institute for Communication Research see Stanford University
Institutional characteristics 4, 252-8, 274-5, 321-4
Institutional research 3-4, 17-25, 44-9
Institutional survival 36, 39, 321-4
Interface characteristics 48
Internal characteristics 44-9
Internal communication 67, 97, 172-3, 283-5, 287-9, 291-2, 294, 297-300
Interventions 120-3, 128-9, 157, 221 see also general entries for specific interventions
Irwin, Joan 121, 124, 125, 130, 133, 273
ISLAND ECHOES 236
IT'S A MUSICAL WORLD 80, 165, 167, 175, 208

Jacobs, Jane 41
Johnson, A.W. 134, 262, 295
JOURNAL see Ottawa Journal
JOURNEY 157
JULIETTE AND FRIENDS 80, 143, 208
Juneau, Pierre 2, 68, 87-90, 103, 119-20, 126, 133-4, 135, 154, 173, 187, 201-5, 216, 233, 239, 253, 272, 286, 326-7

Kesterton, W.K. 65-7
Kirby, Blaik 97, 122, 123, 125, 127, 129, 130, 134, 180, 210, 233, 236
KLAHANIE 167
Klein, Paul 23-4
Korchinski, Stanley 236-7

LaMarsh, Judy 68
LAND AND SEA 167
Language distribution of population 56
L'Association des Realisateurs 170,

172, 209, 218, 287
Lawrence, John 192
Lead-in effect 151-2, 192, 195-6, 199-201
Leiterman, Douglas 254
LES BEAUX DIMANCHES 238-9
Levene, Sam 157
Lewis, Dick 271, 327
Lewis, Robert 86, 89-90, 242, 255, 289
Licence conditions 131, 153-4, 214, 216, 247
LOTSA LUCK 80, 149
LUNCHEON DATE 80, 208
Lynch, Charles 130

MacDonald, Ian 125, 129, 131, 133-4, 154, 237
MACLEAN'S 68, 243-4, 265, 279-80
MacPherson, Don 125
Macy, John W. 30, 35, 39
Malik, M.F. 103
MAN ALIVE 80, 126
Managing Director of Television 108-9, 275
Mandates, nature of 30, 264
Maps, Canada
  English Television coverage 78
  Provinces, Territories, and Capitals 52
  Population distribution 53
MARKETING 119
Marshall, A.K. 152
Marshall, Douglas 122, 253
MASH 80, 149
Mass audiences 38, 131, 152, 190-3, 195-6, 199-201
Mass society 31-3
Massey Commission 1, 231, 295
MAUDE 80, 149
McCall, G.J. 40
McGall, Bob 176
McGrath, James 237
McKay, Bruce 95, 96, 257, 270
McNaught, Kenneth 51
McPhail, Thomas 327
Media management 107-9, 171, 280
MEETING PLACE 80, 165
Memo From Turner 122
Mendelsohn, Harold 17
Mennie, Don 75
Milgram, Stanley 14
Miller, Jack 87, 89, 125, 129, 130, 266
Mirror naalogy 33-5
Mobile unit production 145
Models, organizational 45-9
MON ONCLE ANTOINE 157
Montreal 165-7, 174-5, 177-8
MONTREAL GAZETTE 129, 130, 134, 236, 237, see also MacDonald
MONTREAL STAR 133, 134, 232, see also Irwin
Morrison, Neil 14
Multiculturalism 186-90, 199-201, 229, 263-4, 275-7
Munro, Marce 325-6
MUSIC TO SEE 80, 165, 185
MUSICAMERA 80, 185

National Association of Educational Broadcasters 103
National Film Board of Canada 162, 173, 185, 231, 237
National Resources Manager 110-1
National unity contributions 137-8
Nationalism 57-64, 67, 135-7, 159-60, 200, 222, 225-7, 229, 232, 263-5, 275-7
Nelson, James 123, 218
Nelson, Lyle M. 95-6, 243, 265
Network program schedule 80-1, 199-201
Neville, William H. 248-9, 259
NEW HORIZONS 167
Newman, Peter C. 239, 244
News 20, 132, 139, 168-9, 195, 212-4, 237-8
NEWS FROM NOWHERE see Epstein
NEWS PROFILE 80, 166, 289
NEWSMAGAZINE 80, 145
Nicholson, Connie 121
North, the 130, 235
Northern Broadcasting Plan 105, 245

Objectives
  Program 96, 99, 196
  Service 114-5, 196-7, 275-7, 285
Olympics 153, 180, 200, 212, 245, 281
OMBUDSMAN 80, 166, 168, 254, 308
Organizational communication see Goldhaber, Rogers
Ottawa Area 107, 271
OTTAWA CITIZEN 129, 130, 133, 134, 236-7, see also Penn
OTTAWA JOURNAL 125, 134, 236
Owen, Bruce M. 243
Ownership 18, 85-6

PACIFIC NORTHWEST ADVENTURES 167
PACIFICANADA 237
Parker, Edwin B. 75
Parliament 104, 133, 235-41, 242-5, 255-6, 259-66, 268-70, 272-3, 275-7, 285, 324-32
Participant observation 40-3, 93, 274-5
Pearce, Pat 291, 294-5
Pearson, Bryan 130
Pearson, Lester B. 59, 266
Peers, Frank W. 30, 59
Pelletier, Gerard 134, 156, 237

Penn, Frank 88, 129, 133
PERFORMANCE 236
Personnel practices 67-8, 141-2, 277-83, 297-300
Persuasive communication 31, 139
PETTICOAT JUNCTION 24, 209
Picard, Laurent 2, 68, 91, 129-30, 133-4, 141-2, 171, 173, 204-5, 206, 215-6, 220, 237, 238-40, 242, 247-8, 258, 262, 266, 267-73, 291, 294-5, 298-300, 326
Planning Group 111, 157, 159-61, 171-3, 183-5, 188-90, 199-201, 206-10, 218-23, 251, 263-4, 274-94
Planning System 100, 114-7, 173, 217-9, 221-3, 287-9, 291-300
POLICE STORY 80, 149, 152
Political balance see Balance
Pool, Ithiel de Sola 19
Population
  Coverage 76-9
  Density 54-6
  Distribution 53-6
Porteous, John 88
Porter, John 18, 93
Portrayal 32, 185-90, 199-201, 235-9, 275-7
Prang, Margaret 59-64, 232-3
Preshing, William A. 41-2
PREVIEW COMMENTARY 95, 239
Producers 112-7, 222, 268, 277-80, 282-3, 297-300, 311, see also
  Association of Television Producers and Directors (Toronto)
  L'Association des Realisateurs, and
  Personnel practices
Production facilities 123, 141, 174-85, 201, 271, 277-80
Program development 112-4, 167, 211-4, 220, 221-3, 263-4, 272
Program Proposals 99-100, 113-7, 196-7, 310
Program schedule 80-1
Public Broadcasting Service 14
Public broadcasting tradition 28-30, 232
Purchasing power 82-4

RADIO FREQUENCIES ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY see CRTC Decision
Radio League see Canadian Broadcasting League
Radio One/Radio Two 90-2, 125, 227, 247
Rainsberry, Frederick 201, 203, 293
Recognition 32, 185-90, 199-201, 275-7
Regina 174-5, 245
REGINA LEADER POST 204
Reith, J.C.W. 28-9
Regional flow and exchange 163-73, 184-5, 200, 275-7
Regional management structure 108-10
Regional program exchange 166-7
Regionalism 57-64, 127, 129, 131, 161-85, 200, 206-11, 220, 222, 230, 263-4, 271, 275-7
Reorganization 67-8, 114-5, 171
Reserved programming 77, 79, 81, 200
Resource allocation strategy 206-11, 220, 275-7
Responsibility, broadcaster 33-9, 199-200
Richardson, Don 3
Rivers, William L. 31-2
Roberts, Donald F. 16
Rogers, Everett M. 27, 274, 277, 279, 281, 284, 288
Romanow, Walter Ivan 226
Rowland, Willard D. 192-3, 243
Royal Commission on Broadcasting see Fowler

Saint John 174
St. John's 165-7
St. Laurent, Louis 236
ST. LAWRENCE NORTH 167
Satellites
  Direct broadcast 74-6
  Domestic relay 76, 171, 183, 246
SATURDAY NIGHT 204, 207, 264-5, 289
  see also Fulford, Lewis, Wolfe
Schedule, network 80-1, 149-50, 190-201, 308
Schramm, Wilbur 16, 31-2, 34, 95-6, 243, 265
Scott, William 236
Scrutiny of the CBC 1-2, 122, 233, 253, 267-8
Secretary of State 68, 104-5, 134, 156-7, 236, 237, 259
Seige mentality 252, 255, 322
Selltiz, Claire 40, 42-3
SESAME STREET 80, 141, 148, 166, 193
SHADOW IN THE CAVE see Smith
Shanski, John 187, 296
Shared program experiences 138-40, 159-60, 200
Shea, Albert A. 257
Shoemaker, F. Floyd 27
Simmons, J.L. 40
Sinclair, Gordon 282
Sinclair, Lister 156, 163, 291, 299
SINGALONG JUBILEE 80, 145, 164, 208
Singer, Benjamin D. 19
Single system see Canadian broadcasting system
Smails, R.G.N. 104
Smith, Anthony 29, 32-3, 36, 192, 252, 255, 256, 260, 263, 266-7, 292, 296-7, 322
Societal studies 15, 26, 28
SOME HONOURABLE MEMBERS 80, 125, 208,

313
Special Senate Committee on Mass Media see Davey
Specials 139, 165, 185
Spry, Graham 201-3, 235, 240-1
Stanfield, Robert 237
Stanford University Institute for Communication Research 3, 95-6, 103, 205-6
Stations 69, 83, 245
Statistics Canada 54, 56, 57, 162
Stevens, Geoffrey 134
Stewart, Andrew 68
Stewart, W. Brian 225
Strickland, Stephen 16
Structural arrangements for CBC 104-5, 259-63, 269-70
Submission see CBC
SUN see Toronto Sun
SUNDAY 126, 210
Sustaining programming 79, 81
Systems theory 45-9

TAKE 30 80, 165-6, 168, 278, 313
TEE TO GREEN 167
Technological trends 74-6, 248
TELESCOPE 157-8
TELEVI$ION see Brown
TEN LOST YEARS 236-7
Tennant, Jan 289
THE BEACHCOMBERS 80, 151-2, 164, 207, 208
THE BEVERLEY HILLBILLIES 24
THE COLLABORATORS 80, 152, 208
THE DAYS BEFORE YESTERDAY 195
THE ELECTRIC COMPANY 80, 146
THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 167
THE IRISH ROVERS 80, 145, 175
THE MARKETPLACE 80, 126, 145, 166, 168, 254
THE MARY TYLER MOORE SHOW 80, 149
THE NATIONAL 80, 140, 166, 168-9, 237
THE NATIONAL DREAM 80, 168, 195, 208
THE NEW DICK VAN DYKE SHOW 80, 149
THE NUTCRACKER 208
THE OFFERING 157
THE PARTRIDGE FAMILY 80, 149
THE PLAY'S THE THING 80, 143
THE ROWDYMAN 157
THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE see Smith
THE TENTH DECADE 195
THE WALTONS 80, 149, 151-2
THE WAY IT IS 210
THE WORLD AT WAR 80, 195
THE WORLD OF DISNEY 80, 151-2
Themed evenings 289
THIS HOUR HAS SEVEN DAYS 67-8, 126, 210, 230, 254, 257
THIS IS THE LAW 80, 145, 208
THIS LAND 80, 126, 166, 168
Thomas, Alan M. 37
TO THE WILD COUNTRY 173
Toogood, A.F. 267, 270
Toronto 62, 65, 73, 127, 129, 143, 163-9, 172-3
TORONTO STAR 87, 129, 236, 266, see also Miller
TORONTO SUN 127, 129, 130, 133, 266, see also Blackburn
Trudeau, Pierre E. 59, 236, 237
Twomey, John E. 303

United States
  Programming 67, 79, 81, 83, 131-2, 147-53, 160-1, 190-201, 207, 262-3, 275-7
  Proximity to 51-6, 147, 326-32
  Public broadcasting 14-5, 27, 29, 30, 39, 190, 249-50, 266, 296
  Stations 72-4, see also Cable
UP CANADA! 80, 127, 166, 168, 313
Utilization of research 4, 27, 301-19

Van Stolk, Mary 128, 304
Vancouver 73, 102, 164-7, 174, 209
VANCOUVER SUN 121, 142-3, 170, see also Hobbs
Variety 213-4
VIEWPOINT 80, 95, 166
Violence in programs 16, 19, 152
Visibility 170, 242-3, 256-7, 264, 275-7

W5 126
Walsh, Michael 122
Watson, Patrick 68, 289
WEEKEND 97, 126, 210-1, 254
Weick, Karl F. 46-8
Weir, E. Austin 30, 59
WEST 80, 173
White, David Manning 18
White Paper on Broadcasting 67, 84, 218, 243
Whyte, William Foote 40
Wilson, Bob 119-20
Windsor 102
Wingrove, W.C. 192
Winnipeg 76, 102, 165-7, 209
WINNIPEG FREE PRESS 134
Wolfe, Morris 122, 143, 168, 204, 207
Women 187-8, 289
Women for Political Action 187-8
WORLD OF MUSIC 80, 185

Young, Christopher 133
YOUTH CONFRONTATION 80, 165